MEADS at Crossroads – Or Not?

http://defpro.com/daily/details/561/ | It is fairly normal (isn’t it?) for major defence programmes to hit a serious bump or two along their development and procurement road. But beyond this, for some unfathomable reason, certain programmes appear to be both cursed by a whole series of hiccups and resulting repeated attempts at folding them down, and blessed by an uncanny ability to survive against all odds and endure unscathed through technical difficulties, budget cuts and waning operational requirements. In this particular category, a prominent place must certainly be reserved for the MEADS (Medium Extended Air Defence System) programme, being pursued (well, sort of) in international cooperation involving the United States, Germany and Italy.

Retracing the ups and downs of the MEADS effort over the past years would take a massive book, so let’s go straight to a synthetic description of the latest bump. Basically, another billion dollars or so of taxpayer’s money would need to be pumped into the development phase, if this is ever to be completed. Now, cost increases are hardly a new experience in defence, but in this specific case there is a palpable lack of enthusiasm amongst the three partners towards coughing up the required money. Most particularly, the pursue-strings holders in Germany have made it officially clear that the money simply isn’t there, period.

Which brings us straight to the respective advantages and pitfalls of international cooperation programmes in defence procurement under the multiple operational, political and industrial points of view.

The US Army seems to have very little residual interest in MEADS, and it even tried (unsuccessfully, as it was) to dump the programme onto the Missile Defense Agency. Basically, under the current situation of tight money, the Service’s medium-range air defence and tactical ballistic missile defence requirements could sort of be satisfied by the combination of the existing PATRIOT (possibly further upgraded beyond the current “Pure Fleet” effort) and THAAD systems. Germany could also accommodate itself to a roughly similar arrangement, should THAAD eventually be selected (which looks like a foregone conclusion) for the NATO’s upcoming missile defence programme. Italy does not currently deploy the PATRIOT, and thus abandoning MEADS would necessarily imply extending the current SAMP/T procurement and joining France for the development of an ATBM version of the ASTER 30 missile. Now this would admittedly force the Italian Air Force into the outrageous proposition of having to deploy the same air defence system as the Army, but, hey, nobody ever said life is fair.

Given the above, the official glue that still keeps MEADS together is largely political. International cooperation programmes are notoriously difficult to kill (this being arguably one of the main reasons for selecting this approach in the first place), and furthermore it now so happens that MEADS is the last surviving major trans-Atlantic effort. It is thus only too understandable that Washington, Berlin and Rome would be very wary of being perceived as the unreliable partner that renounces its commitments and leaves the others in deep trouble; and would be willing to keep MEADS alive even through and beyond circumstances, that would be more than enough to cause the demise or a purely national effort.

Plus, of course, the, say, varied picture of industrial interests, and the impact these interests might or then might not have on the governments’ attitudes and decisions. It is no secret that a certain US defence major would have a vested interest in sending MEADS down the drain in favour of a further revamped PATRIOT, and it is actively exploring ways to ensure that this will indeed be the case. As for the MEADS International consortium, there are unmistakeable signs to indicate that the European part of it has already started formulating a “Plan B”. This would involve most notably finding ways to complete the development programme as currently underway for the MEADS radar, and identifying a possible alternative operational use for it that would justify procurement in at least limited numbers.

Be this as it may, in political terms Germany now appears to hold the keys for whatever future is in store for MEADS. Washington would almost certainly not wish to cancel the programme on its own and be seen as “betraying” Europe, while a conceivable unilateral departure of the Italian 17 per cent would not be enough to kill MEADS. But if Germany’s 25 per cent goes, for whatever reason, then that’s it.

But even from a political point of view, it is a fair bet that on the European side industrial considerations would have an even larger influence on the decision-making process than it is usually the case. Both the German and Italian governments are firmly in support of close ties with Washington, and they can thus be counted upon being more than prepared to save a trans-Atlantic programme for its own sake if they only can decently do so without imperilling domestic support. Given this, if industry this side of the pond starts crying foul and threatening that the demise of MEADS would lead to job losses, plant closures and the like, then the beancounters’ resistance will easily be broken, and money to save the programme will be found. But if, on the other hand a least a solid majority of the European industries currently involved in MEADS can accommodate themselves to a “Plan B”, then the future of the programme looks uncertain indeed.

