IMO it may struggle to beat even the JF-17 interms of airframe performance however it may make up for that with more advanced avionics/weapons.

IMO is fine, because right now, there is little data available on the performance of the JF-17, in terms of airframe performance to compare with. In terms of avionics, there is data available on the KLJ-7 etc and there yes, LCA does have an edge if we compare some systems. But in airframe terms, there is precious little about what the PAF expects of the aircraft & what it has achieved so far..

Hi Sign,

Let me attempt to explain.

Saab works as a integrator of systems. The things it need, they look outside before making anything it self, to keep costs down and lesser risk. “not invented here” does not exist.

This is exactly my point. While ADA may look towards SAAB for assistance for overall design & integration, as a third party “audit” to speed things up (by avoiding any mistakes later on into the design process), they may look towards other partners for detailed system design & development expertise.

Coming to stealth, materials and datalinks – won’t type out point by point replies, but i fear you understate the magnitude of the issue. For materials didnt SAAB work with BAE and others, as it did with GEC Marconi for the PS-05 radar, and similarly, for stealth, building test articles for UAVs and UCAVs is a good thing, but the depth of understanding required for an all up, much larger fighter aircraft is an order of magnitude harder.

Similarly, for IRST and radar on the Gripen NG, its not SAAB which is making these items, but is sourcing them from Selex. A stealth optimized radar with LPI (airborne) and fire control functions, would be harder still and something SAAB has not done till date.

Similarly, the TIDLS datalink is good, but its not a stealthy datalink.

What I am pointing to is the fact that while SAAB has decent capabilities in several areas, it is not the best in class in all system functional areas, that makes it the single solution partner. Hence, for a program like the AMCA, it makes more sense for ADA to actually chase down individual companies for “best that meet needs”/”RFP cost effective” solutions.

Consider the LCA MK-2. BAE systems original assistance for speeding up flight testing, well, that job is now EADS’s, where they audit the program & see how many tests are necessary versus good to have versus unnecessary. For the engine, there was a contest between GE & EJ. For the AESA radar, right now, there is a contest between ELTA and EADS (technically, it should be Selex, but reports said Selex was dropped but EADS continues, confusing).

For the Indian AEW&C program, ELTA reportedly served as the consultant for technical design. However, EADS was chosen in specific as the consultant for the mission program architecture & its certification.

So, again, there is no single partner that meets “all” needs & India may have to look for specific partnerships for specific systems.

Hence, my statement:

Even SAAB, as you said, at best can only provide some of the things we are looking for, in terms of design optimization, share work packages to speed up design to production etc.

IIRC first delivery was 1997. They won’t be ‘around 3 decades old’ until after 2025. They were Su-30MK, not MKI. The first true MKI was delivered in 2002, & will be 18 years old in 2020.

Yes, you are right, posting at late night leads to silly mistakes.

But over time, the FGFA is IMO, going to be a MKI replacement, even as it initially complements them. The current numbers though just don’t add up for the IAF – as even after inducting the MMRCA, LCA & the MKIs, they’ll still end up with a fleet shortfall if the next aircraft type does not come in time.

Doctrines are not evolved in a vacuum..they are evolved looking at existing and future threats. If the IAF was convinced that the ADA could bring out a Pak-Fa in the same timeline they would pay the ADA to do it and buy the cheaper plane from abroad not the other way around.

Yes, doctrines are not evolved in a vacuum, but what you said was the IAF looked at the J-XX and would want the FGFA, thats incorrect, because there is next to nothing available on the J-XX. How can you decide what the FGFA will be based on something unknown? You may end up setting the requirements fairly low.

Instead, they’d benchmark using whats known about existing designs & capability from programs such as the F-22, plus map that to what Russian/Indian input can deliver & try to see how it meets their future requirements.

These requirements would again not be just limited to fighters but things like Surface to Air Missile systems, likely detection by AEW&C aircraft, engagement zones when current A2A weaponry are used against 5G aircraft, the number of parameters that can come up are far more than saying “J-XX”, which would be a very wrong way to go about the whole exercise. All these detailed requirements will flow from the IAF doctrine about what it wants to accomplish in a conflict.

