Pakistan sets up tri-command nuclear force:

(Kyodo) _ Pakistan has set up three commands in its armed forces equipped with nuclear weapons and missiles and capable of retaliating for any first nuclear strike by India, Defense Ministry officials, strategists and nuclear experts have revealed.

The Armed Strategic Force, or ASF, is comprised of special commands in Pakistan’s army, air force and navy that store nuclear weapons and nuclear-capable missiles in semi-knocked-down condition in peacetime for assembly and deployment during periods of high tension with India.

“We have an Army Strategic Force Command, we have the Air Force Strategic Force Command and the Naval Strategic Force Command…They are being controlled by responsible people,” Defense Ministry spokesman Shaukat Sultan told Kyodo News in a recent interview.

“The strategic force in the army is headed by a three-star general and they have various missile groups under them,” he said.

The army component, set up in 2003 under Lt. Gen. Ghulam Mustafa, forms the backbone of the combined strategic force and its silos and warehouses, mostly underground, dot the map of Pakistan, according to officials and experts interviewed by Kyodo.

“There might be up to 100 facilities where missiles and nuclear weapons and their parts are stored in peacetime,” said a source well-versed with developments on the nuclear front.

Sultan refused to divulge the number of people involved in the storing, security and possible deployment and operation of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal, but independent inquiries reveal the army’s strategic force has nearly 6,000 “appropriately trained and skilled people.”

It is equipped with medium-range Shaheen missiles along with long-range Ghauri missiles with a range of up to 2,500 kilometers, capable of striking almost anywhere in India, with which Pakistan has fought three wars since independence in 1947.

The air force component of the ASF has F-16 fighters, supplied by the United States in the 1980s to support Pakistan’s frontline role during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, and French-made Mirage aircraft, both modified to deliver nuclear weapons.

In what has been hailed as an impressive technological feat, Pakistan rewired the F-16, reprogrammed its computer and fitted it with under-wing carriages to carry a nuclear device, the shell of which was reconfigured for the purpose.

“It is poetic justice that the nuclear device fitted on the F-16 aircraft resembles an American conventional bomb,” remarked an official source.

As for the navy’s strategic force, defense analysts said Babar, a newly developed cruise missile, is the best candidate for induction, though Pakistan has yet to follow India in test-firing such a nuclear-capable missile from a naval platform.

Both Pakistan and India carried out nuclear tests in May 1998, triggering international sanctions and calls for them to desist from weaponization, namely miniaturizing nuclear devices for placement on surface-to-surface missiles. Neither, however, has discontinued their weaponization and missile development programs.

Shireen Mazari, head of Pakistan’s Institute of Strategic Studies, an Islamabad-based think tank, said it would be “ludicrous” to do otherwise. “If you develop weapon capability, you are going to weaponize,” she said.

Sultan confirmed that Pakistan has indeed been carrying out an India-specific modernization and weaponization program, but he said its nuclear weapons and related missiles have never been deployed.

Likewise, India has carried out a weaponization program but without moving to deployment, according to P.R. Chari, a former Indian Defense Ministry official who is currently a research professor at the Institute of Peace & Conflict Studies in New Delhi.

As a precaution against theft or misuse, Pakistan’s nuclear devices and nuclear-capable missiles are stored in partially knocked-down condition, nuclear warheads are not mated with delivery systems, and the weapons require codes to operate, Sultan said.

“The launch mechanism, the device and various other mechanisms, they are kept at different places. To launch them, you have to first put them together,” he said, adding that the codes are available to very few, even among strategic force personnel.

Despite having been sanctioned for their 1998 nuclear tests, India and Pakistan have both engaged in dialogue with developed countries like the United States and Japan to introduce safeguards against pilferage, theft and accidental use of nuclear weapons.

“We are in touch with the International Atomic Energy Agency, we are in touch with the U.S. authorities, and they fully know what kind of command and control system we have…There is no chance that there is any pilferage or any accidental use,” Sultan said.

The defense spokesman said that while the three strategic force commands remain affiliated with the respective services — army, air force and navy — they take orders from the Nuclear Command Authority headed by President Gen. Pervez Musharraf with representatives from the government and the military.

Musharraf, who came into power in October 1999, set up the NCA in February 2000 to decide on nuclear weapons deployment.

The NCA’s secretariat, known as the Strategic Plans Division, is located in the office of the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee in the garrison city of Rawalpindi, adjacent to Islamabad, and headed by three-star Lt. Gen. Khalid Kidwai.

The division oversees the activities of all the nuclear and missile-related organizations, including the ASF, with the assistance of two committees that respectively decide about the size of the minimum nuclear deterrence and their deployment.

The creation of the ASF was hastened by the Sept. 11, 2001, terror attacks on the United States, which exposed Pakistan’s vulnerability to a preemptive strike by India or forces hostile to Pakistan’s nuclear program.

At the time, India had offered bases to the United States for operations against the Taliban and al-Qaida positions in Afghanistan that would involve overflying Pakistan, which was then one of only three countries recognizing the Taliban government.

Pakistan responded by also joining the coalition against international terrorism and offering bases to the United States.

