In the Vietnam War during the 60’s, America had been faced with the challenge of stopping the supply of the adversary conducted by jungle trails called as Ho Chin Min . Despite all the means at its disposal the U.S, the North Vietnam trucks continued to cross the jungle trails and deliver supplies at its forces that were fighting against the U.S. in the South Vietnam, especially during periods of the year when heavy rains occur in this region. The forward looking infra-red (FLIR) had operated by U.S in command aircraft which were already very efficient in locating the trucks at other times of year or even under the night cover could not detect the trucks during the rainy season.
Among the various programs implemented under designation Igloo White in the 60′, perhaps the least known and possibly the most advanced equipment that were mounted on an aircraft that could captured the radio frequency emission denominated as Termed Van Eck radiation ( see more in The Electromagnetic Bomb article from APA) from the North Vietnam trucks. This radio frequency emission came from the generation of an electric current, then all equipment using electrical current emitter this Unintentional Emission, also generate a signature on form of electromagnetic wave, such as a transponder.
With these devices the U.S. surveillance aircraft were able to accurately locate vehicles in the Ho Chin Min trails, as those vehicles were producing electric current in their engines, under heavy concentrations of clouds and rain, or even under the cover afforded by the jungle. Once the target’s coordinates were relayed to strike fighters or gunship aircraft’s as AC 130 Hercules, once all this aircraft’s had the LORAN navigation system, which was the predecessor of the GPS system, leading the aircraft’s to attack even without able to visualize the targets with reasonable accuracy could be destroy the enemy vehicles in the Ho Chi Min trail.
The application of this technology on SR 71, possibly classified as being intended for ELINT operations, would that even be able to collect not only electromagnetic radiations from transmissions emitters of the radar or communications equipment, but also to collect the Unintentional Emission as Termed Van Eck from the electricity generation equipment and power electric consumption from the target area. With this information it would be possible to detect bases and new silos to launch Intercontinental Strategic Missiles, as new facilities for research and production of military equipment’s and estimate the economic and industrial capability of the Soviet Union and its allies or as China and North Vietnam, and perhaps most important, determine the capability for economic growth of the socialist world.
This information could be used to establish what further developments of the military forces of the Soviet Union and China, and to identify any weaknesses that it possessed to be explored. It is possible to SR 71 and carry out its missions with it be possible to estimate the economic capacity of the industrial block led by the Soviet Union or even China what, could br help to create a strategy to contain the advance of the Soviet Union . However in the way of SR 71 across the USSR could rise the MiG 25P, and against this opponent the probability that the missions of SR 71 would end in disaster was highly likely.
CpK Estimate Development From SR 71 Blackbird
An aspect that had always aroused interest was the high-powered radar of the interceptor MiG 25P, and even with this high powers its were estimated that range was much lower than other Western radar with less power. One possible use for high-power radars from MiG 25P would be that could also be used to create jamming interference in other radars or sensors like those used on reconnaissance aircraft as SIGINT and ELINT, since with this jamming interference those aircrafts would be unable to retrieve electronic information from the target; those reconnaissance missions will be useless, and without even shoot down the enemy aircraft that could be in international airspace, would make the mission of the MiG 25P a success. Nowadays radar with AESA radar technology are described as capable of being used as radar jammers against adversaries radars, these radars are present in most modern fighter aircraft in production or in design.
Any attempt to invade the Soviet Union with the SR 71 without knowing in detail the performance of the MiG 25P in all aspects (speed, altitude, electronics, missiles, etc.) could be regarded as an unacceptable risk. However out these missions with SR 71, same with all the risks, and still not be able to get the desired information, since the sensors of SR 71 could be under intense electronic interference during the mission and therefore did not collect the information, a failure would be unacceptable and probably cancel any future missions of SR 71 across the Soviet Union. Therefore the program for the SR 71 could be capable to perform that not official mission should be necessary to know in detail its opponent MiG 25P Foxbat, and this would be nothing better than getting a sample of the MiG 25P for analysis. As the Soviets probably should not have agreed to sell a fighter to the U.S. would have to find another way.