Second, you are mixing up things when dragging in ADA. ADA’s stated focus is the LCA program & then the AMCA program, it is not involved as the leading partner for heavy fighter jets. This was made clear by ADA almost a decade back. The Sukhoi program was hence tied to HAL as the lead industry partner, when it became clear the T-50 was a heavy platform & the IAF was amenable to a heavy platform after it realized the advantages of the type post the MKI induction. So why would the IAF even consider the ADA for a HCA program, when A) the LCA program is still ongoing & its taking what technical manpower India has to complete it B) ADA’s own mandate is around building a Medium weight follow on & not a heavy fighter.

So basically, you are coming up with a theory & then trying to fit the facts to conform, as versus the opposite.

Its also fairly pointless to say that the IAF would even compare whether the ADA would bring out a fighter in a similar timeline & use that as a benchmark.

There is simply no comparison here between the work ADA is doing versus what is envisaged in the T-50, because a) the T-50 program began several years back & second, it leverages the far larger industrial expertise of the Russian military aerospace industry. ADA’s critical mandate is to grow the Indian aerospace industry, via programs such as the LCA & MCA. They simply don’t have the depth of support Sukhoi has. There are ADA guys who have to hand hold private industry to deliver items & technologies.

Sukhoi’s T-50 on the other hand, has an entirely different structure, Sukhoi/KNAAPO don’t have to create a domestic aerospace industry, they already have partners for each system which are equivalent to ww corporations in their own right, eg NIIP which if I recall, is part of the huge Almaz Antei consortium & has both R&D and design houses within the consortium.

So why would the IAF or the MOD, have ADA change tack, dilute its focus. ADA’s stated focus is the LCA & then the MCA, while programs like the FGFA fit a different platform/requirement & also leverage an existing program like the T-50, to get items/aircraft for different IAF needs.

Currently, this “dual” sourcing strategy is being adopted for pretty much every major acquisition, whether it be missiles, sensors or large system of system programs. What we can acquire domestically, provided it is in range of current ambitions, we do so, but we don’t drop existing programs & take on widely expanded ones for the sake of doing them locally.

India can do some composites work but can’ really take the lead. Quest / TATA could be used to do the mundane number crunching.

After lca and alh India should not take the lead as it does not have as much experience.

Who said India would be taking the lead? Current reports could not be clearer. Russia is doing around 75% of the workshare, while India the remaining 25%, this from what’s remaining of the fighter program, but India also gets access to technology to make the aircraft, plus future rights towards IPR, share the proceeds from exports etc.

The Russians would undoubtedly be the senior partners in the effort, but it makes absolute sense for India to involve itself into specific aspects of the design, so it can modify/customize the aircraft over time, to meet its own requirements, without having to rely overmuch on Russia & having to worry about whether the design modifications are legitimate or may void some critical warranty or affect the design.

Relying on an exclusively ADA designed AMCA will be a bit unwise on the IAFs part. The thing is that there are not many HAL/ADA can partner with in the development of a fifth generation fighter, LM already has its hands full with F 35, Boeing is looking at sixth generation, Dassault is skipping the fifth gen and working on the UCAVs. Countries like Japan South Korea and Brazil are in no better state than India interms of developing a fighter. The only other partner is SAAB, which may work out well but they don’t have any powerplants either and with the Kaveri up in the air there is that huge potential for delay on that as well.

Thing is IAF cannot rely on the AMCA alone because it is a medium weight fighter. Its envisaged as a replacement for the upgraded Mirage 2000/MiG-29/Jaguar class fighter. As such it will have payload/range restrictions (though cheaper to acquire and operate) versus a larger heavy combat aircraft.

Plus you are correct about partners, because as things stand apart from the UK & Germany (to add to your list), no other country has spent to acquire the kind of capabilities that will be required in a 5G platform. The only nation apart from the US, with the sort of vertically integrated national military industrial complex, that can work with India, and has attempted something like a 5G aircraft, is Russia.

I really don’t buy into the rumours that the AMCA will have simpler “4.5G” requirements, because the one thing the IAF has consistently done, is to set high requirements & once they become more aware of what is & what is not possible with the FGFA program, the AMCA requirements will also be defined accordingly (even if not at the same level).

Even SAAB, as you said, at best can only provide some of the things we are looking for, in terms of design optimization, share work packages to speed up design to production etc.