What is lamentably missing in the whole affair is a serious analysis as of whether or not the operational requirements that did originally lead to the three countries joining forces for the MEADS programme still stand in the current scenarios, together with an in-depth discussion on the roles MEADS (which along its development path has metamorphosed into a very different beast than originally envisaged) will or would play. But this is, I’m afraid, an only too common occurrence in contemporary defence procurement – whereby the needs and ideas of the Services play a very distant third fiddle to political and, increasingly, industrial issues.

In a world where the British Defence Secretary finds its quite normal and logical to present an order for two additional ASTUTE-class SSNs (for the not totally insignificant cost of £300 million) without even mentioning the Royal Navy’s operational requirements, and rather by commenting at length about the situation of the British shipbuilding industries and the need to preserve jobs and skills there, it would certainly not be surprising if MEADS finally meets its fate, or rather is once again saved like the perpetual Phoenix, for reasons that have a precious nothing to do with what the US, German and Italian military might think or wish.

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By Dr. Ezio Bonsignore, http://defpro.com/daily/details/561/

US KC-X Tanker Competition: Just Once More, Please

US DoD issues revised request for proposals for new US Air Force aerial tanker
http://www.defpro.com/daily/details/516/

defpro.com | Yesterday, US Air Force and Department of Defense (DoD) acquisition officials informed Congress and members of the press on the revised request for proposal (RfP) for the competition for a new aerial tanker. The officials claim that RfP for the controversial KC-X programme, which is now entering its second attempt of finding a solution for the future of US Air Force air-refuelling, is designed to promote fair, open competition. However, it is still questionable if there will by any competition, as the Northrop Grumman-EADS consortium, having been awarded a contract in 2008 which prompted a protest from rival bidder Boeing, threatened that it would not solicit a bid, should it be convinced that the competition is not fair.

The $50 billion programme to replace the ageing KC-135 Stratotanker fleet of the US Air Force, has turned out to be a political-industrial marathon, with an exceptionally strong focus on the basic parameters and proceedings, rather than on the aircrafts’ performance and . In particular the Air Force, which has an urgent requirement for a new refuelling aircraft, was pushed to the limit of its patience. Putting it in a nutshell, then-Commander of the Air Mobility Command (AMC), General Arthur Lichte, exclaimed: “I don’t care which tanker wins, I just need a new tanker!”

With the long awaited release of the final terms of the competition, the US officials attempt to provide a more transparent process and answered 350 separate questions, as the Financial Times reported yesterday. The highly details RfP includes 372 mandatory requirements and incorporates 230 mostly technical charges in response to comments on a draft document issued in September. According to Deputy Defense Secretary William J. Lynn III, the new RfP recognises the high stakes in the determination in terms of jobs as well as revenues and “buffeting” from both competitors, Boeing and the Northrop Grumman/EADS team.

According to different news reports, an EADS spokesman said the company would study the new terms when they were issued. Despite Northrop Grumman’s threat to withdraw from the competition, Defence Secretary Robert Gates expressed his hope that both competitors would participate in the bidding. In a step which might not be the wisest, EADS receives support from French Defence Minister Hervé Morin, urging Washington to give the consortium a fair chance. Defence experts have repeatedly expressed the opinion that the Northrop-Grumman/EADS solution would have a hard time in the competition due to the fact that a European industry partner is involved, while Boeing would appear to be the more “patriotic” choice. While during the first bidding, EADS was omnipresent in the news, promoting its solution wherever it could, it may be politically wiser to place Northrop Grumman into the focus this time.