Chapter 1 – The Soviet Planning To Defeat The SR 71 Program :https://sites.google.com/site/sr71xm…oviet-planning
Chapter 2 – MiG 25 RB X YF 14 Tomcat II Over Sinai in 1973 :https://sites.google.com/site/sr71xm…over-the-sinai
Chapter 3 – MiG 25P to MiG 31A , From SHADOW to DARKNESS :https://sites.google.com/site/sr71xm…ow-to-darkness
Chapter 4 – SR 71 Blackbird, The Legacy of Murphy’s Law : https://sites.google.com/site/sr71xm…phy-law-legacy
After the end of the Soviet Union that appears around 1994 were proposed a project from rocket launcher of satellites in low orbits called Burlak / Diana, a joint project from Russia / Germany, which ended up not had been realized. This Burlak/Diana would be launched from high altitude by Tu 160 Blackjack.
Another rumor that I had been read or heard about the Tu 160 from Ukraine were an U.S. company that would be interested in buy three Tu 160 Blackjack to be used for launching satellites in low orbits, perhaps as a platform from Pegasus XL rocket. This indeed had become operational and used as platform launcher the Lockheed L 1011.
But unfortunately, not for all, the end came too soon for the Tu 160 Blackjack from Ukraine.
There was no need for that. Even in a mental exercise of some MiG-25RBs in Egyt outside the control of the SU and allowed to fly an attack mission against the international airport Lod well inside Israel it had not given the desired result. On the ground, during climb out and landing back the MiG-25RBs were very vulnerable to every F-4. .
You’ve been correct about mentions the fact that the MiG 25RB would be vulnerable, while in the ground, taking off, landing or climbing, at the F 4E Phantom II, as well as too: Mirage III, IAI Nesher and even the A 4 Skyhawk from Israel Air Force.
However there was one small detail that could prevent this to happen as you said, it was the fact that in 1973 the Israel Air Force had failed to establish air supremacy, just remember the “infamous air battle” in October 14, and not even at the end of the war. Without air supremacy would not be possible keeping the CAP( Combat Air Patrols) over air bases in Egypt, or even in Cairo West Air Base, to destroy the MiG 25RB when it come out of their underground shelter to strike the Operation Nickel Glass.
At the end of World War II, the Germany after had been introduced the new jet fighter as Me 262 in combat received as responses from Allied patrols by allied fighters ( CAP), over the air bases from Germany. Due to the fact that at this stage of the war the Allies had established the air supremacy over Germany .
This tactic from Allies had been keeping CAP’s over German air bases were partially effective, however the tactic which reached better result were due the lack of fuel for the Me 262 accomplish its missions to intercept allied bombers. Once the Allies had concentrated heavy air attacks against facilities that produced synthetic fuel destined for the Me 262.
Despite the FMEA have the appearance of a tool for use by engineering, in fact its best use is when all those who are part of the design and production, and especially those that will put this project in operational service could be part of the preparations of FMEA’s, as both the DFMEA and PFMEA. Put people responsible to develop with those who use the new project under conditions that both groups could discuss about the project could not only raise the temperature in the room, but reveal aspects hitherto unimagined and new opportunities.
The implementation of FMEA tool and its performed in the correct way, could be favors the new project not only about the problems but also in the implementation of improvements due to the exchange of ideas that arise in meetings of the FMEA. In the case of an advanced and complex as the SR 71, this tool could allow getting increasingly being made in high levels of capability, and since the main problems that emerged were being rectified by making the SR 71 it becomes a highly efficient and reliable.
Above in the problem example of the welding process of titanium alloys at SR 71, the RPN about the problem had the following developments with the actions implemented over time:
The FMEA tool does not solve problems or create innovations itself, since those responsible for it are people competent and motivated in the team, but what is the FMEA provides a method to analyze and quantify the problems with actions, in a way to score these and establish a continuous cycle of improvement that is possible to achieve a zero probability of default on the field.
