The USN faces one similar problem to RN.

the fear that number of platforms will always be cut so a desire to make each platform as good as possible, and hence each platform is more expensive and more vulnerable to cuts in numbers.

If there was a genuine proposal to provide two CVF sized (but nuke powered) flat tops for the same money as one Ford class would the USN support it? I suspect not due to the fear that this would leave them with the same number of smaller and less capable carriers rather than twice as many.

So, the issue is political rather than ‘technical’. Mr Canaday reminds us that the US navy got its first carrier (Langley) that way, with politics overriding what the navy wanted….

So now we get back to the “bigger vs smaller” carrier argument which has been going on since aircraft first went to sea…..and I might add that the small carrier argument has never won out…….:mad:

As it turned out, the destruction of the USS Hornet at Santa Cruz in October of 1942 was to be the last time the Navy ever lost a large carrier. However, the lesson of the war’s first year was that even with radar and other defensive innovations, carriers were far from invulnerable. Concern that carriers might be too vulnerable had led the Navy to experiment with smaller carriers during the interwar period. The Navy’s first carrier built from the keel up – USS Ranger, commissioned in 1934 – was considerably lighter than the Lexington and Saratoga, carriers fashioned from converted battlecruisers that preceded it to sea.
But the disappointing performance of the Ranger convinced Navy leaders that it made more sense to operate a smaller number of big carriers than a larger number of small ones, due to the loss of combat capability and survivability associated with smaller vessels. The service has continued to espouse that view ever since, despite the frequent efforts of civilian leaders to fund smaller, more numerous carriers
That emphasis persisted even after the Soviet Union began deploying large numbers of nuclear-powered submarines in the 1960’s.

Because the U.S. enjoyed a substantial advantage in undersea warfare – conferred in equal parts by favorable geography, superior technology, and rigorous training – the main thrust of defensive investments for carriers throughout the Cold War was to address air-breathing threats. Network-centric warfare is the latest manifestation of this multi-generational effort.
It was concern about Soviet cruise missiles that led the Ford Administration to mount the last major effort to build smaller, conventionally-powered carriers rather than nuclear-powered ships. In 1976 defense secretary Donald Rumsfeld proposed foregoing another Nimitz-class nuclear carrier and instead buying two fossil-fuel driven carriers that could host vertical-takeoff and landing aircraft. Rumsfeld argued that the Navy needed to begin dispersing its sea-based tactical aircraft in response to the growing antiship cruise-missile threat.
That proposal was rebuffed by Congress after the Navy argued large-deck, nuclear-powered carriers were intrinsically more survivable against most threats. In addition to the larger ship’s capacity to absorb damage, it could also accommodate more robust defenses such as F-14 interceptors and E-2C early-warning aircraft. Moreover, nuclear propulsion enabled a carrier to operate at maximum speed (about 30 knots) indefinitely. Nuclear carriers were thus harder to attack, had less need for logistical support, and more room for defensive stores (munitions and aircraft fuel). Due to these considerations, the Nimitz class has remained the Navy’s reigning carrier design for three decades.

http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/library/resources/documents/Defense/aircraft-carrier-invulnerability.pdf

Com on, Jonsey… you know very well that, barring a complete reversal of current trends (likely involving a full-on “USA vs USSR”-style cold war between the US & China), that the ONLY thing building 65kt full-on carriers would get the USN is a 1-for-1 replacement of Nimitz-class CVNs with the new “more economically-reasonable” “nuclear-powered Midways”.

Your force structure would actually be 2-3 100kt Fords and 9-8 65kt “CVMNs”.

What about the 8+8 force structure I suggested earlier (you can argue that based on how many ships you need to keep 1 on station: 8+8 gives you 2 fullsize CVNs and 2 smaller cousings on station at a given time)

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lq-xlLcL_1k

Petr Ufimtsev

What of it if it were? (i.e. who cares, why would it matter?)

