TeerWhat reason do you have to say “no matter what difficulty Tajas had or have, AMCA will be a smooth run”? Do you say that because AMCA is an Indian project? Tejas has not had a smooth run. Unless much is changed in terms of setting goals and resourcing and managing the project, I think AMCA will encounter many problems and will certainly not have a smooth run.
It should have a smooth-er run as versus a smooth run, provided the IAF uses its brains and asks for something reasonable, as versus asking for the sun, skies and the moon. Based on whatever they read in AWST, Janes & the brochures peddled by assorted OEMs about their new 6th Gen aircraft.
Reasonable requirements are half the battle won.
The other three challenges, will be funding, technology, and manpower. This time around, hopefully, India will not be stingy with funds which directly affects the latter two quantities. And furthermore, the AMCA will be starting from a far better baseline than the Tejas ever did.
The key thing is to complete the Tejas MK1 & then the MK2 program. Even the MK1 will have given India invaluable experience through the whole of the design-test-development-certification process. Whereas the MK2 will give the crucial link to the AMCA.
Some technology for the AMCA will likely be incubated through the MK2, in particular stuff like displays, more intuitive mission software (including sensor fusion) & radar/EW tech.
In an interesting development – which directly ties to what the LCA has been for the Indian aerospace program (tech/experience generator), BEL has announced that it is codeveloping EW suites, with DARE (DRDO) for the Jaguar, Su-30 and MiG-29.
It was already known that the upgraded MiG-29 EW suite was an evolution of the suite developed for the LCA (and upgraded MiG-27). The Su-30 & Jaguar news is further to that. The Su-30 is being upgraded as part of the Super-30 program, and the Jaguars are going through their own DARIN-3 program. With new Adour engines, they should be fairly respectable strikers.
TeerThe basic problem with many Russian items now is their inability to meet original agreement.
The IAF is often getting frustrated by Russia’s inability to honor agreements with regards to easily available logistics, proper TOT & furthermore, their hard bargaining when the IAF walks back to them to resolve teething issues.
Problems get resolved, but the tough process makes it unattractive.
Time was, the IAF wanted western gear – the west acted snooty, the Russians stepped in, with “friendship prices” and even technologically leading gear – e.g. supersonic MiG-21s and the IAF’s move towards Soviet stuff was reinforced by political mandate.
But now, things are changing. You have the US, Europe, Israel all willing to sell to India. Indian industry has moved ahead by leaps and bounds, despite all the negative media hype, in terms of mission avionics, EW & sensors. Private industry is stepping into the gap of specialized items which require huge capital outlay.
What this means simply for Russia is that they need to capitalize on making their platforms as flexible as possible & ensure that cost wise, they are competitive. Flexibility means liberal incorporation of Indian & western subsystems as necessary, and proper TOT. The third, biggest issue is that they need to be reliable.
That means if they promise the IAF x MTBF, then the product better approach those standards & they should work on their own time, effort to get it to x if it does not meet x. If the IAF asked for spares for xyz flight hours, then those should reach the IAF in time without the IAF having to have its reps run around Russia & meet political leaders to expedite issues. Finally, if they say TOT to India, it should be done in timely fashion. Just taking it easy & blaming the Indian partner, when even the documentation is not ready in English, makes it very apparent that delaying tactics are in vogue.
Otherwise, the Americans will start taking away even platform deals. Subsystem deals are already lost to France, Israel & Indian industry. The Brahmos is the only one JV with Russia. Its instructive to note that for pretty much every radar system, EW system, avionics system – IAF has gone to France, Israel or looked to Indian MIC.
Rafale was the writing on the wall, MiG-35 was nowhere near the same level of sophistication. And even MiG-29 UPG has been delayed.
Now FGFA project & Su-30 MKI upgrade are potentially huge money spinners for Russian industry. Sukhoi has been ok so far, so hopefully they won’t mess it up.
But MTA project- quite frankly – its been far too much effort from the Indian side to negotiate workshare. There will be voices in India which ask industry to look towards Embraer & other airframers if this project does not get back on track. IJT has similarly been plagued by the AL-55 engine not being upto required spec.
Right now, the perception gaining ground, steadily, is that cheap prices alone cannot compensate for quality of service and reliability. This is something Russia must & should address.
At end of day, Russia and India have no political issues between them. This makes Russian products preferable for Indian sovereignty to a large extent
TeerThis inside information stuff is one more example of how rotten a section of the Indian military rtd apparatus has become. These are the guys who “leak” motivated information and deliberately sabotage local programs.
Nowadays, its very common for all these companies to hire these guys as local MDs, advisors and so forth.
Its really shameful to see how openly these folks try to influence the MOD and public perception, by openly touting unproven ware while downplaying attempts to either develop systems locally or by sabotaging the procurement procedure, when India puts tough conditions on transfer of tech, or offsets.
