During the Cold War some myths had been developed about the MiG 23 that it had the ‘crate shape’ profile because it were more easier and cheap for manufacturing in reason of mass production to supply all countries from Warsaw Pact and others allies from Soviet Union.
Indeed the MiG 23 were several times more expensive to produce and maintain while compared to its predecessor MiG 21 , and this higher cost were not only because of more advanced missiles BVR or electronics equipment’s at this time, also because the MiG 23 was designed as ‘off road fighter’ to operate at airfields severely damaged by enemy attacks.
Due to that the MiG 23 had been received variable geometry wings with goal to reduce landing speed and takeoff and landing gear highly reinforced to resist efforts resulting from a damaged runways. The MiG 23 fuselage with facetted shape since this had incremented structural strength to withstand those efforts in takeoffs or landings in damaged runways.
All this could allow the MiG 23 were also capable of operating on alternative airfields , though alternatives could also mean airfields had been captured from the enemies in its advance or retreat of the Armored divisions from Soviet Union , in which the Battalions of Engineering from those Armored divisions were able to repair the damaged runways from this captured airfields rapidly, as ie could remove debris and fill craters in the runways with the available local materials such as land and gravel packed , since the MiG 23/27 would be able to operate under these dread conditions.
As the main offensive missions in the case of the Warsaw Pact would be under the responsibility of the Armored Divisions from Soviet Union , the MiG 23 had been fewer distributed to other countries of the Warsaw Pact in reason of its high production cost and operation.
About the Soviet Union doctrine the others Air Forces from Warsaw Pact had keep an only mission to support the operations from Soviet Union, that could means that air forces would perform local intercept missions that MiG 21 would be enough to carry out. Those others Air Forces from Warsaw Pact should not be displaced to others countries such as the Soviet Union.
As well as in case of rebellion from any country of the Warsaw Pact the obliteration of its Air Forces could be more practicable to accomplish with the air attack against long runways from its air bases that had been operating the MiG 21 than if they were fully equipped with the ‘off road’ MiG 23 .
The official version actually shows that the Buccaneers and Tornado’s GR1 from RAF were operated jointly at an altitude as 7,000 m or 20,000 ft in attack missions during the Gulf War in 1991.
However the official version does not provide a lot details about the fact that strategists did not order the Buccaneers since the beginning of Operation Desert Storm, and in this case the lack of time could not be used as ‘stylish’ excuse.
[PHP]The Tornado GR1 IDS in the 80’s were one of the most powerful instruments from NATO to strike the Warsaw Pact. However among NATO strategists had doubts whether the Tornado GR 1 would be used in attacks on ultra low altitude or would be used in attacks on medium altitude with fighter escort and support of ECM and SEAD aircrafts against the most important targets from Warsaw Pact.[/PHP]
Anyway the Buccaneers could have been useful in supporting SEPECAT Jaguar from RAF and other fighter-bombers from Coalition even to designate targets in tactical missions over occupied Kuwait, as well as in attack missions in depth for the Tornado GR1. Indeed the F 111F from U.S. made anti tank missions over occupied Kuwait in which had been destroyed approximately 1.500 armored vehicles from Iraq.
The most usual explanation for this were that the US-led Coalition had many aircraft’s (F 111F, F 15E, F 16D and A 6E) with a wide range of advanced equipment with infra red imaging capability for daytime and night missions with laser designator for PGM( Precision Guided Missiles) and LGB (Laser Guided Bombs) and due to this the Buccaneer with its limited targets designation TV system AN/AVQ 23E Pave Spike for daytime would not be needed to designate targets for the Paveway LGB .
Over the battlefield of Kuwait that were occupied by Iraq the Coalition had Attack helicopters AH 64A Apache with its infra red and night light imaging system that could designate targets even for the LGB(Laser Guided Bombs) or PGM ( Precision Guided Missiles) launched by attack aircraft’s if the missiles as the AGM 114A Hellfire would not enough power warhead to destroy targets as bunkers or any others hardened structures.