Should the transatlantic consortium decide to enter the race for a second time, it will do so with a strong platform. While both platforms are designed to meet the requirements of the Air Force, the KC-45 by far exceeds many of the requirements. In fact, the 2008 decision in favour of the KC-45 is primarily attributed to its capacity, carrying about 45,000 lbs more fuel than the current KC-135. As a consequence, Boeing used the delay in the competition to revise its strategy and put the larger 777 platform into the race. The Boeing 777-based tanker is comparable in size to the Airbus A330, which is the basic airframe of Northrop Grumman’s KC-45, but delivers 54,000 lbs, or 23 per cent more fuel.

In an ongoing voting at defpro.com, the Northrop-Grumman/EADS solution maintains a significant lead with 54.29% over its competitor, Boeing. The latter received support by only 33.8% of the voters while a mixed solution is favoured by 11.91% (see http://poll.fm/1ai5f). However, while this poll represents international opinions, the decision will be made in the US and will include (next to the requirements of the Air Force) domestic factors such as employment, distribution of the manufacturing activities, and the shaping of US aerospace industry’s future.

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By Nicolas von Kospoth, Managing Editor
http://www.defpro.com/daily/details/516/

Part 2 of a comprehensive overview on Sukhoi’s 5th generation fighter

http://www.defpro.com/daily/details/506/

06:53 GMT, February 11, 2010 On 29 January 2010, the Sukhoi PAK-FA (Perspektivnyi Aviatsionnyi Kompleks Frontovoi Aviatsy, literally “Future Front line Aircraft System”), which could variously be described as a technology demonstrator, the first prototype of the future T-50 fighter, or an intermediate step between the two, took to the air for the first time from the freezing runway of Dzemgi Air Force Base (shared with the KnAAPO plant) at Komsomolsk-on-Amur in the Russian Far East Siberia (see also http://www.defpro.com/daily/details/497/). A fundamental step has at last been accomplished in the development of the long-expected Russian response to the American F-22 RAPTOR air dominance fighter.

(Part one of the article can be viewed here: http://www.defpro.com/daily/details/505/)

Airframe

The aerodynamic configuration of the PAK-FA maintains a vague reference to the Su-27 as regards the fuselage and the location of the engines, which are installed in widely separated nacelles forming a tunnel with the flat bottom of the fuselage. The general planform is a tailed delta, similar to the F-22, with the all-moving horizontal tailplanes close-coupled and on the same plane to the wing without any gap. The twin vertical surfaces, canted outward by perhaps 25°, are also all-moving. This solution has been used rarely in recent times; in particular the ill-fated Northrop YF-23 had a pair of all-moving butterfly tailplanes. The all-moving verticals however had been fairly used in supersonic designs dating back to the late 1950s or 60s, in particular the SR-71 which used a pair of all-moving verticals canted inward to reduce the induced roll moment when the surfaces were rotated, and most of the North American design of the period – the RA-5C VIGILANTE, its contemporary YF-107 and the unique XB-70 – as well as the British BAC TSR 2 used a similar solution. In the PAK FA design, their reason d’être arguably consists in enabling the smallest possible vertical surfaces for the sake of reduced radar signature and supercruise drag, while at the same time also maintaining (in combination with the 3D TVC nozzles) excellent manoeuvrability.

The underfuselage tunnel between the engine nacelles contributes significantly to the overall aerodynamic lift generation, just as in the Su-27 and MiG-29 as well as in the F-14 – arguably the real originator of the “centreplane lift” concept. This lift is added to that provided by the large wing and should enable excellent manoeuvrability even at high altitude – a potential advantage of the F-22 and now the PAK FA over all their rivals. The widely separated engines also offer much better survivability in the event of battle damage or accidental fire/explosion.