VK Singh – the IA chief ran afoul of this group of corrupt officers, and ultimately lost his job for being a whistleblower and embarrassing the INC Govt, which is busy embroiled in scam after scam. Such is the state of affairs
TeerThe Congress is the disaster that keeps on taking from the nation. 60 years of unbridled loot has not been enough.
They will keep sucking every asset to feed the system of politics of patronage, so that they can retain power and then loot more. Which means that state assets which are productive, or have potential, will never be funded to achieve breakthrough success.
But those which bring votes and are merely employment shops or methods to make commission money, will keep getting support.
TeerThe chances of a Russian engine, that too a Klimov making it to the Tejas or AMCA is very unlikely. The Klimov in particular has a pretty bad rep thanks to the issues with the MiG-29 early on. Hopefully the newer ones with the MiG-29 Upg will salvage that reputation.
A Russian engine by itself is unlikely, because without the AMCA, the Kaveri-Snecma variant will be left without a host platform, which has a production run est. at several hundred engines. A 150 MCA would translate to at least 300 engines, and of course more considering lifecycle replacements, on base spares etc.
I sincerely hope the IAF does not gild the lily with regards to requirements and accepts a straightforward, turbofan without any fancy TVC.
TeerWhat this thread started from are the usual rubbish from media reports which couldn’t tell a difference from a LCA or a MiG if both were given to them on a tray…and then there are the copy-paste sites like IDRW which either cook up stuff or plagiarize without an ounce of sense.
So you have the claim in this IDRW “report” of Tejas prototypes not being the same as each other. Common sense would have told these experts that the Tejas is WIP, with the MK1’s still receiving improvements – heck, a dedicated local AFCS was just developed & fielded last year! So how would one prototype be the same as a LSP, and even the LSPs will vary from type to type, till the MK1 configuration is frozen!
Net – to take a proper look at where Tejas is today, as versus the same old, same old of buying a Swedish or Rwandan or Martian fighter (which does nothing for India), we have to look at what the actual challenges are!!
So..
I would include inadequate and incompetent project management. For example appraisal and monitoring of Kaveri progress should have resulted in the project being frozen years earlier and outside expertise being sought IMO. When Tejas missed development time lines action should have been taken to investigate the reasons and measures taken to get the project back on schedule. Instead the project appeared to stagger on from missed target to missed target without anything being done to get a grip on the situation.
I hope the management of Mk2 will be better than that of Mk1.
These should also address your statements about project management! Unless you understand what the Tejas team faces in terms of challenges, you will not get where the program is.
First – the Tejas today!
There were several areas where the Tejas team had to develop world class capabilities from scratch.
– Airframe with highest/high portion of composites vis a vis even most contemporaries. Status? Achieved – and further improvements underway
– Complete glass cockpit with HOTAS/HUD etc- status? Achieved, and even IAF late requirements of HMDS incorporated. Please check the F-22 and other programs to see how much delay these can cause
– Radar: IAF initially asked for a simple AI radar with limited BVR capability; moved to significant BVR with SARH homers; moved to full MMR with significant A2G capability; Upgraded MMR requirement to include SAR! The previous configuration only had DBS and A2G ranging.
This is one of the key challenges for the Tejas because as late as a few years back, a combination of funding challenges & sanctions (post India’s nuclear test) meant that the flawed decision to assign the MMR to HAL (a firm with very limited focus on radar development) meant that they could not handle the subsystem challenges (signal processor mismatch) or develop the software to maturity! The radar itself was sanctioned more than a decade after the LCA program was launched!
So, only some 2-3 years back, did Elta get roped in to tackle the issue to utilize the tech India had already developed for the radar. Pretty much all the hardware, from the high gain antenna, to the rotational scanner (developed by BARC, a nuclear agency with experience in high speed motors), to the TWT and power units! Elta is basically taking the Indian components, adding its own signal processor (with a specific focus on A2G) and porting its Elta 2032/M software to this hybrid radar, for the first 40 MK1s.
The easy approach would have been to just ditch all the Indian radar subsystems (though they work and work well) and replace with an Elta 2032/M as on the DARIN-3 Jaguars and Sea Harriers. India is NOT taking this approach because the radar, remains in ADA control and can be customized further locally.
Furthermore, the MK2 is to have an AESA system, for which development has been shifted from HAL to LRDE, which is DRDO’s own radar specialist & which, by now, has significant experience with radars. Recognizing the challenges involving in producing compact fire control radar Tx/Rx modules, plus certifying the software, they will probably take consultancy. Again, this time around, the funding has been made available.
