@Teer;

I am not against Brahmos with the IA full stop, but contrary I do appreciate its usefulness especially in the western theatre.

I hold fast that in the northern front it has a limited use partly due to the terrain, partly due to the stratigic depth, partly due to the fact that India can not hope to win a offensive game and lastly and largely because of the existence of the Second Artillary Corps.

Again, you seem to be mixing up things here. The Brahmos is a system. Pls. stop thinking in terms of systems, start thinking of system of systems ie how various tools in the toolbox are used, and what are the information systems that flow into them. Kindly go back to my prior post about what overall plans relate to, and then think about the issue. The Brahmos by itself is not meant to deter the PRC or Pak- thats not its role. What it offers though, is very valuable. An ability, to hit heavily defended targets, on a time sensitive basis.

Also, although I can imagine India taking punitive action in the western front (one of the selling points of Brahmos) it can not afford to do so and will not as proven by recently history in the north, even if there were targets in the north which India could identify.

What is this punitive action business you are talking of? This is absolutely unrealistic stuff. Any use of Brahmos, either in the west or the north, means all out war. Period. Its not some toy that can be used against Pak but not the PRC. It can be used against either, as long as India knows and has planned for what follows thereafter! Which is a conflict.

As many have pointed out, to have a war you need two parties to either meet or lob things at each other from afar. For, the first scenario, India to be effective in the north it would be prudent for India to put priority on artillary rocket/traditional and for the second scenario India has just started playing catch up but the Brahmos is not it. India needs a SAC of its own no way around it.

You are mixing up so many things here, that it does not relate to how things are done on the ground!

First, India operates on the basis of regiments, battalions, brigades, divisions and corps! Each has specific systems allotted to it depending on its organizational structure and which can be used for tactical support! Then there are systems allocated to AHQ level (strategic or even corps level!) and after that there is the Strategic Forces Org which keeps command & control of N weapons! Now in your post, you mix up all these & without even understanding where what system fits in and then come to the conclusion “Brahmos is not it” – well of course Brahmos is not what you claim it to be, but nor did the Indian Army ever claim it was what you claimed it to be, either!!

For lobbing stuff back and forth@ the level of the 2nd Arty – again, thats not the job of the conventional rocket arty or the gun tubes – here again, Smerch is Corps level support, Pinaka can go down to the regimental level (and at Kargil, BM-21s were supporting platoons!). When you talk of 2nd Arty level, do understand the IA is setting up regiments for operationalizing long range strike, and these include both Brahmos & other systems (Agni et al which come under the SFC).

All in all, its very unclear as to what you are even referring to and what you envisage the 2nd Arty’s role to be in a potential conflict, and as to what you think versus what is, versus the IA setup which would reflect in how it approaches the problem. Unless you detail these questions, the debate is not really factual in any sense.

Also for the first scenario India can only aford to play a positive defence game.

Again, what is a positive defence game? I fail to understand what you are saying here.

As for SEAD if I remember correctly India has just spent a significant budget on buying Israeli drone system which would be more effective and better use of equipment.

Again – mistaken understanding of the overall setup. This is the IA we are talking of. HAROP and HARPY were purchased by the IAF, which also has Kh-31’s and Kh-25’s and also ARMAT (which may be phased out).

And you would be very mistaken in thinking what HAROP is meant for is the same as what Brahmos offers!! HAROP is nowhere as potent as Brahmos – its meant for either low defended targets, or stationary systems such as radars and C3I which dont have the resources to take the HAROP down before it can strike!! In contrast, Brahmos is meant for those targets which can and do defend themselves but still need to be hit in a time sensitive fashion.

Unless you do some basic research in understanding who has what, and for what reason, you will not understand what these systems are meant for, and how they will be used. Buzzwords and repeating marketing is fine, but operational use another thing altogether.

Teer,

Appreciate what you have written but I think you’d accept that Land Attack Brahmos is not going to be flying NOE profiles at high mach numbers. Terrain masking from proper ingress route selection is a valid method of screening an inbound, but, proper deployment of GBAD is always to counter any obvious ingress routes. Obviously that is dependent on the tactical environment at the time though.

Your point is of course valid, but the nav-attack suite incorporated in the Brahmos enables some decent mission planning. Of course, we really cant talk much about what Brahmos does or cant in the relevant frame of discussion viz. flight profiles, because the more we dig into this, the more the pros and cons (!) are brought up. So its a bit of a “d.. if you do..d.. if you dont” kind of thing.