Wiki:

The U.S. Navy awarded Northrop Grumman Corporation’s Ingalls Shipyard Division a $2.4 billion fixed-price incentive contract for the detailed design and construction of LHA-6. It can carry 20 F-35B and 2 MH-60S to serve as a small aircraft carrier as demonstrated by LHD operations in Operation Iraqi Freedom. Program cost, $6.8 billion. Unit cost, $3.4 billion (FY 2011)

Construction began on CVN-78 in the spring of 2007, and is planned to finish in 2015. In 2005, it was estimated to cost at least $8 billion excluding the $5 billion spent on research and development (though that was not expected to be representative of the cost of future members of the class). A 2009 report said that the Ford would cost $14 billion including research and development, and the actual cost of the carrier itself would be $9 billion.

So, roughy 3 ‘small’ carriers for the price of 1 large (!) carrier. Given dwindling resources, to keep up the deck numbers and ability to deploy to a variety of areas at the same time, it may be usefull to have both large and small carriers (even if the latter offer far lesser capability). Using the small carriers to maintain presence in low threat areas while reserving the large ones for high threat areas. Still, I fiigure you need four carriers to keep one on station, so for the US that would mean maintaining at least 8 large carriers. Is it worthwhile sacrificing 2 large decks to add 6-8 small decks?

IMHO all would need sufficient escorts and recon assets. So there no money saving in that respect.

I had no intent to doubt Hoa please believe that…there are different variants of the 3M54 missile though and SIPRI does not seem to list which one Vietnam has ordered. Plus the same weapons system can launch the 3M14 LACM…which, given the proximity of somewhere like Zhanjiang to Hai Phong, might be an interesting capability for Vietnam to deploy. 😉

“Kilo Class submarines are already configured for 3M54 Klub family (SS-N-27) missiles.”
http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/vietnam-reportedly-set-to-buy-russian-kilo-class-subs-05396/

“Hanoi’s outstanding order for six Kilo- class submarines fits significantly into this mix as well. The weapons fit is expected to include the sea-skimming 3M-54 Klub anti-ship missile, ranging up to 300 km.”
http://www.chinapost.com.tw/commentary/the-china-post/special-to-the-china-post/2012/01/10/328567/p2/Vietnam-prepares.htm

07 May, 2011 DEFENSE STUDIES

Commentary Han Hoa Military Magazine in April, a leading source of military technology expert reputation in Moscow (Russia) said that under a bilateral agreement signed between Russia and Vietnam, in 2013, Vietnam will receive the first Kilo submarines, a year later as the second and the last one will be delivered in 2017.Compared with 636-MK submarines that use by the Chinese Navy, Kilo 636-MV submarines that Russia sold to Vietnam has many differences, of which the largest is about armament.

First, Vietnam’s Kilo submarines will be fitted with land attack cruise missile 3M-14E latest type, with a range of 290 km. Missiles are not Russia’s Defense Ministry approved the export to China. Apart from Vietnam, two other countries are exporting Russian 3M-14E missiles is India and Algeria.

Besides that, Kilo 636-MV submarine is equipped with radar-guided complex multi-effects post GE2-01 type. This has not been removed for export to China, the biggest advantage is minimizing the noise in the environment and help diversify measures directions.

Sonar system, Kilo 636-MK China submarines is equipped with sonar systems MGK 400E basic types. Meanwhile, the Kilo 636-MV submarines are installing sonar systems MGK 400E type improvements. Two sonar system has the same sounding range, but the sonar system type MGK 400E is equipped with improved signal processing speed and performance more digitized higher level.

On the periscope, both Kilo 636-MK submarine and Kilo 636-MV submarines are equipped with sounding optical system, but the periscope used for tasks Kilo 636-MV attack submarines are installation of additional equipment measuring distance from IR ray and TV monitoring systems, Meanwhile, Kilo 636MK submarines primarily use optical aiming device and no distance measurement beam from. That means fighting capability at night and the attack accuracy of the Kilo 636-MV submarine will be higher than Kilo 636-MK submarine.

