@Teer
A well considered post. It’s rare these days that such well thought through and explained posts are written here. So from me a thumbs up.:)

Thanks ! 🙂

And this is from web-archive of Overscans avionics page.

N019 is the USSR standard model.

N019EA is the version supplied to Warsaw Pact countries. Lacks “SP” mode.

N019EB is an export variant for general export. More downgraded. Less capable TS100.02.06 digital processor. Also lacks “SP” mode.

N019M is an updated version, developed as a response to the compromise of the N-019 radar by a US spy. Tested from 1986, it entered limited production in 1991. Slightly lighter than the N-019 at 350kg. N019 has increased ECM resistance, new software, and a more advanced built-in monitoring system. A new Ts101M computer relieves the processor overload problems of the N019, more than doubling capacity to 400,000 operations per second whilst weighing less, just 19kg, and with doubled MTBF of 1000h compared to the 500h of the Ts100. N019M allows two targets to be engaged by active radar homing missiles simultaneously. Range increased slightly to 80km. Originally intended to be fitted to the existing MiG-29 fleet as an upgrade, about 22 aircraft with N019M are thought to have entered service with the VVS.

N019ME Topaz Export version of Topaz, slightly downgraded. All Indian MiG-29s have been upgraded to this standard.

Basically, all the constraints mentioned above were relevant to the VVS bar 22 airframes, for a while at least. The SP mode mentioned is a free search mode (probably volume search) and the radar display/ergonomics issues associated with overall fit, plus the lack of SA when SNP/TWS mode went to STT mentioned would remain.

From day one the N001 radar in the Su-27 shared a great deal of commonality with the MiG-29’s N019 radar. They share the same digital processors C-100, regimes have almost exact user interface and cockpit fiddling. Both the N019 (MiG-29)and the N001 (Su-27) radars automatically switch to STT mode while loosing other targets Track-While-Scan ability (called SNP on both radars) prior to missile launch, because they were designed at a time where only SARH missiles were available. The N001 is basically an upscaled Mig-29 radar regarding design with the same functionality.
Therefore saying Overall it is a much better system is not truth.

No, please check this up. The MiG-29 and Su-27 system are similar and their common base of tech is well known, but a crucial difference AFAIK, is that the Su-27 system continues to display the TWS targets in SNP while the MiG-29s original N019 did not. That was a big deal. BTW, in Indian service, the MiG-29s did see a limited upgrade later, so this issue was presumably solved, but the N001 did not have this problem early on.

In fact, this is what I have in my notes regarding how the Su-27 system was overall more sophisticated – I think the poster was Pit (who corroborated what i was informed by actual crew)

With N-001 and Narciss-M display system much of the so called “processing limitations” were gone. Targets that appears in the IPV-1 CRT being “SnPed” show you its danger classification (from number 1 to 10 based on Vc to your aircraft or range to your aircraft), speed vector, heading and altitude vector. If you’re using datalink ops with K-DlA or you start to interrogate each contact you can also get unknown (target not interrogated), friendly (possitive IFF return) or enemy (negative IFF return) ID tags. If you’re working as a wingman in datalink ops you will receive also what is the priority of the engagement (to the other side of the danger clasiffication of each target will appear a number, if it’s “1” that’s your designated target, you will also check in the right side of display a series of numbers that gives you an idea of the priority of attack, it shows you the number of the target to engange in order, per example “3”, “6”, “9”, “1”.

If you’re working with the K-DlA activated in group modes (2 aircrafts, 4 aicrafts, 16 aircrafts) you also get the position, speed vector, altitude vector and heading (plus number ID) of your connected wingman/leaders. That helps you a lot in building SA.

MiG-31’s display systems are pretty similar, actually Su-27S datalink is better than APD-518 of MiG-31, it’s more capable, allows more connected fighters, higher data rates…

Off course with MiG-29 you have much simpler system, you don’t have any “fancy” symbology for contacts no matter if they’re tracked or detected, you don’t get speed vectors, nor heading neither altitude vectors. It’s like running in a digital Phantom II’s APQ-120 without all the garbage clutter.

And western pilots who operate teen and Mirage-2000/Tornado F3 fighters don’t like that!.

I think that’s a quite narrow-minded view on things, the range was according to requirements for a point-defense fighter and not long range interceptor, the design then have been due these requirements. As a twin engined “Advanced Lightweight Tactical Fighter” you just do not have much space as on board much bigger Su-27. In mid 80ies they built an upgraded Mig-29M with also significantly increased internal fuel capacity in the dorsal spine(do not mistake with the Mig-29SMT) and LERXs fuel tank, do you at least care about history staying unbiased when writting such things?

Martinez, you can complain about “narrow minded” and “history staying unbiased” or you can try and understand the simple point being made that the MiG team screwed up by sticking to an overly restrictive set of requirements limiting the usage of the fighter. In which case, the “narrow minded” people at MiG stuck to a very bizarre requirement of limited range and hence hobbled their aircraft to become a glorified short range hot rod. They also did not pay adequate attention to the cockpit and weapons systems either apparently as the Su-27 pilots find the latter ahead. The result is that an otherwise excellent airframe is severely limited when an offensive AF tries to exploit it for multiple air dominance, or air superiority missions.

Flanker was/is ahead of its time mostly due to space inside the fuselage and wings offering large fuel capacity/range, various avionics upgrades without drastic structural changes(Su-35BM), but curiously without any advanced CFRP materials saving weight used as in the older and smaller Mig-29. [/b]Of course also due to external hardpoints able to carry much more than Mig-29. [/b]

Glad we agree. The Flanker design, from day one had most things right, as a result of which even legacy Flankers remain potent threats today.