Just the beginning of the Desert Storm air campaign, the Iraq began to counter-attack with the launch of TBM (Tactical Ballistic Missiles) such as the Iraq versions from SS 1 SCUD, which in fact were predicted by the strategists. However what had been not foreseen were that the elimination this threat would be several times more difficult than were anticipated.
While the Buccaneer and Tornado GR 1 had been attacking heavily defended targets in Iraq as Air Bases in missions during the day, the F 111F were focused on attacking armored vehicles as i.e. BMP 1 and T 54 tanks almost entirely hidden into the sand during the night over the occupied Kuwait.
The reason could be the ability of the FLIR( Forward Looking Infra Red) AN/APQ 26 from F 111F to detect the vehicles from Iraq Army due to the fact the metal from vehicle to cool faster than the desert environment at nightfall, in this case the metal being colder than the environment allowed detection of the vehicle, just the opposite that were supposed to use the FLIR, once the reason of the FLIR should be detected targets with thermal signatures more high than the environment.
Perhaps this should be not the only reason to use the F 111F over the occupied Kuwait and Iraq desert closer the border with Saudi Arabia, after all other more advanced FLIR equipment such as LANTIRN from F 15E and F 16D did not show the same capability of the AN / APQ 26 despite the LANTIRN still a generation ahead from the AN/AVQ 26 Pave Tack.
Indeed other possibility about the efficiency of the F 111F could be advent from its powerful terrain following radar that had been operating in the band Ku, once it were possible to detect the periscope of a submarine in the middle of the ocean by ASW(Anti Submarine Warfare) helicopters and aircrafts , it may also be possible to get a more intense radar signature from a top tower such as a tank T 54/55 that were dipping the sea sand over the occupied Kuwait.
In this case when detecting something with a more intense reflection signature on the terrain following radar from the homogeneous desert terrain around the possible radar contact, then could be used the AN / AVQ 26 Pave Tack to search the area in order to classify the contact, in case there are indications that it were a hidden vehicles on the ground would begin the attack with Paveway LGB.
Apparently the primary targets of F 111F in this missions over the occupied Kuwait would be the TELs( Transporter Erector Launcher) from SS 1 Scud as the model MAZ 543 with capable to operate in all terrain like the desert.
That were thought the Iraq should keep the TEL MAZ 543 in ditches during the day until nightfall when it would leave those shelters to launch Scuds missiles. Due to the difficulty of identifying the targets during the night with low quality image from AN/APQ 26 at this time, and the psychological pressure had been placed over the crews from F 111F to destroy those TELs, even a lonely metal drums abandoned in the desert could easily became a target for Paveway LGB.
The joint missions between the Tornados GR1 IDS and Buccaneers were not something casual because of the Gulf War in 1991, but something that had been prepared since the early 80s to be used in case of war against the Warsaw Pact.
The Tornado GR 1 had been overwhelm the Buccaneers in virtually all aspects, from the most advanced electronics equipment’s as the agility and supersonic speed. But in one aspect the Buccaneers had an advantage over Tornado GR 1 and this would be the capability to resist damage caused by portable missiles and anti aircraft’s cannons and machine guns.
The Tornado GR 1 and F 111 could perform its attacks at ultra low altitude with supersonic speed, as well as the Soviets Su 24 Fencer or even Tu 22M2/3, which would make it virtually ineffective of the anti air defense systems such as machine guns and anti aircraft guns of small caliber, or even MANPADS as SA 7 class, due to lack of time from their crew will be capable to detect the attacking aircraft and engage them. Even for the guns and SAM with radars assistance the advantages were on the side of those aircraft’s, since aircraft would be flying below the early warning radars from the air defense from its targets.