But there will be extensive requirements around LO design, testing and validation, materials and structures which require an experienced industry partner. I do hope we can leverage some of the work & knowledge plus materials from the FGFA program for that.

Another key thing will be next generation systems. While we can come up with some decent avionics on our own, we’ll need to probably partner for the airborne radar, any IRST, discrete datalinks etc.

Again, from what I can decipher, we will not sign one overarching deal with one country to assist, but pick & choose from separate industry partners for each system.

In effect IAF is playing it safe with the FGFA but I can’t help but think the FGFA money going into R&D for the AMCA including engines may have gained better results. Then again each organization has its own priorities and when it comes down to that i guess defense of the nation in the short term is just as important.

Well that is true to a certain extent. Big ticket acquisitions from abroad have historically been funded at a far higher rate than domestic programs, in the name of urgency.

This has been true for almost every program till date, where a program purchased from a foreign OEM gets a clearance with a financial proposal that would IMO, never be approved for a domestic one, unless its a strategic program like the ABM one. Cost escalations in programs with foreign partners are also invariably far more in overall terms than domestic programs.

But you take what is available and work with it.

The IAF has little in terms of institutional support for R&D in comparison to the Navy, and tends to depute personnel for programs from regular flight & engineering units. It does not have a R&D, production assistance set up of its own and hence it tends to prefer quick acquisitions over domestic programs & leaves it to the industry partners to sort out technology transfer and production.

This is an attitude widely prevalent in the IAF in the past, and hence, even doctrine apart, imports were widely preferred.

Even so, of late, there has been some shift in that, for the past decade and the coming one, we are acquiring combinations of imported & domestic equipment, versus relying purely on imported items.

The MOD is clearly playing a balancing act, supported by a section of the IAF which realizes it cannot continue to import as it hitherto did as modern day systems are simply too expensive.

I was actually pleasantly surprised to see the depth of support for programs such as the AEW&C. IAF officers actually explored more cost effective alternatives to having the Phalcon and also backed the AEW&C program. In old days, it would be domestic industry which would come up with such proposals & the IAF would dismiss them as not meeting the most stringent specifications. Also, there is support for domestic capabilities in sensors (radars & EW), missiles and networking.

I feel as HAL etc builds more capabilities (on its own or via JVs), the level of IAF’s import requirements will reduce, but there will always be some programs or critical requirements that require JVs. Its simply not possible for India, in the next couple of decades scale up to the level, that it can meet all the IAFs demands, which are fairly staggering. These requirements will continue to rise as well.

This seems the sensible, informed approach to evaluating the 50/50 project claim.

It simply cannot ever be a 50/50 project. Claiming it could be such is chauvinistic nonsense IMO.

Imagine this scenario: India has a long history of designing fighter aircraft. India designs, builds and starts testing a lightweight fighter. Russia (with very limited experience of designing fighter aircraft) signs a co-development deal. Could that by any stretch of the imagination be construed as a 50/50 project?

Where is this 50/50 claim coming from? Arent you tilting at a windmill here, attempting to disprove what nobody serious has claimed.

As far back as January, the details that India were negotiating were for 25% workshare, and that too around select areas and not overall design.

http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/india-to-develop-25fifth-generation-fighter/381786/

Some of what India is angling for (and of course Russia would negotiate hard, every percentage point towards Indian industry is a percentage point taken from Russias highly vertically integrated aerospace complex) is mentioned in the article above. But other areas where India could contribute are composite structures & it could also pick up workpackages around CAD & software that private industry could execute. I do hope though that HAL keeps its eye on the ball and looks towards value added work and not merely workshare by value. India will pick up a lot in terms of design processes and manufacturing techniques, but HAL should really aim for more than that.

To be honest I never understood why India became so worked-up because of what he said?

Hardly worked up. If it had been worked up, official statements would have been given, instead they just told what was what to a handful of folks who approached them. The general IAF feeling about Fornofs comments was that he was just shooting the breeze. As folks in the IAF noted – release the ACMI tapes & they’ll show the truth.

Actually he did not say any negative about the IAF, on the contrary!

He tried to tell a nice yarn to impress the audience, plain & simple. He made claims about the MKI performance at Mountain Home which were wrong, and yes, the IAF would take it as negative, because it was directly contrary to that demonstrated by the pilots.