– Next: Avionics. Status, achieved, though the IAF will continue to ask for more & more as is usual ..so this is always a moving target. One of the core requirements of the LCA was that almost all the core items should be Indian, at the system/module integration level. This was achieved by the time of the TDs itself! But the IAF asked for a complete revamp to incorporate newer processors & architecture, to match what they saw on the Rafale/EF etc on the WW market. This too was done within 3 years. For instance, on the original LCA – you had dedicated mission computers, display processors, video switching units, digital map generators. Each with separate modules & processor units, all as separate boxed LRUs. In the current LCA, all these functions are now handled by a single OAC (Open Architecture Computer) running on high power processor cards, with another OAC on hot standby!
Next – late into the program, the IAF asked for the LCA to have an internal EW capability! Note – NO OTHER IAF aircraft – till date has had an internal EW capability from its procurement. The LCA team has certified both standard jammers & DARE (DRDO) has also developed a state of the art EW suite (high sensitivity multiple receivers connected to a matrix with multiple transmitters).
– Engineering Development: High level of maturity. As can be seen with the F-35, concurrent engineering is a big challenge for a densely packed platform. The LCA’s dense package comes from the IAF requirement that the LCA be small enough to fit into the MiG-21 footprint. Yet, it should have the performance of the Mirage 2000 and MiG-29, which were then the IAF’s best fighter class platforms.
As such Mirage 2000 and MiG-29 pilots were deputed to the ADA for both specifications & later on, for many other configuration decisions. This means that ADA has had to take far harder decisions than those with larger platforms. Small changes in the LCA mean complex changes throughout. To ADA/HAL’s credit, they have been managed inhouse. For instance, they redesigned/rerouted entire parts of the fuel system to avoid risk.
– Flight Control & Certification: WIP. This is the area where India had the least experience – remember, we just license built other folks aircraft, let alone build something as complex as a FBW system. So help was sought from the US for both the FCS hardware (actuators & flight control computer from MM and then LM), software (Martin Marietta then LM) and certification (BAE).
Lets take a look at what happened here. First, funding issues, slowing down the program at the beginning. When things picked up, by 1998, the sanctions stopped ALL consultancy with US vendors. The LCA team even so, did not stop the program – they actually indigenized the DFCC, replacing all the US systems with a new scratch built prototype (the US one was impounded by LM), set up a new control law team locally to develop the FBW software, and even traded actuator shipsets between both ground based rigs & flying aircraft, to keep the test program running. India lost a good 3 years here, but did not stop the program, as was the intent of the sanctions, to cancel the LCA for good!
BAE by the way, stopped their assistance, citing manpower issues for the EF program.
Effectively, this remains the LCA’s final hurdle, which is why the delays have come in. The delays were baked into the program at the time of the sanction and have just carried over.
Now – a WW RFP was sent out for consultancy to speed up testing & EADS has been signed up. Boeing which gave a presentation to India for being the chosen vendor, never responded to the RFP as they did not get clearance from the State Dept.
By 2008, as I recall, 85% of the flight envelope had been opened up by India alone, and AoA had approached the 20-22 deg mark.
Now, to get to the final 10-15% PLUS weapons configurations, EADS should be helping out.
Testing & certification with a FBW aircraft is NOT the same as with older aircraft. In those, you took them up, tested them (as long as structural limits held) and came back. With the LCA, each time they take any prototype up, the software is first reviewed multiple times, then run multiple times on the ground rig, finally put onto the test article (and remember, weights on these vary from other configurations) & flown. They are doing this with each & every test point on the chart. This is where EADS/BAE would help with “tribal knowledge”, i.e. you don’t need to test this “entire zone” because these “five test points” cover that sector.
This is the IOC requirement summed up, and with weapons involved – which again involve iterative additions to the radar & FCS code (to handle different configurations), the LCA MK1 will get FOC.
Right now, the pilots love the FBW and handling. Its all about opening the envelope, and not about any critical issues with the system itself.
– The engine! Contrary to belief here, the Kaveri program is no cause for delay now! Its been delinked from the program quite some time back, once funding was made available to order enough Ge404IN20s for the MK1 and enough have been ordered (as a first tranche) for the MK2 as well (99 engines, easily enough to cover 4 squadrons, spares plus those for prototypes).
As to why the program was linked heavily to the LCA, first- its a strategic program with no parallel elsewhere in the Indian MIC. No redundancy. If the LCA MMR was not sanctioned, there were always the naval airborne radars and later the CABS AEW&C to continue to build competence.
No such option exists for the Kaveri. But when funding became available, and the MOD saw the MOF would give it, they delinked the program to proceed on its own.
Net, to summarize!
The three key issues which the LCA team is working on (and will complete) are the Flight Envelope validation (fully opened up), and the weapons integration. For the first, including FBW tweaking to handle fuel/weight shifts- EADS has been hired as a consultant. India will do the work, but EADS basically is to tell them not to run after test points where time is wasted.
For the second, Elta is to ensure the radar works. For weapons integration – India now has three programs to draw on, the MiG-27, Jaguar and Shar upgrades. This is not going to be a showstopper.