Among all the systems that should have been continuously improved in the SR 71 perhaps more important was that intended to collect information. Between the appearance of the U 2 and SR 71 had occurred a dramatic revolution in the way of how strategic information could be obtained, especially the optical field.
Since it were possible for both the U.S. and USSR to fly with impunity over opposing sides several times a day without the risk of the vehicle to be shoot down, because had appeared the reconnaissance satellites that could be orbiting the earth at low orbits of the Earth, but due to international agreements it is not considered as violation of airspace of nations that were once above the atmosphere.
In the early 70’s its job from reconnaissance satellites were extremely common among both sides, just remember that in 1973 in the war between Israel and Egypt and Syria, the Soviets had launched a reconnaissance satellite Cosmos two days before the start of the offensive by Egypt and Syria and five other Cosmos satellites were launched during the next three weeks to cover the conflict zone. The U.S. itself issued in 1970 showing the first pictures of the high secret prototype of the Tu 22M Backfire in a testing center in the Soviet Union ad been using images taken by reconnaissance satellites .
The interesting about this shoud be the SR 71 had not replaced the U 2, since it went into service in updated versions as TR 1 and continue in service until the present day, while SR 71 were retired in the late 80’s. The TR 1 were designed for reconnaissance missions or monitoring of the battlefield, which were a mission more tactical than strategic, while SR 71 were given the mission of strategic reconnaissance, making it through of the invasion from the airspace of opponent side that should be monitored, as it did in North Vietnam and on China in the early 70’s.
Among the various equipment that the SR 71 had to perform its missions, the most debated about others were the SAR ( Synthetic Aperture Radar) had been designed mainly to obtain detailed images of land even under adverse weather conditions or even under heavy cloud layers during the day and night. In a battle over the European continent, especially in winter when visibility could be restricted mainly during snown storm, not being able to monitor the borders or even the battlefield could be a high risk factor to loose the battle or the war, just remember the Battle of the Bulge in 1944. The development of the MiG 25R/RB for reconnaissance missions would be intended to demonstrate the high importance by USSR about of the need to have a means to achieve reconnaissance in all weather conditions and preferably out of range of the enemy, as does the TR 1 from U.S.
Strategic missions has had the main goal to collect information before the start of a war, and not to obtain immediate information in order to conduct a battle that must be performed in preference of the independent from atmospheric conditions. So develop a system so complex and expensive as the SR 71 to take images of installations that could be made by reconnaissance satellites or missions with radar mapping ( SAR) from the ground so as to obtain the same information that would be possible to obtain satellites, with the additional risk that the aircraft could be shoot down over the adversary territory and thus lead to a new World War, may suggest that the purpose of SR 71 was not exactly designed to collect information using only these devices.
Possibly what had motivated the SR 71 program were to obtain a recognition system that was capable of shooting pictures optical or radar means not only the facilities, but to determine what inside those installations were capable of producing. With regard for industries, it could be more easier to build a warehouse than to equip with machinery and production equipment that same warehouse. So if it was possible through the satellite images to estimate the capacity of the Soviet industrial economy, especially for the strategic or military sectors, through the measurement of the construction area of those facilities, it were not possible to determine the real industrial or economic capability of those facilities were able to manufacture by only taken picutures from sky.
The main input of an industrialized economy is energy, which is the electricity. The greater industrial capacity has been demanding greater amount of energy to be obtained and consumed. In a manufacturing facility almost all equipments and machines has been requiring electrical energy, which in any case must be obtained somewhere, even if it is within its.