The fuselage sides have marked “chines”, again like the F-22 and its unfortunate competitor, the YF-23. This shaping can be assumed both to contribute toward reducing radar reflectivity and to develop, at high angles of attack, favourable lift-enhancing vortexes flowing above the inner wing upper surface just above the engine nacelles. The wing has dropping leading edges providing for a variable camber airfoil and separate flaps and ailerons, these latter contributing towards enhanced TO/landing performance (this should anyway be very good, given the huge lift generated by the aircraft configuration as a whole). The inner part of the wing leading edges is stepped longitudinally with a much longer chord which blends forming, in part, the engine nacelles’ upper “lips” and then merging into the fuselage to enhance the lift generating characteristics of the overall aircraft configuration, somewhat akin to a lifting body. Possibly for this reason, but also to ease a smooth airflow into the engines at very high angle of attack, the upper intake projecting false “lips” appear to be hinged parallel to the sweep real intake lips, thus providing a variable camber like the wing leading edge. In this way, the upper surface of the air intake contributes to overall lift generation. It is also possible that the movements of these peculiar elements, when linked to the full authority digital flight control system, could contribute in some way to the aircraft’s longitudinal control, acting like a third control surface (in line with the Sukhoi tradition as exemplified in the three-surfaces Su-30MKI). It seem however clear that the “lips” cannot move as fully independent control surfaces, due to their primary role in ensuring a correct airflow to the engines.

The possible rationale behind the fuselage “chines” and wing strakes could be to generate two vortexes over each wing upper surface, thus enhancing lift (via more diffused vortex lift) at high angle of attack (AoA). In particular, the two inner vortexes (those generated by the fuselage “chines”) would energise the airflow over the inner wing upper surface blending with the fuselage above the engine nacelles. The two outer vortexes (those generated from the wing strakes outboard the intakes lips) would transfer their kinematic energy to the upper outer panel wing airflow. Furthermore, given the expected path of such latter vortexes, they would also interact with the upper airflow over the all-moving horizontal tailplanes – thus replicating the superior longitudinal control provided in the Su-27 by its peculiarly located slab tailplanes.*

Summing up, lift appears to be generated by following elements, working in a synergic way:

• Wing outer panels (outside the engine nacelles) with dropping leading edges (variable camber airfoil);
• Engine nacelles upper surface blended with outer wing panels and fuselage with dropping intake upper false lips/leading edges (variable camber);
• Fuselage tunnel between the engine nacelles;
• Vortexes generated from the front fuselage “chines“, enhancing the engine nacelles upper surface lift and possibly the all-moving verticals’ control authority at very high AoA;
• Vortexes generated by the wing strakes outboard the engine nacelles, enhancing the outer wing panels lift and possibly the all-moving horizontal tailplanes control authority at very high AoA.

The fuselage has the already mentioned flat bottom and a straight tapered upper part ending in a flat and somewhat smaller “sting” between the engine exhausts. The installation of a braking parachute in a bay in the upper part of the sting makes room for the rational introduction in the extreme tailcone of a wide-scanning ECM antenna or perhaps a rear hemisphere surveillance/tracking radar (experiments were carried out a few years ago on a modified Su-32FN). The second prototype, which was used for taxi trials on 23 January appears to have a different tail cone, for unclear reasons.

The rear fuselage beavertail appears wider than in the Su-27/-30 albeit with a similar layout, and should offer more freedom of movement to the multi-axis thrust vectoring control (TVC) exhaust nozzles which will most certainly be fitted to the engines of the T-50 (although their current presence on the PAK FA is not certain). This configuration with the widely exposed round engine exhaust nozzles is however detrimental in terms of rear-emisphere IR and radar signature.

The PAK FA is claimed by Sukhoi to offer “unprecedented small signatures in the radar, optical and infrared range”, and this is certainly true as regards Russian combat aircraft and quite possibly all existing non-American designs. At the same time, it is evident that the PAK FA has been designed with a close attention to stealth characteristics, but is not intended to be an uncompromising stealth aircraft à la F-22. When certain design features detrimental to low observability were deemed to be all-important, these were adopted nonetheless. It would be extremely interesting to watch the eventual results of this approach in terms of maintainability and operational availability, particularly in the light of the in-service experience so far with the F-22.

An element which maintains some similarity to the Su-27 family is the landing gear. All the members retract forward, easing the emergency extension which in this way can be accomplished simply by gravity and air pressure. The main tyres, again like the previous Sukhoi design, when retracted lays flat in bays partially above the air intakes and partially inside the thick wing root fairing born out from the air intake upper part and as a continuation of the sweep surface linking the fuselage side to the outer wing, running above the upper air intake lip.