These are typical words from a businessman, there is a saying “after a battle everyone is a general”.

And MiG and its fans should learn that selling aircraft is a business, not a hobby!

Professional AF’s with large fleets follow practises that are very business like and could actually teach businesses, they have to show the capex, operational cost to their respective ministries, they have to optimize supply chains and deliveries, those countries in a high threat environment like India, where war can break out any other year, have to make sure their inventory of spares is available and the aircraft downtime is minimum.

And MiG has failed its customer repeatedly, as far as Indian experience is concerned. So much so, that the “love for all things Russian”, transferred to Sukhoi, and has remained there.

It could seem that both Mig and Sukhoi had same start line in the world aircraft bussiness after SU dissolution and as it turned out Mig management failed to find key customers or export contracts as Sukhoi did. Why?
The reasoning is simple, when Russian and other Warsaw Pact airforces cancelled large orders for new Migs-29 in 1990, Russian AF even lost interest/funding in deeply upgraded Mig-29M version (BTW. much more advanced than Sukhois delivered to India and China in 90ies) and decided to support Su-27 only, MiG had to turn down production lines bcs of full stocks with no foreign customers available at that time. Anyway, what new customer buys an aircraft which is no longer in production? It is simple as that, if you do not have aircraft production, you can hardly sell to a new customer, you do not earn big money, you hardly invest into polishing customer relationships or aircraft upgrades.

Now look who is reinventing history :p – did the Su-30 MKI even have a single customer before the IAF purchased it?! Clearly you didnt follow the history of the deal. The excuses you have listed out for MiG is huge, and yes, some of these problems were valid, but they clearly dont absolve MiG for its lackluster approach.

The fact remains that Sukhoi signed on the Su-30 MKI with India ASAP, got the deal through very restrictive Russian export clearances and the deal began as a political sop to help Russian business and to keep India & Russia ties ongoing. The Indian AF was not content to get into just a political deal however, and ensured that they chose a plane which met their needs and was better than the then Mirage 2000-5, and when they realized that the Su-30K was actually behind in many respects in systems ability, the Su-30 MKI was born.

And Sukhoi responded. Overall, they changed their thought process, included Indian made and CFE (Customer Furnished Eqpt) to put into the Su-30MKI, plundered the kitchen sink and then some to put everything they had via the then Su-35 program to put into the program, and Indian payments helped the process.

In contrast, MiG sat on its hands when India approached it to set up local spares production in India (because MiG claimed it could no longer guarantee spares supply)

-refused to part with design data when India, frustrated, said it would make the spares on its own, but needed MiG to assist in the process

– was very blase about addressing concerns with product quality of both airframe and aggregates (and whenever India complained, it pushed back with more and more about contractual provisos, how the deal was in FSU times, times had changed etc) and then hiked prices.

Basically, it did all it could to treat the customer as a cash cow, and as a truant child who did not know what was good for him.

Several IAF Chiefs of Air Staff, who loved the MiG-21 as an airplane, grew so fed up, when they were asked about the MiGs, they’d raise this issue.

When India’s challenges with the MiG fleet were at their highest, MiG was busy holding press conferences in Russia blaming the customer! They even went so far as to blame the IAF for buying spares from the dastardly, evil East Europeans.

Whereupon, the then IAF Air Attache made the acerbic comment, that if MiG knew there were things called spares and provided them to customers, these problems would not arise.

Finally, especially for the MiG-29s and MiG-23s, India started making spares in-house. When your customer has to go through all these problems just to keep its investment operational, then yeah, its high time MiG realized that its a business and professional customers do expect proper business like terms.

Thing is in old times, eg Soviet Union times, these problems could be solved with diplomat-ese and making the right phone calls, but now with everything related to Russian MIC, the answer is, times have changed, its business. But if you are doing business, then please do it properly.

MiG didnt manufacture all spare parts and agreggates, for that are subcontractors, but if they cancelled production as well, you`re dependent on doubtful stocks across the Russia. Comparing to that Sukhoi made large bussines with India and China and was practically healed in 90ies. Even today large countries are showing interest for the Su-27, bcs it is still being produced for so many years.

Agreed, but its not just spares, its the attitude.

When IAF raised design issues with MiGs, they were not just stonewalled, they were ignored. Denial only goes so far. Issues with MiGs include MiG-21s, 23s (a big challenge) and 27. MiG-23 was especially a problem since it was not produced in India, so there was lack of product documentation beyond the maintenance manuals and design data on several subsystems was not available.

MiG failed to address issues on its own, would not work with the Indian side adequately, unless pushed heavily. Only some of these things can be blamed on chaos post Soviet Union breakup. There was also an attitude issue underway.

Even with the MiG-21, as mentioned earlier, problems persist, and for which local solutions were found.

See, when a company is in trouble, it has to do far more to survive. Here, in India, the long arm of the Govt protected several firms as state owned enterprises. Over the past two decades, things have changed appreciably, and these companies like Keltron, ECIL etc have had to compete for business, win it, and then sustain it. They have done so. Others have failed (when they ignored the customer needs and didn’t bother to change).

Point is what MiG went through was hard, but its attitude (or at least that of some key people in the organization) was shambolic.

Holding press conferences attacking the customer, is not a way to win hearts or solve problems.

Things came to such a pass, that instead of giving the MiG-27 upgrade contract to Russia, India went for a limited upgrade at HAL, where even without full access to design data they did what they could to add modern capabilities.

Now, the fleet is due to be retired, without re-lifing, this despite the fact that many pilots liked it, it is a tough useful bird.