Chapter 1 – The Soviet Planning To Defeat The SR 71 Program :https://sites.google.com/site/sr71xm…oviet-planning
Chapter 2 – MiG 25 RB X YF 14 Tomcat II Over Sinai in 1973 :https://sites.google.com/site/sr71xm…over-the-sinai
Chapter 3 – MiG 25P to MiG 31A , From SHADOW to DARKNESS :https://sites.google.com/site/sr71xm…ow-to-darkness
Chapter 4 – SR 71 Blackbird, The Legacy of Murphy’s Law : https://sites.google.com/site/sr71xm…phy-law-legacy
I admit that I’m too lazy to research the agreements to limit weapons sales and this would apply to Tu 160 Blackjack, but with regard to cruise missile as I recall there is a limited range for export that could be about 250Km.
The Russia launched a variant of the Kh 55 with reduced range or smaller amount of fuel inside and with conventional warhead more heavier than the original nuke, this version were called Kh 65E as I recall, so them could export this without violating the agreements.
However would not be very complex to replace the tank fuel original Kh 65E for a larger capacity as the Kh 55 if the goal was to increase the range by decreasing the weight of conventional warhead, or attached the conformal tanks of the Kh 55SM in the external airframe.
I suppose that could be found ways to sell the Tu 160 of Ukraine, if it wished, to China without this sale could be challenged. The Tu 160 Blackjack could be for example converted into maritime patrol aircraft such as the Tu 95 Bear in the Tu 142 , and these last had been exported to India, and could be upgraded to receive the Brahmos missile, developed jointly between Russia and India.
Another alternative had been envisioned would be more complex since Tu 160 and Kh 55 would be dismantled and the more complex parts such as engines and avionics could be sell for China, or even critical parts of the titanium airframe, so that China could clone the Tu 160 e Kh 55 using the complex item had been obtained of the original Tu 160 and Kh 55 from Ukraine.
Another rumor that I had been read or heard about the Tu 160 from Ukraine were an U.S. company that would be interested in buy three Tu 160 Blackjack to be used for launching satellites in low orbits, perhaps as a platform from Pegasus rocket.
However these commentaries had been based on rumors, I have read or heard a long time ago, and I believe it would be very difficult for Ukraine if it wanted to sell really the Tu 160 Blackjack for China.
As also think it should have been a joke, when it was said that if the sale of the Tu 160 for China or U.S. would be confirmed, Russia would provide all technical assistance to China and U.S., since that would receive the Tu 160 in countless pieces already dismantled free of charge by Russia even on the territory from Ukraine.
If anyone read this and think that would be having a déjà vu , this probably is not, because I believe that I’ve written this before.
The F 4E Phantom II of Israel in 1973 were equipped with the air-air medium range missiles as AIM 7E Sparrow with SARH ( Semi Active Radar Head) seeker, those were also the standard used by the U.S. in the Vietnam War. Both radar AWG 10 and missiles AIM 7E were already well known to the Soviet Union because of the Vietnam War, which had facilitated the USSR for the development of ECM System SPS 141 “Siren” for the MiG 25RB Foxbat to jamming both the AWG 10 radar as the AIM 7E Sparrow missiles from F 4E Phantom II.
Due to increased threats and the poor performance in the Vietnam War of the U.S. AIM 7E, the AIM 7F were developed and it were almost a new missile under the skin when compared with AIM 7E since it was introduced in the AIM 7F a new seeker with semiconductor circuits much more resistant to jamming by ECM, indeed a technological revolution at the time, and a new rocked motor with dual stage which also led to the AIM 7F obtain a range more than twice once compared to the AIM 7E.
However the AIM 7F began to be produced after 1976 and that it was used against Syria in the 1981 in the Lebanon War, and the F 15A/B/C/D Eagle had fired these missiles and achieved several victories including some MiG 25 RB’s from Syria.
The AIM 7E had been used by Israel in the F 4E Phantom II against MiG 25R/RB between 1971 and 1972, or by F 4D / E Phantom II from Iran until 1978 did not shot down any of MiG 25 R/RB that invaded the air space from Iran, despite several attempts with AIM 7E fired from F 4D/E Phantom by Iran and Israel .
