Interesting statistics, thanks for that. If true, this means the LRAAM project is potentially a lot further ahead than I initially realised, which changes the calculus somewhat. I would really like to get hold of that book, but last time I tried contacting Pierre Victor I was told it was out of stock and that he was unable to provide me with any information as to when a new run would be printed. Any idea how to get hold of a copy?
I also think the nukes discussed may have been theoretical designs rather than actual devices. In order to achieve the level of miniaturisation required for missile delivery, SA would’ve had to create a far more sophisticated implosion-type weapon than the six gun-type devices actually built. Sure, it was feasible, and I don’t doubt that SA was pursuing more advanced designs (hence the RSA-4), but it may have been as much as a decade before we overcame the technical difficulties associated with building one.
Therefore I think the proposed ramjet’s intended use was probably conventional. As sealordlawrence said, it would’ve been quite well suited to a number of roles.
Very, very interesting. I wonder how far along the tests of that ramjet got? I do have my doubts about the nuclear role though; South Africa’s nukes were far from sophisticated enough to be used in a missile this size. It was enough of a hassle to try get them to a size that would fit the RSA-3 and RSA-4.
Some more backround..
Oops, I can’t believe I missed all that. I guess I’ll need to do a better search of the archives next time (I wasn’t here in January). There’s some excellent information on those other threads.
joey, the source is David C. Isby, whom Jane’s regard as trustworthy enough to reprint his reports almost verbatim. They have a serious reputation to uphold, so they’re not going to print the kind of frivolous garbage others might. Whether India joins the project or not, the LRAAM project with the claimed stats above certainly exists and the SAAF is interested in it.
It’s a bit tricky to ascertain the exact state of seeker development in SA, but Kentron (now Denel Optronics) has demonstrated a working two-colour imaging infrared (IIR) sensor, capable of 180 degree off-boresight acquisition and highly resistant to countermeasures thanks to its imaging capability and a sophisticated ECCM suite. More information than that is hard to come by, though it is known that the seeker completed captive carry trials.
Currently, the IR missiles in SANDF service (U/Darter and Umkhonto-IR) use slightly less sophisticated two-colour infrared seekers. The Umkhonto is also equipped with a datalink and a variant with an active radar seeker is under development, to be introduced into service on the SAN’s Valour-class frigates once additional funding becomes available.
Finally, the Mokopa anti-tank missile is available with either a MMW or Semi-Active Laser seeker. The SAAF hasn’t decided to purchase the MMW variant yet, but it’s available for export.
It definitely looks a lot better with a clear visor rather than the mirrored one in the article, but it’s far from conventional. That said, all modern fighter pilot helmets look pretty weird, what with bulging visors and attached paraphernalia taking away the clean lines of old. I will admit though, there is a sort of high-tech futuristic beauty about them in some ways.
flex, that design was Elbit’s demonstration graphic for its visor projection system, which is why it looks slightly different to the actual system that was unveiled.
Well, the F-35 HMDS is a development of the J-HMCS, which is already in successful squadron service. Plus, both Israel and South Africa have been operating HMD/HMCS helmets for close to two decades, so it’s not like the CG problems are new or haven’t been dealt with before.
As for Elbit, it’s actually the prime display contractor on both the J-HMCS and the HMDS through VSI, its joint venture with Rockwell-Collins. Incidentally, BAE Systems has developed an Alternate Helmet Mounted Display System (AHMDS) for the F-35 as a risk-mitigation effort. It’s based on the Eurofighter Typhoon’s existing Striker helmet, but there’s still no word yet on whether the UK will adopt it in place of the HMDS.
The Cobra helmet is a development of the Striker intended purely for the Gripen, though both are broadly equivalent in capability and design. In contrast to the J-HMCS and HMDS, which use a magnetic tracking system, the Striker, AHMDS and Cobra use an optical tracking system from South Africa’s Denel Optronics.
They won’t, they’ll be buying them straight from the manufacturer. While the government might want to bolster the Turkish defence industry by making tech transfer and local manufacture a requirement for bidding (which is why no US companies bidded), the Army’s just interested in getting the gear they want, which in this case is the Apache. This might be a compromise, allowing everybody to walk away claiming they won.
So far as I know, the T-129s are to be built locally in Turkey. The five year period is to allow for AgustaWestland to transfer enough tech and expertise to make that possible.
Though to be fair, I should point out that photographs of Zimbabwean Air Force aircraft piloted by white guys won’t be proof of mercenaries being hired. I’m not sure how many white Zimbabweans remain within the AFZ (probably none by now), but there have definitely been a few in the ranks over the past 20 years.
The same applies to South Africa, whose pilots are still overwhelmingly white. One shouldn’t be too quick to categorise “African or non-African” based on skin colour alone.