Clearly, the IAF wants all its MiGs out, and considers keeping them around, far too much trouble. The era of MiGs is hence coming to a close in the IAF, which is a shame, because if MiG had played its cards right, India could be a customer & a financier of MiG corporation.

Instead all that money is going to Sukhoi. Google up the Super-30 upgrade. The IAF is planning to upgrade its Sukhois and also work towards the FGFA. MiG gets peanuts for ~65 MiG-29s.

I agree, they treat customers very badly not only in India, but I see it as a result of the “causality” I described above. There exist some other joint venture companies close to MiG, established by their former personnel claiming to support maintenance and spare parts across their target region, but their acting is even worse that of MiG itself. What is interesting, I also talked to MiG maintainers working in India complaining about the way Indians are carrying about the Mig-29, disregarding operation and maintenance instructions, cheating with aggregates when they returned back from Russia after GO. Indians complained they are not working while sending back to Russia different ones….??..:)

The last line is actually typical of MiG. They refused to solve problems, the customer finds his own solutions, and then they accuse the customer of “cheating”, which is a typical case of engaging in buck passing.

If you get a product that does not meet even a bare minimum of what you require in some cases, the OEM refuses to help and you undertake whatever measures to keep the fleet operational..and then the OEM promptly uses that as an excuse to claim the warranty conditions are changed etc and similar legalese to avoid its share of the work.

When the IAF has had to set up its own facilities at BRD, that make some ~40-60% of most mission spares, getting upto 96% of mandatory spares. (http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/IAF/Today/Unit-Articles/336-11BRD.html)

The problem is simple – first ask extortionate prices, then under deliver, repeatedly, forcing the customer to look within.

Unfortunately, that is the story of MiG in India, at least after the Soviet Union breakup. Before, India could put up with niggles in attitude because all said and done, the planes were really good and dirt cheap (Russia offered early MiG-21s almost free), the spares were available, and the boost to combat capability still offered bang for buck. After FSU breakup, everything is market price or extortionate, needs are not met anyways, so why stick with them!

We even have one specific problem regarding Mig-29 spare parts in my country region. Most of the money our airforce is spending on spare parts is consumed by some civil bussiness companies providing after-sales service and specialized maintenancefor the Mig-29. Sometimes it ends up in the way, that airforce pays for RD-33 overhauls, but they return back from Russia with all that cracks, damaged and burned out blades than before. Then it is found out that Russian engine overhauling company received money for only revision and engine functional tests…:D:D. Hopefully you are well aware of both sides of he coin, when so eagerly complaining about the problems with MiG service.;)

Martinez, I have sympathies for MiG in that it is working across multiple organizations and has problems in owning the product, but what I really can’t excuse is their habit to pass the blame on the customer, when things like above happen.

Ownership was lacking from MiG, but is expected. When Dassault, EADS approached India for the MMRCA, or Boeing et al, they came with Govt assurances, and also brought all their suppliers along to ensure their was transparency. The airframer “owns” the product or at least works towards getting problems resolved.

quoting from a letter written by Yuriy Malakhov, chairman of the Engineering Center of the Experimental-Design Bureau (OKB) named for A. I. Mikoyan in 2011

“The situation taking shape in our engineering center forced me to write this letter. We’ve always been the brain of the company, it’s right here that new aircraft models were developed. For a long time, we’ve had no new orders. In the past five years, six general directors have been replaced, they all come from the Sukhoy company, and the impression’s created that they are strangling us, they want to close our company. All the best orders go there [Sukhoy]. For example, we aren’t even allowed to participate in developing unmanned aerial vehicles. Sukhoy is working on them, but this aircraft company doesn’t have our experience. They focused on heavy fighters. The pay of our colleagues is lower than in the trolleybus yard next door…….
http://russiandefpolicy.wordpress.com/tag/mapo/

That’s sad but it still does not explain how shoddily they treated the IAF with its MiG-21s, 23/27s and 29s. Sukhoi cannot be blamed for going back in time and messing up things, can they.

The problems above could relate to getting new business and working on new programs from 2006 (as mentioned above). India’s problems with MiG have been around for several decades now. (http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/MONITOR/ISSUE5-1/suresh.html

PS KS Suresh was himself a Hunter and MiG-21 pilot and also worked with HAL, one of the rare people who bridged piloting and moved to engineering/production successfully. The entire article is a defense of the MiG-21 as a platform, but look at this part.

The Russians used this occasion to hit back at the IAF, holding it mainly responsible for the high rate of accidents. Perhaps for the first and only time in a relationship going back four decades; they blamed India for the frequent crashes of its MiG fighter aircraft and “delivering a heavy blow to MiG’s reputation around the world”. A senior MiG executive, Vladimir Zhukovsky, accused India of “creating conditions for frequent crashes by buying low quality spares” from Ukraine and East European countries. “At times, it even buys spares that have outlived their utility,” he is reported to have told media persons at the MAKS-2001 International Air show at a Moscow suburb.

Many in the country fell for the Russian allegation and some sections of the press went hammer and tongs to emphasize that all accidents were a result of poor quality of spares. Unfortunately, neither Air HQ nor MoD refuted these to state that there was no correlation between quality of spares and accidents. But the Russian allegations did not go completely unchallenged, as retired officers are not restricted in their access to the press.