In the Iran / Iraq War during the 80’s that lasted almost nine years, despite all the controversy about the loss of MiG 25P/RB from Iraq and even MiG 25BM from Soviet Union, Iran just had announced that victories were obtained with the air-air long range AIM 54A Phoenix missiles only, with were used by F 14A Tomcat from Iran Air Force, and none of the MiG 25RB in attack missions were shot down or damaged by AIM 7E Sparrow used by all F 4D / E Phantom II and even the F 14A Tomcat. Because of the revolution in Iran in 1978 that did not received the AIM 7F had been ordered from U.S. before the revolution in 1979.
Iran announced in 1975 that had damaged one MiG 25R from Soviet Union that could be hit by the AIM 7E’s fired from F 4E Phantom II, but the MiG 25R managed to escape and crossed the border with the Soviet Union.
However Iran had admitted that against the MiG 25RB , which were a more advanced version than MiG 25R, the F 4E Phantom II with AIM 7E missiles were unable to stop the invasions of MiG 25RB since it were equipped with a powerful and advanced ECM system.
In fact the invasions of MiG 25RB were contained only with the arrival of the F 14A Tomcat equipped with AIM 54A Phoenix, which beyond the sophisticated of the AIM 54A Phoenix , the AWG 9 from F 14A Tomcat were not affected by the ECM from MiG 25 RB.
How the F 4E Phantom II were the most numerous interceptor from Iran Air Force, between F 4D/E maybe more than 220 were delivered before the revolution in 1979, and those were the most used during the war with Iraq.
It would be logical that MiG 25RB in several attack missions that had done during the war would have been slaughtered by F 4E Phantom II equipped with AIM 7E Sparrow missiles if those missiles could be effective against the MiG 25RB.
In the War of 1973 the F 4E Phantom II from Israel might had to face the MiG 25RB aircraft, equipped with ECM, under extremely disadvantageous conditions because of the limitations of AIM 7E Sparrow against a target so hard.
Even if the F 4E Phantom II with AIM 7E still had a chance, it would be inevitable that the Israel Air Force should required to maintain almost all its force of the F 4E in CAP( Combat Air Patrol) missions along the possible routes from targets of the MiG 25RB, which could lead to collapse of the front lines with Egypt and Syria, since without the F 4E Phantom, the Egypt and Syria Air Forces would be establish superiority over the battle fields, and the Israel Army would suffer devastating attacks by the Egypt and Syria Air Forces.
Part II
In the course of FMEA that I was a student many and many years ago, the instructor had pointed the importance of the FMEA tool in the success of Apollo mission, what was dedicated to the Moon landing, where its use of the FMEA was one of the strong tool to achieve the difficult goal . However when I became an instructor of FMEA tool, in my first class, I told for the class the same about the Apollo Mission and one student made the remark as a joke about that : ” this tool should be very efficient, since the Americans had been foreseeing all possible risks of the mission, gave up the manned mission and instead built a scenario here on Earth to simulate the lunar surface in order to make the landing and the mission itself, and resulting it to be a success without risks for the USA.”
I did not know what to say in response for some time, while the others students laughed about what had been said for the funny guy, while I was tried to remember that when I was a student the instructor had not faced that situation. Returning of the direct impact suffered, I started explaining why I did not agree on the fact that the first landing mission on the Moon was staged, as if the mission was made in a scenario, the Soviet Union would eventually found out , and it could send another probe to Moon as they already did in 1967 to photograph in specific the area where the lunar module landed, and the footprints that the astronauts should have been left on its surface as well as the flag, since this supposed disappointment would be a major blow against the U.S to be show at the World.
The Soviet Union even before the Apollo mission were capable to send vehicles probes that had landed on the Moon surface. But with regard to the fact that many “intelligent” Americans engaged in the project probably should have considered the fact that communications between the lunar lander module, or even the orbiter spacecraft and NASA could be compromised by some technical failure or even a unpredictable solar storm, and due to this built a scenario with “actors” to simulate the landing on the Moon if some fault happened with a transmission in that historical moment, this would be a very realistic assumption, especially for those who use this FMEA tool.