Would the Swedish AF take trash talk about its Gripens in any exercise, when they performed to the opposite level, lying down, or would the RAF or would the French AF or even the Americans themselves.

That apart, there were more mistakes throughout the so called talk, including claims about fratricides & how they occurred, about the MKIs & their take off rules & several others. The IAF would obviously feel these needed to be corrected. Its a professional AF, and while media management is hardly a priority, these things matter.

I do think Fornof had access to information from some earlier cope India/exercise with other AFs with similar equipment (Israeli jammers etc) & tended to use that to dress his talk up for that day.

Besides if you read carefully what Vishnu writes (and also some of the very insightful comments) you may notice that Vishnu tried to put his own spin on this… frankly this is surprising and is perhaps indicating a difficult to comprehend insecurity on behalf of the IAF…? :diablo:

You are reading far too much into the comments to support some notion you have in your mind.

Vishnu is a member of this board & you can ask him directly, but if you were to ever track his posts, he more or less tries to have his posts come across as balanced, in this case, he tried to tone down the “us versus them” aspect of “India versus the US” & tried to settle the controversy by pointing out all said & done the USAF & IAF got along fine, and Red Flag was a good learning exercise.

So if you were expecting chest thumping jingoism & got something else, and you consider that “insecurity on behalf of the IAF”, thats plainly wrong. That “spin” is his alone.

But the more important point to note was how Vishnus statements corroborate what Pushpinder Singh Chopra told the DewLine & which account even others can corraborate if they have had access to the IAF. If you think these two are the only accounts which corroborate each other, you’d be mistaken. There are others & they all agree on the salient facts.

Chopra on the other hand didn’t pull his punches or try to parlay the discussion into a larger talk about how “effective Red Flag was”, his statements are to the point & address the inaccuracies in what Fornof said.

And note, none of this would have even bothered the IAF or the USAF, if some dude hadn’t Youtubed Fornofs statements & the media both international and domestic, not pressed the IAF for a response.

First, you haven’t read my post, or decided to ignore what I’ve said. Second, I’m saying the airframe of the ‘akash’ and SA-6 is identical. It’s you who is saying the ‘outside’, i.e. airframe, is different, but can’t back this up with anything. Have a look at the pictures above, what’s ‘different’ on the ‘outside’ between the ‘akash’ and even the Chinese attempt at copying the SA-6?

I read what you said, and it didn’t make sense. If your standard of judging what is a copy and what is not, is a picture, then less said the better. As regards backing up what I said, I have enough data on hand to be confident about what I wrote, question is though how much time should I spend on typing it all out from a print copy, to rebut claims based on seeing “pictures from the outside”.

For the Akash, there are enough details available on the design considerations, including specific impulses of several times versus contemporary solid rockets and hence the requirement for an IRR, the development of special maraging steel (MDN250) for the the missile, the 5 section structure keeping missile systems in mind, including a section for the SADM & warhead, whereas the SA-6 has that entire portion dedicated for the seeker. Where the SA-6 has a warhead, the Akash has its air bottle for the actuators, its command guidance unit, its onboard avionics package with 3 different LRUs. The only real commonality between the two designs is towards the rear of the design, where the sustainer motor + booster follows the same layout as on the SA-6, but even there, the Indian composition is entirely different using a composite propellant booster, a thermal protection system for the motor, plus a Mg powder based sustainer motor.

The different design considerations lead to different performance as well. The SA-6 has a top speed of 2.8M, the Akash goes upto 2M. The Akash can hit a wider range of targets though & employs upto date navigation algorithms. Again, different requirements.

As to the Chinese system, I have no data on hand to state whether it is a copy or not, or even what Eagle Talon states is ok or not, so I reserve my comments! It may be a SA-6 transferred to China, or a SA-6 equivalent developed by China to check out performance..I really don’t have details to be sure, one way or the other.

‘Everything’ hasn’t been changed between the ‘akash’ and the SA-6, like I’ve said, the airframe is the same design, only internals have changed.

Which is a fairly irrelevant statement, as the airframe is made out of different materials, has different Cg & would handle differently if the interiors are changed, and the specifications expected are different, conforming to specific local requirements.