Engineering development challenges can be handled locally.
Net – there is nothing now in the LCA program that is anywhere near the quantum of challenges that the ADA/HAL faced when starting this, or even when they were midway into the program in the early 2000’s. Right now, its just a matter of putting the nose to the grindstone, and completing the job.
The media is going to continue to carp and attack the program, copy paste sites like IDRW will then take that and run with it, but its come too far now to be stopped by any of this.
Last but not least – all those claims of LCA MK1 not meeting ASRs/IAF unhappy are just overwrought.. the LCA MK1 as it stands will handily outperform the bulk of the IAF fleet of MiG-21s and Jaguars in A2A and strike.
If it didn’t meet the overambitious requirements set out in the first tranche, that’s still ok. The LCA of the 80’s had to be as maneuverable as the MiG-29 with high ITRs of the Mirage 2000, and it had no HOBS missiles nor did it have a HMS.
The LCA of today has HOBs missiles (R-73E confirmed, Python reported) and an Elbit DASH HMDS. A couple of degrees in marginal STR is not a showstopper. Similarly, 8G versus 9G in its MK1 – especially given the kind of platforms the IAF is facing, the JF-17 which too has a 8G limitation, is again not an issue.
Are these my views alone? No. They are first hand from the test pilots whom I (and many others) met at a public industry event sometime back. They have no qualms about the combat performance of the LCA MK1 whatsoever.
Yes, the IAF HQ wants a perfect fighter. It has the world’s best toys available via import, and will not compromise. Thats tough for the developer, but still achievable. Because all said & done, the program is now a certainty, with 6 squadrons indented for (those 99 engines make the MK2 a reality as well) and funding for both MK1 and MK2 committed for by the GOI. Now, its just a matter of patience.
A lot of the stuff developed for the LCA is going to find its way onto the AMCA and before that, other IAF fighter programs as well as upgrades. There are folks who will get that done as well.
The biggest advantage for the AMCA will basically be all the lessons learnt in certification & having an ecosystem of developers who built 2Gen of products for the LCA. That is stuff India could not have ever achieved via buying a third party design.
When LCA started, India did not even have 1 MC of its own design. Today several firms can build Mission Computers for ADA (having worked on the LCA) and can code entire modules for subsystems. There are many software and hardware companies that have built stuff for the LCA, and then kept busy with upgrades.
Three years back, even Digital Map Generators – hitherto being imported from Israel as separate LRUs – were having a competition underway with 2 firms competed. With the missile program, India even has a local RLG-INS for serial production to replace the Sagem unit..
Right now, there is also talk of a LCA MK3. Apparently the IAF wants to really strengthen up against the PLAAF/PAF (hi-lo combo) and the LCA is its most cost effective choice.
However, one of the key advantages of the 5G program with Russia is the testing & certification part. Right now, India is at the test each & everything mode. Once experience builds up, and both databases and tribal knowledge exists – testing & certification will speed up. These can easily take off years off of a program.
That is going to be a key lesson learnt for the AMCA or whatever the IAF calls it..
TeerThis pretty reliable website (rafalenews.blogspot.com) says
Olivier Fourt, from RFI, has interviewed the team which will conduct experimentations in Mont-de-Marsan.
The interview reveals that the C137 will not keep its array : it will be unplugged to equip a two seater.
Interesting points (though only little is really new) :
range doubled (to about 200 km), compatible with the Meteor ;
submetric SAR imagery ;
eased maintainability ;
independent modules allow to assign them to different tasks ;
softwares automatically recognize the array which is totally plug-and-play ;
only 5 to 6 hours to unplug and re-plug the AESA array on another Rafale (even a PESA) ;
a few AESA per squadron may be enough, provided we use them for air superiority for example (AESA flying ahead, PESA behind…).
Is the 200 km range against a 3 sq mtr target? Because against a 5 sq mtr target, we know the Rafale PESA was reportedly 130-140 km detect (Serious Squall, Avionics Magazine)
TeerWhere is the evidence that Russia gets payment in tranches whereas rest get it up front? All vendors receive the payment per agreed upon contracts. These vary from deal to deal, but the basics remain the same, that we pay an initial amount up front, plus TOT fees.
Several errors in that report by Karnad above, don’t remember about the France not being helpful part, but the rest I can correct.
The grievous error in the control circuits or whatever, was basically the seeker side assembly had extra metal in it, which was machined out of the way by IAF engineering to fit the bomb to the IAF iron bombs
The LGBs were used along with Litening, not just dropped off using GPS guidance and dead reckoning. The fitment happened double quick
The LGBs did help at Muntho Dhalo as well. Litening equipped Mirage 2000s detected the camp and marked it with precise strikes. Only then did the MiGs & other fighters plaster the place. A Mirage pilot who led the strike remarked – the rock, flowed thank to the heat from explosions
TeerMore like the 57 became 71.