Sultan said one reason Pakistan acted as it did was because failure to do so would have endangered its strategic assets. “Had we not taken the decision, had we not joined the coalition, probably, yes, there could have been a strike,” he said.

The spokesman said that with the setting up of the ASF, Pakistan is now in a position to retaliate if India were to opt for a preemptive strike against Pakistan.

“One can say that Pakistan would be able to survive any kind of strike and will be able to respond,” he said. “But let me put on record that this is only an academic discussion. Normally, no two countries should talk about these serious matters. It is not only dangerous for one country, it is dangerous for the whole world.”

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‘Pakistan is not involved in any kind of Nuclear Trafficing: IAEA’

from: dawn.com

VIENNA, Sept 7: The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has declared that there is not a single incident of illicit trafficking of nuclear materials by Pakistan. According to a report published by the IAEA, “Pakistan has taken stringent measures to secure its nuclear materials and is continuously pursuing to meet international standards in regulating its nuclear activities.”

Referring to Pakistan’s Nuclear Regulatory Authority, the IAEA said: “Those accusing Pakistan about safety of its nuclear materials need to assess their own record.”

The report stated that Pakistan does not figure in ‘IAEA Illicit Trafficking of Nuclear and Radioactive Material Database’ which shows incidents occurred mostly in different parts of some European countries.

The report, recently released by the IAEA, revealed that out of 827 confirmed incidents involving nuclear, radioactive materials and radioactively contaminated material from 1993-2005, Pakistan was not included in any of the incidents.

To the day, there was not a single incident of illicit trafficking of nuclear materials as was manifested from Illicit Trafficking Database (ITDB) report to which Pakistan subscribes through its Nuclear Regulatory Authority (PNRA).

The IAEA had been maintaining ITDB since 1995 to facilitate the exchange of authoritative information on reported incidents among the member states.—APP

The Pakistan Air Force desires a new long-range Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) system (Strategy Centre); originally the Chinese FT-2000 was considered (Strategy Centre), however a deal could not fall through due to lack of Pakistani interest to buy. It is not clear what long-range SAM system the PAF is currently interested towards; rumors/unofficial reports suggest that the Pakistan Government is negotiating with Russia for the sale of long-range S-300-series SAMs. However India has strong political influence on Russia regarding strategic and military issues. The new port city of Gwadar in Pakistan as well as Pakistan’s valuable strategic location are leading to warming relations with Russia – as compared to the early to mid-1990s. But due to current political and financial reasons the PAF’s next long-range SAM may end up being the Chinese HQ-9 and/or FT-2000; it is likely that these missiles will also be Pakistan’s Anti-Ballistic Missile system. For the replacement of Crotale short to medium-range SAMs the Pakistan Air Force is negotiating with Italy for the Spada-2000 short to medium-range SAM system; although Pakistan’s relations with Europe have been mixed, Pak-Italian relations have been quite strong in the recent years, especially in the field of avionics. The Pakistan Air Force signed a deal for six AN/TPS-77 land-based three-dimensional tactical mobile radar system from the U.S; these systems may be supplemented by Czech Vera radar systems if they meet PAF expectations. The PAF also bought six advanced long-range mobile radar systems from China and is in the process of inducting them. A national C4I system is being developed, Air Weapons Complex may be on the forefront of its integration into the Pakistan Armed Forces.

Here are the Options in my view…

1) SPADA 2000 ADVANCED AIR DEFENCE SYSTEM

The Spada 2000 is an all-weather, day and night, highly automated, air defence system developed by MBDA (formerly Alenia Marconi Systems). The system has quick reaction time and requires very few operators to man the system. The unit can operate independently or can be integrated with national air defence centres. Spada 2000 is in production and in service with Spanish Air Forces.

The Spada 2000 is an upgraded version of the Spada Air Defence System providing significant operational and technological improvements, including increased firepower and range, and the capability of co-ordinating additional anti-air weapons.

The system provides air defence missile coverage of 2,000km². Target detection and tracking range is up to 60km and the missiles can intercept crossing and approaching targets to a range of 25km. The kill probability is high even against highly agile crossing targets. The system can engage up to four targets simultaneously with Aspide missiles.

CONFIGURATION

Spada 2000 is modularised and integrated into sheltered units, which provides a high tactical and strategic mobility. The system consists of a Detection Centre and either two or four Firing Sections, each section equipped with two missile launchers. Each missile launcher has six ready to fire Aspide 2000 missiles.

DETECTION CENTRE

The Detection Centre contains mission planning capability allowing fast and precise effective deployment of the weapons. The centre is fitted in a hardened shelter with an RAC-3D radar installed on a hydraulically operated mast on the roof of the shelter. The shelter houses the system’s operating centre, including the voice and data communications suite. Auxiliary equipment in the centre includes a global positioning system, a north finder, air conditioning and power supplies.

