ImpiToo bad for the BAMSE missile, I guess Sweden was not able to put it into production.
—–JT—–
There was nothing wrong with putting it into production, it’s just that it didn’t suit Sweden’s needs for the Visby class.
Unlike either the Mica VL or Umkhonto, the BAMSE is not a vertically-launched missile and therefore cannot be stored and fired from seamless below-deck launchers. It would have required an oblique launcher mounted externally, which would have compromised the Visby’s stealth profile and may have required a significant redesign. Using vertically-launched missiles is a lot easier.
The BAMSE is also a Command-to-Line-of-Sight (CLOS) missile, which means it requires constant guidance from the ship’s radar in order to score a hit. In practical terms, this means that you’re only able to launch missiles along specific axes (ie, where the radar is targeted at a given moment) and you’re limited both by the number of missiles you can launch simultaneously and the flight channels those can follow. In contrast, the Umkhonto is a fire-and-forget missile with full hemispheric protection, meaning that you can launch 8 of them in rapid succession and have them all target separate targets approaching from different directions. So it’s better against a saturation attack.
Finally, the Umkhonto-R, which Sweden is also hoping to bring into service, has greater range than the BAMSE.
The BAMSE itself is a fine missile, but it just wasn’t suited for this particular application. So far as I know, however, its adoption by other arms of the Swedish military continues unabated.
ImpiIndeed. And it is involved in other sectors of the SA defence industry as well, having purchased majority stakes in Avitronics, Grintek and Aerospace Monitoring and Systems (AMS) over the past few years.
ImpiBuying the Umkhonto can satisfy Sweden’s offset obligations to SA for selling Gripen.
Are you sure of that? To my knowledge, the offset obligations are on the part of Saab itself (and those are almost all complete), so a purchase by the Swedish Navy does not count at all towards the offset obligations. Offsets are also defined as industrial investment in South Africa with an eye to improving capacity, so mere orders of military equipment do not suffice. I just don’t see how this decision has any effect on the offsets at all.
As for Denel Dynamics, it has been spun off as a more or less independent company from the parent group, with its own management team and finance structure. At the moment its future looks quite secure, more so than most of Denel’s other divisions.
That said, watch this space: I would not be surprised at all to see Saab Bofors Dynamics (or a similar firm) purchase a majority stake in Denel Dynamics within the next year or so. The offer has already been made. If this happens, it may put a new spin on the Umkhonto purchase by the Swedish Navy.
But that aside, the fact remains that the Umkhonto is a capable missile which outperforms the Mica VL on performance and was worth choosing on its merits alone. It’s certainly possible that that’s the reason it was chosen.
ImpiWilhelm, you can get ‘From Tailhooker to Mudmover’ from one of the following sources:
From Tailhooker to Mudmover – The Airforce Shop
From Tailhooker to Mudmover – Combat360.org
Combat360.org also sells a DVD containing a PDF version of ‘Vlamgat’ for those who were unlucky enough to miss out on the book version:
Vlamgat – Combat360.org
Impi‘Vlamgat’ means, literally, ‘flaming backside’. It’s a colloquial expression which refers to the appearance of a fighter jet in full afterburner. Accordingly, fighter pilots are called ‘Vlammies’ in SAAF slang.
I can fully recommend the book of the same name, btw. Aside from the above-mentioned statistics on SAAF losses, it contains fascinating insights from the pilot’s career as a Mirage F1 pilot in the SAAF. He has also written another book, From Tailhooker to Mudmover, detailing his experiences flying for the Fleet Air Arm, the US Navy and the SA Airforce, and which is also recommended.
ImpiSo earlier Gripen’s like the C can be upgraded completely to the entire new Gripen N? That is news to me. I thought that the major redesign to accomodate extra fuel and new engine pre-cluded this?
The Gripen Demo is an upgrade of a JAS-39D, which in turn was upgraded from a JAS-39B, all on company funds. The new engine apparently required very little modification, with the main change being the swapping out of the undercarriage fuselage section and its subsystems for an entirely new module. All in all, there are 3500 new parts in the Gripen Demo, but not all that significant a structural change.
Saab has always emphasised the upgradeability of the Gripen, which is why Gripen Demo was designed from the outset as both a potential upgrade for JAS-39C/D operators and a new aircraft type. In theory, if Saab succeeds in keeping the costs down, the SAAF could quite easily upgrade its Gripens to E/F (NG) standard in 2020-2025 or so as a Mid-Life Update. Or if it chose to, it could incorporate selected elements of the upgrade (such as the AESA radar and new avionics system) even earlier.
All in all, the Gripen NG approach seems like a wise move by Saab. Not only are they turning the Gripen into a significantly more capable aircraft, but they’ve created a reasonable and well thought-out upgrade path for existing customers. I don’t believe there’s any other fighter in history that’s this easy to upgrade to the latest standard. It certainly does not involve as drastic a rework as the Harrier example posted above.
ImpiThe Empire Test Pilot’s School.
