Tail Wind from Cairo West Air Base

After the ceasefire from August 8th 1970 there was no longer a war between Egypt and Israel till October 1973. Both sides kept some recce flights to monitor the changes of the other side including the intercept attempts of that. The pair of Su-7Bs were on a tactical recce mission along the Suez had just bad luck when passing over an alerted Israeli stronghold. The EAF lost just a handful MiG-21s/Su-7s against the Israeli escorts when they tried to intercept Israeli recce planes over Egypt or by Israeli interceptors, like that one over Mansura AB 1972 f.e. The Israeli realized soon that there was a small chance only to intercept the MiG-25RBs. The F-4E interceptors had to be scrambled to the estimated exit point of the very recce mission. A small Israeli error saved a MiG-25RB. As the Russians learned that they kept a CAP there to escort the MiG-25RB for landing back. When most of the Russians left Egypt in 1972 they retired the MiG-25RBs too. The two loaned USAF RF-4Cs were replaced by six new built RF-4Es from March 1971 already.
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As has been posted above would be a fact that the Israel Air Force made ​​a great effort to intercept or destroy the MiG 25R/RB in the airspace of the Egypt and even in the Cairo West Air Base that were its base.

According to Mr. Yefim Gordon the MiG 25R/RB in its reconnaissance missions were escorted and protected during their take off and landings by the MiG 21 Egypt’s in attempts of the interceptions from Israel Air Force because in this phase of the mission the MiG 25 would be vulnerable to F 4E Phantom II of the Israel Air Force. Since after the MiG 25R/RB had achieved its maximum altitudes and speeds these were beyond the reach of F 4E Phantom II equipped with air-air missiles as AIM 7E Sparrow.

The decision from Soviet Union to send to Egypt the MiG 25 was taken to even before the ceasefire from Attrition War between Israel and Egypt in 1970, and even before that the Soviet Union had sent a large military contingent to Egypt in order to help Egypt in the air defense of the main facilities of this country.

In fact even before cease-fire between Egypt and Israel the Soviet Union had suffered losses due to attacks from Israel Air Force.

Despite the ceasefire the hostility was high since both countries had bee invading each others with reconnaissance missions or attempts to intercept and attack until the war in 1973.

Facilities at Cairo West Air Base had been prepared by the Soviet Union since 1970 in order to withstand attacks with precision weapons then used by the USA in the Vietnam War since 1967.

With the experience of the Vietnam War the Soviet Union had prepared Cairo West Air Base with facilities so that it were not easily damaged or destroyed by precision weapons used by the U.S. so far as: AGM 62 Wallerey, GBU 8 HOBOS and LGB 117 Bolt. At least AGM 62 Wallerey and possibly the GBU 8 HOBOS had bee provided to Israel even before the Yom Kippur War in 1973.

A Hardened Aircraft Shelters in underground for the MiG 25 would be the best passive defense against attacks mainly with precision weapons, since one aircraft has been equipped with precision weapons could cause far more damage than a dozen of the same aircraft with unguided bombs or rockets as that was see in the Vietnam War.

If the MiG 25RB were taken from Cairo West Air Base after the Soviet Union to withdraw its staff, which some estimate that nearly 20,000 military and accessors, from Egypt in July 1972, after the President of Egypt to expel the Soviets that they had refused to sell the MiG 25RB for the Egypt are facts that has been reported and publicly accepted as well since 1973.

As the fact that the MiG 25RB were reassembled in two days after its return from the Soviet Union at Cairo West Air Base and managed to make a reconnaissance mission at the end of the Yom Kippur War in 1973 .

As another fact widely reported and officially accepted that while civilian aircraft from Israel as B707 and B747 had started the Operation Nickel Glass from 10 October, the USAF ​​only could started from 14 October, while the Soviet Union started from 10 October even to both Egypt and Syria.