RAC-3D RADAR

Aspide 2000’s radar is the Selex Sistemi Integrati (formerly Alenia Marconi Systems) RAC-3D, which gives three-dimensional volumetric air surveillance, detection and tracking. The system has the capacity to track 100 targets simultaneously within a range of 60km. The radar is capable of operating in hostile electronic warfare environments and is robust against clutter interference and electronic countermeasures. The radar features emission control, jamming location, random frequency agility and coded waveforms. The radar’s erectable antenna is up to 13m high.

OPERATIONS CENTRE

The operations centre is manned by two operators for mission planning, system deployment and management during combat operations. The computer displays the air threat data in 3D co-ordinates. The system tracks, identifies and prioritises the targets and assigns the firing sections to the priority targets. The targets can also be assigned to other anti-air weapon systems. The system is able to co-ordinate up to 10 small anti-air weapons deployed within a 10km radius.

The operations centre can be connected to a remote upper level air defence command centre.

FIRING SECTION

The Firing Section consists of the tracking and illumination radar, the control unit and the missile launchers each with six ready to fire missiles. The radar carries out target acquisition, tracking and illumination functions for missile guidance.

The control unit is managed by a single operator. The unit controls all the functions from target designation to missile launch and target intercept and operates in manual or automatic mode.

COMMUNICATIONS

The communications suite includes the data links between the detection centre and the firing sections and also internal and external secure voice communications.

MISSILE

The Aspide 2000 missile is an upgraded version of the Aspide surface to air missile. The missile is capable of engaging hostile attack aircraft before the aircraft can release airborne standoff weapons. The Aspide 2000 is also capable of intercepting air launched missiles once launched. The upgraded missile uses an enhanced single stage rocket motor which provides increased missile speed, higher lateral acceleration and effective range. The missile is also in service with the Italian Air Force and the Royal Thai Air Force as part of the Oerlikon Contraves Skyguard air defence system.

The high thrust single-stage solid propellant rocket motor provides high supersonic speed and high agility to intercept manoeuvring targets. The guidance system is semi-active radar homing.

2) HQ-9 / FT-2000 SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILE

The HongQi-9 (HQ-9) is a long-range, all-altitude, all-weather surface-to-air missile system to counter aircraft, helicopters, and cruise missiles. It also has limited capabilities against tactical ballistic missiles. Developed by China Academy of Defence Technology (CADT), the missile system may have entered service with the PLAAF Surface-to-Air Missile Corps in limited numbers since 1997. A shipborne version is being deployed onboard the PLA Navy’s Type 052C air defence missile destroyer. An anti-radiation variant known as FT-2000 has also been promoted to the export market.
PROGRAMME

The HQ-9 was developed by China Academy of Defence Technology (CADT), China’s leading surface-to-air missile designer and manufacturer located in the western suburb of Beijing. A subordinate of China Aerospace Science & Industry Corporation (CASIC), the academy is also known as China Changfeng Mechanics and Electronics Technology Academy, or 2nd Aerospace Academy. An export variant FT-2000 fitted with an anti-radiation seeker has been promoted by China National Precision Machinery Import and Export Corporation (CPMIEC) to the international market.

The HQ-9 development programme began in the early 1980s. The missile design was initially based on some limited U.S. Patriot air defence missile technology, but was later incorporated with Russian S-300 missile design and technologies. Like the Patriot, the HQ-9 uses a ‘Track-Via-Missile’ (TVM) terminal guidance system. The early prototype was launched from a Patriot-style slant-positioned box-shape container launcher, but the missile was seriously oversize due to China’s substandard solid fuel rocket technology. After China imported the S-300PMU missile from Russia in the early 1990s, the HQ-9 missile was redesigned to incorporate Russian missile rocket, aerodynamic layout, and launch system. The resulting HQ-9A is ‘cold-launched’ vertically from a S-300-style tube launcher system.

The HQ-9 was initially developed to replace the PLA’s bulk of obsolete HQ-2 (Chinese copy of the Soviet/Russian SA-2 Guideline), but the slow progress in the development forced the PLA to purchase the S-300PMU missile from Russia. By the time the HQ-9 was ready for operational deployment in the late 1990s, the missile was already behind foreign air-defence missiles such as U.S. PAC3 and Russian S-300PMU2 in terms of technology and performance. Only a small number of the HQ-9A are being deployed by the PLA for operational trial and evaluations. The naval variant of the HQ-9A is deployed onboard the Type 052C destroyer which was commissioned in 2004.

MISSILE

The HQ-9 is reported to have a slant range of 200km up to an altitude of 30km. The missile has a proximity fuse with an effective range of 35m, which goes active when the missile is 5km away from its target. The missile is transported and launched on Taian TAS5380 8X8 transport-erector-launcher (TEL), which has four canisters that look almost identical to those used in the S-300PMU1. Like the S-300, the FT-2000 is cold-launched.

GUIDANCE & FIRE CONTROL

The HQ-9’s guidance is very similar to that of the Patriot missile, consisting of inertial initial guidance + radio command midcourse correction + track-via-missile (TVM) terminal guidance. Midcourse correction commands are transmitted to the guidance system from the ground engagement control station. The target acquisition system in the missile acquires the target in the terminal phase of flight and transmits the data using the TVM downlink via the ground radar to the engagement control station for final course correction calculations. The course correction commands are transmitted back to the missile via the command uplink.