What had made the F 111 , Tornado GR 1 and Su 24 extremely deadly were its advanced avionics for its time, once these aircraft were equipped with terrain following radar that could scanner the land surface for flying automatically at low altitude over all weather conditions night and day, as well as ground mapping radars that could detected targets as buildings or others structures over the ground also in all weather conditions night and day.
These aircraft’s were highly dependent from its radars to accomplish that strike missions. Even in the daytime and with good weather conditions to obtain precision in those attacks. The radars had become the greatest vulnerability from these aircrafts.
The reason of this were that radars were active sensor systems that emitted electromagnetic radiation towards the targets, and because this that electromagnetic radiation could be detected for the targets if the same were equipped with ELINT systems.
In 1968 the U.S. had been used for the first time the F 111A in the Vietnam War. It did only in 55 missions with the loss of two aircraft�s due to technical problems. Those missions over Vietnam had show for the Soviet Union the high advanced attack aircraft that will become the F 111 when those failures would be rectified. The Soviet Union had been already developing the Tu 22M and studying the prototype T 6 that would be the Su 24 Fencer in the next years.
But the Soviet Union had also noted in 1968 that air defenses from Warsaw Pact would be extremely vulnerable to face such aircraft as the F-111 or the new concept that would be the Tornado IDS. So it would be necessary to take urgent measures to counter the advantage of the F-111 from U.S. and NATO.
In fact it would be necessary to introduce a new fighters generation even more advanced than the new MiG 23 in late-stage development, as well as a new generation of SAM to contain this new threat and either the new cruiser missiles under development by the U.S. High priority in the development of the MiG 29 and Su 27 along the MiG 31 as well as the new SAMs (SA 10 , SA 11 ,SA 12 and SA 15) and its introduction in the 80s were largely a result of it.
However in the 70’s the best that the Soviet Union would be to put in production the MiG 23 with a limited capability to look / shoot down and the MiG 25PD to destroy targets as the F 111 and the future Tornado IDS along other threat as the cruiser missiles .
This new fighters were not the ideal solution to those threats once that SAM network system from Warsaw Pact would be outdated due this threat, and the new SAM system still in conception phase at this time. Because of this the Soviet Union had been sought an alternative to the short and medium term could be implemented in the early 70’s to increase the defense against those threats.
This alternative solution were widely knew by the Soviet Navy in reason of the air defense of its warships or by its attack aircrafts with anti ship missiles from AV-MF, once to defend against those anti- ships missile the best defense were the ECM ( Electronic Counter Measuring) to interfere electronically over the radar from missile and strike aircraft that would launch them, as well the AAM missiles from interceptor fighters and SAM missiles had been launched by the warships against the strike aircraft’s from Soviet Union.
Thus the Soviets had sought during the 70s the development and introduction of ground electronic jamming systems for its air defense of its most important ground facilities such as Air Bases, in case of interference systems could blind the radars from attack aircraft as the F 111.
This could be done in two ways:
As the Cairo West Air Base in Egypt had received the facilities to receive the MiG 25P/R/RB in early 1970, and highly probable that this base should be the first to receive those ground jamming electronic systems to be used as ECM against attack aircraft like the F 111 or even fighters bombers like the F 4E Phantom II armed with AIM 7E Sparrow air-air missiles from Israel Air Force.
In 1972 the U.S. had returned with F 111 to Vietnam and performed thousands of successful missions against important targets in North Vietnam.
Although those new jamming systems had a great cost to the Soviet Union in the early 70’s, the technology were available for production in large scale, and the cost of this jamming system would be several times less than the equivalent of a SAM battery for protection of the same target while these new SAM will not available for large scale manufacturing.
The U.S. response were to develop a new version that would be the F 111F during the 70s with an infrared imaging system coupled with laser designation that were denominated AN/AVQ 26 Pave Tack. This system had given the capability for the F 111F to self designate the LGB bombs as GBU 10 Paveway series.