IAF faced a critical spare parts crunch after the collapse of USSR when Air Chief Marshal SK Kaul was the CAS. Now retired, he dismissed the Russian outburst as “an old MiG ploy. MiGs were crashing even when the USSR was supplying spares. They never admit that the design is bad, and quickly blame crashes on bad maintenance”. Air Chief Marshal Kaul also questioned the need to make so many modifications in the MiG-21, the mainstay of the IAF, “if there were no design problems”. His successor, Air Chief Marshal (Retd) S K Sareen singled out MiG-27 ground-attack aircraft for “design inadequacies”. Air Chief Marshal Sareen disclosed that India was forced to look elsewhere when the “Russians started taking us for a ride by overcharging up to four times. This forced India to shop for spares in the East European market. “They had the same kind of weapon systems as ours, had reduced their forces almost overnight by half, and had surplus spares to offer,” he recalls. Some of the parts were made available by cannibalizing aircraft. “But these were purchased after stringent quality control checks,” Unofficially, the former Chiefs must have viewed the Russian outburst as a “desperate sales pitch”.

…what I can add to the above, having spoken to the front line maintenance staff of the IAF at the time, the issue was not just of the price, the issue was even what came, did not work!

And when design issues were pointed out – after all, to be fair, these planes were designed for Europe, and intense usage (IAF was flying 180 hours per year+ on MiG-21, 360 landing-take off cycles), the response was usually, dont bother us, or its all your fault..

This is our initial MiG-29 experience.

The Indian Air Force (InAF) MiG-29 Experience:

The Comptroller and Auditor General of India published on 31March1993 the results of an in depth study on the operational performance and reliability of the MiG-29 aircraft. This study was first reported in Aviation Week & Space Technology during 25July1994 (pg.49), and has been obtained by author from Mr. Pushpindar Singh, of the Society of Aerospace Studies, New Delhi.

65 x MiG-29 single-seat and 5 x dual-seat trainers with 48 x spare engines (sparing factor of 0.7/aircraft) were delivered between 1986 and 1990 at a total program cost of approximately $600 million that included initial spares and support. These aircraft were the first MiG-29’s to ever leave the Soviet Union and were not up to the weapons system standard of those that went later to the Warsaw Pact allies. The aircraft were sent disassembled by sea, and re-assembled, and test flown in India. By 1990 three squadrons were operational. Two Flight Data Ground Processing Units were included to help pilots debrief their utilization of flight controls and systems. Expectations were that single-seat aircraft would fly 15 hours per month (180 hrs/yr) and dual-seat aircraft 20 hours per month (240 hrs/yr).

There were extensive problems encountered in operational and maintenance due to the large number of pre-mature failures of engines, components, and systems. Of the total of 189 engines in service, 139 engines (74%) failed pre-maturely and had been withdraw from service by July 1992, thus effectively shutting down operations. 62 of these engines had not even accomplished 50% of their 300 hours first overhaul point. Thus the desired serviceability showed a steadily decreasing trend.

Engineering reports mainly attribute RD-33 failures to design/material deficiencies causing discolored engine oil (8), cracks in the nozzle guide vanes (31), and surprisingly, foreign object damage (FOD). The eight material deficient engines (discolored oil) were repaired by the contractor under warrantee provisions, but the engines had to be recycled to the manufacturer. The thirty-one engines with cracks in their nozzle guide vanes were fixed in the field by contractor teams and adjustments were made to the entire engine fleet. But even though the incidents reduced the occurrences of the cracks, they continued. But the FOD situation is the most interesting, especially after the inlet FOD doors received world press coverage, but there were other concerns about production quality control that led to problems.

Since the Indian Air Force received early model Fulcrum A’s, some just after the 200th production article, there were quality control deficiencies that resulted in numerous pieces of FOD (foreign object damage) and tools being left behind after final construction inside of the aircraft. Remember that the Fulcrum skeleton is made first and then the skin is riveted over top, in the way aircraft were made in the fifties and sixties in the West. Nuts, bolts, tools, etc. all made their way to the engine bays and inlet ducts and when they were loosened up after accelerations they damaged engines and equipment.

On top of all this, it was discovered that the unique FOD doors on the MiG-29’s inlets were not stopping material from getting into the engine ducts. Since the doors retracted “up” into the inlet, debris that was kicked up by the nose wheel lodged on or at the bottom of the door seal and then was ingested into the engine when the door opened during the nose gear lifted off the ground during takeoff.

This problem was known from the earliest days. After the first four MiG-29 prototypes were evaluated, the nose gear was moved further back, but nose wheel “mud-flaps” or guards were still required to protect the engine from flying debris. It took until 1988 before all delivered aircraft were so equipped, therefore the initial batch of InAF aircraft had to be locally retro-fitted with mud guards and that activity was not completed until June 1992. All costs were supposed to be re-imbursed by the contractor but Mikoyan reneged and left the InAF with $300,000 in liabilities. In subsequent MiG-29K/M models the FOD doors were replaced by screens that closed “down”, forcing any debris out of the louvers repositioned to the lower side of the inlet duct..

The Indian Air Force procurement contract was concluded in September 1986, and the first engine was expected to go into overhaul in 1989. However, four engines prematurely came up for overhaul and no repair facility had been prepared. As time went on, 115 of the 122 engines (94%) prematurely failed and had to be re-cycled through engine depots in Russia at great cost. Backlogs were created and only 79 (65%) engines returned on schedule. Even when a regional Indian repair facility was completed in August 1994, the high failure rates continued and the majority of broken engines had to be sent back to Russian depots. Self-sufficiency was achieved in 1994, only after the operations tempo was significantly reduced on a permanent basis. In the process of refurbishing failed engines, the total technical life of most of the engine fleet was effectively reduced from 800 hours / 8 years to 400 hours / 4 years, at a minimum.