Its quite good, uprated engines, glass cockpit, weather radar, chaff, flares, extra armor around critical areas, NVG compatible with Gen3NVGs, has a waypoint nav system with autopilot, airconditioning.
Overall, brings the familiar ruggedness of the Mi-17 series which IAF is used to, with some useful new technology insertions.
With ALH and Mi-17V5, the IAF Heli fleet is definitely on a good upgrade.
We should get some IFR capable, really long range heavies as well, such as the Ch-53s, those would help for long range Special Op missions.
Interesting to see how secretive the IAF is about the Super-30 MKI upgrade, they are not releasing any info at all. Though, we do have info gathered from assorted organization reports, development programs.
TeerFrench test pilots who had tested the F-15 reported the M4000 as way superior.
Any more on this?
TeerWoohoo, so 12 gold plated AW-101s cleared double quick, with DIRCM and what not, while MOF rejected A330 success versus IL78 tankers on grounds of cost and forced a retender.
Quite similar to how the SPG prances about with designer eye wear and fashion coordinated tacticool armor, while NSG reinforcements in 26/11, after all with NSG meant for common public, even had WW2 style steel helmets.
The sheer venality and brazen ways of the current loot-maar UPA Govt never fail to “impress”. When it comes to saving their own skin, procurement gets cleared double quick, irrespective of how pricey and fancy it is. Everything else, gets stuck with a corruption tag (Barak-1 missiles f.e.) and has to either go through umpteen hurdles or get stuck on price irrespective of how important it is (Kaveri-Snecma deal or SRSAM anyone)?
Seriously, what a bunch of self aggrandizing clowns.
TeerIf the PAKFA has only 4 A2A BVR missiles (and the FGFA follows suit..), it will be truly disappointing and the space inside the aircraft bays would have been very inefficiently utilized. Hope Sukhoi does put an adapter for 3 missiles per bay. Reason being that all the BVR missiles spoken for the PAKFA till date are RF guided, and given the advances in LO and VLO tech., plus EW, RF BVR missiles remain uncertain against high grade targets. If multispectral BVR missiles were fielded, then I’d be a bit more certain about just having a loadout of 4 missiles for BVR.
Also have any LPI mode/s been reported for the NIIP radar? NIIP has given regular updates on radar tech, but LPI specific modes have not been mentioned so far, AFAIK
Also, any reports of active EW?
Some Indian articles have mentioned EW systems for the FGFA will be locally developed. EW (active) seem counter intuitive for a truly all aspect VLO fighter, but then makes me wonder whether a combination of EW and V/LO in the rear aspect is enough as versus a very expensive, total redesign of the fighter to achieve F-22 levels of shaping (flat nozzles etc., which come with a significant 10-15% loss of thrust). Loss of thrust to be compensated for by more powerful engines, means the PAKFAs fuel advantage (speculated in reports so far) may be lost.
TeerBlack Archer, excellent update!
42 – well, thats the number of Sukhois intended for the last batch! Incidentally, the same ones intended to be turned into Super Sukhois plus the first fifty that were imported at the beginning of the program!
216 Brahmos-ALCMs is a substantial number, and won’t be the end of it, since the MKI is to get an air launched Nirbhay variant as well, and possibly even a Prahaar derivative.
http://www.deccanchronicle.com/channels/nation/south/after-agni-v-nirbhay-test-bed-007
Nirbhay..
The air-launched version of Nirbhay for Su-30MKI aircraft of the Indian Air Force, would further accentuate the range and strike capability. Specifically designed for Su-30 MKI, this cruise missile is equipped with ‘loitering’ capabilities and is going to enhance the Indian/Russian BrahMos supersonic cruise missile by covering more distance.
Prahar..
http://tarmak007.blogspot.in/2011/12/prahaar-awaits-army-intent-drdo-luring.html
The missile is capable of carrying multiple warheads, has very fast reaction capability from mission command to execute the launch. “With all weather, day and night launch capability, Prahaar’s range, if launched from an aircraft (read as Sukhoi), can be extended up to 350 km. This is quite feasible as the missile has less weight, diameter and radar cross section.
The first program already exists, hope the IAF also clears the Prahar one.
Probably another distorted reporting from the former tank commander?…who btw cannot identify a T-72 (the very tank he supposedly commanded), the case being a Syrian T-72 exploding, which later turned out to be a western tank…after many posters pointed it out on his blog.
Supposedly commanded? He commanded 4 Horse, formerly Hodson’s Horse, retired in 2001, after being commissioned in 1979. So yes, he did command a T-72 and FYI, most tank commanders would be hard pressed to tell the differences between T-72 variants unlike the legions of fans on the net, who have a lot of time to spend doing this stuff. In real life, the average commander only cares about knowing the basics of what he is facing – how it looks, how it fights/moves (weaknesses, strengths, logistics). The data is given to them by MilIntel and analysts but cannot be parsed beyond a point. For instance, will a Pakistani tank commander distinguish between a first series T-90 received by India, or the second batch with a welded turret, or a third one with Indian armour components? He is unlikely to be able to make out the difference beyond a point, and nor will he care, they are all T-90s.
