Lot of quivering outrage there, but your first statement does’nt necessarily flow from what Swerve said.

The point of not developing the border infrastructure is to make it harder for the enemy to resupply his extended lines of logistics. The deeper he gets, the more disadvantaged he is. Ultimately, the Lines of Communication become overextended and the enemy is on the backfoot. The Indian forces would, on the other hand, be fighting from preprepared positions stockpiled with enough reserves and could hold out for a while while larger battle formations got into play. This is actually the same policy followed till date, and the Indian Army’s strength in the respective sectors is such that it has proved to be a deterrence from any permanent large scale invasion. The back and forth tussles over unmarked pastures are not that alarming from the Indian POV, despite the hype they generate.
The thinking which you dismiss as “shortsighted” and the bureaucrats whom you dismiss as “spineless” actually came up with a good plan for the era, given Indian constraints, given which the Indian side has managed to more or less maintain the status quo, at low cost, for the better part of the century, post the 1962 conflict. There was no luck either that the PRC withdrew during 1962. Their LOC was overextended and their political message to Nehru & co had been delivered. Meanwhile, the Indian Army was gathering everything but the kitchen sink to hit back, and the PRC withdrew before the Indian side got its PR victory in turn.

The change today, is because the post boom PRC economy has allowed them to rapidly ramp up infrastructure on their end to the level that they can sustain LOC to the battle zone, and rapidly reinforce units engaged. But it wont be easy.

Its still anything but an easy task, and relatively still means days. The Indian forces employed in theater, are formidable. Make no mistake. The Army has learnt from ’62 and barely five years thence, in 67, didnt back down from pressure on the borders, leading to a shooting skirmish. And lets not even bring up Chequerboard and Op Falcon.

Today, the Army & AF plans are being executed and more importantly India can afford a response now. Its very straightforward, without money, there can be little movement on the infrastructure front.

Two additional raisings have been sanctioned for the Army alone, thats a huge step forward. The AF is upgrading all the AF bases throughout the country in 2phases, and deploying more modern eqpt to the theater.

Another point is that Indian citizens in the border area want and expect the border infrastructure to be improved, given they can see the corresponding improvement on the PRC side.

All in all, its not necessarily any sign of incompetence or treason. Times change, methods change.

Talk to any half decent roadways engineer and ask about the amount of money it takes to maintain a road in inclement weather, as in the NE, and you’ll get an idea of why we moved slow on the infra. front.

Teer, I can’t see your points about the MoD being responsible for the PSU/DRDO inaction.

You would see my points, if you had any clue of what you were talking about.

Just take a look at the breathtaking domain ignorance that is displayed below. It would test the patience of any barely aware guy, like me, let alone somebody from GTRE or elsewhere who has the big picture in mind. No wonder most of these guys dont post online despite repeated requests, dealing with such know-it-all, but know-nothing expert posts would drive anyone nuts. India’s education system has a lot to answer given the state of affairs.

The GTRE has received a HUGE amount of funding by Indian standards.

Who the heck cares about “Indian standards”? Is India living in some parallel dimension that suddenly raw materials, equipment for test, manufacture, integration, series production all becomes magically Indian? Who supplies all this stuff? Any idea from your end?

Your statement shows you dont have the foggiest idea about how hard jet engine manufacture is. It is by itself one of the hardest things India has EVER attempted, in terms of complexity, challenge and all the while under sanctions. If you dont understand what this means, you have no business posting on it.

Indian industry could not even rise to the occasion to make an engine for a tank upgrade. Get that straight. A tank upgrade. Todays Indian industry is still chary of such a project. We are talking of a jet engine here. The materials are much more complex, the dynamics of a system in operation (a system) are still black art. The entire value chain of design, including the CFD codes used for optimization are sanctioned. Every thing in this domain is classified. We have moved on the design process almost entirely on our own, with selective consultancy with Russia and Germany, for optimization and testing.

You have no idea of what you are talking about. Even today, funding is insufficient to meet program requirements. It is PATHETIC. The only option now, thanks to the MODs foolishness to meet IAF requirements is now the JV option. And even that, will cost an arm and a leg.

Funds haven’t been a problem for over a decade since the MoD has often okayed cost overruns of over 100 percent when asked.

Funds have not been an issue, says who? You? Have you even any idea of the scale of funding that is required today to even set up the basic infrastructure for R&D of Kaveri systems and test them, that is YET to be funded? Countries like Japan – have budgets equal to the entire yearly R&D budget allocated for Kaveri, for single systems and technologies, which may or may not even go into production. India cannot even afford this, let alone flying testbeds and the like.