Non-availability of radar and weapon system components also resulted in the grounding of seven aircraft for a period of six to twenty months. Two may have been damaged for life due to cannibalization. Besides this, a large number of subsystems and computers experienced unpredicted failures in the last four years which adversely effected the operational readiness of the squadrons. Some of the computers were field-repaired by specialists from the manufacturers, others were replaced. These repair costs were all in excess to the initial contract costs. It was noted that the 10 additional computers, which were imported, cost the InAF around $806,000. Two Flight Data Ground Processing Units quickly became unserviceable during their warranty period and have been lying un-utilized and un-repaired for over two years.

The InAF Headquarters also noted in March 1991 report that a severe shortage of product support equipment had resulted in the decline of fleet availability by 15-20%, which in turn, took negative effect on operational readiness and mission requirements.

http://www.sci.fi/~fta/MiG-29-2b.htm

Note that it has taken the IAF significant experience in the Base Repair Depots to correct mission availability issues, but it remains critically dependent on Russia for many spares, especially regarding the engine. Bottomline, to keep the MiG-29 at acceptable availability rate, it has had had to go through a lot of trouble.

Point is, no matter how much you support MiG corp, and yes, the MiG-29 is a hot rod, no doubt, the way they conducted business with their customers has been bad.

Ahh, new aircraft in the service, even superior to the gloryfied Su-30MKI in some aspects,

Actually where it matters, the Su-30 MKI whups the MiG-29 in most respects. The only two aspects in terms of combat relevant equipment where the MiG-29K may be ahead of the Su-30 MKI are newer IRST & the new Topsight Helmet. Both are not exactly war winning though, since the overall IRST on the Flanker is larger (and hence does not lose out on range) and the Sura/R-73E/TVC combination in the IAF has been called near unbeatable in IAF internal evaluation & even proven in exercises. So the Topsight alone will not make a difference. In everything else, from EW to radar to newer systems, the Sukhoi is much much ahead. Theres nothing like the Super-30 for the MiG-29 in IN/IAF service either.

ou are complainng about some hydraulic problems during induction. How many times we have read from India press that the whole Su-30MKi fleet is troubled with Al-31 failures, faulty ejection seats, various maintenance and corrosion issues, even some dumb tire shortage complains. Please keep it detached.

Au contraire, you are clutching at straws here. The Sukhoi issues in contrast to MiG issues are peanuts! The most “important” issue in all the above are actually shortage of tires, which too is being addressed (reports suggest India is looking within to make the tires locally and in the interim, attempting to stock up). The rest, pretty much all addressed.

The IAF racked up 300-400 hours per year on its early Sukhois, while the fleet is on a whole easily at the 180 hours standard/yr/pilot and above! You think with AL-31 issues (hyped up by an excitable press after few early engines had FOD issues) that was possible.

Overall, Sukhoi experience in IAF has been a huge positive!

270 orders for Sukhois (confirmed already) with indications more are on the way (see other IAF thread) says it all, actually! Plus, the willingness to tie uo for the FGFA/T-50.

In contrast, with MiGs, IAF had to look within, to keep mission availability rates at reasonable levels. Even so, there is a difference between mission systems and flight critical systems, and there, it has to hoard necessary spares for engines etc to compensate for MiG’s broken system.

Even the MiG-27, which went through a successful upgrade for 2 squadrons, well liked and appreciated (planes can be used for everything from PGM attacks to EW role now), well, the IAF is retiring them, rather than re-lifing them or re-engining them. For the Jaguar, its willing to re-engine them.

In case you still don’t understand, its not that a new product has problems. What differed in the case of MiGs is not just the quantum of problems but also the unwillingness or inability of MiG to solve them. While blaming the customer for problems.

That basically means MiG shot itself in its own foot, I am afraid.

Maybe if India had ordered another 100 Mig-29 in nineties instead od those few claimed by some internet web sites, then MiG would be really capitalizing its relationship with India, saving production line and making upgrades for Indian Airforce only. According to internet India was/is operating around 70 Mig-29 since late 80ies. Do you think that such a large aircraft manufacturer like MiG could live from servicing 70 Migs29, their spare parts and agregates?

See above, and you’ll realize why India decided against ordering another 100 MiG-29s. The flip side is that MiG was absolutely incapable of properly supporting ~70 MiG-29s, ~85+ MiG-23’s, ~140 MiG-27s, so in what logical way could the IAF give them an order for another 100 MiG-29s.

Its very interesting to see how things turned out as well. In mid-80s-early-90’s, the proposal to buy more MiG-29s was up against proposal to buy more Mirage 2000’s. Both sides ensured other’s stalled, and at the end, Indian economic issues ensured both lost. When proposal was dusted off in late 90’s and came up again in 2003, guess which aircraft was proposed – Mirage 2000.

In Kargil, IAF MiG-29s played an excellent role. On one notable occasion, patrolling MiG-29s locked on to a F-16 formation sent to intercept an IAF strike package, and the F-16s broke and ran. The BVR capability of the MiG was widely appreciated. As you can see posted earlier, in A2A combat, the MiG-29 had an edge throughout versus the Mirage 2000. This within a short time of its induction. But the maintenance issues with keeping these planes at the required 80%+ serviceability, has meant IAF brass did not process the case to buy more of these planes.

Now, do you think the French were all strawberries and cream when they dealt with the IAF. For your information, they have also overcharged on spares. IAF was literally armtwisted to pay for spares after French suppliers went back on original agreement and said they had run out of spares for radar (RDM series) etc. But overall, what we paid for, we got. And mission availability rates were not compromised. They cooperated when we added capabilities as soon as possible. Design/manufacturing/teething issues were sorted out.