Fully appreciate reticence to discuss ISTAR. No apologies necessary. You understand the importance of asking the question and the issues left open by the lack of information available on the subject though!.

Thanks -and I absolutely understand. As they say, you cant hit what you cant see!
But measures are being put in place (locally) to address this critical aspect.

So buy or develop a MALD equivalent and ramp up SEAD commensurate with the threat. The weakness of S-300 is in ready rounds and reload time. Thats where you hurt it – by feeding it cheap things to kill then murder it when its pants are down.

Jonesy, the issue is of different strokes for different situations per se. India anticipates war on the fly, at least decision makers do. We simply may not have the opportunity to put all the pieces in place for an approach of this sort (which is not to say that such an approach is not being worked on).

I appreciate what you say about Brahmos conferring some capacity for SEAD where none exists presently, but, it is a limited solution at best. Double-digit area SAM batteries are significant targets in and of themselves and, if you plan to push slow-mover air into their envelope, you want them thoroughly, and verifiably, attrited beforehand. Not a percentages volley of missiles that may or may not degrade the target!. Its a personal opinion only, of course, but I think that SEAD is one of those things where ‘close enough’ isnt ‘good enough’. If you know the opfor is putting out S-300 batteries you want a full effort to neutralise that capability at the rush.

The thing is that Brahmos salvos, if properly planned + EW offer a certain acceptable capability for SEAD/DEAD which is leagues ahead of what exists currently, and even with alternative approaches. The end result is its another weapon in the toolbox which the commander can employ.

Lastly I also appreciate what you are saying about this being the top-end of a system-of-systems designed to provide multi-layered indirect fire-support/strike capability for the IN. The proposed system you describe sounds uniformly excellent and entirely in keeping with what the IA should be looking for.

It does, however, validate Matt’s earlier commentry (if he’ll forgive me putting words in his mouth!) that the Brahmos was a very specific and ‘niche’ weapon in the grand scheme of things though!.

I presume you meant IA, not IN and thanks for your kind words.

The problem is Matt’s arguements in the thread were IMHO tilting at windmills as he seemed to suggest that the Brahmos was the only solution contemplated and it by itself had no use. I would disagree with that assessment. The way things stand today, the Brahmos offers the IA what it never had earlier, a 290 km reach into an enemy area without depending on the AF, which as in all forces worldwide (perhaps the USMC is an exception as they are stated to be very well integrated, and of course the US itself has vast airpower assets which make them far far ahead) is a capability sought for long.

The Brahmos is now a tri service missile (the AF is insistent – and its not DRDO which has been pushing for it but the AF itself) that the Brahmos be available to them. (They do have an option in Nirbhay and another in the Uran).

The thing is that from I can publically determine, all three services want a relatively fast munition, which even if expensive, gives them the ability to hit at time sensitive targets. I queried this from an Army artillery officer who played a role in setting up the Brahmos LACM trials, and his statement was succint – “I’d rather have this and not need to use it, then need it and not have it”.

The issue is that India is now setting up its Cold Start Doctrine, in response to further Mumbai’s.

And the window for an offensive reaction may indeed be short, so the Brahmos is a tool in the toolbox.

no sir, you are wrong in this case. Indian components (mission computers etc IIRC) do end up on other specimens of the mki family in other countries i.e the MKM and MKA. sure of the first one, for second one it is likely but unconfirmed AFAIK.

All MKI derivatives eg MKM and MKA carry the DRDO designed HAL manufactured twin radar computers for the Bars. These are tightly integrated into the Bars WCS (weapons control system) and act as radar controllers and data processors.

All of them also utilize the symbology and display software developed for the MKI by India (it also drove commonality with the MiG-27 and Jaguar upgrades).

The Algerian MKAs also have Indian display processors (they also signed a contract with the DRDO to upgrade/customize the display software).

All MKI variants also carry Indian manufactured airframe components which are manufactured by HAL and shipped to Irkut for integration.

However, India has not exported the Tarang RWR or the Mission Computers, both of which have been upgraded further from what were on the original MKI Phase 3’s. The RWRs are now the brand new R118s whereas the MC’s – have improved processors.

There are many other improvements both inducted and planned for the MKI which place it ahead of its peers in terms of modifications and combat capability, perhaps the IAF may disclose them someday.