However these facts could lead to the following questions:

GBU 8 HOBOS From Israel Air Force

http://www.fez.ch/modules.php?set_albumName=album71&id=GBU_8_Hobos_IAF&op=modload&name=gallery&file=index&include=view_p

RF 4E Phantom II and GBU 8 HOBOS from Israel Air Force
http://www.flickr.com/photos/xnir/3434341108/

F 4E Phantom II armed with 02 AGM 62 Wallerey from Israel Air Force

http://forum.keypublishing.com/showthread.php?t=85288&page=2
User:roberto_yeager

AGM 62 Wallerey displayed with glasses windows to show the components

http://www.pbase.com/image/100723044

LGB(Laser Guided Bomb) 117 Bolt

http://aviationintel.com/2011/10/15/fast-history-the-bolt-117-laser-guided-bomb/800px-f-4d_497th_tfs_with_bolt-117s_1971/

F 4D Phantom II from USAF during the Vietnam War equipped with two LGB 117 Bolts

http://aviationintel.com/2011/10/15/fast-history-the-bolt-117-laser-guided-bomb/800px-bolt117lgb/

Fishbone Diagram

Plus some of the diagrams leave the reader wondering what the data presented proves. For example, the “casue and effect” diagram. Big red arrow pointing to SR-71 with several “legacy fighter” boxes surrounding it and various other boxes with various data, this diagram has no obvious meaning

The Fishbone Diagram is an analysis tool for solving problems. The effect is what is desired to eliminate the problem, and the causes are the means by which its possible to find a solution so to eliminate the problem.

This tool is widely used in order to make the “famous” “brainstorm” of ideas that in certain cases(in the most times necessary) could happen with seeking for the solution to a problem. It is directed or focused to the problem in order to identify the strengths and weaknesses of each option or idea has found out to solve a problem.

FISHBONE DIAGRAM

1. EFFECT: To eliminate the problem of future invasion of the SR 71 Blackbird in USSR should be desired to obtain the means to intercept this spy aircraft.

2.CAUSES: The means available or possible to obtain in order to find the solution of the problem that would be to intercept the SR 71. In this case the means were:

3.Causes Analysis: When analyzing each possibility would be possible identifies the strengths and weaknesses from these.

Each of these possibilities would be analyzed in order to find out those that as example that could be viable and discard those that were not effective or possible.

This analysis was simplified to show the tool the Fishbone Diagram with the purpose about the possibilities that could has the USSR in that time to eliminate the spy missions of the SR 71 Blackbird.

S 37 Berkut could replace the MiG 31BM in the future

Long time ago I had read that the S 37 Berkut would be a project to replace the MiG 31 B/BS and Su 27S in IA PVO (Air Defense Force) and MiG 1.44 MFI was a project to replace the MiG 29 and Su 27 on VVS ( Air Force).

But that after the merger of VVS and IA PVO into the new VVS had decided in light of budget constraints to develop a new project which is now known as PAK FA or T 50, a project that would be more advanced than the MiG 1.44 MFI indeed once would be need to replace the Su 27 either in air defense missions. The MiG 31 would be retired from service because the high cost do keep theses fighter in operational service, and will not replaced since the budget constraints.

With the recent decision from Russian to modernize part of its fleet of MiG 31 B / BS for the standard MiG 31 BM could be an indication that the S 37 Berkut could be used in future to replace the MiG 31, since from the beginning of the project S 37 Berkut had equipped with engines that were used the MiG 31 and supposedly part of your electronics such as radar Zaslon N007.

The priority of the project S 37 Berkut was presumed to achieve a performance as the MiG 31 with Mach 3 speed at high altitudes but with the maneuverability of the Su 27 Flanker, stealth technology is not the high priority as it is in the PAK FA since and that conditions from Mach 3 speed in high altitudes were not available the stealth technology from Russian .

Since Russia has been joined with India and due to this there was a decreasing in development cost per unit built for the PAK FA could be now Russia has better conditions to continue the development of the S 37 Berkut to replace in the future the MiG 31 Foxhound ?

MiG 25 RB into belly of the monster An 22 Antei

F 4G Phantom II armed in order from near to far with: AGM 88 HARM, AGM 65 Maverick, ALQ 119 ECM pod, AGM 78 Standard, AGM 45 Shrike

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:F-4G_Phantom_II_wild_weasel.jpg

Wild Weasel tactics and techniques were first developed in the Vietnam and after the Yom Kippur War, and were later integrated into the Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD) that has been used by US air forces to establish immediate air control, prior to possible full scale conflict. The Yom Kippur War was extremely important for the U.S. to test and refine their techniques SEAD.