The PAK FA appears to be built with a significant percentage of composites, including most of the wing, horizontal tailplanes and dropping intake lips skin, centre-forward engine nacelles, most of the fuselage skin and the doors of the weapons bays and landing gear bays. Metal parts seem to include the dropping wing and intake lips leading edges (with the exception of the inner sections where the conformal aerials are expected to be installed, and which should thus be built of dielectric material), the engine intakes and the wide fairings blending the outer wing panels to the fuselage. Press reports suggest a 75% (being weight) being made of titanium alloys and 20% by composites, which sounds plausible.

Powerplant

The planned engine for the T-50 is understood to be the new Saturn AL-41F, expected to offer about 17.5 tons of thrust in full afterburning mode and somewhere in the range of 12 tons in dry mode. The latter figure would comfortably enable supercruising (i.e., supersonic cruise flight without afterburner) at around Mach 1.5, thus in the same class as the F-22. The prototype/technology demonstrator now flying was expected to be powered by the Saturn 117S, a much improved version of the AL-31F intended for the Su-35 but still less powerful at 14.5 tons in full afterburning than the AL-41F. There however are some indications to suggest that the aircraft already has the new engines.

The engines are fed by two-dimensional raked air intakes with the upper lip generating an oblique shock wave favourable to dynamic pressure recovery in the supersonic regime, which for the PAK FA could approach Mach 2.3÷2.5. While in appearance of fixed geometry, it is possible that a variable-position upper ramp, to generate multiple oblique shocks is part of the system for a further better dynamic pressure recovery in the high supersonic speed regime.

The tight shape of the engine nacelles and the position of the ventral “venetian blind” auxiliary intakes seem to suggest that the PAK FA does not feature a serpentine air duct to the engine compressors, as typically adopted for low-RCS aircraft. It is possible that the Sukhoi designers have preferred to limit the compressors’ strong radar reflection by inserting a grill in front of them, while optimising the air intakes for higher max. speed and supercruise performance.

The engines are mounted with a slight forward convergence (some 3°). This, in twin-engine aircraft with conventional exhaust nozzles, would typically reduce thrust asymmetry in the event of an engine flame-out – although with the drawback of reduced controllability. Given however the installation of TVC nozzles, the choice of converging axis built into the nacelles could be the outcome of an aerodynamic local airflow optimisation due to interaction of all the aircraft elements.

A large fuel capacity in line with the previous Sukhoi fighters is certainly provided, let’s say in the order of 12,000 litres. A fully-retractable in-flight refuelling probe is installed on the left side of the fuselage in front of the windscreen.

Armament

The standard air-to-air armament is carried internally in two identical tandem weapon bays, which can be estimated at about 5m x 1.2-1.3m. The bays’ position inside the tunnel between the engine nacelles ensures a discrete opening of their doors at weapons launch, otherwise a drawback for a stealth aircraft. In addition, the doors have saw tooth-shaped edges to further reduce radar signature. The size of the bays can be assumed to allow internal carriage of eight R-77-class radar-guided AAMs with folding wings, i.e. the same figure as for the F-22.

Similar to American 5th generation types, for the “second/subsequent” days of war operations, four additional underwing hardpoints can be installed under the outer wing panels. However no wingtip store positions appear to have been foreseen. A dark area to the right side of the upper front fuselage under the cockpit betrays the installation, similarly to the Su-27, of a single cannon (a 30mm GSh-30-1?) for close combat engagements.

Avionics

The combat avionics of the T-50 has been under development for some time, and some elements will almost certainly be installed in the Su-35 interim fighter. The main sensor will be a Tikhomorov NIIP X-band radar with active AESA antenna, which was unveiled at the latest MAKS Air Show in August 2009. The 1m-dia. antenna contains some 1,500 solid stat transmit/receive modules by NPP Pulsar, which places it in the same class as the F-22’s APG-77. Tikhomorov claims an exceptional range of ~400km against a 1m² equivalent radar surface target. The radar entered bench testing in November 2008, and a flyable operational prototype will be completed by mid-2010.

