“Upon reaching Iraqi airspace the squadron split up, with two of the F-15s forming close escort to the F-16 squadron, and the remaining F-15s dispersing into Iraqi airspace as a diversion and ready back-up. The attack squadron descended to 30 m over the Iraqi desert, attempting to fly under the radar of the Iraqi defences.[52]”
Source:^ a b c d e f Rafael Eitan, 2003. “The Raid on the Reactor from the Point of View of the Chief of Staff,” Israel’s Strike Against the Iraqi Nuclear Reactor 7 June 1981. Jerusalem: Menachem Begin Heritage Cente
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Osirak
As I could understand it four F 15A had been dispersed in Iraq airspace from of the six F 15A that were escorting the eight F 16A , while two F 15A with eight F 16A had penetrated at low altitude until the target that was the Osirak reactor in order to avoid the detection by Iraq radars .
If there was radar coverage its four F 15A which would not be flying at low altitude on the route to the Osirak target next to H 3 should have alerted the Iraq Air defenses ?
Note: The Osirak reactor were at the 17 Km or 10 Miles from the Baghdad City, that had been surrounded by several airfields, once in 1981 the Iraq was in war against the Iran and those Air Bases should be in alert against any attack by Iran Air Force.
Strange that this time there was no question about my claim, or rather my question about something so unusual.
But my doubt about the H 3 attack by Iran in April 1981 and the attack on Iraq’s nuclear reactor in Osirak by Israel in June 1981 indeed had been planned jointly by Israel and Iran, once that claim has been found out in Wikipedia site.
In fact there are in the Wikipedia site a reference to a book in which Israel, Iran and the U.S. held secret meetings with the purpose of destroying the nuclear reactor in Osriak.
Trita Parsi, in the book Treacherous Alliance: The Secret Dealings of Israel, Iran, and the United States, writes that a senior Israeli official met with a representative of the Khomeini regime in France one month prior to the Israeli attack.[48] The source of the assertion is Ari Ben-Menashe, a former Israeli government employee. At the alleged meeting, the Iranians explained details of their 1980 attack on the site, and agreed to let Israeli planes land at an Iranian airfield in Tabriz in the case of an emergency.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Opera
Because I have not read the book so I asked about this issue in order that if someone read the book and this there are any mention of the H 3 attack by Iran, since the Iranian version of the attack destroyed two radar stations.
How the F 16A and F 15A had crossed the Iraq territory close from this three bases from the H 3, and because this could be possible that even some Iraqi military personnel from such airfields waved to the Israeli fighters by mistake imagining that they were Iraqis fighter, once in June could be one reasonable possibility that the radar stations close the H 3 were out of operation due to attack on April against H 3.
If there weren’t radar coverage in this sector defense from Iraq because the attack on H 3 in April that could allowed the Israel task force to penetrate the Iraqi territory practically at the center of Iraq in Osirak, since due to the war between Iran and Iraq, the defense sector in the region of H 3 was not a priority to be restored.
Instead I try to guess what happened, someone would be kind enough if you read the book to share their knowledge, since a joint operation between the U.S., Israel and Iran in 1981 would be almost impossible.
Even though the Soviet Union had not positioned its MiG 25RB/PD on H 3 Main , that Air Base would be ideal to receive MiG 25RB/PDS from Iraq in 1981, since these were delivered shortly before, and how the MiG 25 were considered extremely complex to operate, requiring a long training from the pilots, H 3 would be reasonable choice once its out of reach of the Iran Air Force with its F 14A Tomcat equipped with AIM 54A Phoenix missiles, at least the F 14A would refueled by air tanker B 707 from Iran in the middle of Iraqi territory, which would be nearly impossible due Iraq Air Force.
In cases of war were very common install training centers in locations distant from the battlefield, especially for flights units since squadrons in training are considered priority targets, since their elimination as they are not trained would be very more advantageous than after they are prepared for battle. If I’m not totally mistaken, the UK in the beginning of World War II transferred its training centers of new pilots for Canada.
As in 1980 Iraq were receiving large quantities of aircraft: 90 MiG 21, 104 MiG 23 , 48 Su-22M 3K and 24 MiG 25RB/PDS. Therefore the demand for training should be very high, however with the beginning of the Iran / Iraq War it would be quite logical that at least the of H 3 could has become an important training center , even without considering the reasonable hypothesis that the Soviet Union settled their own units in H 3.
If this should be extremely hypothetical, the attack against H 3 for the Iran in April 1981 against those bases of H 3 (Southwest, Main, Northwest) were not hypothetical, as is the fact that according to Iranian attack version with its F 4E Phantom II were supported by three air tankers B 707 that had been flying over Turkey before the rendezvous with F 4E Phantom II and a command aircraft B 747 all from Iran Air Force.