After this improvised explanation, I noticed that the class was very interested in learning how to use the FMEA, which had not happened even before that observation of the funny guy. The lesson I once again saw with that remark was that there are no tools or methods that by themselves are able to solve the problems, but how we use these tools to understand the problems and impacts in order to establish alternative actions to overcome these challenges, even when you can not get the resources to make the problems go away or maybe send the funny guy get some fresh air in Siberia, this could be the difference in getting what is planned or else fail.
In the figures below is the usual description of the FMEA methodology:
A complex design like the SR-71 reconaissance aircraft could have several thousand steps on your DFMEA and PFMEA. It should be mentioned that steps would require the participation of a large contingent of many fields with technical personnel who were involved with: design, manufacture and operation. Therefore these tools to become functional should be represent the analysis of a heterogeneous team with people who occupy different roles .So just to illustrate the case of SR 71 would be needed in your FMEA equity in each specific case: the workers, scientists, technicians, engineers, pilots, senior officers , e.g.
Chapter 1 – The Soviet Planning To Defeat The SR 71 Program :https://sites.google.com/site/sr71xm…oviet-planning
Chapter 2 – MiG 25 RB X YF 14 Tomcat II Over Sinai in 1973 :https://sites.google.com/site/sr71xm…over-the-sinai
Chapter 3 – MiG 25P to MiG 31A , From SHADOW to DARKNESS :https://sites.google.com/site/sr71xm…ow-to-darkness
Chapter 4 – SR 71 Blackbird, The Legacy of Murphy’s Law : https://sites.google.com/site/sr71xm…phy-law-legacy
http://toad-design.com/migalley/index.php/jet-aircraft/mig25/?nggpage=2
The first MiG 25R were converted to the standard MiG 25RB since 1972, and production and modernization of the MiG 25RB and MiG 25BM this last one for SEAD mission had been continued until 1986.
The MiG-25RB had the system inertial navigation system ( INS) Peleng D that could be updated by LORAN signals from ground stations, which had been increased the precision both in attack and reconnaissance missions.
Another novelty introduced in the MiG 25 RB , at least in soviet fighters by end of the 60′, were an electronic counter measuring (ECM) that had been combined with its max speed from 2,500 to 3,000 km / h (1,562 to 1,875 mph) within the combat radius of 920km ( 575 miles) and maximum altitude of 26,000 to 27,000 m (85,301 -88,582 ft), those MiG 25RB became almost immune to being intercepted at least in the early ’70s.
The number from attack versions of the MiG 25 Foxbat were quite extensive as:MiG 25RB / RBT / RBS / RBK / RBN / RBV / RBSH / RBF / BM.
In the early ’70s the quantity and variety of reconnaissance equipment’s were already impressive as: SAR radars, ELINT sensors and photographic cameras. In fact the equipment’s could be exchanged in its own bases since those were mounted on pallets, allowing the change of sensors according to the missions.
The performance had been estimated for the MiG 25RB in 1973 by the intelligence services from West nations that assumed a much better performance than were the reality of the MiG 25 Foxbat. However this were only known after the analysis of MiG 25P had seized in 1976 in the Japan.
Because of this lack of correct information about the MiG 25 in 1973 it had been estimated that the MiG 25RB could be armed with 5,000 kg free-fall bombs or 10 FAB 500 62T on each attack mission with a combat radius of 900km at a speed of Mach 2.8 and an altitude of 22,000 m. Each TBM( Tactical Ballistic Missile) as SS 1 Scud could carried a 500 kg warhead with HE or fragmentacion to a target at distance of 500 km as comparative analisys.
Thus each MiG 25RB could launch over the target as equivalent to 10 TBM SS 1 Scud missiles per mission in a much greater range than would be obtained with those TBM but with the equal or better precision.