In the effort of Operation Nickel Glass sent to Israel:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yom_kippur_war

While the F 4E Phantom II and A 4 Skyhawk had been provided by the USA in order to recover losses from Israel flew to the same with American pilots, in order to allow the fighters to be used as soon as possible.

However, the Soviet Union’s MiG 25RB had arrived in Egypt totaly dismantled, and yet made ​​its first real mission just two days after his arrival on board the An 22 Antei.

While not impossible to perform the assembly of complex aircraft like the MiG 25 RB in so short time, yet those were not a routine operation from Soviet Union, since the MiG 25 Foxbat were not designed to be transported by An 22 Antei of order to be reassembled and become operational in a few days.

MiG 25 RB almost entirely dismantled lands into the belly of the monsters An 22 and flies off in two days after leaving the same?

Although not impossible, this event could be classified as fiction if the Soviet Union had not disclosed it, and the MiG 25 RB were not tracked by radars from Israel and USA, which confirmed the same mission.

However the lack of details on this spectacular mission does not match very well with the purpose of this mission was carried out only in order to impress the Western nations.

Among the most important lessons of the Yom Kippur War to the Soviet Union was that it should develop a new heavy cargo aircraft so that it were possible to transport larger amounts of loads per mission and loads much more voluminous than the An 22 Antei were able . And for this the Soviet Union should have an aircraft of class C 5 Galaxy, which has spawned the development and production of An 124 Condor.

An 124 Condor had been escorted by Su 27 Flankers that was also another lesson from War of 1973

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:An-124_RA-82028_in_formation_with_Su-27_09-May-2010.jpg

Second Part – MiG 25P To MiG 31A

The complexity of the air defense system in former Soviet Union in which various types of radar operating in different bands are those of the interceptor missile batteries and figthers, must have been one of the factors most relevant to concept of the stealth tecnology adoption by the United States in future projects.

Even the SR 71 during the 80’s must had become more vulnerable to Soviet defenses, and even equipped with sophisticated systems of electronic interference, it should not be more immune to air defense systems, especially in the presence of the MiG 31.

The high effective air defense systems such as missile S-300 (SA 10), S-300M (SA 12) and S-300VM (SA 12VM) all equipped with much more advanced radars than the previous generation of SA 5 and SA 4 may have become a greater threat to SR 71. Although the SR-71 to fly at high altitudes than those systems were able to achieve, with the exception of SA 12VM, their surveillance radars and fire control systems could aid in the air interception by fighter as MiG 31 and MiG 25 ( possibly by Su 27S too), reducing the efficiency of electronic interference from SR 71 to keep away from these menaces.

The concept of aircraft such as F 117A, B 2A, F 22 Raptor could be started due to the fact that at some point it would not be possible to avoid the interception only by electronic interference by jamming systens or high performance in speed and ceiling, since in a tactical situation where the adversary would be able to achieve datas by using own signals from the target that were transmitig signals from the eletronic jamming system, an effective defense would be becoming invisible to radar, which thus would not be necessary to emmiters powerful jamming radiations, which instead of protecting the aircraft could make it an easier target.

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Currently there are multiple communications and navigations(GPS, Glosnass and the future Galileo as i.e) satellites orbiting the planet Earth and sending a high power electromagnetic waves in the bands X and L. It would not be a much imagination to think that in future those radars that will equip the legacy fighter or futures projects will be capable of operating in passive mode, and use the emission from those satellite networks that will reflect on objects such as aircraft, ships and structures as i.e the light from the Sun . These objects could be tracked by these future radars without the emition radiation from theses, or will allow to do so only for brief periods before the launching of this weapons to confirm the target, increasing the surprise factor and the survival of those fighters.