However as in fact the result of the attack can not be confirmed, since the Iran has never showed any image during the attack from the cameras of the F 4E Phantom II , as recalled SENS on your post, the version on the destruction caused by the attack has been very questionable.
However another attack that occurred a few months after the attack in 4 April 1981 against H 3, certainly has left no doubt about the damage inflicted, and this was not executed by Iran, since it had attacked with 4E Phantom II this same target in September 1980 without causing damage , but on 7 June 1981 the F 16A Falcon supported by F 15A Eagle from Israel Air Force reached the Osirak nuclear reactor in Iraq and destroyed its facility.
Could be the attack on H 3 an operation to divert attention and squads from Iraq Air Force to Northern border of the Iraq, with purpose that the Iraq Air Force should be intensified the patrols on their borders with Turkey and Syria, so this diversion could have open the way for Israel attack the Osirak nuclear reactor through the border with Jordanian and Saudi Arabian?
In 2003 all Iraqi ABs were in US hands and none claimed that “Underground HAS”. Maybe you can give a present US source to bolster your claim. The US will not have missed the opportunity to show something like that to press.
At your first link of airpower .. 1992 you can find the original comment of “Lt Col Sergey Bezlyudnyy” and how it was reused at acig.org a decade later without mention the origin of that.
“9 The aerodynamic-looking HABs at the airfields were “superhardened,“.. was missing for example. Not a single word about the claimed Underground HAS from Bezlyudnyy like in the text above at ACIG.
The Source about Underground HAS:
1) Christopher M. Centner (BFA, Maryland Institute College of Art; MS, Defense Intelligence College) is an arms control negotiations adviser with the Department of Defense. He has also served as chief of the Combined Arms Branch and as a tactical threat analyst with the Air Force Intelligence Support Agency, Fort Belvoir, Virginia. Mr Centner was one of a select group of analysts who provided daily intelligence briefings to the Air Force chief of staff and the secretary of the Air Force during Operation Desert Storm.
“In Desert Storm, coalition air forces faced a formidable Iraqi air base network, the product of a massive hardening and survivability program that may be considered a model for air forces worldwide. For instance, the Iraqis had extended their air base network to include a ring of identical, hardened dispersal bases along their border. Each base in this network–known as Project 505 and begun during the Iran-Iraq war–contained 12 widely dispersed HABs with half-meter-thick concrete walls, eight fuel tanks, two power stations, and squadron operations facilities.4 Buried and hardened airfield support components were scattered throughout each air base, many of which covered 5,000 acres.5 Iraq also organized airfield-repair teams that were supplied with fast-setting concrete and other critical material.6 Almost 600 HABs built to NATO standards (or better) were constructed in Iraq by British, Belgian, French, and Yugoslavian contractors.7
At the heart of the Iraqi airfield network were three bases built for–and as–strategic assets. Planned as early as 1975 and code-named Project 202, these airfields were designed to function during chemical, biological, and even nuclear war and were dubbed “superbases” by the press. Construction of these bases for Iraq’s strategic strike aircraft apparently began in the mid-1980s.8 Every airfield component was protected by layers of thick concrete. “I will admit that this air base literally overwhelmed me,” declared Lt Col Sergey Bezlyudnyy, a former MiG-29 flight instructor stationed in Iraq. “I had never seen anything like it before, although while serving in the [Soviet] Union I had been in scores of garrisons. The equipment, shelters, and blast walls–everything was the last word in equipment and of outstanding quality.”9 The aerodynamic-looking HABs at the airfields were “superhardened,” built to withstand all conceivable threats. “As far as I could see,” said Colonel Bezlyudnyy, “it would have been virtually impossible to destroy this [HAB] with tactical weapons, even superaccurate ones, and probably only by using nuclear warheads.”10“
2)Tom Cooper
For more details see also “Iran-Iraq War in the Air, 1980-1988”, by T. Cooper & F. Bishop, Schiffer 2003, ISBN: 07643-1669-9, p. 248 & 249)
“The Project “Super-Base” was launched by Iraq in 1975, in response to the experiences from Arab-Israeli wars in 1967 and 1973. Originally, 13 airfields were re-built by British contractors, and on all of them also a number of hardened aircraft shelters was built. Subsequently companies from Yugoslavia – previously engaged in building bridges in Iraq – became involved. Due to their specific construction of these airfields – which included taxi-ways leading right out of hardened aircraft-shelters and laid diagonally to the runways – they became known as “Trapezoids” or “Yugos”.
In addition to 13 re-built airfields during the mid-1980s the Yugoslavs have built also five entirely new facilities, code-named 202A (H-1 New AB), 202B, 202C, 202D, and 202E (Tallil AB). The code-names for Samarah East, Balad, and al-Bakr remain unclear, but known is that each of these “super bases” covered an area of 21.5 square miles (40 square kilometers), and had one or two concrete runways, usually at least 2.800m long and 45m wide.
