SR-71 was pretty much a one trick pony due to it’s extremely limited flight envelope. The mach-altitude band was narrow to prevent inlet unstart. In other words, it could not fly high and slow or low and fast.

Right so.
It wasn’t a fighter but a recon aircraft. The high endurable speed came with a price. It was for the intended mission a very feasible approach. And the SR-71 always remained a very special aircraft, not useful for large operational use.

For the Mig-25 vs. SR-71, I believe the Blackbird edges out the Foxbat for speed, especially sustained speed.

There is no comparison as both were designed for different missions, and one couldn’t do the mission of the other. The only reason why the MiG-25 is often put against the SR-71 is its (in case of the MiG-25) theoretical ability to go beyond Mach 3, which was side effect of its development. It wasn’t deployed for that reason, while the SR-71 was. The question if one (MiG-25) can successfully intercept the other (SR-71) is acedemic and about 17391 posts concerning this issue were written in this forum alone. Please don’t add number 17392.
From the pure technical point of view, the SR-71 employed more advanced technology. It also enjoys a very positive image, which actually can not really be reasoned by its operational impact.

First of all, the T-4 was never flown above M1.3, so how believable is the M3 speed the Russians said it had?

Why wasn’t it flown beyond Mach 3? I guess because the technical specifications did not allow it (the Russian otherwise never missed to set a record if possible). I guess the first and only prototype wasn’t even intended to do so. In order to build such an aircraft with so little experience, one has to do extended risk reduction. All Russian manufacturers did it with prototyping, they relied more on prototypes. Unlike American industry the first prototypes hardly achieved the overall performance (reason may be the contractual logic of the USAF, where the initial aircraft need to demonstrate the required performance). They Russian often initially build testbeds, carefully used them to gain experience. Not a bad approach, just a different, more time consuming often (not always) and more costly.
You can see similar approaches on most MiG and Suchoi aircraft, the Buran and other. Some American and European aircraft programs also saw prototypes that didn’t match the performance of the intended aircraft (see EAP, or the many X-programs of the 50s). Also the XB-70 was a prototype from the onset and with this fact in mind that it wouldn’t see service, many issues that plague an intended operational design could be evaded.
Taking a risk-reduction prototype as prove that they were unable to reach that performance in general is flawed logic, proving the opposite is equally flawed.

I’m not arguing for or against either the Leopard 2 or the Abrams. Again, I feel that they are, at the moment, two very closely matched tanks. So closely matched that to discount the fact that one of the two types was available cheaply and practically instantly to most users would tip the selection every time. In fact, if you look at it, most of those users had no competition against the Abrams.

What strikes me: the US Army has 5000+ Abrams in service. What do they need it for? In Iraq and Afghanistan a few are on duty. Or what is the number of Abrams in service?

USAF transport aircraft purchasing seems to have been a disaster area for about 30 years, with the exception of the C-17. There’s a clear need for something bigger than a C-130 but cheaper than a C-17 (looks as if canning AMST was a mistake), & a dearth of small transports (at last being addressed by the planned C-27J buy).

Maybe because they always insist on excessive short field capability and the ability to carry a tank. Of course, a general would like his aircraft to carry anything anywhere, but the related price tag is obscene.
And the consequence is that short-field-able C-17 fly logistical missions from CONUS to Iraq into 3000m fields. What a waste! The C-17 are cleared for 30,000hrs lifetime.

You already answered your question.In several books is said that this is one of the main reasons why Flogger suffered more casualties than expected.

But when MiG-23MLD promotes the superior radar of the MiG-23MLD, then I would like to know if any relevance was given to improve the man-machine interface. The F-15A was up to my knowledge the first aircraft where one single pilot could handle a BVR fight without close guidance (means: acquiring target, locking, firing). Of course, ability is very depending on training and workload may easily exceed the limit, especially when under attack. On an F-16A (although the aircraft lacks MR-AAM support) the radar allows the pilot to have a quite useful awareness of the situation 50km in front of him, possibly even plan his tactical maneuvers ahead (f.e. a bracket maneuver).

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Logan Hartke

Your points are true to some extend: the underlying reasons to buy tank A or tank B are often political, and the surplus Leopard 2A4 sell quite well, indeed. Still, most armies consider the Diesel-engine equipped Leo 2 more useful than the more sophisticated Abrams. Performance-wise I would think they are both comparable. Nowadays, like with aircraft, the equipment counts. Anyways, wrong forum for such a discussion.

OK, the afterburner needs ~50% more than most turbojets of that era (it actually doesn’t compare too bad against later turbofans in reheat). The really problem is the gas leak in dry thrust. But look by yourself:

[ATTACH]158675[/ATTACH]

That is, we have an SFC of about 1.5 at normal subsonic operations (11km@M0.9). That is about 30% more than an average early turbojet and ~40-50% more than a J79.

Note that the engines at M0.8 and 11km give ~3800daN thrust in reheat each, and 2900 dry each. With reheat at M2.0 they give 16000daN, so an increase of 400% compared to Mach 0.8.

Understanding turbojet technology 101. 😉

The issue of the Tomcat being obsolete is nonsense.

No, that is just what it is about. A late 1970s F-14A Tomcat is obsolete and its weapon system only a threat to other 1970s fighters, so it worked quite well against Iraqi aircraft in the 1980s. Amusing to note that both the USAF (1991) and the IranAF (1980-88) found its self-confidence in conflict with the Iraqis, while the Iraqis performed quite bad in both conflicts.
Upgrading it can be done. If you fit it with new weapon system it will have a new weapon system. Then it is obsolete in airframe and engine, but up-to-date in weapon system. Done on F-4F.
But if you assume the Iranians only modify the existing system but not radically rework it (which would mean quite a task), then they will not exceed the original performance so much that it makes a difference in 2007.