ImpiThis is the entire fleet:
[INDENT]
[/INDENT]
[INDENT]
[/INDENT]
[INDENT]
[/INDENT]
[INDENT]
[/INDENT]
The three strike craft are to be withdrawn from service this year, to be replaced by a new multipurpose hull type sometime in the next six years (an RFT has yet to be issued). There was serious talk about acquiring a fifth frigate, but it appears that was dumped in favour of the LHDs.
The frigates are obviously the only real escorts in this list. Each is armed with a 76mm gun, 8 Exocet Block 2 SSMs, 16 Umkhonto SAMs, various close-in weapons systems and a single SuperLynx 300 Mk64. Not exactly a highly-protective screen, but possibly sufficient for the threat scenarios the SAN envisages in African operations.
Impitarget, no problem, glad to help.
Unicorn, I agree. Right now, Project Millennium is looking very similar to the RAN’s Canberra-class procurement and the SAN could gain a lot of valuable experience and advice from the Aussies on this one. In fact, if I had things my way I’d join the Canberra-class program, tacking the SAN’s ships onto the Australian order so as to benefit from some level of economies of scale. It would also enhance commonality and interoperability, making things easier if the SAN and RAN engage in joint ops sometime (something that’s looking increasingly likely).
Incidentally, the Canberra-class is another example of why I think the LHDs are a bit ambitious for the SA Navy at the moment. The Australian defence budget is US$19 billion, whereas the South African defence budget is only US$3.8 billion. Yet the SANDF wants to buy the exact same ships as the ADF? It just doesn’t make sense, if the SA government wants the kind of capability provided by LHDs, it should expand the defence budget proportionately. Otherwise we’re going to be stuck 10 years from now with some of the sweetest kit in the world and neither the trained personnel nor the funding to use them. What’s the point?
ImpiThey are to be acquired under Project Millennium, though the full requirements have not yet been fleshed out as the SAN’s waiting on a project study to be completed. But I do have the preliminary ship types and requirements under consideration.
The SAN wants to buy at least two (maybe even three) LHDs in the 20 000t range. One of these is to be operated to some extent on behalf of other African countries, most notably those in SADC. Having considered LPDs, the SAN decided the extra capability provided by LHDs was worth the expense. There’s talk about an in-service date of 2013 at the moment, but that may be overly ambitious.
Right now, the three designs under consideration are the Mistral-class, Navantia’s BPE and ThyssenKrupp’s MHD-150. They range in capability from being able to carry 11 helicopters and 750 troops to 16 helicopters and 1000 troops, along with 12 or so tanks and a few dozen armoured vehicles. In another words, a single ship would be able to land an entire battalion (with their vehicles) plus a single tank squadron, or possibly a reinforced battalion group.
Current plans call for embarked troops to be drawn from 44 Parachute Regiment, 6 SA Infantry Battalion (Air Assault) and 9 SA Infantry Battalion (which is to become an amphibious unit). Though the SAN is also keen to deploy its new Maritime Reaction Force (sort of like a limited Marine unit) off the ships. If a mechanised response were required, 61 Mechanised Infantry Battalion Group or 1 SA Infantry Battalion could be embarked.
At the moment, there’s no word on how the air component will be structured, and whether new helicopters will be procured. But I don’t see space in the budget for any new heli buys, so it’s likely that the existing Air Force Oryx and A109 helicopters will be deployed to the ships on an ad hoc basis although this will be a serious strain on capabilities. There is a rumour that a number of surplus CH-47Ds may be acquired cheaply (read: donated), but for now that’s only a rumour and is unsubstantiated.
To be perfectly honest though, I’m not really in favour of this acquisition. The cost is enormous: We’re looking at at least R8 billion ($1.16 billion) per ship, and that’s not including ancillary equipment such as helicopters and landing craft. What’s more, the SANDF has no experience in large-scale amphibious operations and no equipment for it, meaning it will need to go through a very costly acquisition and training period while also trying to write an entirely new operating doctrine. Considering the underfunding problems already plaguing the military, I think it’s folly to be spending so much money now and it will inevitably result in a reduction somewhere else like training and ops.
That said, I think the idea of procuring LHDs is fundamentally a good one. They offer fantastic capability. But I would rather see the decision pushed back until at least 2014, to give the budget time to deal with the acquisition costs from the Arms Deal, the new Badger IFV and the A400Ms.
ImpiThanks for the replies (and excellent work on the drawings, McConrads). Sorry I haven’t been able to reply earlier, but I’ve been laid low with a rather severe case of the flu.
Wilhelm, the radar element for the optronic tracker refers to the Reutech Radar Systems RTS 6400, of which each ship as two. I actually hadn’t known that the radar elements weren’t already installed, but nevertheless the radar is an X-band monopulse radar with 60km range.
The only items on the upgrade list which will change the ship’s profile in any way are the Rogue weapons platforms. Although it appears the SAN is only installing two per ship at the moment, plans call for each ship to receive four Sea Rogues in total.