The programs are there in fighter, weapon and tech development, but as long as they aren’t finished, it makes no sense to go on. Just as you say:

You misunderstand what I said apparently. For instance you note:

without this technolody base, we simply can’t improve and that’s exactly what I said. However even with this base, there is still the lack of experience, which can only be equalise with new developments and by the fatc that we can’t do them on our own, we need co-develomens, jv…

..the point remains that unless you do your own programs and reach a certain stage, there is little point in talking of “new developments and co-develomens, jv” etc. For instance, what do you know of the Brahmos, JV? Do you think what India contributed to it, was developed just because of the JV or it was an evolution of systems used in the IGMDP? If the latter, now do you understand what I meant by you have to “be somewhere” before talking of the next step.

The point is we are there now because of the LCA. And just ending it before taking it to the next step is pointless.

IF the A2A capabilities would work, before Elta joint, why they never testes an A2A weapon guided by the radar? R73 and R77 could already be integrated or?

Are you even aware of the topic at hand? The R73 does not need a radar to be integrated. It was integrated nonetheless as the Russians did not assist and test fired and qualified. The A2A capabilities worked but why would the IAF want an A2A radar alone and go through expensive and timeconsuming quals on it? They wanted a complete integrated MMR and which is what they will qualify systems on.

AESA development started yes, but IAF stated that it is not good enough and searches for a foreign partner.

Again – wrong. The AESA program was launched in Nov 2008 with the clear understanding of the IAF that the first Tx/Rx units for the TRMs would be developed jointly with a manufacturer with prior experience in the arena.

Again only under development now!

What now? It was launched a few years back and it is India’s first program in A2A missile development, and so far tests are proceeding methodically and with good results testifying the basic systems are sound. Or are you suggesting that India has some magic pill that it can develop AAMs overnight?

Also only under development and even if Snecma joins, it will only be ready by 2015.

Which is when it will be of use, since that is when the LCA MK2 is expected by. In fact, it may not even be required for the LCA MK2 since the IAF may standardize on the EJ/GE and it could be used for the MCA. Eitherways, its good enough.

The whole LCA development and those indigenous weapons and techs are for sure the right way to get the base, that we both are talking about. However, they overestemated their capabilities and now they have to fix those problems and get all the started developments done, before any NG development is possible.

If you are saying that then where is all this talk of JVs and this and that coming from? You seem to be caught in contradictory positions here. And secondly, you seem to be unaware that some systems and capabilities derived via the LCA are already mature, which mean that NG capabilities in those arenas can be started already. Which makes ample sense.

They get funded because the GOI has no other options!

It has many other options, it saw what they were worth and went with what it knew worked.

I know its a conceit amongst several folks that they know best and GOI never does, but things are never as black or white as that.

Actually, thats hardly nonsense. Thats how the Government works, and the IAF has more or less placed an order.

Why a RFP?

Because HAL now has to come up with a price that meets what the IAF has budgeted for it. Its a negotiating tactic. If HAL’s price in response to the RFP is higher, the IAF can then ask the MOD to a) either ask HAL to reduce the price or b) keep the price into account when deciding the Capex allocation to the IAF for further LCAs.

The IAF and all GOI depts take these things very seriously. Everything in Govt is decided by precedent, and a proper paper trail means that any further LCAs or orders can be placed at x price without insinuations that the IAF or xyz did a shoddy job or that there are other considerations involved.

Even after meetings are held to agree on something, the IAF can and does, record pricing objections in print as a matter of formality.

Technically all these organizations belong to the MOD, so why even bother – but the reality is that each organization has its own separate budget and accounting, and even provisions for taxes are taken into account, despite the fact that all are GOI entities. Thats the way the system is.

Nor is it correct that orders for subsystems and equipment are either placed or need to be placed only once a formal order is in hand. This is not how things work. HAL has and does intimate its suppliers in advance for such items. Furthermore, it must also be remembered that they still have substantial time, as the 20 orders for the first squadron need to be supplied first (~1.5 years).

The other thing incidentally is that in a PSU, despite there being a considerable amount of paperwork, there is leeway/freedom in committing capex without firm orders. PSUs routinely do this, and it is the CAG which occasionally succeeds in making a hue and cry about “infructuous expenditure”.