Therefore in case that the 04 MiG 25RB could be used in the Yom Kippur War in 1973 since those aircraft could had been performing a mission per day for 15 days, and with this could released over the targets with a destructive power equivalent to 600 SS 1 Scud missiles!
Throughout the war between Iran / Iraq that endured eight years in total were released almost 500 SS 1 Scud missiles. In the first Gulf War Iraq had launched less than 100 SS 1 Scud missiles against targets in the Gulf countries and Israel.
As the transport aircraft in the Operation Nickel Glass had loaded with ammunition would be exposed in the loading and unloading terminal from airports at the MiG 25RB that in each mission of the 04 MiG 25RB according to these estimates could launch the equivalent of 40 SS 1 Scud missiles in each attack!
Since each transport aircraft could be loaded with dozens of tons of explosives and fuel, that one was hit would be enough to cause major damage at the airport and hundreds of casualties on the ground staff, interrupting the Operation Nickel Glass for several days. The worst possibily was that the attacks could continue thereafter as the MiG 25RB were immune at air defenses from Israel with F 4E Phantom II and SAM Hawk.
About the “infamous” air battle of October 14, even neither serious publication would have not mentioned this, its appear that all seem to know about the same, including the authors of serious publications.
On the October 18 I had mentioned the first wave of attack from Mirage 5DE, whereas SENS described what happened with the second wave of attack against the el-Arish Air Base from Israel.
Fear what? …of MiG 25RB taking pictures of air transports?
It may be a new possibility thanks at the MadRat commentary that the U.S. sent the F 14A Tomcat II in secret for Israel to avoid the MiG 25 RB overfly these airports that had been receiving the transport aircraft to take pictures of it and for some part of its MiG 25 RB loose itself,especially those “red things” hanging above the wings and the belly of the MiG 25 RB , and hit some transport aircraft in the ground by accident, after the safety of Soviet aircrafts by the West analysts has always been questionable.
I still can not find the windows to take pictures on the MiG 25 RB?
2.3 – The Battle Plan
“So if there is a villain assassin hiding in the forest, even a thousand men pursue, everyone around you will look like owls and observe how wolves. Why? Fear from violence that break out and hurt himself. Thus, a blind man to life and death can hag a thousand.”
[RIGHT] [RIGHT]General Wu Ch’i
The Art of War[/RIGHT][/RIGHT]
The large-scale military exercises in Egypt in March and August 1973 were interpreted only as a show of force in order to pressure Israel in secret negotiations promoted by the U.S. with goal to return of Sinai to Egypt, as well as statements by the President Sadat from Egypt on this a possible war against Israel. For U.S. and Israel analysis after the withdrawal of the Soviet Union in Egypt this last one has not the resources needed for a military offensive against Israel and that is why he used these demonstrations of force as the only resource they had to pressure Israel.
The plan of Egypt and Syria to defeat Israel in 1973 as it was later had demonstrated with purpose by these actions not based on a short time operation as several times interpreted with the invasion of Israel, but in an attrition war with goal that Israel’s military losses became unsustainable over time, and after its losses could be accepted a ceasefire on terms favorable to Egypt and Syria, through the return of occupied territories in the War of 1967.
For an attrition war against Israel could be effective, Israel should be isolated from supplies military sources as well new weapons and equipment to compensate the losses of the fighting. But a long war with Israel in conditions that could be supplied by U.S., the war could become extremely disadvantageous to Egypt and Syria, since the military capability of Israel in causing losses to Egypt during the War of Attrition in 1970 was very unfavorable to Egypt.
The Soviet Union through experience in the Vietnam War had knowledge about the high impact caused by the use of PGMs( Precision Guided Missiles) as the smart bombs had been used by the U.S. against North Vietnam and its armed forces operating in South Vietnam. in the case of Israel, which already had a high advanced Air Force and too well trained, the widespread use of these new weapons should has a devastating effect about the infrastructure of Egypt and Syria in a prolonged war.