RTS 6400 optical radar tracker
Sea Rogue remotely-operated close-in weapons platform
ImpiNick, fair points. I have read the original article and there are some interesting similarities. I’m certainly open to the possibility that much of this story may be little more than inaccurate and sensationalist reporting. It’s happened before (see Zimbabwe’s supposed FC-1 fighters as an example).
But my position has been to stake a middle ground between the opposing ideas that this is either a certainty and will be a definite success or that it’s a completely bogus story with no basis in fact. I don’t think either approach is the best one to take, especially considering what little information we have now. What I’m saying, therefore, is that this deal is uncertain, perhaps even unlikely, but it is nevertheless plausible.
Only time will tell if the story truly has any merit. But whatever the case may be, what we know for certain is that South Africa has a new BVR program based on fairly advanced technology, and it’s actively courting both India and Brazil to be partners. This could possibly lead to something.
ImpiDenel was blacklisted fairly recently and the ban is still in place, which would present some difficulty in the case of a joint missile development venture. Though that said, from what I’ve heard very little solid evidence was found to justify the blacklisting, so removing it from the list might be easier than it seems.
Look, I agree with anybody who says that this agreement may not come about. The original report itself stopped short of saying the agreement was a certainty, saying only that it was ‘close’, and in my first post I said we should take it with a pinch of salt. Considering past missile development efforts, it’s actually more likely that the agreement (if indeed one is to be signed) will fall apart before the first LRAAM ever enters service. If, in fact, it ever does enter service; the history books are replete with still-born missiles as well.
But what I didn’t agree with was the assumption (made by Nick_76) that the entire story originated with Sengupta and that therefore everything about it, including the existence of the LRAAM project, is a lie. This is clearly not true, the LRAAM project existed and was fairly advanced before the SAAF pulled the plug, and Denel’s cryptic comments do point towards its revival. And such a co-operation agreement is plausible, as Brazil and South Africa are already jointly developing the A-Darter while actively encouraging India, the third member of the IBSA partnership, to get directly involved.
That’s all I’m saying: It’s plausible, yet not certain.
ImpiLet’s back up a second here and examine what exactly we know and what we don’t know, so we can separate fact from fiction:
Most importantly, the LRAAM project definitely existed. In 1995 Kentron (now Denel Dynamics) displayed a full-scale mockup of the missile, which was powered by a solid-fuel ramjet engine with four intakes. At the time, the missile (also known as the S-Darter) was trumpeted as a missile with 100km+ range and Kentron briefly considered entering it into the British BVRAAM competition (which resulted in the Meteor) before pulling out when it realised the politics involved meant it had no chance of winning.
By this stage, the missile’s solid-fuel ramjet engine (developed by Somchem) had undergone several successful tests and further development looked promising. But from the mid-1990s onwards the SAAF experienced a dire funding crisis and the missile was presumably cancelled. In an attempt to keep the project alive, Kentron offered a variant of the missile to Pakistan, but this deal was not completed before the SA government imposed an arms embargo on the country after Musharraf’s coup.
But in January this year, Denel announced that it was developing a new long-range BVRAAM for the South African Air Force, which would use components from the Umkhonto SAM and technology from the S-Darter (LRAAM) and T-Darter. When asked whether this included the Somchem ramjet engine fitted to the latter missiles, a Denel representative said only: “range is always important”. That doesn’t sound like much of a denial to me.
Now it’s possible that Denel is indeed talking about a 60km non-ramjet missile (as one comment suggests), but this doesn’t quite make sense. Not only is the existing R-Darter already capable of that range (needing only a datalink to achieve it), but the proposed missile is to be based on the Umkhonto’s 180mm-diameter fuselage. Considering that the LRAAM was also built upon the same 180mm fuselage (in this case the Umkhonto’s tech demonstrator, the SAHV-IR), this does suggest a more LRAAM-style ramjet missile than something based on the 160mm R-Darter.
Combine all this with the knowledge that India, Brazil and SA are members of the IBSA multilateral forum and that both Brazil and South Africa are heavily pushing India to become involved with their joint missile development; and this story becomes plausible. After all, if it’s true the LRAAM would provide a level of capability far in excess of the Astra, so it would complement rather than replace it.
This also proves that the 120km ramjet LRAAM is not BS dreamt up by Sengupta, but a real project. And if that’s true, there’s no reason why the rest of the story isn’t true as well, especially as it’s unlikely that Jane’s would permit itself to get duped that easily. There’s more substance to this story than you’re willing to admit.
ImpiInteresting. It would be nice if it featured some information on the Torgos as well as the MUPSOW, especially if it cleared up the questiion of whether the MUPSOW ever was purchased by the SAAF. It hasn’t been displayed publically, so I’d guess the answer is “No”, but one never does know for sure.
As for the Flowchart, it evolved into the Seraph high-speed high-altitude stealth reconnassaince UAV, though the SAAF lost interest before a proper prototype could be flown. A couple years ago, Kentron resurrected the Seraph design and modified it slightly to create a Seraph II, which was a stealth UCAV design study to be fitted with Mokopa missiles or possibly Umbani guided bombs. Again, funding wasn’t forthcoming, so the project was apparently shelved.
Sign In