In a very innovative development, the main X-band antenna will be supplemented by auxiliary L-band antennas installed in the wing inboard leading edges. In addition to the obvious IFF/SSR functions, this arrangement (which is also being offered for retrofit on the Su-27/-30 family as well as the Su-35), has a very clear anti-stealth search function. Most current stealth or semi-stealth designs – and most particularly the F-35 JSF, although not the F-22 – are optimised to reduce radar signature against X-band fire control radars as the main threat, and their low-observability features and shapings do not work as well against L-band radars. Of course, the lower the frequency the higher the wavelength the poorer the accuracy of distance and angular measurements, and thus even apart from excessive volume, weight, power and cooling requirements a fighter aircraft could not possibly rely on a main L-band system alone. However, the presence of the additional L-band antennas will provide an important early warning function against at least some low-observable targets, and it may also enable a “mini-AWACS” role. It is additionally conceivable that these antennas could also be used for the detection and disruption of sensors and digital communications systems operating in L-band, including e.g. the all-important JTIDS/MIDS/Link-16.

While the PAK FA has no functioning radar yet, it already sports the protruding head of an electro-optic IRST system in front and to the right of the cockpit’s windscreen. This will maintain the excellent mixed solution (radar/IRST) used in all modern Russian fighters, event tough the IRST seeker’s “ball” is at odds with the search for a reduced radar signature in the front emisphere. The decision to add the L-band antennas while maintaining the IRST reinforces the perception of the T-50 being mainly intended for air defence roles against intruding low-observable strike aircraft.

The Indian Factor

Back in early 2007, Russia and India reached an agreement to cooperate on a Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft (FGFA) based on the PAK FA for the Indian Air Force. The programme is officially described as involving a 50-50% split as regards both financing and R&D activities, but it is nearly universally understood to rather cover a scheme, under which India will fund a substantial portion of the PAK FA’s development bill in exchange for access to the relevant technologies.

The Indian Air Force’s requirements do differ rather substantially from the Russian Air Force’s, and are reported to demand a twin-seat configuration as well as possibly a different wing and control surfaces. Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd is expected to become responsible for some 25% of the total development workload for the FGFA programme, involving modifying the PAK FA single-seater airframe to a twin-seater configuration as well as the mission computer, navigation system, cockpit displays and ECM dispensers. HAL will of course also take care of eventual series production of a tentatively planned total of some 200-250 aircraft.

Indian sources have ventured into suggesting that the FGFA could be in service by 2015, but this is quite obviously not feasible given that development has not yet started. A logical date would be well into the 2020s.

Conclusions

As a first tentative assessment and on the basis of the basis of the scarce information as currently available, the PAK FA (T-50-1?) looks like a mix of well-proven solutions from previous Sukhoi designs married to several new ideas, in particular as regards the still superior quality of Russian aerodynamic research.

It is also possible that the significant delay suffered in developing a Russian counterpart to the F-22 could have turned into a blessing in disguise, giving Sukhoi designers a period of reflexion to generate a well balanced design. This would relate in particular to the decision not to push for extreme low observability characteristics at the expense of everything else, including not only flight performance but also acquisition costs and most importantly maintenance requirements and thus operational availability.

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By Sergio Coniglio
http://www.defpro.com/daily/details/506/

defpro OpEd: “While Airbus threatens A400M cancellation governments try to pour oil on troubled water” http://www.defpro.com/daily/details/479/

… Airbus Chief Executive Officer Thomas Enders openly considered the option to cancel the programme should the governments fail to participate in the financing of costs exceeding the original offer.

Congrats! You are doing a real good job.