As an educated guess, I’d say most sub-Saharan African countries use local pilots rather than mercenaries. There seems to be a popular misconception that most African air forces use mercenaries, but so far as I know the number of air forces actually doing that number less than 10. This probably includes Ethiopia, Eritrea, Sudan, Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia and Guinea.
As for the reason behind it, TempestII is absolutely correct. Few African countries have either the infrastructure or the funding to maintain proper air forces and the training they require. So when they do get in trouble and need fighter aircraft and attack helicopters to repel a rebel movement or go to war with one of their neighbours it becomes necessary to buy the equipment off the shelf while hiring mercenaries to fly them. It’s also more cost-effective, since you only need to spend money when you need the stuff, rather than maintaining an expensive force permanently.
But again, not many African air forces actually do use mercenaries and most use their own pilots to fly their aircraft.
There aren’t any current plans to procure an anti-shipping missile for the SAAF’s Gripens. With the possibility of attack from the sea being so small, the SANDF is going to rely on its Valour-class frigates and their onboard helicopters.
Isn’t 2009 a little late? They’re already starting to receive Gripens, and any decision they make down the road will mean that the current jets might have to be upgraded at additional cost to adapt their AAM choice.
The logical move might have been to simply adopt the AIM-120 (this is of course subject to US export approval, I don’t know where South Africa might stand on that issue inside Congress) as it is already integrated fully, or perhaps to adopt the MICA and have both IR and ARH BVR AAMs.
I understand fully the desire to integrate the indigenous A-Darter, keeping Denel on the cutting edge and potentially leading to export sales once the weapon is fully developed, but putting off a BVR AAM until 2009 seems a little odd if you ask me.
Sorry about that, I got my dates mixed up. The decision date for the SRAAM is 2007, with first deliveries only expected in 2009. I’d presume the decision on a BVR missile will be also be made in the 2007/2008 timeframe.
You’re right that it is leaving it slightly late, but the timescales aren’t that bad. The first JAS-39C single-seaters will be arriving in 2009, with the first example entering an OT&E period in which new weapons can be tested and qualified. Deliveries will continue until 2011, with the aircraft only becoming operational in 2012. In the meantime, the Cheetahs and their R-Darters will remain operational.
Thus the SAAF only needs a replacement BVRAAM from 2012/2013 onwards. Within this timescale the Meteor makes sense, especially because only minimal integration work (aside from a software upgrade) will need to be done. That makes it unnecessary to procure a BVRAAM right now, whether it be the MICA or AMRAAM (though I don’t forsee any export problems with the latter). If the Meteor’s in-service date does slip due to unforseen delays, it will also be possible to resume the R-Darter’s integration process on the Gripen (it was about 50% complete when it was halted) for use as an interim measure.
Denel Aerospace Systems is also reported to be developing a new BVRAAM, which will incorporate elements from the Umkhonto SAM and R-Darter and technology from the S-Darter and T-Darter design studies. The first prototype is due to be unveiled next year sometime, while it’s likely that the missile will be a joint venture between SA and either Brazil or India. This might be part of the reason for the delay in choosing a BVRAAM.
As for the A-Darter, were it not for the Brazilian decision to get involved and contribute funding, it’s likely it would’ve been cancelled in favour of the IRIS-T. The SAAF is still reserving judgement, funding development of the A-Darter but delaying the final commitment to either the A-Darter or IRIS-T for later this year.
Interesting discussion so far, I’ve just got a few points to add.
First of all, as others have already stated, South Africa isn’t really spending a lot of money on defence. In fact, the figures provided are outdated, since the SA defence budget is now at only 1.3% of GDP, far below the international norm for countries of its size. To put this into more perspective, the entire defence budget (including the new aircraft and ships) represents just 4.3% of the government’s annual spending. Education, health, housing, policing and welfare all receive significantly higher amounts, so it’s really not as if money’s being diverted away from more important areas.
In fact, I think the defence budget should be increased to at least 1.7% of GDP, since it’s been underfunded for years while at the same time demands on its capabilities have been increasing. At any one time, more than 3 000 soldiers out of a fairly small combat force of 30 000 are deployed in foreign peacekeeping missions, including a battalion group in both the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Burundi, and a battalion in Darfur. Added to this, South Africa is expected to contribute at least 6 000 soldiers at short notice to the African Standby Force’s SADC Brigade. That’s a fairly hefty commitment from a small middle-income country, yet it’s all being done on a budget that in inflation-weighted terms hasn’t increased since the 1998 Defence Review which planned for a small peacetime force with no foreign deployments. There’s a new defence review process on the go at the moment, which will hopefully be more realistic than the last one in spending sufficient money on the defence force to meet the demands placed on it.