RVV-AE/AMRAAM is a poor comparison, the Russians didn’t physically copy the AMRAAM airframe to derive the RVV-AE, and besides, the reason it was nicknamed the ‘AMRAAMski’, is because of its similar performance to the AMRAAM and intended design goal, i.e. medium/long range BVR missile.

The comparison is germaine, as the Russians pretty much adopted the same classical layout as on the AMRAAM leading many to erroneously call it an AMRAAM copy. They pioneered the ARH arena, and I’d wager, every designer today is more or less adopting a similar layout.

The Russians adopted the lattice fin partly because of issues with actuation requirements for a compact missile. In the latest version of the RVV-AE currently under development, the latticed fins are to be dropped for similar fins as on current AMRAAMs/other missiles WW, would that make the RVV-AE a copy of the AMRAAM then?

A more appropriate comparison would be the SA-2 Guideline and H-2/QB series of missiles, where the SA-2 airframe was copied, while internal systems/components were different, i.e. similar to the process used for the ‘akash’ and SA-6.

That’s a fairly irrelevant comparison to make because the SA-2 & H-2/QB series of missiles more closely relate to Project Devil, as in the original form factor and specifications are kept and the missile/system is an updated, one to one copy as far as both schema and performance is kept.

As far as Akash is concerned, its capabilities & technologies relate pretty less to the original SA-6 & are purely driven by doctrinal issues. If the developers had kept the same Acquisition/ Track/HF radar, etc approach as on the SA-6 & not bothered with introducing or experimenting with entirely new technologies, your comparison would be germaine. However, they had entirely different things in mind, as evident from the use of an ARH seeker, multifunction radars and what not, and the architecture was hence designed around an entirely different capability. They went on tailoring systems as trials showed pros and cons, keeping local requirements in mind.

As things stand though, the only thing in common with Akash & the SA-6 is a common layout, and the use of an IRR.

Overall, where your argument fails entirely is in fixating on the Akash missile, as versus the Akash system. The Akash is not just the missile, its the entire system, comprising vehicles, different radars, and the C4I grid with a high degree of automation & this has all been designed keeping in mind what the IA & IAF expect of the system.

Going forward, its entirely possible that the Akash missile itself may be replaced over time, with a new system, such as one based on the Astra AAM w/booster or a derivative, with the missile grandfathered into the existing Akash system, what then, of comparisons to the SA-6. Just look at the ABM system as an example of how substantial changes are possible, by examining the technology level currently available in India versus what was available when Akash was developed. If the services ask for a new F&F variant, even that is possible, whereas the same cannot be said of the SA-6.

It is the difference in this entire system versus that of the SA-6, which makes comparisons to the SA-6 pointless, because the SA-6 was designed keeping Russian requirements in mind, a specific performance level with certain doctrinal issues in mind, and what it can & cannot do, are not germaine to what Akash can or cannot do as the system is designed differently, with different strengths and weaknesses.

And just who did the Chinese copy with this missile? No one is the answer.This was Project 640 😉

Real interesting stuff Eagle. Is this the same missile meant for ABM purposes and was to deploy a N-warhead.

That’s because the ‘indigenous’ akash missile is nothing more than a copied SA-6 with updated electronics.

Wrong. The only thing Akash shares in common with the SA-6 is the basic configuration of the missile, namely an integrated ramjet & general layout. Even there, the sustainer & boost components of the Ramjet are different.

Form follows function, the reason why a ramjet was adopted, and hence a “look” similar to to the SA-6, was because of IAF insistence on sustained maneuver capability, which was possible at the time only with airbreathing ramjets.

Today, for trajectory shaping, DRDO is relying on dual pulse motors, as in the MR/LRSAM project.

That apart, its entirely different from within in terms of subsystems & its guidance & support ecosystem is absolutely different as well.

Most of this Akash is a SA-6 stuff is because nobody bothered to look deeper into the systems & see the actual details.

The SA-6 has a SARH guidance, the Akash is command guided. The SA-6 engagement & acquisition radars are different as well and with different functions and capabilities. The overall performance of the Akash versus SA-6 variants is also different, with its capabilities tailored to what was asked by the IA & IAF in specific.

There is an Akash MK-2 as well in development, again with improvements to the baseline Akash.