Boeing’s new US tanker bid strategy

Source: http://www.defpro.com/daily/details/337/

11:15 GMT, June 22, 2009 During the recent Paris Air Show 2009 Boeing has hit the news with a new strategy presentation for the pending US tanker bid. This new strategy is primarily based on a change of the tanker platform: Boeing is considering to give new momentum to the race for the much desired contract award by offering its larger 777 platform along with the 767 of the prior contests. This was acknowledged by Jim McNerney, CEO of Boeing, at the beginning of this year’s Paris Air Show.

The US tanker bid, scheduling the procurement of 179 tankers worth some $35 billion to replace the aging Air Force fleet of aerial refuelling aircraft, preoccupies the aerospace industry, the political decision-makers and the media since quite a time. Back in 2001, Boeing had been awarded the first Air Force tanker contract, which was afterwards cancelled due to an acquisition scandal. In February 2008, a team of EADS and its US partner Northrop Grumman won the much discussed second contest with their A330 tanker. However, this deal was cancelled by Defense Secretary Robert Gates in late 2008 after Boeing protested the procurement process as unfair and the Government Accountability Office (GAO) decided in favour of the Seattle based company.

Now, Gates plans to restart the process in the course of the following weeks. The request for proposals will most likely be issued by midsummer 2010 and will show up new requirements and procedures for the contest. According to UPI, the contract is expected to balloon to more than twice the initial size with fresh orders for tankers in the future. It had also been discussed in Washington and suggested by several veteran lawmakers to split the contract between Boeing and Northrop Grumman-EADS. Yet, this alternative was explicitly dismissed by Gates saying that a split contract would be “bad public policy and bad acquisition policy” as well as “a bad deal for taxpayers.”

Bigger, better, faster?

By offering a tanker on the basis of the commercial 777 jet, Boeing aims at improving its bidding position in view of the Airbus A330 MRTT being larger than the 767. The 777 capacity significantly surpasses the A330’s. According to Boeing’s spokesman William Barksdale the aircraft “definitely, is much more capable than the A330.” Dave Bowman, Boeing vice president of tanker programmes, confidently states: “We’re ready to build America’s next tanker in whatever configuration and to whatever requirements the [US government] desires.”

McNerney revealed that Boeing will not leave the field to the EADS/Northrop Grumman team without a struggle. If necessary, the company’s CEO says, Boeing could develop a new aircraft from scratch which would then be available as of 2016. If the US Government will accept such long waiting periods for its new system remains to be seen. Even before, Airbus could offer its newly developed long-range A350 jet aircraft, which could be completed by 2013, according to the company.

Boeing’s 777 could, however, encounter problems on different nature: the production of the military version could come into conflict with national security regulations. As the construction of military equipment must be conducted in secured settings, part of the production of the commercial and military aircraft would need to be carried out in separated buildings. Furthermore, according to different sources, several defence specialists doubt that Boeing will be able to redesign the project in such a short term.

Also at the Paris Air Show, Northrop Grumman and EADS reaffirmed their commitment to the KC-45 tanker. In a joint statement Ronald D. Sugar, chairman and CEO of Northrop Grumman and Louis Gallois, CEO of EADS said: “The KC-45 was previously selected because of its superior operational capability, lower risk and greater cost competitiveness. We have continued to strengthen our offering and look forward to working closely with the U.S. Department of Defense and U.S. Air Force to ensure that the upcoming competition will provide the warfighter with the most capable, best value tanker available.” (see: http://www.defpro.com/news/details/8114/)

Source: http://www.defpro.com/daily/details/337/

Boeing Committed to Funding F-15 Silent Eagle Development

Source: http://www.defpro.com/news/details/8167/

09:15 GMT, June 18, 2009 PARIS | The Boeing Company [NYSE: BA] will dedicate funding to further development of the F-15 Silent Eagle program, with the goal of a flight demonstration in the third quarter of 2010. The announcement came at the Paris Air Show following meetings with potential customers and reaffirmed a commitment to the prototype program made by Boeing Integrated Defense Systems President and CEO Jim Albaugh at the air show on June 14.