The Gripens were also not bought for defence, since there’s no forseeable conventional threat on SA’s borders. Rather, they were purchased because the Cheetahs are becoming increasingly difficult to maintain and keep airworthy, so a new type would greatly ease the maintenance burden while maintaining a capability that the country does not want to lose. But they would also potentially be very useful in African peacekeeping missions, specifically in the air interdiction role since a large portion of the illegal weaponry that reaches rebel groups comes in by air. Cut off that supply line and you’re going to make your job a whole lot easier. As an added benefit, the Gripen’s ability to operate from short runways with minimal maintenance and logistics support makes it far more suited to the forward-deployed troop-supporting role than F-16s (for example) would’ve been.
As for weapons, none of the weapons currently integrated on the Cheetah C will be carried over to the Gripen, except perhaps for the standard Mk.84 bombs. Decisions on air-to-air missiles will be made in around 2009, though currently it appears that the SAAF will choose the A-Darter and Meteor, while it might procure Denel’s GPS-guided Umbani bomb kit (think JDAM) for its guided bomb needs.
Looking to the next few years, the SANDF is looking to procure new IFVs, APCs, MBTs and logistics vehicles, a long-range maritime patrol aircraft, a fifth frigate and at least one amphibious landing ship. For the latter, SA Navy chiefs are rumoured to be eyeing the same ship types as the RAN’s planned Canberra-class, but it remains to be seen whether the funds for ships of that size will be made available. If so, they’d make great disaster-response and peacekeeping support vessels, freeing the SANDF from land bases in the coastal regions and giving it quite a bit of added flexibility.
All this will in turn help make Africa a safer and more stable place. Already, Burundi’s at peace while the war in the DRC is largely over. I think those who decry the SA government’s spending on defence should at least consider the positive impact it brings to the rest of Africa.
EDIT: I forgot to point out that SA’s buying 30 helicopters (A109s), not 60, and that it abandoned its IRBM/ICBM and nuclear weapons programs way back in the early 1990s. The SA defence industry is far smaller than it used to be, which is unsurprising considering the vastly smaller defence budget and the fact that the embargo is no longer in place (hence no need for substitution).
I’m pretty interested in Project Protector as a whole. New Zealand seems to have acquired a useful bunch of ships for a very good price, from the looks of things. I think it’s definitely an approach other small nations could learn from.
But yeah, thanks for the pic.
For my money, I’d take the B-52 for its sheer excellence as a multi-role bomber, but the Tu-95 is a close second with its proven versatility. Either way, there’s little point getting all that heated about deciding which aircraft is marginally better when both have long outlived both their original design and most of their designers.
Which brings me to a point. GarryB, you really need to tone down the rhetoric a tad. This conversation was puttering along nicely, with some firm (but friendly) points in favour of both planes, until you decided to barge in with a grudge on your shoulder. It wasn’t necessary and it ruined what was becoming a really good thread.
Honestly, nobody was saying the Soviets were incapable of anything good, or that the Tu-95 was a ton of junk, or that Americans are always right and best. Instead, guys like Schorsch were saying that at that moment in time the Soviets were behind, yet they later bounced back sufficiently quickly to virtually equal the US in the space race. To me, this seems patently reasonable, yet you appear to be so besotted with your anti-American and pro-Soviet/Russian stance that you won’t accept even that. You need to calm down down a tad, nobody here was getting nasty until you started it.
So from now on, can we please get back to the real topic? Namely, discussing two remarkable aircraft and offering our personal opinions as to why we believe one was better than the other.
probably want to stop covert recon missions into Iran if you don’t wanna get caught.
15 men in RIBs 10 miles or more from the Iranian coast involved in covert recon missions? How effective is that going to be? And further, what could they be doing recon-wise that couldn’t be done much more effectively by aerial surveillance aircraft operating 12 miles or so off Iran’s coast? I’m sorry, but that just doesn’t make much sense, despite what the Iranians are claiming.
Even if we’re generous to Iran and accept that the Brits were in Iranian waters (a highly dubious claim), not even the Iranians are claiming that the boats were close to the Iranian coast. They’re getting their knickers in a knot over a claimed breach of their 12-mile territorial zone, not close-in covert recon.
Even if the British sailors had mistakenly entered Iranian waters, according to the UN Convention on the Law of the Seas a mistaken entry of that sort qualifies as ‘innocent passage’ and may not be interfered with. If the marines were conducting ship boardings within Iranian waters it does complicate matters, but it seems unlikely that they’d make a mistake that sloppy after the fracas in 2004. My call? I think Iran might’ve taken these guys in order to try trade them for the Revolutionary Guards personnel caught in January while in Iraq assisting the insurgents.