The HQ-9 system reportedly uses a large HT-233 3D C-band mono-pulse planar phased array radar, which operates in the 300MHz bandwidth and has a detection range of 120km and tracking range of 90km. The radar can detect targets in azimuth (360 degrees) and elevation (0 to 65 degrees), and is capable of tracking some 100 airborne targets and simultaneously engaging more than 50 targets. The radar system is carried on a Taian TAS5380 8X8 heavy-duty cross-country vehicle.

The HQ-9 may also be compatible with the Russian tracking radar, making it suitable to be deployed in combination with the S-300.

FT-2000

In 1998 CPMIEC revealed a unique anti-radiation surface-to-air missile system FT-2000, which was designed engage airborne warning and control system (AWACS) and other electronic warfare aircraft at long ranges. Based on the HQ-9 design, the FT-2000 is fitted with a passive radar-homing seeker and is launched from a 8X8 transport-erector-launcher (TEL) vehicle carrying four missile tube launchers.

The FT-2000 is a scaled down version of the HQ-9 fitted with a passive radar seeker that homes the missile using the electronic emission of enemy AWACS and electronic warfare (EW) aircraft. When the missile detects and locks on to the radar or jammer, it can home on the target autonomously at 1,200m/s while sustaining a 14G overload. The FT-2000 can also be used in co-operation with friendly aircraft when the onboard radar warning receiver detects hostile signal. In addition, the FT-2000 missile has a built-in inertial navigation system, so that whenever it has acquired a lock-on, it will continue towards the target even if the emitter is shut down, although the missile’s accuracy would seriously degrade in this case.

For the detection and localisation of hostile radar emissions and jammers the FT-2000 makes use of four ground-based Electronic Support Measures (ESM) sensor posts, each of which is mounted on wheeled vehicles and can together track 50 targets simultaneously. The ESM sensor posts are deployed at a distance 30km from each other. The missile launchers are deployed near the central ESM sensor station at a distance of 150 metres. Additionally, the missile can also be used in conjunction with surveillance and target acquisition radars.

Despite being regarded as the first of its kind in the world, the real effectiveness of the FT-2000 in operation was somehow doubtful. The missile caught great attention when it was first revealed in 1998, but did not enter production due to lack of interest from either domestic or international market.

It is not clear what long-range SAM system the PAF is currently interested towards; rumors/unofficial reports suggest that the Pakistan Government is negotiating with Russia for the sale of long-range S-300-series SAMs. However India has strong political influence on Russia regarding strategic and military issues. The new port city of Gwadar in Pakistan as well as Pakistan’s valuable strategic location are leading to warming relations with Russia – as compared to the early to mid-1990s

3) S-300 (SA-10) SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILE

The S-300 (NATO codename: SA-10 Grumble) family of surface-to-air missiles (SAM) developed by Russian Almaz Central Design Bureau are the most capable air defence missiles in PLA service. The missile is also regarded as one of the world’s most effective all-altitude regional air defence SAM systems in service. The PLA Air Force (PLAAF) Surface-to-Air Missile Corps obtained the S-300 system in the early 1990s to replace its obsolete HQ-2 (S-75/SA-2 Guideline) to provide area defence for some most crucial regions in China. Unconfirmed reports suggested that the PLA is also considering a possible licensed co-production of S-300PMU under the designation HQ-15 and acquiring the more capable S-300V (SA-12 Gladiator) theatre missile defence (TMD) system.

PROGRAMME

The PLA ordered the first batch of the S-300PMU (SA-10A Grumble-A) SAM systems in 1991 and received them in 1993. The exact number of the missile is unknown, but some reports suggest that this may include one regiment (4 SAM batteries). In Russian Army’s order of battle, each S-300 battery consists of a command and control company and three missile launch companies, with a total of nine truck-towed SAM transporter-erector-launcher (TEL) vehicles, each with four ready-to-fire missiles. If the PLA follows the Russian organisational structure, this could total 36 TEL systems and 144 missiles. These missiles are operated by a PLAAF SAM division stationed near Beijing to provide regional air defence for the capital city area.

In 1994, the PLAAF purchased additional 120 spare missiles from Russia to replace those fired in exercises. The second S-300 SAM regiment (4 batteries) joined the PLAAF in the late 1990s and it was also deployed near Beijing. Some batteries of these regiments were later redeployed to Shanghai. The third regiment equipped with the improved S-300PMU1 (SA-10B Grumble-B) variant carried on the MAZ7910 8X8 TEL vehicles became operational in 2000~01. This regiment is reportedly deployed in Fujian Province across the strait from Taiwan.

By 2006 the PLAAF was reportedly operating 12 S-300 SAM batteries with about 108 TEL vehicles and a total of 432 missiles. If taking spare and practice missiles into account, the total number of missiles purchased from Russia could amount 650~1,000. Most of these missiles are likely deployed near the older HQ-2 and short-range HQ-7 SAM units to form integrated multi-layer air defence networks where the S-300 radar systems would provide the target information for both S-300 and non-S-300 units.