So its not as if MiG is being unfairly targeted or that IAF has a very soft understanding of product introduction.

The problem is both the quantum of issues and the attitude displayed by MiG in solving them.

In IAF MiG-29 K case, when the hydraulics problems were raised, MiG reportedly, first denied, and then tried to use contract stonewalling tactics. So, the desparate customer agreed, gave them a follow on order for the limited number of MiG-29s for a minimum fleet availability….and is now interested in buying Rafale.

I find it sad, because lets face it, the MiG-29 is a classic, the likes of which will rarely if ever come about again, and it was always my favourite in the IAF.

The future of Mig-35 is questioned bcs RusAF is not using it, that is the only problem.

I disagree here, there are enough MiG-29s still in service to guarantee a level of product existence.

Fact is though, its just new wine in an old bottle. Its simply not in the class of Rafale/Typhoon in terms of overall performance. Or its own peer the heavier Su-35.

If as you suggest, Sukhoi is sabotaging MiG & MiG cant do anything about it, as recent as 2011, then its sad, because MiG is effectively finished. I still think they can do a lot to revive themselves, but if you are implying that they don’t have the wherewithal to make any of these decisions, then that’s really the end. 🙁

Mind you, as a MiG-29 fan, I will be totally disappointed. I was actually in support of buying more MiG-29s, second hand if need be, and refurbing/upgrading them for IAF service, after all the effort we went to keep the fleet operational and sustainable. But looks like all our money is now parked (as far as foreign vendors go) with Sukhoi and Dassault/partners.

Teer, I do understand and did take into account that we are having enough heavies and more are going to come in. What is not good is the neglect and the very low priority being assigned for single-engined low-cost fighters. btw, plz adrrss me as BoGo.

Fact is the ship has sailed. If you are facing an enemy which has and will have superiority in numbers, each and every platform that you field must be:

– Capable of facing the enemy opfor or be flexible enough to do a range of specific capabilities
– Must offer the force commander maximum autonomy without having to depend on supporting assets to get the job done

The PLAAF has some 300 Flankers of various types (per Asian Military review, linked to Wiki) and 260 J-10s. While the number of J-10s may be on the higher side, it clearly points to the threat the IAF is facing from modern types in the PLAAF alone.

The light fighters are simply not flexible enough to take on heavies without supporting assets ( a problem even the PAF will face against the IAF when they’ll need more tankers, AEW&C et al to counter MKIs with JF-17s). Basically, if you add up the costs, the hidden costs add up and also, the flexibility for a commander reduces.

Right now, a MKI squadron commander colocated with a MiG-21 Bison force (tomorrow, the LCA) can handle a range of tasks. For short range missions, he can put up the LCA, the CAP etc can be from LCA. Deep strike, airsuperiority with loiter will go to the MKI. But if all he has are light fighters, then his flexibility reduces.

And with heavy/medium fighters galore in the opponent force, the IAF will seek to balance it out with a single type that can do both tasks, hence the Sukhoi, the new backbone of the IAF.

I’ve replied to the matter above to BA. But 200+ Flankers is simply not enough strength to face India. J-10 are medium units and they don’t have the range either to get inside deep. Though they can cause harm with stand-off weapons, which can be true in our case also. Then the fact on ground is that J-10s are not anyway in large numbers and all are currently (& for foreseeable future) meant for the eastern side of China. China have not yet devoted J-10 on a permanent basis to engage India.

There is nothing like permanent basis or non permanent basis. If the Chinese prepare the AFB accordingly and train for quick deployments of different types, they can field any and every platform (space constraints being the key limitation) from earmarked AFB. They don’t have to station planes in the area near India theater of ops to demonstrate “capability”. Fact is if war breaks out, then both sides will throw everything and anything, bar the kitchen sink to seize the initiative. Coming to the J-10 its range/payload profile puts it firmly in the Jaguar class. While its not earthshattering, its a pain to deal with, as it can carry a mix of fuel and strike munitions and get to IAF AFB in the NE/opposite TAR and make it back. Escorts can be Sukhois for air to air. It makes life more difficult for the IAF.

First of all, do you really think, there is going to be a two front war?
I don’t, at least there won’t be a sustained two front war, if ever if gets soo worse. Because, a dozen of PAF fighters shot down and an armor push means India will be facing the N-clear stick. So on the western front any outcome is going to be a stalemate!
If China can convert Pakistan from the American cultivated Islamic state to a Communist state, we can talk about having a good bout (w/o using N-weapons) by employing all the assets.

Nobody can say how tomorrow will turn out. What prudence demands though is to see the trends and prepare for what could happen, as long as it is within the realms of reasonable possibility. China and Pak are pretty much partners. Will the PRC go to war if Pakistan-India fight, perhaps not. But it may make sufficient moves as it did at Kargil, so as to tie down Indian assets. In the case of a PRC -India war, Pakistan being the junior partner in the alliance may well try and seek an opportunity to escalate and seize Kashmir. Point is India has to be prudent & at least aim for a stalemate on one front, while winning on the other. It needs assets to be able to do that, and that means an advantage in equipment and training, since numbers are going to be against it.

True. There is no disputing the capability of MKI or how it have transformed the capability of the IAF. But we need smaller fighters and 3T is not a bad load for LCA employed in AA duties. Lets employ it where it can excel rather than pushing it into someones shoes.

If India was going to acquire 400 LCAs then perhaps numbers could have compensated. But right now, with 126 firm indents (same as the MMRCA) and some 3 squadrons (say 60 more planes) as options as is usual, the LCA will still be outnumbered by a combined PAF & PLAAF fleet. This because the significant orders for the LCA, the opponent too is stocking up on light fighters (PAF) or has huge numbers already (PLAAF) to protect his airspace.