The F-15 Silent Eagle, which Boeing launched in March, advances the most modern variants of the F-15 multi-role strike fighter with enhanced survivability. Features include a digital electronic warfare suite coupled to an Advanced Electronically Scanned Array radar for enhanced situational awareness, aerodynamic improvements and cost-effective radar cross-section reduction technologies.

“We know from talking with current international F-15 operators that they are very interested in the capabilities of the Silent Eagle,” said Albaugh. “Making this commitment to get the program through to a flight demonstration will ultimately help international customers understand how this aircraft meets their need for a flexible, long-range, large-payload, high-speed, multi-role strike fighter with reduced observability.”

Boeing will conduct further trade studies to allow new F-15 technologies to be brought to market. In addition, Boeing will continue discussions with a number of international aerospace companies about potential co-development opportunities.

After the VH-71 termination – What’s next?

06:27 GMT, June 11, defpro.com | 2009 On January 23, 2009, President Obama stated that the VH-71 presidential helicopter programme was “an example of the procurement process gone amok.” In fact, the VH-71 programme has experienced significant schedule delays. US Defense Secretary Robert Gates said April 6 that the programme has fallen six years behind schedule and runs the risk of not delivering the requested capability. He recommended the president to terminate the programme which has seen already more than $3 billion invested to cover the R&D and production costs of the first phase.

As a result, Ashton Carter, the DOD acquisition executive, issued an internal DOD memorandum directing that the VH-71 programme be cancelled on May 15, 2009. The Navy announced a stop-work order and a termination of the programme on June 1.

Since the termination of the VH-71 programme, which had the aim to provide 23 new helicopters replacing the 19 aging VH-3D and VH-60N rotorcraft used to transport the president, the US Congress has now to approve the Administration’s proposal and initiate a successor programme.

According to a report by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) released on June 5, CRS is exploring the costs of alternatives to canceling the VH-71 presidential helicopter programme. In this report the CRS stated that continuing with the VH-71 programme in more or less the current form would result in acquisition costs of $13 billion or more, including sunk costs on the VH-71 programme of more than $3 billion bill, thus taxpayers would have to pay about $10 billion.

Since its beginning, the programme was divided into Increment I and Increment II helicopters. The Increment I meet some but not all the operational requirements as stated in the VH-71 Operational Requirements Document which was approved by the DOD In December 2003. It was intended that the Increment I enter service first as near-term replacements while Increment II which meet all the requirements in the ORD, were to enter service later.

An alternative proposed by the CRS would see 18 Increment I aircraft procured while Increment II would be cancelled. Including the five pilot production Increment I aircraft, this would make a total fleet of 23 presidential helicopters. Terminating the Increment II would save $3.6 billion leaving less than $6.4 billion to taxpayers, the report stated. Another option could see 14 rather than 18 additional Increment I aircraft procured saving another hundreds of millions of dollars.

This estimate of both proposals, however, does not include the costs of keeping the 19 existing presidential helicopters in operation until they are replaced by the new aircraft.

Alternatively the 19 existing presidential helicopters could be upgraded and their service lives extended. Such an upgrade could cost $4.4 billion according to US Navy estimates. According to the CRS an upgrade could extend the service life of the VH-60Ns from 10 000 to 12 000 flight hours and thus provide another 6.9 years in operation. The VH-3Ds would have their service lives extended from 14 000 hours to 16 000 hours, providing another 6.7 years of operation. However, the 19 existing aircraft would not meet many of the operational requirements in the VH-71 ORD.

Be this as it may, due to the advanced age and technological limitations of the current fleet, a new fleet of presidential helicopters are still necessary. The proposed live extension of the current fleet of presidential helicopters, which are already 35 years old, would just postpone the date for a new programme which still will be needed. The US Congress has now to find out if a total termination of the programme would be even more costly than completing the current program under one of the above mentioned option.

Lockheed Martin Systems Integration-Owego is the prime contractor and systems integrator for the VH-71 programme with overall responsibility for the programme and aircraft system. AgustaWestland, the principal subcontractor, has responsibility for the basic air vehicle design, production build, and basic air vehicle support functions.

Source: http://www.defpro.com/daily/details/330/