Final difference is the air conditioning system that Kilo 636-MV submarines using more appropriate to the climate, tropical terrain.

Besides these differences, Kilo submarines that Russia sold to China and the Russian Kilo submarine exports to Vietnam have some similarities, such as the missile is equipped with 3M-54E anti-ship, and used batteries 476 E type of improvement, long life and meet the requirements of the water temperature in the Pacific Ocean.

Sources said that the production time of two submarines on each other for over 5 years, the technology equipped for Kilo 636-MV submarines is granted with more advanced than Kilo 636-MK. Considering the differences above, according to the magazine, although both are Kilo 636 M submarines, but the gap in technology between the Kilo 636-MV submarine and Kilo 636-MK submarine at least 10 years.

About 6 Kilo submarines sold by Russia to Vietnam, long have information that Vietnam can use them to build two fleets. However, according to sources, six submarines of the Kilo 636-MV Vietnam will be arranged uniformly, forming a Russian fleet and the construction will be in charge of all media repository missiles at seaports and oxygen supply stations as part of the contents of bilateral agreements signed with Vietnam.

Related to the purchase price of Kilo 636-MVsubmarine, formerly reported that Vietnam Navy may have to buy Kilo 636-MV submarines with high prices. But according to sources, the price of Kilo 636-MV submarines that Russia sold to Vietnam is completely true and current prices Russia has started to manufacture first Kilo 636 submarines for Vietnam.

http://forum.keypublishing.com/showpost.php?p=1753530&postcount=3

Speaking of Korean yard involvement, KRI Makassar comes to mind (besides a Dokdo variant)

M-7

The SA-2/HongQi 2 can play a secondary role as surface-to-surface missile. Egypt reportedly used its SA-2 SAM in this manner during the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. The project of converting the existing HongQi 2 into surface-to-surface role was known as “Project 8610”. The missile was reportedly sold to Iran and North Korea under the export name M-7 in the 1980s.

http://www.sinodefence.com/army/surfacetoairmissile/hongqi2.asp

M-7 (CSS-8/PROJECT 8610)
The M-7 can deploy its payload to any range between 50 and 150 km (31 and 93 miles). Its payload is typically equipped with a single 190 or 250 kg HE warhead. It is probable that submunitions and chemical agent warheads exist to increase battlefield effectiveness. The missile is 10.8 m in length, has a maximum diameter of 0.65 m and has a launch weight of 2,650 kg.

http://missilethreat.com/missiles/m-7-css-8project-8610/

TQ-2

The TQ-2 (Tuqiang-2) is the high-speed, high-altitude target drone developed from the HQ-2 SAM. The drone has been used to evaluate the effectiveness of the HQ-2, HQ-3 and HQ-4 SAM systems.

The TQ-2 high-altitude, high-speed target drone for missile testing (Source: Chinese Internet)

http://www.sinodefence.com/army/surfacetoairmissile/hq2-part2.asp

Dongfeng 11 (CSS-7)

A DF-11 TEL.
Main article: DF-11
Also known as the M-11 (export), the DF-11 is a road-mobile short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) designed by Wang Zhenhua at the Sanjiang Missile Corporation (also known as the 066 Base) in the late 1970s. Unlike previous Chinese ballistic missiles, the DF-11 use solid fuel, which greatly reduces launch preparation time (15-30 min). Liquid-fueled missiles such as the DF-5 require up to 2 hours of pre-launch preparation. The DF-11 has range of 300 km and 800 kg payload. An improved DF-11A version has increased range of >825 km.[13] The range of the M-11 does not violate the limits set by the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). Estimates on the number of DF-11s in service vary between 500 to 600.[14][15]

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dongfeng_(missile)#Dongfeng_11_.28CSS-7.29