ADA is much more open and transparent to the Indian taxpayers, compared to say the CVRDE and their mess. I hope CVRDE put forward such a detailed list of components for the Arjun MBT that need to be indigenously made. Will we ever see that happen?
On the contrary, you couldn’t be more wrong. Clearly, you haven’t followed the Arjun program. The import content in Arjun is well documented and known for eons, thanks to multiple audits, CVRDE depositions and media reports. And that CVRDE has been working with severe limitations thanks to the fact that the Army puts piecemeal orders for limited numbers of tanks, which makes indigenization beyond the 40% by value level challenging (in LRUs, the Arjun has more than 50% local, but in value, the high cost of the power pack – engine, transmission, plus the GMS, GCS takes up the disproportionate amount).
ADA is able to launch an indigenization drive because they have 40 confirmed orders apart from the prototypes, and a follow on series production of 100 aircraft plus for the MK2 (83 minimum for the AF, and around 2 squadrons for the Navy). Plus AF needs may ensure numbers may rise. Given the depth of support from HAL, BEL, plus the programs already underway for similar series upgrades in the IAF, the volumes for the LCA stack up. This is not the case for the Arjun, which has unique LRUs.
DA have put up the list of LRU’s to be indigenously made and this could be the best opportunity for the private/public companies with the required capability and skill to join the aviation sector and make the industrial base stronger. The process is going to help make the ADA/HAL/Indian aviation industries in a better position to contribute in much better value to ongoing & future projects, including the PAK-FA/FFGA. I wish everything go smoothly.
53% localization in the LRU count at the advanced prototype stage, after all the additional items the IAF has asked for, above and beyond the original plans, is fairly creditable.
Several of these LRUs shown as imported for the LCA – e.g. the RWR LRUs, antenna, SFA are already made in India for other IAF programs from local development e.g. cavity backed antenna for the new IAF RWRs developed by DRDO. Similarly, there at least 2 companies which make antennae for TACAN, VOR/ILS etc.
This list appears to be a combination of things which are not yet made in India (e.g. ejection seats) plus others which are made locally, but not yet for the LSPs, opened up as a public RFI/RFP to broadbase the existing supplier network (as versus releasing the PO to just the existing local vendors for the other IAF programs).
A reasonable approach.
TeerBTW, another point in the interview about how intensive the IAF curriculum is: 20 flights per month, twice a day, per MiG-21 pilot according to the IAF Chief of Air Staff.
That’s 240 hours a year per MiG-21 pilot. The average MiG-21 sortie is around half a hour.
The CAG mentions that the minimum standards set for the MiG-29 fleet in 1985 were 180 hours for the single seaters and 240 for the dual seaters.
At Cope India 2, at KKD, F-16 pilots noted they had conversed with IAF Wing Co’s and others with 300-350 hours per year on the Su-30 MKI.
The point is the IAF flies extensively and can hence recognize the value of a platform and adopt accordingly.
Fairly certain that the Phalcons have been used extensively as well, and more will be procured soon.
TeerThank you for the informative post Teer. However, I am not entirely convinced, and feel that Jang does have a point. The fleet seems rather top heavy, and will cost a fortune to maintain and keep up during war as well.
I strongly feel that the IAF tendency towards heavier birds is not a deliberate decision out of some sudden necessity to deal with PLAAF flankers/J10; it stems more from a desperation that the GOI’s procurement policy has forced upon the AF. With delays in the LCA and MRCA (again the original requirement was for single engined M2Ks, which I find hard to believe has suddenly changed to twin engined heavies due to strategic reasons. This change is itself reflective of the pathetic decision making/unnecessary interference of the GOI as evident by its opening up of the MRCA race). They have effectively screwed the IAF imvho.
Cain, that desparation stuff is just a complete misreading of the situation. If the IAF was desparate for fighters and did not want heavies, then why ask for extra Su-30 MKIs as versus Mirage 2000s! Or even refurbed MiG-29s, both of which would come in cheaper or at best, at parity. The IAF deliberately ignored both options and has chosen not to press even the Qatar procurement.
The IAF is a professional AF that constantly re-evaluates its requirements and has been very conscious about what is going on up north and even with pakistan. It has moved to the Su-30 MKI because all the way from Krishnaswamy’s time, the IAF realized that to project power it needed heavy fighters. And it has to operate within a 39.5 squadron cap – only lately relaxed by a few squadrons
While delays have meant that the need for Su-30MKIs have become more urgent, the overall need for them has been driven by the understanding that heavy fighters bring more value overall in terms of flexibility.