Although the U.S. had been emphasized that the goal would be to use the Paveway LGB by F 111F, indeed what should be sought with the introduction of the system AN/AVQ 26 were also had a backup in case of interference with ECM against the terrain following radar and the ground mapping radar from F 111. In this case of the F 111F could be jamming by ECM, the AN/AVQ 26 that would be immune could also be used for navigation and attack with guided and unguided weapons without the use of terrain following and ground mapping radars.
As a further advantage that the F 111F could perform attack without emitting a radar signal, which could be detected by Emitter Locating System stations and due to this the aircraft could be located before the attack without that early warning radar would be active from air defense of the target, or even if the F 111 could be bellow from the radar range.
The Soviet Union also adopted the concept of imaging system with laser designator that were denominated as Kaira 24 for the Su 24M, which went into operation in the 80s, though the Kaira system did not operate in the infrared band in reason of the restrains from electronic industries from Soviet Union, and because this therefore had no night capability as the AN/AVQ 26 from U.S..
However the new Tornado GR 1 IDS that were completing tests and about to enter into production in the 70’s had not anticipated an imaging system as the F 111F or Su 24M, beyond what the Tornado GR 1 had no vacancy space to accommodate a system as AN/AVQ 26 from F 111F or even something like the Kaira 24 from Su 24M.
The project Tornado GR 1 had been emphasized that strike aircraft should be more as a fighter-bomber in agility parameters than an attack aircraft as the F 111. In this respect the Tornado GR 1 had been surpassed the F 111 and Su 24 in the capability to survive even in dogfight combat with any interceptor fighters as the MiG 21/ 23 from Warsaw Pact.
However these aspects had limited internal space to accommodate new sensors like the bulky systems as imaging system in development during the 70s, besides the high cost of the same which were not foresaw in the program Tornado GR 1 as well.
In this last case even if some equivalent version of the AN/AVQ 26 could be transported also on external pod, this solution would decrease the weapons load of the Tornado GR1, and would remain the problem about the cost about this imaging system over the entire program of the Tornado GR 1 IDS.
Due to the complexity of the program even in all political matters, in several occasions the Tornado GR 1 were threatened to be shut down, which contributed a lot to avoid any further compromise the program with the addition of new sensors so costly and complex as already planned for the Tornado GR 1.
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Courtesy by SENS
In 1971 the Soviet Union sent to Egypt a contingent of MiG 25R and MiG 25RB with the aim of performing reconnaissance missions over Israel and Mediterranean Sea, and for those missions the MiG 25 had been operating in Cairo Base West after it were prepared to receive the MiG 25.
The Base West Cairo was originally built by the British’s before of the World War II, and this location it is just a few miles from the city of Cairo in Egypt.
http://www.flashearth.com/?lat=30.123729&lon=30.906241&z=10.7&r=0&src=msa
Because of the installation of the MiG 25 near the city of Cairo in 1971 the flow of “tourists” to Egypt had increased considerably since the MiG 25 arrived, at this time the MiG 25 were the most advanced and secret fighters from Soviet Union. Actually the MiG 25 in Egypt had became a priority for the information agencies from the West besides others like China and Israel, once this place were the best to collect information about the operational capabilities from MiG 25 in Egypt.
Although access to Base Cairo West were highly restricted by the Soviet Union, but still a lot of information ended up had been openly disclosed by the Egyptians themselves, and those information’s ended up being widely circulated around the World.
http://www.flashearth.com/?lat=30.123729&lon=30.906241&z=10.7&r=0&src=msa
For many analysts at the time the choice of Cairo West by the Soviet Union had been motivated by political rather than military reasons, since it was believed that the Soviet Union would be interested in demonstrating the technology and military capabilities of the MiG-25 to the West, and gain political points with it, and put these MiG 25 near the capital of Egypt facilitate this propaganda issue.
If the operation of the MIG 25 in Egypt from 1971 to 1972 were highly publicized at the time, the same could not be said about the huge preparations had been started in 1970 to bring the MiG-25 for the Cairo West Air Base.