Second, do you have any idea how R&D works? So for the past decade funds are released, and that magically makes up for all the time that was wasted in decades past when no infrastructure was set up and dedicated attempts made. How wonderful. All the MOD has to do now is to release funds to all programs delayed in the past due to lack of funds, by releasing funds now, all is well. Seriously???

I guarantee you that in any other country it’s performance for the funding given would have gotten it disbanded.

What do you know of any other countries? Have you been to any other countries and worked in jet engine manufacturing? Or have you been a policy maker in charge of these initiatives?

Man, I dont know whether it is the age factor, but these kind of pompous, irrelevant statements are unbelievable.

Do you have any idea how hard and troubling engine manufacture is? Do you know from when India’s peer nations have been doing work on this? Are you aware of how one of our key suppliers of military equipment, which has mastered electronics, land systems, even aeronautics has openly told India it does not have the wherewithal, technological and economic to make engines? And that what India has achieved via the Kaveri needs to be progressed and sustained?

These are the basics of what is the debate under question. You mention HAL’s engine division – yeah, LOL!! The magical HAL engine division, which struggled for a decade and a half with the Lakshya turbojet engine!! Yes, they have magic cookies which GTRE does not!

It’s the same for other PSUs. I doubt any of them(in recent times) have had a situation where they have had to lay off employees due to lack of funds like the Russian defence industry.

Yet another pearl of wisdom. And what of the scale of the Russian MIC, IOW unaffordable, versus the Indian MIC? Russia had entire “Weapons towns” which sprung up around R&D hubs for weapons and manufacturing. Good luck with sustaining that, on a budget which is a fraction of the Soviet Unions. In case you were not aware, the Soviet Union collapsed under its excess military expenditure.

And you compare that to India, which if anything, has a critical lack of production capacity for military equipment and is exploring any and every alternative to ramp up to meet its basic needs, which are a fraction of those achieved by Russia in its heyday, and which still survive.

And you quote this as an example. Wow.

They are assured enough funding in their projects in the MoD’s budget. Any profits they make(mainly due to their monopoly on the Indian Armed Forces’ domestic orders) is ploughed back to the Ministry of Defence under which they operate, probably one of the main reasons why PSU vs. private tenders like Samyukta and Rustom have been so one-sided.

And this is supposed to be a factor in the debate. Are you even aware of how many private firms have been tapped, and have been unable to make systems for the Kaveri? And you relate this to the profit motive and your idealogical fixation on PSUs?

“Assured funding” – yeah, sure. That assured funding is reason why for a decade, the Kaveri program languished, without even the funds to hire the right people. Good examples.

And Samyukta and Rustom have been one sided because unlike what the pvt sector wails, they dont have the basic experience yet to contest versus a company which lives, breathes RF and another which has decades of experience in aerostructures. All the pvt guys can do is wail and gnash their teeth to journos who deliver their outrage without using their own grey cells.

Tomorrow, as and when these companies cut their teeth on system projects and manufacturing, they will compete as equals. Otherwise, it is foolish to think they are overnight the equals of PSUs which have far more experience and infrastructure, and are lower risk options overall.

Every dang 2-3 months one of you overnight experts appears, proceeds to trash the thread with your non stop public versus private stuff, and turns an informative thread into a pile of goo.

These repetitive, argumentative, “passion versus substance”, oh so superior pvt sector posts have taken this thread to the toilet.
Congratulations.

@Teer,
earlier sources sited a 100 km detection range against a 3 m² target for the RBE2. Latter sources insisted ~130 km range or equal to RDY. It was initially said 40% greater than RBE2 for the new RBE2 AA which would be around 180 km, though I’m not sure whether this applies to a 3 m² or 5 m² target.

Thanks Scorpion, as always.

Which estimate do you go by? Personally, am rather surprised by the 75nm range figure for the RBE-2 vs 3 Sq Mtr, and 130 Km sounds more reasonable?

The IAF also operated the MiG-23BN as well, and if your willing to operate ‘that’ aircraft but not the MiG-25P…

India has operated aircraft which met its doctrine, which was predominantly tactical, in outlook and rarely contemplated aircraft which were “overkill”. One oft cited example is the decision to pay an OEM to remove refuelling probes from contracted fighters. In that vein, the MiG-23BN was acquired versus a need for a fast, strike fighter. The MiG-23BN also fulfilled IAF requirements for a Tactical Strike Aircraft, which was then followed by MiG-27 procurement.