So it is incorrect to say that Capex is not committed in advance. BEL purchased CEL’s phase shifter plant in anticipation of Akash orders and orders for the Rajendra derived WLR. No orders were placed at the time.
However, subsequently, 16 (AF) were placed. 8 more are believed to have been indented for by the Army (2 regiments, 4 batteries per regiment), whereas the Army also provided BEL with a letter of intent to procure around 28 WLRs, based on which BEL made the capital expenditure and decision to set up a dedicated assembly line.

Bharat Dynamics Ltd., circa 2005 had extra workers on rolls kept in anticipation of Akash, Nag, and K-15 orders. These are being realised now (Nag of course has the penultimate set of trials this year, after which orders are expected to be upped).

Similarly, a RFP from the IAF is sufficient grounds to put the production system in place for 20 MK1 standard LCAs.

Incidentally the IAF did the same process for the first squadrons of the Akash.

One most congratulate TEER on this news as he was the only person consistently saying that this massive order is in offing.

Re Teer

Any info on Akash mark-2? Would it not overlap with Barak-LRSAM-MRSAM of 70km? Will Akash Mark-2 retain command guidance to keep price low or will it also incorporate ARH?

It seems on thumb rule basis that the cost of roughly equal to Spyder SR, around half of Spyder MR and One third of Barak=MRSAM=LRSAM. This would make it a cost effective buy for the IAF.

+ 1! Kudos to the deep undercover brother. We need more tidbits though! Now when is that deal for extra MKI going to materialize? Any chance of them being single-seaters? Also, which way doth the MRCA wind blow? Rafale/Tiffy vs. Shornet OR Gripen Vs. F-16IN? I have given up on the 35 getting to see IAF colors, no interest there it seems.

USS.

Thanks guys.

Curious – its a bit early to speak on the definitive set of features Akash Mk2 will have. A basic improvement in range could be quite possible.

One of the things is that the Rajendra radar has longer tracking ranges than currently utilized by the Akash itself.

You are quite right that the Akash is very cost effective, plus the series production of the WLR spreads out the production cost of cost of components like the phase shifters as well.

The Indian AD in the plains, will be multi layered, if we look at in the form of concentric circles, the outermost circle will be mapped by ER versions of the MRSAM, followed by MRSAM at the next circle and then the Akash, and then the Akash, then the SRSAM/SpyDer and finally Iglas. Depending on factors in play, you might have several of these systems mixed and matched for defense in depth

Apart from this will be the ABM program for select cities and high value targets, with the PDV and AAD. The next phase of course will be the AD-1 and AD-2.

But in the North east, the terrain is such that an Akash itself is very sufficient, when well sited and kept at choke points.

I have to express a degree of understanding of Matt’s point here. The Brahmos Land Attack variant is clearly optimised for striking fixed reinforced point targets. As an air launched standoff weapon that makes sense. As a ground based weapon, in the Eastern theatre, its target set is surely very, very limited though?.

You aren’t going to hit supply depots with a realtively small penetrator warhead – its an area target and needs an area weapon. You aren’t going to target artillery battery’s or heavy missile TEL’s because dispersal effectively renders it 1 Brahmos = 1 gun/vehicle and that means lots of expensive missiles fired for little real return.

If the Chinese move a specific set of missiles into theater which cannot be taken out by airpower, the Brahmos will be the tool of choice. Rather spend money than lose lives. The Brahmos is backed up by a program to give the Prithvi warhead system PGM capabilities. Both work in a complementary role.

C3 nodes and divisional/regimental CP’s etc would be about it as point targets of sufficient value to warrant a BrahMos, but, within 200km of the fighting front those would be targets that the opfor would keep mobile and employ various concealment techniques to prevent timely localisation. Is Indian overland ISTAR in place to isolate and fix mobile commo nodes or shifting high-level command posts to actually engage with this weapon?. Is it suriveable ISTAR in the face, for example, of fairly comprehensive-looking PLA anti-air systems?.

India has put several ISTAR assets in place to employ the Brahmos and other weapons, its not my position to speak of them.

Furthermore, its entirely because of the PLAs anti air system that the Brahmos is a preferred system.

A salvo of Brahmos is preferable to sending a flight of heavily loaded Jaguars to what would amount to a one way trip.

The intent will be to use Brahmos to open up holes in the AD zone and then exploit for further effect, as well as use Brahmos for deep (ie greater than the 30-40 km tactical battle area) strikes that cannot be immediately handled with airpower.