The S-300 SAM system provide the PLA with a highly effective means of denying Chinese airspace to enemy air forces. The SAM systems could also be used in a more ‘offensive’ manner by deploying them along the mainland-side coast of the Taiwan Strait. This would effect a partial airspace blockade over Taiwan, forcing the Taiwanese Air Force aircraft to only use eastern coast airfields to avoid entering the envelope of the S-300 SAM systems.

MISSILE
The vertically launched S-300 missile uses a single-stage solid propellant rocket motor. It is normally armed with a 100kg HE-fragmentation warhead with a proximity fuse, though a low yield tactical nuclear type is believed to be an alternative warhead option. The missile’s vertical launch trajectory provides fastest available reaction time capability to counter targets approaching from any azimuth. Missile engagement altitude extends from 25m up to about 30,000m. The maximum engagement range is stated as at least 90,000m, though in practice it is probably greater.

4) S-300PMU (SA-10A GRUMBLE-A)

The S-300PMU (SA-10A) launch complex consists of a missile battery which includes a battery command post and engagement control centre, the large Clam Shell 3D continuous wave pulse Doppler target acquisition radar, the Flap Lid-A I-band multi-function phased-array trailer-mounted engagement radar with digital beam steering in hardened sites, and up to 12 semi-trailer erector-launchers which mount four tubular missile container-launchers.

The towing unit for the semi-trailer erector-launcher is the KrAZ-260V (6 x 6) tractor truck. The launchers are usually positioned on concrete pads with the trailers being levelled by the use of four hydraulic jacks. An S-300PMU regiment comprises three such batteries and employs the Big Bird 4-meter tall F-band long-range, 3D surveillance and tracking radar at the Regimental command post for initial target detection.

5) S-300PMU1 (SA-10B GRUMBLE-B)

The S-300PMU1 is carried and vertically launched from a dedicated four-round capacity transporter-erector launcher vehicle based on the MAZ-7910 (8×8) truck chassis. The combined engagement radar and control station is mounted on the same chassis.

The S-300PMU1 mobile missile battery comprises the combined Flap Lid-B engagement radar and engagement control/command post station mounted on a MAZ-7910 chassis, up to 12 TEL (known as SPU in Russian: mobile launcher unit), a trailer-mounted 36D6 Clam Shell 3D 360º scanning target designation radar, and a maintenance section.

The S-300PMU1 Regiment consists of three such batteries with an additional radar section and a number of TZM (transport-loader vehicles) MAZ-7910 transloaders for re-supply purposes. The TEL carries a total of four sealed container-launcher cylinders, each of which is used for the storage, transport and launching of a missile. When travelling the launcher system is carried in the horizontal position but at the launch site is elevated to an angle of 90 degree.

HQ-15

There has been speculations that the PLA may be considering a licensed co-production of the S-300 SAM systems in China. The Chinese copy of the S-300 was reportedly designated HQ-15. Some reports suggested that Chinese-assembled S-300 missiles using Russian-made kits have already been tested by the PLA, but this cannot be confirmed. China has the capability to initiate such a co-production but the PLA may wish to use the S-300 technology to improve its own indigenous designs such as HQ-9. Another possibility is that China will only produce the missile, but not the TEL vehicles and guidance radar, to save the overall costs of the programme.

RADAR

The combined ‘Flap Lid-B’ radar/engagement control vehicle has the 2.75m2 planar array antenna on a box-like antenna mount and support systems container. When travelling the array is carried horizontally, and when deployed it is raised above the container to an angle of approximately 60 degree.

The battery takes only five minutes to deploy once it comes to the halt. The vehicles have electronic inter-vehicle communications and data transmission links with elevatable pole-type antenna, and thus it does not require interconnecting vehicle cables. Each of the MAZ-7910 derivative vehicles has four hydraulic jacks positioned either side between the first/second and third/fourth road wheels which are lowered to the ground to provide a more stable and level environment.

Missile guidance is of the Track-Via-Missile (TVM) type with the ‘Flap Lid’ guidance radar capable of engaging up to six targets simultaneously, with two missiles assigned per target to ensure a high kill probability. Maximum target velocity is stated as 4,200km/h with the battery capable of firing three missiles per second.

If the battery is employed in rugged terrain or forest then the engagement radar system can be mounted on a special trailer-mounted extendible 24.4m high tower to improve radar coverage. The use of this extended-range radar for low level engagements increases the system’s range to 43,200m from the original 32,000m. In its sealed container-launcher cylinder the missile is considered to be a round of ammunition and is said not to require any check-ups or adjustments for a period of 10 years.
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[SIZE=1]What other option do we have?[/SIZE]

very well.. Hamza submarine (3rd Agosta 90b) is about to enter in PN fleet this month. though it had never been tested but i think these harpoons may equiped Hamza as a primary antiship missile… as this boat is better than the previous ones…

have a look at this… and still US is eager to cooperate… anyway..