What you must understand is that if the IAF wants to use the Su-30 MKI for even short range actions, and hence ensure its fighters are configured for limited AUW and hence available for free maneuvering for the word go, instead of the typical long range BVR-heavy armament carrying profile, even that is possible. Which is why the IAF has based even MKIs at tactical forward AFB in Rajasthan and elsewhere.
On the other hand, a light fighter cannot do the typical heavy role of long range strike, with all pylons occupied, without significant supporting assets! The IAF has war time experience, and knows how scarce these “silver bullet” become in a conflict!
Point is the more PAF and PLAAF field in terms of a combined medium fighter force plus heavies in PLAAF, the IAF needs a force structure that can match and outfight both!!
It will never have numbers on its side, so it needs capabilities, both by platform size and technology.
Which is why whimsical suggestions to restart the MiG-21 line, buy Gripens etc went nowhere. The IAF firmly rejected these suggestions. The latter after a comprehensive evaluation, which proved (yet again), that heavier fighters brought more range/payload to the table overall.
Now, the MMRCA – it is actually to the IAF (and the Indian taxpayers great benefit) that the MMRCA came about and India did not procure the Mirage 2000. Lets be honest, the plane is limited in many ways to face future threats in the 2020 timeframe – advanced medium fighters and Integrated Air Defenses. It can take on Pakistan, but it will struggle against PLAAF’s AD Network when carrying a heavy payload!
India effectively bypassed a procurement of yesterdays fighter – in its final stage of modernization – the Mirage 2000-5, and went for a truly competitive platform which will remain viable for the next 30-40 years, because it is the primary product for another AF which too will invest in its modernization. With the Mirage 2000, India would be locked into a platform for which only it would pay for its continued modernization and support! Unlike the Flanker class platform, even advanced variants were unlikely to appear to allow for continued production of key subsystems and spares.
IIRC, this desperation was clearly seen when ACM Tyagi wrote a personal letter to the higher ups explaining the floundering situation and hence “begged” for additional MKIs circa 2007.
The bigger point is that he did not ask for other platforms. He asked for MKIs because the MKIs bring far more to the table than any other plane in the IAF inventory today.
Had it been otherwise, the IAF would not have been clamoring for single engined M2ks throughout the 90s and well into the 2000s. The PLAAF had made its commitment to flanker types and J10s in the early 90s, and AFAIK, the IAF didn’t at the time start looking for heavies, they stuck to their demand for the M2k. The MKI was a result of M2ks simply being far too expensive.
That’s just a faulty interpretation of how things turned out i am afraid. The IAF clamored for single engined M2Ks because they were a quick way to boost a declining inventory, and because they were still becoming familiar with the MKI. Meanwhile the M2K was a mature asset that had proved itself well at Kargil. Once they did understand the potential of the MKI, and became more and more confident of the type, they started making it the center piece of their recapitalization. Note the M2K procurement would have come with manufacture in India and driven costs down.
Once the MKI line stabilized, feedback started coming in from the units, the IAF quickly realized that it had a winner on its hands and the shift towards heavies became firmly established!
You have to understand the IAF wants a minimum 45 squadron force, with 60 being the actual requirement to take on both the PLAAF and PAF. Given the tardy procurement procedures, the modernization of both forces, and finally the current cap on squadron limits at the 42-44 squadron level, the IAF needs a force which has the numbers AND the capability, even as its supporting assets slowly build up. That means heavy fighters, with medium/light fighters which are as modern as possible.
The era of MiG-21s, cheap “swarming” etc is firmly over.
Of course, the MKI procurement worked out for the IAF in more ways that one by not only stemming the tide in terms of numbers but also providing an offensive capability that no single engined fighter could match. However, a sudden shift in IAF posture, which has always seemed q somewhat defensive/holding out pattern vis a vis the Chinese+Pak combine, into an “offence is the best defence” type of strategy seems unrealistic. War time constraints, esp. if it is a long drawn two front war (their worst nightmare) will inevitably force the IAF into a defensive posture, and lighter birds would be of great value at such times.
Somewhat defensive/holding out posture and a move to offense being a sudden shift? Boss, the IAF has always been an offensive force in terms of its doctrine and thinking, all the way to 71 and that too from lessons learnt before..
From 2003 – 9 years back:
http://www.frontlineonnet.com/fl2015/stories/20030801006410100.htm
`We are a totally offensive force’
Interview with Air Chief Marshal S. Krishnaswamy.
Is not the IAF’s operational ethos more defence-oriented?
That’s not true. The IAF is more strike-oriented. Look at our inventory: MiG-23s, MiG-27s, Jaguars, all strike aircraft. Mirage 2000 is a multi-role aircraft. So is the Su-30MKI, which can carry 8 tonnes of weapons load. MiG-21 (Bison) is again multi-role; it can drop PGM (precision-guided munition) and has precision attack capabilities. MiG-21(Bis), although we are using it for air defence, is a short-role, multi-role aircraft. Even during the Kargil operations we performed a role that was more strike than air defence. The IAF has pure air defence aircraft like MiG-29s, pure strike aircraft and ones with multi-role.