The facilities on the super-bases were divided into two categories: “surface” and “underground”. The “surface” facilities were actually the “softest”, and included maintenance hangars of metal construction, and HAS of concrete construction. In total, the Yugoslavs have built no less but 200 HAS on different airfields in Iraq during the 1980s. The protection of each HAS consisted of one meter thick concrete shells, reinforced by 30cm thick steel plates. There was only one entrance and this was covered by sliding doors, made of 50cm thick steel armoured plate and concrete. The HAS’ were usually built in small groups – seldom more than five, with each group sharing the same water and power supply, besides having own backup gasoline-powered electrical generator, and each HAS being equipped with a semi-automatic aircraft-refuelling system.
In addition to “surface” HAS, the Yugoslavs have also built 24 “semi-surface” HAS at H-1 New, and 12 at H-3 South West, positioned near the end of the runways, with enterance and exit on each side.
The third kind of structures on “Super-Bases” were underground facilities that could shelter between four and ten aircraft on average. In order to build these the Yugoslavs used equipment and construction techniques identical to that use in underground oil-storage depots, additionally conealing the extension and the true purpose of the whole project. The underground facilities were all hardened to withstand a direct hit by a tactical nuclear bomb, burried up to 50 meters bellow the ground and consisted of the main aircraft “hangar” (consisting of two floors in several cases, connected by 40ts hydraulic lifts), connected with operations, maintenance, and logistical facilities via a net of underground corridors.
A former Soviet MiG-29 flight-instructor in Iraq, Lt.Col. Sergey Bezlyudny, later said in an interview about the Iraqi super bases:
I will admit that this air base literally overwhelmed me. I had never seen anything like it before, although while serving in the [Soviet] Uniton I had been in scores of garrisons. The equipment, shelters, and blast walls – everything was the last word in equipment and of outstanding quality. As far as I could see, it would have been virtually impossible to destroy this [hardened aircraft) shelter with tactical weapons, even very precise ones, and probably only by using nuclear weapons.
The total cost of building these five “Super-Bases” was $4.3 billion, and the project was completed in 1987. “
After The Invasion of the Iraq in 2003:
In 2002, Northrop Grumman and Lockheed Martin were working on the development of a 30,000-lb (13,600 kg) earth-penetrating weapon, said to be known as “Big BLU”. But funding and technical difficulties resulted in the development work being abandoned. Following the 2003 invasion of Iraq, analysis of sites that had been targeted with bunker-buster bombs revealed poor penetration and inadequate levels of destruction.[citation needed] This renewed interest in the development of a super-large bunker-buster, and the MOP project was initiated by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency to fulfill a long-standing Air Force requirement.[3]
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Massive_Ordnance_Penetrator
TIP:
The better question that SENS could have done would be that source I took the information that could be in H 3 Main had Underground HAS instead of generalizing to all Air Bases in Iraq.
However as the Sens did not not have read the entire text of the pages that I had cited, and that no one else did because if they had done would have posted this, now is that I will not reveal my source until finish this thread, but when I finish will reveal.
I know that reading is exhausting, even more what I write, because every time I finish I can not read what I just wrote.
During the first Gulf War in 1991 the U.S. had initiated an urgent program for the development and production of the GBU 28 “Bunker Buster” able to penetrate and destroy hardened underground facilities from Iraq.
In 2003 the analyzes conducted on the use of the GBU 28 after the invasion of Iraq had demonstrated limitations of the GBU 28 to destroy underground facilities that triggered the project to develop a new weapon even more powerful from GBU 28 that it resulted in the design of the GBU 57 MOP.
As North Korea must have several underground facilities, particularly their Air Bases that in case of a confrontation with South Korea and U.S. those facilities would be priority targets, and due to the limitations of the GBU 28 in destroying the most hardened targets, most likely would be necessary to use the GBU 57 MOP.
However the GBU 57 MOP has a slight disadvantage over the GBU 28, since the GBU 28 could be released from F 15E Eagle or F/A 18E/F Hornet but the GBU 57 could be employed only by heavy bomber as B 52H or B 2A Spirit since the GBU 57 has a mass of 30,000lb or 14,000kg.
How the GBU 57 is not stand off weapon it should be released next target could be protected by air defense as SAM systems.
In that case of the B 2A Spirit with its full Stealth capability this would not be a serious problem, however if the B 2A could be invisible to radar, the same does not apply to GBU 57 that after leaving the bomb bay would become a great signature on air defense radar and probably could reveal the position of the B 2A Spirit for SAM system or even the interceptor-fighter that could be in alert.
Although underground facilities are vulnerable to air strikes these require a lot of effort as well as adequate means to assure its destruction, thus ultimately creating large restrictions at the means aimed at their elimination.
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