If any offended one try to reply here.. i urge him to keep his sentiments down… reallity will not change by passing un-necessary remarks here….this is may be the side of the picture which u haven’t seen yet or may not want to see because it is not too pleasent to look at…
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Indian Nuclear Program
By Adnan Gill
On August 6, 1945 the nuclear bomb Little Boy killed an estimated 80,000 people. In the following months, an estimated 60,000 additional souls were lost to radiation poisoning. Three days later Nagasaki was targeted by the second nuclear bomb. An estimated 39,000 people were killed instantly with another 75,000 believed to have succumbed to radiation poisoning. American intelligence estimates the casualties to be manifold higher in a similar attack on densely populated Indian cities like New Delhi or Mumbai. Indian experts say the country could face an equally devastating nuclear catastrophe, not because of its nuclear rival, but from within. Dr. A. Gopalakrishnan, a former chairman of the Indian Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB) summarized the threats from within as, “There could be lesser accidents which could still release moderate amounts of radioactivity into the crowded areas surrounding some of our less-safe installations at Madras, Trombay or Tarapur. It could be devastating to a large number of people.”

An International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and World Health Organization report attributes 56 deaths to Chernobyl accident and estimates that as many as 9,000 people, among the approximately 6.6 million most highly exposed, may die from radiation exposure. As horrific as these statistics may seem, experts believe these figures will dwarf in front of mass casualties resulting from an impending nuclear disaster(s) in India. Indian nuclear reactors are called by some nuclear experts, ‘disasters-in-making.’ Experts say, It’s not a matter of if, but when?

Indian industrial complex is notorious for lack of safety and catastrophic disasters. The Bhopal Disaster of 1984 is the worst industrial disaster in history. It was caused by the release of 40 tons of methyl isocyanate from a Union Carbide pesticide plant located in the heart of the city of Bhopal, India . The gases injured between 150,000 to 600,000 unsuspected victims, and snuffed at least 15,000 innocent lives. What is even more disturbing is that experts believe Indian nuclear complex is poised to kill even more Indians. Such a disaster will put even Bhopal Disaster to shame. Scientists believe that Indian plants are so poorly designed, built and maintained, a Chernobyl-style disaster may be just around the corner. The threats posed by its mad pursuit of nuclear weapons are real, because India is the only country in the world where nuclear research and plutonium production occur inside or near heavily populated areas. The Indian nuclear complex is believed to be gravely unsafe and most dangerous in the world. It is not surprising that the popular American television program ’60 Minutes’, charged India with operating “the most unsafe nuclear plants in the world.”

The safety black holes in the Indian nuclear program range from hazardous mining practices, near meltdowns, heavy water leaks, turbine-blade failures, moderator system malfunctions, inoperable emergency core cooling systems, coolant pumps catching fires, structure failures, to flooding incidents, to say the least. American-based watchdog group — the Safe Energy Communication Council (SECC) — described the Indian nuclear program, especially its reactors to be the “least efficient” and the “most dangerous in the world.” Nuclear safety experts are alarmed by the dangerously unsafe conditions plaguing the Indian reactors. Sharing his alarm with the Christian Science Monitor, Christopher Sherry the research director of the SECC, said, “The fact that India’s nuclear regulator acknowledges that reactors in India are not operated to the standards of reactors in the US and Europe is not much of a surprise, [but] it is very disturbing.”

How safe are Indian nuclear plants? According to Dr A. Gopalakrishnan, the answer is, hardly at all. In his alarming response to the question Dr. Gopalakrishnan said, “Many of our nuclear installations have aged with time and have serious problems. Our efforts to find indigenous solutions, despite our capabilities, are not well-organized or focused.” Fearing the pathetically unsafe conditions of Indian reactors, he said, “[It] is a matter of great concern.”

Today, India has 14 nuclear reactors most of which are modeled after an obsolete 1957 Shippingport ( Pennsylvania, USA ) design. Only three Indian nuclear reactors barely meet IAEA standards. The rest are accountable only to the so-called ‘national standards’ set by AERB.

An Indian atomic-power expert Dhirendra Sharma estimates that Indian nuclear industry has suffered from “300 incidents of a serious nature… causing radiation leaks and physical damage to workers.” He further concedes, “These have so far remained official secrets.”

India’s nuclear-power program has always been secretive, because politicians use it as a cover for the country’s weapons program. The Indian government does not release information about the leaks or accidents at its nuclear power plants. Laws prohibit scientists and politicians from speaking out about the radioactive contaminations and accidents in the nuclear facilities. What throttled the absolute secrecy of accidents at its nuclear programs was the Indian Atomic Energy Act of 1962 (NO. 33 OF 1962. 15th September, 1962), which prescribes that the nuclear program should be shrouded in secrecy. The Act provides the Indian Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) enormous powers and the rights to withhold any information from public. Critics call the DAE an ‘unaccountable organization’. It prohibits private and public equity from within and outside the country. It also says the program should be run by the DAE with limited participation from private industries. Due to obscure international oversight and the 1962 Act the safety conditions at Indian nuclear facilities remain dangerously unsafe and largely hidden from the public.

Even four decades after it launched its nuclear reactor program, technical problems with Indian reactors remain so severe that the rated capacity of the country’s reactors totals only 1,840-mw, contributing less than 2.5% of India’s commercial energy.