In this case the rules were the secrecy, since in Cairo West AB had been built underground reinforced shelter to operate and perform all tests and maintenance on the MiG 25. In anyway reinforced shelters had been built as preparation for the MiG 25 since 1970 and were done by the Soviets which increased secrecy about the same.
http://www.flashearth.com/?lat=30.123729&lon=30.906241&z=10.7&r=0&src=msa
The supposed reason for this at this time should be the fear that the Israel Air Force could attack Cairo West Air Base in order to destroy the MiG 25 to avoid reconnaissance missions over Israel.
In 1971 the population density were much lower than today near the city of Cairo, however even in this age of the Cairo West Base would not be an ideal place for the operation of MiG-25R/RB , since the aircraft had been equipped for reconnaissance missions as the MiG 25RB should be kept in remote locations and preferably isolated, especially in a country like Egypt that was not behind the iron curtain from Soviet Union.
The reasons were that reconnaissance missions as performed by MiG 25RB would demand even in peacetime, although this was not the reality of the situation in Egypt and Israel in 1971, the highest degree of confidentiality, as the simple takeoff of the MiG 25 could be detected by the intelligence services from Israel and NATO, which would eventually put on alert the potential targets of those missions.
http://www.flashearth.com/?lat=30.123729&lon=30.906241&z=10.7&r=0&src=msa
In fact the MiG 25RB could operate outside of the range reach main means for interception at the disposal from the West and Israel, in this case the F 4E Phantom II and Hawk SAM MIN 15, or even of SAM available in vessels NATO or F 4N Phantom II aboard in the US Aircraft Carriers .
However the surprise would be highly essential for a successful reconnaissance mission, since the simple alert about the takeoff of the MiG 25 from Cairo West Air Base by the intelligence services could allow potential targets of reconnaissance missions stay alert and ready in case of SINGINT and ELINT missions had been performed by the MiG 25.
http://www.flashearth.com/?lat=30.123729&lon=30.906241&z=10.7&r=0&src=msa
Note: After the signing of the Camp David Treat the Egypt has been receiving equipment’s and aircraft’s from U.S. since 1979 in replace of the Soviet Union, the first fighter had delivered from Egypt were the F 4E Phantom II already retired from service in Egypt Air Force.
Those potential targets could shut down radar and communications equipments or even perform emissions from Jamming over the sensors of the MiG 25 in order to blind the equipment collection from MiG 25 before it could enter into range detection of the radar emissions and communications equipment of the targets.
In case of air reconnaissance photography missions in visual electromagnet emissions or even in infrared, early warning of the MiG 25 takeoff could also be provided time to the targets could interrupt those operations, in the case of ground targets that simple actions as to extend camouflage nets on the equipment could be accomplished and cover many important details.
Thus an alert a few minutes prior to takeoff from Cairo West of the MiG 25R/RB could be highly important, even few minutes before the MiG 25 had been detected by radar from the targets, once this few minutes could allow simple actions that significantly decreased the effectiveness of the reconnaissance mission.
After disagreements between the Soviet Union and Egypt due to the fact that the Soviet Union would not provide the MiG 25 for Egypt, the MiG 25 and must of the Soviet contingent were supposed withdrawn from Egypt in 1972.
AWACS E 2C Hawkeye and C 130H Hercules in Cairo West Air Base
http://www.flashearth.com/?lat=30.123729&lon=30.906241&z=10.7&r=0&src=msa
Note:As a result of the Camp David treaty which returned the Sinai Peninsula to Egypt, this began to receive similar aircraft to its former enemy Israel as : E 2C Hawkeye AWACS, C 130H Hercules, F 4E Phantom II, F 16 A/B/C/D and AH 64A/D Apache
In 1972 would has been apparent to the West that the displacement of the MiG 25 for Cairo West AB was in order to demonstrate the potential of the MiG-25RB for the West and other countries of the World.