The strategy to defeat Israel should be based on the fact that this would be blocked from sources as U.S. with new equipment or ammunition during the conflict, so that Israel would be forced to maintain a defensive strategy, in reason of the need to save your military resources in case of the prolonged conflit without assistance, and with this situation Israel would keep its military operations almost in defensive actions or limited attacks.
While Syria and Egypt should be receive new equipment and ammunition throughout the conflict from Soviet Union, as well as new air and ground units would join those from other countries of the region in order to maintain pressure on Israel and overcome this in matter of time, or in the must possible possibility til the superpowers as U.S. and URSS would pressure Israel to accept a ceasefire in terms favorable to Egypt and Syria.
Since it were not possible to obtain air superiority by Egypt and Syria against Israel Air Force, with mission to interdict air space from Israel or its airports, the tactics to be used should be the threat to use the MiG 25RB against airports and bases from Israel, so that possibility the U.S. would not send their transport aircraft as C 141 Starlifter and C 5A Galaxy with necessary supplies to Israel, because of concerns that it would be damaged or even destroyed, that could expose a vulnerability of the U.S. in its strategy to send troops and supplies by air transport in case of war against the Soviet Union, especially in the case to support for NATO against the Warsaw Pact.
This could be achieved with the use of a small number of fighter as MiG 25RB once these should be kept secret in Cairo West Air Base had located in the Egypt. In the moment when hostilities would be initiated those MiG 25RB could be placed in flying conditions quickly to strike the bases and airports from Israel in the attempted to seize the Israel for the air transport bridge from United States.
With the possibility of a long war with Egypt and Syria in which Israel would be unable to receive supplies from air transport of the U.S. due to threat of MiG 25RB fighters, the option would be the use of sea transport. Due to this the dangerous Israeli navy would not risk in attack missions in order to preserve itself to protect merchant vessels with the necessary supplies to Israel from U.S..
The remain option to send supplies should be the sea transport between U.S. and Israel, but this option could take weeks and this were also more vulnerable to being hit by naval and air operations of the Egypt and Syria, since when sea transport could be near Israel border its air force should be already severely weakened by the losses from land campaign.
In that case the dangerous Israel Navy with fast missile boats equipped with missiles anti-ship Gabriel would be overwhelmed by air and naval actions of Egypt and Syria, once the Israel Air Force could be at this moment of the war severely weakened to withstand all missions on three different fronts (Sinai, Golan Heights and the Mediterranean Sea).
Egypt and Syria had a considerable number of fast missile boats equipped with anti ship missiles SS 2 N Styx, which would be a serious threat to ships with military supplies to Israel. However the Israel Navy would not be able to protect merchant ships from air strikes in particular by Tu 16K-16 Badger G from Egypt equipped with long-range anti ship missiles as AS 5 Kelt with range of the 100 NMI or 180Km.
Against this threat as much as the Israel Navy could do were attempted to jamming by electronic emissions against the radar missiles from AS 5 Kelt as the SS 2 N Styx, once the vessels from Israel Navy didn’t had SAM ( surface air missiles) with long range to threat the Tu 16K, and because this would demand a high number of missions from Israel Air Force only to keep the Tu 16K with AS 5 Kelt out of range of the merchant ships with supplies.
However this tactics could cause major losses to Israel Navy since the Tu 16K-16 Badger G from Egypt were also equipped with anti radiation missiles AS 5B Kelt with same long range of the anti ship missile AS 5A Kelt, which in this case would be guided to the source of the jamming emission, which would result in the destruction the boat that was interfering with radars of anti ship missiles SS 2 N Styx or AS 5A Kelt in the attempted to protect the ships with supplies.
The sea transport of the emergency supplies to Israel could be a disaster for Israel, since even long time for these to arrive, also would create a third front to the Israel Air Force which would weaken further two others fronts against Egypt and Syria, which would employ those air forces more intense in attacks missions against the ground forces from Israel , that could be collapsing these even before the new supplies reaching them.
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