When analyzing the performance of the F 14A Tomcat II with AIM 54 Phoenix missiles during the Iran / Iraq War, thanks to the work of writer and journalist Tom Cooper who was able to bring this information to the Western audience, it was found that the missiles AIM 54 were highly effective in intercepting targets at long range and high supersonic speed as in the case of Iraq MiG 25 PDS/RB .However, what had impressed the Iranians themselves was that the missile AIM 54 was also effective in shoot down in many cases at low altitude and high speed different targets as: the Mirage F1E , several versions of MiG (MiG 21, MiG 23 BN, MiG 23ML) and Su 22 from Iraq. Those fighters were relatively small compared with bombers Tu 22 Blinder, Tu 16 Badger that were shoot dow too by the AIM 54 or even the MiG 25 that were in high supersonic speed and ceiling by the AIM 54 fired always in high or medium altitude.

Western analysts viewed the same AIM 54 as a weapon designed to intercept large targets like the Soviet supersonic bombers, and the revelation of the performance of AIM 54 fighters against small high maneuverability targets at low altitudes revealed another aspect of these weapons was almost always not just emphasized the fact that these missile attack from the heights.

A mission that the Soviets attributed the MiG 31 with its missiles R 33 Amos ,very similar at the AIM 54, would be to intercept cruise missiles AGM 109 Tomahawk and AGM 86 ALCM with nuclear warheads , that has been launched from any platform (aircraft, land vehicles, ships and submarines) against the Soviet Union. Indeed what is very interesting about this mission is that not enough to be able to intercept the bombers or attack fighters, that the cruise missiles could be fired by other platforms that the MiG 31 could not attack, especially in the case of nuclear submarines. At first this task seems almost impossible, as the cruise missiles had a small radar signature and were still flying at altitude ultra low, but this is where an interceptor capable of operating at high altitude and it had an advanced radar with powerful capabilities had their chance of success, since the radar would detect the cruise missile for its upper area, and in any air vehicle its own upper surface is several times greater than its frontal area, as well as the fact that the MiG 31 was high altitude greatly diminish the appearance of the curvature of the planet in limiting the detection range of the cruise missile.

So have a missile that was capable of climbing at high altitudes and dive beneath the target greatly increases the probability of success, since in any event any aircraft or missile will always have a upper surface area greater than its front, and this is also valid for the interceptor, because in addition to increase the radar range of the interceptor actually be at high altitude and high speed itself increases the range of the missile carried by the same, as in many articles described Dr. Carlo Kopp. Another advantage of a missile that explores this concept as the retired AIM 54 and active R 33 or new R 37 are that the missile’s radar detects the target at a distance much greater than it would if it did fly straight in the target, because the upper surface, so the missile to correct its trajectory long before that if it did fly straight in the target, thereby increasing their reach and avoid losing speed when making high fast maneuvers, which can also cause loss of control of the missile or loose the target .The faster the approaching missile shorter the reaction time of the aircraft under attack.

Since the first study of military strategies, recalling The Art of War written by General Sun Tzu some thousands of years ago, it was observed during this period that those who occupy the heights always have the advantage in battle. Another important aspect is also has been observed since The Art of War is who could be more quick or fast to exploit opportunities or failures of the adversary always has the advantage of the victory in his side. Interestingly of those observation is that both the SR-71 Blackbird and the versions of the MiG 25 or MiG 31 has those aspects in their projects, even the F 14 Tomcat had taken, at least when armed with AIM 54 , this aspect too.

Although currently low detection radar is the most important aspect when considering the lethality of the new combat aircraft, it will most probable never be totally invisible to the means of detection once that it has been evolving also constantly. The General Sun Tzu also attached great value to the ability to not be detected by the opponent, but warned that by basing its strength largely in stealth it just might make your strategy predicable by the opponent if he learn how to discovery your stealth skills, and once this he could reach, its your greatest strength would be nullified even before being employed. The General Sun Tzu warned that has strength in his side will use the heights of sky while who has been weak in means would use the underground to evade from the strongest enemy.

There are several cases in the recent history that has proven this theory, but the stealth aspect in the project of the fighters today has been considered as essential, while the others parameters has become marginal, then with only stealth aspect would be possible not reach these both strategies, because the stealth aspect is more as technological progress than strategy advance. As was mentioned before, the stealth technology could be considered as advance, but when this technological steep forward from adversaries is placed as permanent advance in sacrifices from others aspects as performance capability as i.e. : range , ceiling and speed, its the same to put all eggs in the same basket. If something wrong could be happen with this basket as the remote possibility than it wont be anticipated the advances of the adversary, as the history has several i.e to show , all the eggs will be lost. It’s very usual to accept the technological advances as powerful tool to solve the present problems, and when this technological advance has promise the reduction of financial cost then has become irresistible. But if it has been demanded to exchange capabilities for technological advances as necessary, its time to review the project or the requirements, because something could be out the place.

