😡
Here are few photos:
http://pakmr.blogspot.com/2011/05/pns-alamgir-reaches-jeddah-in-saudi.html
Sadly no Mk.13 launcher or any replacement system…
There are no Alamgir pics on there: the pic in the article on Gulcuk shows the ship with pennent no. 8, i.e. prior to becoming Alamgir. The others are of the transfer ceremony.
No new pic of the ship since here refit…. 😡
I don’t know how good these new Russian warships are.. but they certainly are very beautiful outside and in. In fact I dare say, almost as beautiful as Dutch ships!
… almost 😀
we can agree on that then. and that is the old MLP design the new one uses a off the shelf design but the ship pretty much pulls along side a LMSR and the vehicles onboard are offloaded to that then sent ashore by JHSV, LCAC,s and landing barges, or foreign allied craft. Lets also hope they get worthy names too.
http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/The-US-Navys-Mobile-Landing-Platform-Ships-06525/
I specifically said that Australia does not and is not planning to operate, an LPD.
Largs Bay is *not* an LPD.
Jaja, easy after the fact. IMHO the issue in relation to AOR was Dock + Landingship, and no structural facilties aboard it to support helicopters (other than providing landing spots).
Ummm… wrong!!!
Largs Bay is a LSD*, not a LPD… they are two significantly different types of ship, despite the superficial external similarity.
LSD is the abbreviation for Landing Ship, Dock (a cargo/vehicle-emphasized landing ship).
LPD is the abbreviation for Landing Platform, Dock (also called Amphibious Transport, Dock…a troop-emphasized landing ship).
A LSD has about twice the floodable dock space, more vehicle/cargo storage space, and less than half the troop accommodation (usually 1/3 or so) when compared to a similarly-sized LPD.
* The RN designated it LSD(A), indicating that it was an auxiliary LSD (intended for follow-up operations), not a front-line LSD (intended for opposed combat landing operations).
Jajaja, minor issue. I know there are variants emphasizing troop versus cargo/landingcraft variants. But the distinction is besides the point given the remark I was responding to (about RAN not operating of planning an LPD): I don’t think the poster meant to say RAN does operate an LSD.
“The Bay class are based on the Royal Schelde Enforcer design, similar to Dutch HNLMS Rotterdam (L800) and Spanish SPS Galicia (L51) LPDs. They were at first classified as Alternative Landing Ship Logistics (ALSL) However, they have been reclassified as Landing Ship Dock (Auxiliary) (LSD(A)), as they developed into a form very much more like an LSD, with a large flight deck aft and a docking well in the stern capable of operating a LCU Mk 10.”
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bay_class_landing_ship_dock
What is your point?
Besides, the two LHD’s will have a combined helicopter carrying capacity of up to around 60 airframes.
Australia does not currently and does not plan in the future to operate LPD’s.
Plus, the Fort class are 20 years old (not that much younger then Success really) and single hulled. Throw in purchase cost along with refit cost and its a non-starter.
RAN will probably get two new build purpose built replenishment ships sometime in the next 10 years or so.
My point is that a navy doesn’t need the own the airframes that fly of its deck, since that appeared to be your point earlier.
And, that doesn’t mean ‘stealing airframes from the army’, see example of Dutch Helicopter command: this is formally an air force unit (for logistical/maintenance purposes) but it handles all tranport helicopter (i.e. a tri-service pool of utility choppers)
Please back track a bit and you’ll discover there was already a point in the discussion where all – incl. me – agreed the AOR would not (likely) be purchased by RAN. Since, the arguments are theoritical/hypothetical. In view of your reactions, do you have a problem with that kind of discussion?
ps: FYI RAN recently bought RFA Largs Bay, which is an LPD and topic of this thread.
Oh, the helicopter are there, but by designating additional airframes for the Navy it means taking them away from the Army Helicopter units.
Remember, the number of units acquired was purchased based on six (6) going to the navy as a replacement for the (six?) Sea Kings, enough going to the Army to replace the Blackhawks, with the remainder being in deep maintenance.
Stealing airframes from the army just means the fleet wont last as long since their remaining airframes will be worked harder. The RAN obviously specified six airframes for a reason, they have all the data, we don’t.
Balony, I’m not talking about permanently assigning helicopters to an AOR. I’m suggesting to put them there when needed (e.g when ARMY personnel is shipped elswhere in the world and taking its helicopters with them, but which can’t base on LPD)
The Dutch navy has 2 LPDs, each capable of housing 6 NH90 or 4 EH101 or 4 Chinook. It currently has 21 SH-14D Lynx (only 10 still operational thanks to life-prolonging maintenance. This was necessary due to delivery delays of the NH-90. One is currently held by Libyan pro-Qadhafi forces after a failed attempt to rescue two people from Libya on February 27, 2011.) While carrying Koninklijke Marine titles, they actually belong to the Air Force Defensie Helikopter Commando (DHC), or Defence Helicopter Command, since July 4, 2008. It will get 20 NH-90 of which 12 NATO Frigate Helicopter (NFH) and 8 transport version of the NATO Frigate Helicopter (TNFH) (Being introduced until the end of 2015) It has no Chinooks, no SUper Puma’s (but DHC has)
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Royal_Netherlands_Air_Force#Defence_Helicopter_Command
The RAN doesnt have the helicopters to utilise all that extra space on fort george, and doesnt have the ships to require the additional stores capacity.
The RAN doesn’t need to have all (utility transport) heli’s, they can be Army.