Also, remember, the range/depth argument with Pakistan cuts both ways. If Pakistan is small enough, depth wise, that a light fighter like the LCA can attack deep, then even Pakistani light fighters have sufficient range to undertake defensive and limited offensive missions. Point is the numbers game will always be against India, and hence the IAF has been looking at technology to compensate. This is in essence, one of the reasons for the LCA’s requirements creep.

And don’t you think thatz is what we need on the western front and which can be employed in the Eastern side also? Every mission need not have to be long-range mission, point defence, CAS are all bread and butter duty.

Dont think defensively in terms of doctrine here and make it the de facto. In most cases, the IAF will be on the offensive. Either seeking to dominate the PAF, or trading blow for blow with the PLAAF. In which case, it needs fighters able to range deep (when it wants). Which is why the heavy force is getting so much attention. Of course, the LCA is very valid against the PAF. But against the PLAAF, apart from the TBA, it will have limitations.

The IAF will have to operate beyond the TBA to actually strike logistics lines, these will be defended by mobile SAMs – which means SEAD. They may have to go for logistics nodes – air and rail, deeper into China, which means range and payload both need to be as high as possible. Basically, the Flanker class platform is ideal for such stuff. The LCA will need to load up its pylons with fuel tanks, limiting its munitions. Plus it has lesser range to begin with. With support assets in high demand (12 tankers for the entire IAF, and the need to sustain ISR/AEW&C round the clock missions as well), light fighters are intrinsically limited against deep interdiction.

Thats what I’m saying we doesnt need to ba an all heavy force. Employ the lighter ones on western side with a smaller number/required number of heavies for longer-heavier missions. On the eastern side, why should it need to have long-range mission? It can always do point-defence ..

An offensive AF cannot just make do, it needs to have punch to take the fight to the enemy. Defensive CAP, limited CAS etc just won’t do. The IAF to make a war winning effort needs to interdict lines of communication, hit logistics – these all stretch deep. Remember, when the IAF almost went to war post 26/11, AVM Barbora (the then vice chief) made the telling remark that his target list in Pakistan was ~5000 targets. That’s a strategic campaign and indicates the scale at which the IAF thought it would have to operate to win the fight across the board. In the case of the PLAAF, it will face a far more formidable opponent & with geographic depth on the opponents (China’s) side.

Its not the problem of the lighter aircraft. Employ them in duties in which they can excel. On that basis, to neglect the smaller single-engined fighter is not a good idea.

The thing you are not getting is that a heavy can do all that a light/medium fighter can do, and in most cases, do it better. Its only significant disadvantage is operating costs. The light fighter can excel in its set of tasks, but the tasks it can do, thanks to range/payload issues are by nature more limited than that of the heavy.

In any case, the IAF is pretty likely to take around ~180 LCAs, which is a fairly significant force, so it will be a decent balance. The MMRCA/AMCAs will round off the middle, and the mixed Su-30/FGFA force the top edge. So it will be a balanced force.

All I am saying is that while the LCA will be a very useful capability to have, and may evolve beyond the MK2 to a MK3 (more fuel, more payload), the IAF needs heavy fighters in greater numbers to balance out greater numbers of light, medium and heavy fighters in its opponent air forces.

teer, good post.

I read a similar article many moons ago where Western pilots discussed their experiences with MiG-29.

Apparently the early MiG-29 cockpit was very labour intensive with a lot of “heads down” actions (i.e. looking at instrument panel) compared to Western aircraft of the time (this was pre MFD).

The author wondered whether this would be an issue with pilots who have been trained to fly such aircraft from the outset.

However certainly spatial awareness isn’t as as comprehensive as jets with bubble canopies and well laid out efficient cockpits layouts.

Thanks! I believe the article you are referring to is from Code 1, LM’s internal publication. While some may dismiss that as biased, German AF folks flying the MiG-29s said much the same thing in other publications.

Quotes paraphrased, that I recall, severely criticized both the MiG-29s BVR weapons interface (too much heads down fiddling, very limited analysis and display of weapons-usage information – pilot had to think of way too many things) and primitive/limited nav-attack system interface (not much in the way of waypoint-enabled user friendly navigation).

This is the Code One link: http://www.510fs.org/index.php/squadron/code-one-magazine/item/78-schlemming-with-the-fulcrum

I take the stuff about F-16s being superior to the 29s in flight controls etc with a grain of salt since these were first timers and wouldn’t know the nuances of each aircrafts E-M maneuver ability. But the stuff about lack of automation is fairly bang on and matches what other folks said even after experience.

Overall, original MiG-29 requires lot of time and energy to train on in terms of weapons system usage, time which could be minimized in a better designed set up. The Su-27 was also non glass cockpit and “legacy” but overall simpler and also more sophisticated.

another gem of a post by you Teer. Should archive it since in a few months time, someone else will raise the exact same observations (earlier it used to be Quadbike) about the IAF becoming too top-heavy in the upcoming decades and pontificate on how the IAF is doing it all wrong.