Also, Russian items were politically very favourable, as they also came under “friendship prices”. F.E., one senior bureaucrat remarked that India got AN-32s for ridiculously low prices, and they ended up almost free at the price.

Yeah, sure loads of Foxbats being destroyed in the second war, what exactly was the state of the Iraqi AF then? Overflowing with spares, a trained pool of pilots, and all sorts of support aids.

Can point scoring versus any and every Russian aircraft, whenever a topic of this nature comes up, perhaps based on unpleasant experiences when in the Soviet Union or Russia take a back seat, along with the silly use of emoticons?

The point remains, a fighter with a basic avionics fit, when tactically employed well, proved to be damn well dangerous to the world’s most well equipped AF.

Only amateurs would write off a fighter with several similar attributes but a far more advanced avionics and weapons fit.

Heres what even Vanirs quote says for those too ideologically obtuse to get the point:

Did you know that a MiG-25PD recorded the only Iraqi air-to-air kill of the Gulf War? It dropped an F-18C on the first night of the war–then went on to fire another missile at an A-6 and buzz an A-7, all while avoiding escorting F-14s and F-15s.

An isolated incident? How about the single Iraqi Foxbat-E that eluded eight sweeping F-15s then tangled with two EF-111As, firing three missiles at the Ravens and chasing them off station. Unfortunately, the Ravens were supporting an F-15E strike, and the EF-111’s retreat led to the loss of one of the Strike Eagles to a SAM. Oh BTW, the Foxbat easily avoided interception and returned safely to base.

There’s more. When F-15 pilots were fighting for the chance to fly sweeps east of Baghdad late in the war, itching for a chance to get a shot at an Iraqi running for Iran, they weren’t expecting the fight that a pair of Foxbats put up. Two Foxbats approached a pair of F-15s, fired missiles before the Eagles could get off shots (the missiles were evaded by the Eagles), then outran those two Eagles, four Sparrows and two Sidewinders fired back at them. Two more Eagles maneuvered to cut the Foxbat’s off from their base (four more Eagles tried, but were unable to effect an intercept), and four more Sparrows were expended in vain trying to drop the Foxbats. .

To think that the MiG-31, when used tactically proficiently, would be a walkover, is an exercise in idle idealogy over substance.

And that claim about who in the world is developing Mach 3 fighters is similar errant nonsense. How many nations in the world right now are developing next Gen strategic bombers, long range BMs with MARV capability, and the like? Hardly a handful at best. But to those opponents who face them they are a potent threat. Cost effectiveness only goes so far.

The same folks who tom tom how the Russian cheering section downplays the key advantages of the F-22, namely its speed, avionics are only too eager to do likewise when the shoe is on the other foot.

I have to agree with Vanir here. The juvenile sarcasm displayed against the MiG-31’s attributes, namely its speed, specialized weaponry, and avionics fails to impress.

The quotes posted by Vanir are also educative. The relatively primitive MiG-25 managed to outrun, and break through a well run interceptor package, and posed a clear problem to the Allied Force. Clearly for all the aerodynamic pooh-poohing of how pathetic the MiG-25 was, real live examples proved to be a handful.

The MiG-31 brings far more to the fight, and it is also instructive to look at its upgraded avionics suite. Its sensors derivative, the Bars, is very well liked by crews which use it, and has repeatedly operated through intense ECM & in demanding flight conditions. Upgraded Zaslons with R-33s should not be taken lightly either and are likely to be very challenging for any ECM system.

And comparisons to the F-14, also need to keep in mind the effect the F-14 had, even with no OEM product support, in the Iran Iraq air war, where the former proved a constant challenge for the Iraqis and they’d rather that it had not been there at all. Shooting it down with less expensive aircraft, sure- but at what cost.

In professional studies conducted by the IAF, the challenge for any AF is to manage attrition rate, which if allowed to even creep into the high single digits, makes an air war unsustainable over the long term, or irrelevant to any intense ground war.

If a fully functional MiG-31 force, operated by skilled crew and maintained by well trained technicians, is available to any AF, it would be taken very seriously, as it has the potential to seriously disrupt the air operations of an adversary, if not stop them outright.

That is not how things work

Whether public or private, HAL has to manage with limited resources, manpower is finite and it has a huge order book, vacillation by the customer creates a huge issue through the supply chain,.

HAL makes profits because its products are accepted by the Defence Forces, and only when those products meet acceptable criteria. Otherwise, they are rejected and if HAL does not make items that meet its customers needs it will end up being regarded as a white elephant at the GOI level, which means it will not get any real support to meet future plans as well.