Technology in several fields has been advancing very fast, but due to this many new technologies that today went to bed as futurists, tomorrow may be these same technologies could wake up already obsolete. In the case of those laws of physics remain the major laws that allow huge advantages or limitations depending on the circumstances in which it are employed, and probably will stand still for long time.

REFERENCES

ASAS – ASAS Magazine – http://www.revistasas.com.br

APA – Australian Power Analyzes Website – http://www.ausairpower.net

AIRFORCES – Air Forces Monthly Magazine – http://www.airforcesmonthly.com

GORDON, Yelfin. MiG 25 and MiG 31: Defensive Front Line. Leicester – UK: Midland Prublishing Limeted, 1997.

HACKETT, General Sir John, BARRACLOUGH, Brigadier Sir Jonh, BURROW, Sir Bernard, HUNT, Brigadier Keneneth, McGEOCH, Vice-Admiral Sir Ian, MACRAE, Norman, STRAWSON, Major-General John. THE THIRD WORD WAR – AUGUST 1985. New York – USA: Macmillan Publishing, 1978.

BOLLARDIÈRE, Jacques Paris, PRATS, Juan P. , KISTER, Pierre. THE WAR AND THE DISARM. Editions Grammont. Lausanne – France, 1979.

OVERSCAN’S GUIDE TO RUSSIAN MILITARY AVIONICS [email]-avionics@overscan.co.uk[/email]

WIKIPEDIA – Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia. http://www.wikipedia.com

MiG 25 FOXBAT – http://www.vectorsite.net

FAS – Federations of American Scientists – http://www.fas.org

Google Images: Imagery Sources – http://www.images.google.com

F 111B and F 14A armed with long range missiles AIM 54A Phoenix

F 14 Tomcat II armed with 06(six) long-range missiles AIM 54 Phoenix and probably 02(two) short-range missiles AIM 9 Sidewinder

http://aspirefsx.com/viewthread.php?tid=779

The first real launch of the AIM 54A Phoenix against a simulated target was made by a DA 3B Skywarrior in September 1966.

In 1969 tests had been started with AIM 54A Phoenix and AWG 9 radar with F 111B, and that same year the F 111B was able to perform the launch against multiples targets with four AIM 54A against four drones getting hits against all targets. The first system AWG 9 to F 14A Tomcat II was delivered in 1970 and production had begun in 1973 to AIM 54A.

In this case could ever say that the radar AWG 9 radar and AIM 54A Phoenix missiles were with its development more advanced than the F 14A in 1973.

As in case of confrontation with the MiG 25RB Foxbat during the Yom Kippur War in 1973 this would be done in long range interception with the use of AWG 9 radar and AIM 54A Phoenix missiles, its systems could be considered ready for real use in a emergency event.

The F 111B program that aimed to equip the USAF and USN with the same interceptor but was canceled in 1968 after seven prototypes had been built. The USAF had begun the development of the F 15A Eagle Program and the USN the F 14A Tomcat II Program to replace the F 111B.

F 111B armed with missiles of long-range AIM 54 Phoenix

http://tailhookdaily.typepad.com/tailhook_daily_briefing/2008/02/flightdeck-fr-1.html

Targets Engagement Areas

The USN antidote at that time-scale was the:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RIM-2_Terrier
when the US army had the
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MIM-14_Nike-Hercules

The SAM RIM 2 Terrier or RIM 8 Talos with maximum speed of Mach 2.5 would not be considered a great threat to the MiG 25 RB once would have a maximum speed of Mach 2.8 at an altitude of 20,000 m with a loading of the 5.0 t of free bombs.

Although the SAM RIM 2 Terrier and RIM 8 Talos could reached an altitude of 24.400 m, its range would be considerably reduced in face of the altitude of the MiG 25 RB, and those SAM’s could be effective against targets like the MiG 25RB only if it were very close to the ships that used those system. With those systems it would not be able to perform the air defense from area when it was attacked by MiG 25RB.