Thanks man. Glad you found it useful. BTW, this link posted earlier is fairly interesting. By PV Naik (Chief of Air Staff, rtd – the guy who was in charge of all these programs till last year) mentions the exact thing about the changing requirements of the IAF.

http://indiastrategic.in/topstories1633_the_Indian_Airforce.htm

Our National zone of interest and influence stretches from the Gulf of Hormuz in the West, to the Malacca Straits in the East and beyond. Just like other capabilities, strong and comprehensive aerospace capability is required in today’s scenario to meet our country’s aspirations. I envisage that the capability build up of our aerospace power will be based on four pillars. Very simply put, these are SEE, REACH, HIT and PROTECT. We need to SEE farthest and first. This involves utilisation of space based assets, long range radars, aerostats, AWACS and other ISR sensors. We need to collect and process relevant information in real time. Having SEEN, we need to REACH our area of interest. Trans-oceanic reach by long range combat and transport aircraft, along with air to air refuellers, is the next pillar of our capability. Once we reach, we need to HIT the target. Hit the target with precision; hit it hard. And so, modern weapons are required. While doing all this, we need to PROTECT our assets both in war and peace. This involves all aspects of Air Defence, EW (Electronic Warfare), Cyberspace and Information Warfare.

Other interesting things he mentions, though he forgets the Mirage 2000 upgrade (a big deal):

Upgrade of the MiG-29 series by 2014. Upgraded aircraft will be available by 2017.

Technical upgrades of Mi-17 upgrade.

In fact, upgrades of Su-30 are already in the pipeline and in various phases.

Procurement of additional Su-30 is under progress. Our total numbers are going to be in excess of 270 Su-30s.

First time I am hearing this!! Till now, we only knew about 50 (MK1, MK2, MK3 initial purchase with final in MK3)+140 (MK3 at HAL)+40 (MK3 +CKD/part raw materials assembled in HAL for quick induction) + upgrades of MK1/2 to MK3 + 42 Super 30 Sukhois signed in December 2011. The first fifty (including the MK3s) are also to be reportedly re-lifed and put through the Super 30 upgrade.

Overall, that adds upto 269 Sukhois (since 3 crashed).

More than 270 Sukhois – wow! They really love this plane. And are really adding as many as they can before the line at HAL/Irkut shuts down (HAL will move to FGFA and Irkut to MS-21).

Any new ones likely will be all Super-30s and beyond, like the last tranche of 42. A first time comment from the IAF side that the Sukhoi in IAF service has been in constant upgrade, which could be pieced together from other reports.

The new CAS Browne, mentioned that the MiG-29 upgrades will start coming in from this year, the above means the entire fleet is to be available by 2017 (5 years for 65 aircraft), around a squadron a year. In the process, they will be re-engined and the MLU gives additional hours, plus simulators, and multirole capability.

He also mentions:

IAF envisions itself to be a networkcentric force. The Aim being to have a common operating picture, reduce the sensor to shooter time and enable successful time critical operations. In fact all this will shortly become “bread and butter” stuff. Capabilities like the Integrated Air Command and Control System (IACCS), AWACS and Operational Data Link (ODL) are different aspects of an emerging network-centric environment. Space would be very vital, though largely an invisible component in this mosaic of Network-Centric operations.

The IACCS is up and running already in two-three places per media reports out of twice the number sanctioned. In the next phase I expect the IAF to ask for it to be put in place in many other zones for redundancy & defense in depth. The ODL program should be beyond the test phase & in deployment by now. The hardware was Israeli with local customization of software (for security reasons).

Again, with all Sukhois, MiGs, Mirages, Jaguars and LCA’s networked with a high bandwidth datalink, we’ll have a big force multiplier.

Browne made a very interesting point a few days back. He said as things stand, around 65% of the IAF’s modernization has ALREADY been taken care of, with the MMRCA a key project in progress! That’s a huge number and points out the modernization is ON TRACK. Compare & contrast to the Army’s slower modernization!

Pretty much the entire ADGES is now on track to be modernized.

Apart from the software (IACCS, networking etc) we have:

Contract for Spyder LLQRMs has been signed and the first squadron is expected soon.

All the three AWACS aircraft have been delivered.

Contract for Medium Power Radars, Low Level Transportable Radars and Low Level Light Weight Radars has been signed and delivery has commenced.

Plus the 8 Akash squadrons, and then there is the 9 Squadron MRSAM in development.

Interesting part is the IAF splitting the orders between local & imported, the scale is large enough that Indian industry has been able to get time to develop capabilities while imports met the immediate need, and could be supplanted by local production.

The order numbers speak for themselves, the LLTR order has been for 56 radars (of which 37 were local, considering the Rohini in that category) and fifteen more local ones are planned of the latest AESA variant.

Fifteen MPRs are in delivery from Elta whereas eight are planned from local procurement.

LLLWRs – the numbers are 36, the Indian order is for 21 Asleshas (cleared trials in J&K last year per reports) and 15 from Israel.

With all these deliveries underway, plus the AEW&C programs..I can understand why Naik and Browne feel things are on track!

Even then, the deal is so far ahead it won’t be scrapped or delayed further. They’ll sign it by the end of this year and once that’s done, any delays will have cost based clauses built into them, which will ensure that they’ll go ahead.

Its a very good time for Indian Aerospace & Defense. In a decade’s time, the entire structure will be far more capable and layered in depth beyond the handful of state owned manufacturing firms, especially as several other deals are opening up the MIC to pvt involvement.

The Rafale will bring in 50% offsets and TOT, but the big deals going forward are the FGFA and the AMCA. These will be the game changers and finally establish an independent industry. With the rise in Indian engineering resources (manpower & infrastructure), I foresee many more JV’s with European firms. An executive was mentioning that the cost structure in west europe, especially for the euro-french primes was becoming untenable, and they are always on the lookout for engineering partners who respect IP and are willing to share the cost burden.

Given that India is going to constantly have multiple big-ticket programs over the next two decades to replace its earlier equipment, and that the Indian Armed forces etc only want the best equipment, JV’s and offsets are here to stay. The requirements are so large that purely local programs cannot address all requirements.