If your PSU = non perfoming, analogy was correct, HAL would not have voluntarily moved away from the cost plus accounting structure that it had, with MOD approval throughout the 60’s and 70’s. The company itself realized it was stifling productivity gains and moved to a new cost contracting system and has sought to meet customer complaints and issues.

Similarly, where HAL programs did not meet requirements or where the service found cheaper or more advanced alternatives, programs were cut- the Marut being the perfect example. This single decision cost India a decade and a half.

The GTRE comparison is similarly without merit. Since GTRE belongs to the MOD and without MOD funding and approval, it can do nothing. The LCA itself was bereft of funds through the early 90’s with dedicated funding made available through 1995 onwards, so the effect on subsystem providers is even clearer.

So without MOD funding or approval what is GTRE to do. On similar lines, the Army has been around for 60 odd years in Independent India. How many wars has it fought, so what has been its “use” for the remaining years when there was no conventional conflict? We could have just done with a smaller police force or COIN force? Or does one let a capability, wither away as there is no immediate need for it?

Simply put, jet engine development costs billions of dollars, and only now has India got the economic wherewithal to participate in such programs at a part of the scale at which they deserve (we still have a ways to go). The Marut for instance died a death, partly because India could not even afford to fund an OEM program abroad to customize a plant for its own requirements and manufacture it within India. The decision was however made, within constraints to still keep some capability around. That was the best that could be done at the time, and a far sight better than what was done to HAL’s design department.

By the time of the LCA, HAL’s design department was in such a state, after the Marut cancellation, and no funds available, that only a handful of staff were available. Given the problems, and the IAF requirements, HAL chose to bow out of the program and let ADA take up the challenge. Incidentally, Rajiv Gandhi asked a bunch of private companies if they wanted to lead the program, all saw the task expected and refused. ADA inherited what was left of the HAL team and had to start from scratch in most areas. A decade was spent in building up infrastructure that we would have had to begin with, if there had been aircraft programs at HAL in the interim between the Marut and the LCA.

HAL for its part did not even have freedom to allocate resources for R&D capability allocated till rules eased in the 1990’s.

Now, realizing the space it has to catch up & competition it will face, the company has created a dedicated avionics division in 2008-09, has “clustered” different BUs along lines of business (rotorcraft, fighter types et al) and is actively identifying and working with local and international organizations for products which have commercial value attached, and not just meeting captive requirements.

What this tells is, that times have changed. HAL cannot afford to sit on its laurels, hoping that the MOD will bail and the MOD itself realizes it cannot sit around trying to pin HAL down, because that is going to be counterproductive.

This makes the success of the LCA all that more vital, as now given Indias economic growth, many manufacturers are willing to offer licensed assembly, and they’d gladly offer it to pvt manufacturers, who glib talk apart, will require another 10-15 years to master basic aircraft production and tech. Thats another Marut story all over again.

Thats fine but the IAF does take local industry for granted in delaying orders which put the entire onus on HAL to maintain production lines and keep skills intact, when manpower is at a premium and programs like the MKI need to be accelerated. Simply put, only a captive industry will put up with this. When the same approach was tried with Dassault, for follow on Mirage orders, even with 120 odd airframes up for grabs, Dassault walked away. Ultimately, these costs are borne by the taxpayer.

Secondly, there is also the issue that requirements have to be reasonable, one hopes the MK2 does not get caught up in unobtainable ASRs. The big problem with the IAF is that they often ask for the moon, knowing that local industry has no option but to say yes to get the order, and then keep imports as the back up option. This attitude has cost painful years in development challenges across the board, across multiple programs.

In contrast, China, and the West have long championed, and succeeded at iterative development, with successive “Marks” with more features and capability. In India, it has taken years to convince the IAF to adopt this same approach with the Tejas, wherein they agreed to do so for the Su-30K to MKI, to begin with.

It is here that the issue arises of why sufficient MK1 cannot be ordered to meet immediate requirements. The IAF says “taxpayer money should only be used for state of the art equipment, ” and uses that as the debating point, but more taxpayer money is lost when thoroughly obsolete aircraft are retained in service or at wartime, we lack numbers because “state of the art aircraft” were never acquired for cost or other reasons.

The point is that the IAF & Industry requirements need to be aligned for a common strategic goal, which is possible but not done because there is no overarching planning and coordinating authority, and the MOD serves as a figurehead in many an occasion