A decade ago, a nine-month long AERB safety study of Indian reactors documented more than 130 extremely serious safety issues which warranted urgent corrective measures. The most urgent corrective actions were recommended at the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre; Indira Gandhi Centre for Atomic Research (IGCAR); Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited; Uranium Corporation of India Limited; Indian Rare Earths Limited; Nuclear Fuel Complex, and the Heavy Water Board.

Due to its age and insufficient safety procedures, IGCAR is prone to serious accidents. In 1987, during a fuel transfer process, a tube guiding fuel into the reactor was snapped. Then in 2002, 75kg of radioactive sodium leaked inside a purification cabin.

The Tarapur Atomic Power Station (TAPS) reactors are the oldest in the world. They experienced extensive tube failures which led to the de-rating of its reactors from 210-mw to 160-mw. The two reactors share the same emergency core cooling system, which experts say is a recipe for the reactor meltdown.

Kakrapar Atomic Power Station (KAPS) reactors are considered to be India’s model reactors for controlling radiation leaks; not surprisingly, even they emit three times the radiation as much as the international norm, a fact admitted by S.P. Sukhatme, chairman of AERB. Mr. Sukhatme’s shocking admission put the rest of the country’s nuclear-power plants in grave perspective. Top Indian antinuclear activist Suren Gadekar found the admission to be extremely shocking and disturbing. He said, “The main implication is that other nuclear-power plants are much worse than even Kakrapar.” In February 2002, chairman Sukhatme requested the Nuclear Power Corporation of India Ltd to plug tritium contaminated water leaks in its reactors. In 1994, owing to its faulty design, concrete containment dome of KAPS collapsed. The collapse exposed the workers to high doses of radiation. Thereafter the floodwater entered the condenser pit and turbine building basement which resulted in four-year delay in its commissioning.

In 2002, the AERB ordered the closure of India ‘s first nuclear plant — Rajasthan Atomic Power Station (RAPS). The reactor was plagued with a series of serious defects ranging from turbine-blade failures, cracks in the end-shields, a leak in the overpressure relief device, and leaks in many tubes of the moderator heat exchanger. It was not the first time that seriously dangerous accidents forced RAPS to shutdown. In 1976, due to construction errors, the reactors were flooded, which forced the shutdown. The reactors were once again flooded in 1992. Also in 1992, four of its eight pumps caught fire. On February, 12 1994, it was shutdown for the repair of its calandria overpressure relief device which leaked radioactive heavy water. Later, in 1994, the Indian Express reported that in the aftermath of Canadian reports on the possibility of rupture in the pressure tubes of Canada-India Reactor, US (CIRUS) reactors, RAPS also went through the safety checks, as it was designed from the copied Canadian blueprints. Once, the emergency core cooling system got obstructed, leading to a near meltdown. RAPS’ innumerable problems forced it to be de-rated from 220-mw to 100-mw. RAPS functioned without high-pressure emergency core cooling system.

Despite a warning from the US-based General Electric (GE), the manufacturers of the turbines, in 1991, India commissioned the Narora Atomic Power Station (NAPS). As a result, in 1993, failure of two steam turbine blades resulted in a major fire in one of the heavy water reactors, which nearly led to a nuclear meltdown. The disaster could have been averted had either the government, or the DAE found it prudent to yield to GE’s warnings.

In 1986, the inlets of Madras Atomic Power Station (MAPS) reactors cracked and Zircalloy pieces were found in the moderator pump. Then in 1988, MAPS was shut down after heavy water leaked, exposing workers to high doses of radioactivity. Again, in 1991, tons of heavy water burst out from the moderator system. Its emergency cooling systems are said to be inadequate.

Its not only the designs of Indian nuclear reactors that are obsolete and flawed, even the very sites they were chosen to be built upon were irresponsibly unsuitable for such facilities. The under construction 500-mw prototype fast breeder reactor coming up at Kalpakkam was damaged by the waters of 2004 tsunami. In a March 2005 report, the Telegraph (Calcutta) reported, “Water had surged into the reactor’s foundation pit when the December 26 tsunami devastated coastal stretches of Tamil Nadu.” The report further revealed the extent of damage, “The huge foundation pit, close to the [MAPS], was filled with over six meters of seawater and chunks of silt and sludge.” The fast breeder reactor uses liquid sodium as coolant — liquid sodium is an extremely hazardous agent. Once dried, it can ignite and burn with such heat and intensity that once started, it’s almost impossible to extinguish. Alarmed by the deadly hazards posed by the breeder reactor, in 2005, its Employees’ Association and other workers’ unions planed to file a court case charging DAE for seriously lacking the qualified technical personnel at critical positions of the MAPS reactors and for the reactor perilously endangering the safety of the plant and the public. The reprocessing plant holding glass-matted enriched waste is said to be just about 150 meters from the sea. Will it be safe if another tsunami strikes?