But is the orientation towards air defence and close air support and not offensive warfare?
Besides our inventory, our posture should make it obvious that our orientation is definitely to strike. We believe that defence does not win the war. We are a totally offensive air force. If the IAF is built around defence, it is a total waste of tax-payers’ money.
The IAF was basically a very strike heavy air arm which realized all the way from 1965, that airpower is basically meant to influence decisions on the ground! Which means strike!!
Its modernization plans to bring in more PGMs and self defense aids were scuppered by bureaucrats, otherwise by Kargil, many more elements of the fleet would have been PGM armed with greater stocks.
Thereafter, it took off, thanks to NDA investment, and with political savvy, the IAF has managed to even pass these through the sclerotic UPA.
This is also why the Rafale is such a big deal for the IAF. That brings in a plane which can do both AD & strike, with equal capabilities in either. The LCA evolution to the MK2 must also be seen in that light. At 9.5 T clean & a 90KN engine, its MK1 version can puts the vast inventory of the IAF’s earlier light fighter standard, the MiG-21 to shame. But the IAF wants more, it wants a completely MR platform!!
Also, for current doctrine, look at what Naik has said – he clearly mentions long range fighters with ability for transoceanic reach etc since IAF has to protect India’s sea lines of communication and also project power!!
Every time, the IAF has been exposed to newer capabilities and technologies, it has promptly changed its original plans and sought to acquire them.
Take a look at the AWACS agenda as well. The IAF only asked for 3 Phalcons to begin with and then 3 DRDO AEW&C. Now they are asking for 2 more of the former, several more of the latter, with a new Project India for a Phalcon class platform in the works.
The IAF has many flaws too – one of the biggest ones is the lack of a dedicated product development and management organization which means its lack the ability to foster local development of technology inhouse in a timely manner, but it does quickly move in terms of deciding its equipment requirements if it finds something better.
This tendency towards heavies needs to be seen in the light of certain other requirements too:
1) What about QRA and point defence? The 21 played this role perfectly, will it be completely given to a fleet of MRCA/LCA in the future along with a more robust SAM network?
All fighters will pull all sorts of responsibilities. If there are no MRCA/LCAs in theater, do you think there will be no QRA? Clearly not, right.
The IAF will make sure lightly loaded Su-30 MKIs are available for that purpose! It will work its processes to ensure that it can compensate.
Second, please realize that the IAF’s robust SAM network built around SA-3 Pechoras was a workaround the 39.5 squadron cap (relaxed in recent years to a 42-44 squadron level).
So it raised huge numbers of squadrons (30 as I remember) of Pechoras with 2 firing units each to compensate. Now, these will be supplanted by a combination of Akash and MR/LRSAM units.
But overall, the IAF will anyday prefer fighters because SAMs are static and defensive, not offensive weapons.
The aim of the IAF, as is clear from the upgrades, is to move to an ALL multirole fleet, wherever and whenever possible, so that one platform can do it all. They will task some units with primary responsibilities, but secondary abilities will be trained for. Even the MiG-29 upgrade has moved on from the primary AD role envisaged in 2000, to a full Multirole platform now.
2) It seems extra ordinary that the mighty USAF and even the VVS in its prime, chose to have a much higher proportion of light figthers than heavies such as the F-15, and surely they were far better prepared to support their fleets than India presently is.
They could afford huge numbers to compensate for smaller numbers of heavy fighters. India has a squadron cap and must optimize accordingly. If the CCS/GOI relax the cap to a 60 squadron force, expect some 10 more squadrons of light fighters.
The leaning towards heavy fighters seems a result of working with rather limited choices/constraints available rather than some need to match some strategic security situation. No doubt the IAF is doing the best it can under the circumstances, but it seems like a grasp for a lifeline from a starved foce (no doubt as professionally done as possible, doubt anyone could do it better) rather than a confident step towards the future by a well catered for service.
That’s your perception since you have come to the predefined conclusion that the IAF is a victim that can only react to external stimuli but is unable to set/shape the agenda in its own terms.
However, the thing is that the IAF has long been an organization, that despite all sorts of external requirements, savvily navigates its requirements through the corridors of a political apparatus to suit its own agenda.
About the only area where they were noticeably stuck was the AJT deal, and even there, they actually took Su-30s over the AJT when funds became available, banking on the assumption – eventually proven true – that even AJTs would be financed by a growing Indian economy. The LCA delay was used to push the MRCA and then the MMRCA deal and even that has gone through.
If the Army was half as savvy as the IAF let alone the Navy, it too would have modernized much faster.
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