As for SAM Nike Hercules that was developed in order to intercept aircraft as strategic bombers Tu 95 Bear against North America and long-range attack aircraft as: Tu 16 Badger , Tu 22 Blinder, Tu 22M2 and Tu 22M3 Backfire, in air defense of important targest of the NATO. Against fighter as MiG 25RB Foxbat could be a possibity once the SAM Nike Hercules had a limited maneuver capabilties.

Israel has never bought the SAM Nike Hercules, and this was a system that used fixed sites that were not built in Israel, since Israel did not considerer a great threat the large-scale air strikes against the Israel until the war in 1973.

By the way there were just a small number of C-5A/C-141A transports unloading at Lod International Airport at the same time. Even when a hypothetical attack of some MiG-25RBs became reality the practical damage was limited when the political one was a desaster for the Soviets. The Soviets never operated their military aircraft under foreign command. Even the use of fake Egyptian markings had changed nothing about that! Sadat was seeking US support and had no intrest to attack US forces. The single hypothetical option was Syria to operate such MiG-25RBs from.

The MiG 25RB squad as attack aircraft could perform several missions along the war, which not only could destroy the transport aircraft on the ground as well as damage these airports that was reducing or even paralyzing the Nickel Glass Operation, once those transport aircrafts were loading with live ammunition.

In case of MiG 25RB were operated under the colors of the Egypt Air Force to the Soviet Union would be no disaster since both superpowers maximally helped its allies, and even the U.S. had sent F 4E Phantom II directly from their operational squad’s to replace losses from Israel, and it were employed by Israel during the battles still carrying the markings of the USAF.

War Fog

http://airbase.ru/sb/russia/mikoyan/mig/25/bm/indexe-t.htm

To be brief: About the reasons that the U.S. could had secretly send the new F 14A Tomcat II equipped with AIM 54A Phoenix missiles to protect the air bridge with military aid to Israel in 1973 during the Yom Kippur War. The presence of F 14A was aiming to protect the air transports as C 5A Galaxy and C 141 Starlifter of a possible attack by MiG 25 RB since the Soviet Union had operated the MiG 25 RB / P between 1971 and 1972 in Egypt.

How’s my fault for having wrong in the first place, it is my duty to repair the same ,since there is possible to visualize the nose of the MiG 27 in the photo to prove whether it is the version MiG 27K or MiG 27M, one indicating that it is the MiG 27M is that it does not has the fences in the top of the sleeve of the wings as the MiG 27K has .

The reason for those fences in MiG 27K could be attributed to providing better aerodynamic stability for the TV target laser designator Kaira 1, however when providing better aerodynamic stability reduces the maneuverability of the fighter.

Those fences also sheltered launchers of the chaff / flare but the shape and position of these were aimed to improving the stability for the weapon system and its precision in the attacks missions againt ground targets.

MiG 27K equipped with TV/Laser Designator Kaira 1 in the right photo and MiG 27M equipped with Laser Designator Klen in the left photo.

http://forums.eagle.ru/showthread.php?p=415777

Artist: unknown
Source: ‘Aviation and Cosmonautics’ 2004, No.11 (No.101)

http://wp.scn.ru/en/ww3/a/686/1/1

The Soviet Union would never admit that their aircraft had been operated in real missions during the Iran / Iraq War, since this would be a declaration of war against Iran.

In my humble opnion I do not believe that the nations that formed in the past the Soviet Union would be interested in confirming these actions today. How several people could have participated in this, problably some allegedly state about this but keeping their identities in secret, even with all political changes in these countries the Siberia territory has not changed, since it is remain cold as the time of the Soviet Union.

Many military strategists prefer to analyze weapons performance in real conditions or near it . The reason that even in the more elaborate testing situations, some parameters can not be simulated.

The most important of these is the interaction man / machine, which in a real combat human factor changes considerably, since in simulations are not trying to shoot and kill the human factor.

There is a term for this is that the war fog, due to which the performance of weapons is reduced because the real conditions of employment of the same

In the Soviet Union this emphasis on analysis in real conditions it were a tradition in much at the costly lessons of World War II.