The Royal Australian Navy will replace its aging Sea King helicopters with six marinised NHIndustries NH90 Tactical Transport Helicopters (designated the MRH-90, or Multi Role Helicopter in Australian service) by 2010.[42] These aircraft are to be purchased as part a joint Army-Navy purchase totalling 46 helicopters, with another 7 marked for sharing between both forces
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fleet_Air_Arm_(RAN)#Aircraft
In 2005 Australia ordered 12 to replace outgoing UH-1 Iroquois. The number was revised in June 2006 when the Australian Defence Force announced plans to replace its UH-60 Black Hawk and SH-3 Sea King fleets.[8] with an order of at least 34 additional NH90s, taking their total order to 46; four manufactured in Europe, 42 manufactured locally at Australian Aerospace (a Eurocopter subsidiary) in Brisbane.[9][10] In Australian service, the NH90 will be known as the MRH 90, where ‘MRH’ stands for Multi Role Helicopter.[11]
…
Australian Army: 40 MRH 90 (TTH), 8 delivered in 2009 with the remainder to be delivered by 2014. MRH90 nickname : “Cobra”
Royal Australian Navy: 6 MRH 90 (TTH).
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NHI_NH90
The additional stores space doesn’t necessarily need to be used for supporting ships. It can very well be used to support e.g. an expeditionary force ashore. Likewise for the heli’s (i.e. the Bay class LPD + this AOR working together as a team).
The U.S. Navy ordered the first two Mobile Landing Platform (MLP) ships.
Interesting concept
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Australia already owns Durance… all they are paying for is the modifications.
They would have to first buy RFA Ft. George, and then do (and pay for) just as much modification (and most likely more, due to differing equipment fits) to it.
Ft. George would cost more than Durance… an important consideration.
Yes, and that cost would be the price for a younger hull of twice the displacement, with at least 7 more years of life in it than Durance, with 5950 tons more stores space, with hangar- and maintenance space for 3 Sea King /EH101 sized helicopters (rather than dito for 1 light helicopter), a flight deck with 2 (rather than 1) landing spots for these large choppers and ability to work with 5 such heli’s, and -finally- a better armament/self defence capability.
If the objection to Ft George is that it is single hull i.e. the need/cost of modification with double hull, then it is treated differently than Durance (which is also single hull but slated to get a double hull anyway > that is no extra money to spend for RAN: you either mod one or the other ship). Hence, the only consideration would be the acquisition cost of Ft. George, obviously.
Stealth isn’t just about RCS control, its multi spectral (including the visible spectrum)
While the JSS idea presents som interesting capabilities, I dont know if the RAN would be able to sneak the extra sealift capabilites into the AOR replacements…. although it would be nice if they could:D
RAN was succesfull at sneaking in extra RAS capabilities with the acquisition of the LHDs, which reduces the load on the AORs, so it might also work the other way around. JSS has one RAS station on each beam, which is similar to what HMAS Sirius has (HMAS Succes has 2×2 RAS stations). It is similar also in size and displacement.
Looks like my suggestion re Ocean and its resident Apaches was correct.
They are to be deployed to Libya “within days” according to the Telegraph
How often have Apaches been used from a Naval Vessel before on actual live fire operations?
So how well will they do ?
Target rich environment ?
Manpads or larger systems to be concerned about ?
Any Worries about heavy machine guns on the ground ?
Is there sufficient combat search and rescue ?
There must be operational range worries, as Libya is very large and Ocean will still be some way off shore ?
Anything else ?
Unlike US versions, the Westland Apache has been navalised and now serves aboard Royal Navy ships in addition to its land-based role. It achieved maritime certification in December 2005 aboard HMS Ocean.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AgustaWestland_Apache#Operational_history
Likewise, US Army Apaches have trained from LHA/LHDs since 2005.
http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:US_Navy_050201-N-6019M-001_A_U.S._Army_AH-64_Apache_helicopter_prepares_to_launch_from_the_flight_deck_aboard_the_amphibious_assault_ship_USS_Nassau_(LHA_4)_during_Joint_Shipboard_Weapons_and_Ordnance_(JSWORD)_training.jpg
Success depends on many things and can’t well be predicted in advance.
Target richness depends on rules of engagement: what is and is not considered a threat. This may change as we go along.
Heaviers SAM systems are likely already taken out. MANPADS would remain a problem, but the question is which MANPADS (old systems like SA-7 shouldn’t pose problems but new sysems might) and whether ground forces could deploy and target them effectively (i.e. in a concerted manner as opposed to by smll units and individuals acting alone)
Apache is designed to survive hits by 23mm cannon rounds, so I doubt HMGs should be more of a problem than the 23mm (while off course all AAA needs to be taken into account)
I would think Ocean carriers EH101 as well, which UK would presuably use for combat search and rescue (USN would be different matter)
Most of Libya is desert, the fighting takes place along the populated strip along the coast, thus limiting the operational area and range concerns
PNS Alimgair
Speaking of which, PNS Alamgir, were is she?
Guess this whole thing blows the chances of getting pics of her.
Allright, what’s done is done indeed 😉
Similar discussion re. Bays for Canadian navy (pre-dating the sale to Australia), linking in with JSS need.
http://www.casr.ca/mp-bay-class-lpda-jss-daly.htm
http://www.casr.ca/bg-navy-jss-joint-support-ship.htm
http://www.casr.ca/bg-navy-sealift.htm
I like the approach that was taken with NUSHIP Sirius. When at some point Success is decommissioned, is that the likely route to be taken for acquisition of a replacement Auxiliary Oiler (AOR) or might we see something like the Dutch Joint Support Ship (JSS) or …