However in October 1973, after the onslaught of Egypt and Syria against Israel in the Yom Kippur War, the possibility that the MiG-25RB and the interceptor MiG 25P could be stored in underground shelters of the Cairo West Air Base could be a nasty surprise that own offensive against Israel, since the MiG-25RB and maybe the MiG 25P could seized the air bridge for military aid to Israel by the U.S..
Since as the Israeli Air Force had no means to destroy underground bunkers in the Cairo West AB with those MiG 25 could be stored, and as the MiG 25 were immune to F 4E Phantom II with missiles AIM 4E Sparrow, the only realistic option to destroy those MiG 25 and with it accomplished to establish an air bridge between the U.S. and Israel would be attack with tactical nuclear warheads against Cairo West Air Base.
In this case the choice of Cairo West as base from MiG 25 would not have been casual by Soviet Union, since this Air Base was near the capital of Egypt and the Nile delta, and this were a densely populated area, in this conditions any attack with nuclear warheads would cause many casualties in civilian population, both by the blast from the nuclear warhead as the residual radioactivity fallout over the region.
http://www.flashearth.com/?lat=30.123729&lon=30.906241&z=10.7&r=0&src=msa
Note: In 1973 the only possibility for an image like this would be if some F 4E Phamtom II from Israel crashed in the ground near this HAS after the same had been hit during an attack against Cairo West Air Base.
Before the withdrawal of the MiG 25RB from Cairo West in June 1972 there were some fear on the part from Israel that the MiG-25RB could be used against Israel with nuclear vectors.
In the case of the 1973 War, the information that the MiG-25RB could be stored in sealed compartments in underground bunkers in Cairo West raised fears from Israel, as if it decided to use the nuclear weapons on the battlefield to stop the offensive of Egypt, the MiG-25RB in the colors of the Egyptian air force could retaliate against Israel with nuclear weapons provided by the Soviet Union.
In this condition if Israel decided to use nuclear weapons, the Cairo West Air Base with its MiG 25RB stored in secret should be destroyed first, in order to override a possible retaliation from Egypt with the permission from Soviet Union
http://www.flashearth.com/?lat=30.123729&lon=30.906241&z=10.7&r=0&src=msa
Note: HAS probably built by the Soviets in Cairo West Air Base before the Yom Kippur War in 1973
Without the air bridge with military aid to Israel would be a matter of time until Israel had to accept a ceasefire under Egypt and Syria terms. For the U.S. the victory of Egypt and Syria with support from Soviet Union to Israel would also be catastrophic, though it was almost certain that this would not happen, since Israel would use its nuclear arsenal to avoid this defeat.
About the U.S. analyses any possible use of the nuclear warheads over the battlefield by Israel would be several times more catastrophic for the U.S. and West nations that the defeat from Israel, since this would throw most Middle Eastern countries into the arms of the Soviet Union, while others nations would repudiate the U.S. and the West that had been supported Israel and because of those nations could become highly unstable, and all certainly would seek to obtain an arsenal with nuclear warheads.
However launching nuclear warheads close to a major population center as the city of Cairo by Israel would has incalculable consequences even for the U.S, since this could lead the Soviet Union to intervene directly in the Yom Kippur War, and that could be ended into III World War.
The last image that U.S and West countries would wish to see should be the flag of the Soviet Union fluttering over the largest oil reserves from the World.
If the Soviet Union took by any means the oil reserves of the Middle East, after this would be a matter of time before the Soviet Union flag could be fluttering over the entire World, or other possibility that any flag from any nation could no longer fluttering anywhere in the World.
Note: As secret as its own MiG-25RB from Soviet Union would be the datalink communication equipment for the control and command in the ground from MiG-25RB during its reconnaissance and attack missions. The installation and calibration from those equipment’s would require considerable time to be accomplished, however when the MiG 25 RB ‘officially returned’ to Egypt in the last days of the War in 1973, apparently those secret equipment’s were already installed in Cairo West Air Base.
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