It is said there is no greater curse then to watch one’s child suffer from a disability and deformation. There are thousands upon thousands of Indian parents who inconsolably suffer from this horrific curse everyday. What is even more heartbreaking is that they don’t even realize the evil that has brought the curse upon them is manmade. It is the evil of nuclear poisoning. Indian nuclear program does not harm only the workers of DAE, but it also harms the lives of ordinary citizens even worst.

“Maloti Singh, a nine-year-old girl whose contract-worker father loaded waste drums, was born with one leg withered into a stump and a deformed foot. Her father and grandmother, who used to collect stone chips from the tailing pond, both have skin cancer. None of the family has seen a doctor.” (Sunday Telegraph, 25 April, 1999, Issue 1430). This is only one example out of thousands of ordinary Indians who have been poisoned by the highly-secretive, unsafe, and world’s most dangerous nuclear program.

Environmental contamination is especially severe in the eastern state of Bihar where Indian government callously mines radioactive materials without any regards to human lives or wellbeing of other species. The health threats posed to many families living near the Jadugoda mine are said to be worst than the after-effects of the Chernobyl disaster in Ukraine . The locals suffer from unusually high number of abnormal births, cancers and a host of other ailments that were previously rare. Radioactive contamination is said to be so massive that genetic mutations have also been noted in animals and as well in plants.

In 1999, the Sunday Telegraph revealed, “In all, at least 30,000 villagers — and the land and livestock around them — are being exposed to contamination from the Jadugoda facility, according to researchers. Activists believe that the problems are caused by the lack of safeguards at the mine and its waste dumps, technically known as ‘tailing ponds’, as well as the unprotected movement of uranium and wastes. They fear that contamination has entered the food chain and will affect the genetic make-up of local population for generations to come.” Sadly, those who are the worst affected by the fatal contamination, don’t even realize what is terminating their lives short. Most attribute the strange diseases resulting from the radiation poisoning to the ‘will of God.’

Indian experts like N.M. Sampathkumar Iyangar (former manufacturer of nuclear reactor components) believes the real safety problems with the Indian nuclear program arise from the fact that well-connected manufacturers often sell substandard and defective equipment to build and repair the nuclear reactors. Others believe India cuts corners to save money by forsaking the technologies that make the power plants safe.

What worries experts is not the fact that an ambitious Indian nuclear program has become environmentally unaffordable, rather the reality that its nuclear program has become disasters-in-making.

hmm… interesting development.. here is the satelite imagery link of this reactor. It is in very pre-mature stage so far.. and almost six or seven years away from its completion ….have a look

http://www.isis-online.org/publications/southasia/newkhushab.pdf

A very Strategicaly important develpment have occured in the recent two dayz.
It may be worthy to capture ur attention…
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Defense Security Cooperation Agency
NEWS RELEASE
On the web: http://www.dsca.mil Media/Public Contact: (703) 601-3670
Date: 28 June 2006 Transmittal No. 06-10

Pakistan – F-16C/D Block 50/52 Aircraft

On 28 June 2005, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Pakistan of 36 F-16C/D Block 50/52 Aircraft as well as associated equipment and services. The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as $3 billion.

The Government of Pakistan has requested a possible sale of:

Major Defense Equipment (MDE)

>36 F-16C/D Block 50/52 aircraft with either the F100-PW-229 or F110-GE-129 Increased Performance Engines (IPEs) and APG-68(V)9 radars

>7 spare F100-PW-229 IPE or F110-GE-129 IPE engines

>7 spare APG-68(V)9 radar sets

>36 Joint Helmet Mounted Cueing Systems

>36 AN/ARC-238 SINCGARS radios with HAVE QUICK I/II

>36 Conformal Fuel Tanks (pairs)

>36 Link-16 Multifunctional Information Distribution System-Low Volume Terminals

>36 Global Positioning Systems (GPS) and Embedded GPS/Inertial Navigation Systems

>36 APX-113 Advanced Identification Friend or Foe Systems

>36 Advanced Integrated Defensive Electronic Warfare Suites without Digital Radio

>Frequency Memory (DRFM) or AN/ALQ-184 Electronic Counter Measures pod without DRFM or AN/ALQ-131 Electronic Counter Measures pod without DRFM or AN/ALQ-187 Advanced Self-Protection Integrated Suites without DRFM; or AN/ALQ-178 Self-Protection Electronic Warfare Suites without DRFM and
1 Unit Level Trainer

Associated support equipment, software development/integration, modification kits, capability to employ a wide variety of munitions, spares and repair parts, flight test instrumentation, publications and technical documentation, CONUS-personnel training and training equipment,

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Pakistan – F-16A/B Mid-Life Update Modification Kits

On 28 June 2006, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Pakistan of 60 F-16A/B Mid-Life Update Modification kits as well as associated equipment and services. The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as $1.3 billion.
The Government of Pakistan has requested a possible sale of 60 F-16A/B Mid-Life Update (MLU) modification and Falcon Star Structural Service Life Enhancement kits consisting of:

>APG-68(V)9 with Synthetic Aperture Radar or APG-66(V)2 radar;

>Joint Helmet Mounted Cueing Systems;

>AN/APX-113 Advanced Identification Friend or Foe Systems;

>AN/ALE-47 Advanced Countermeasures Dispenser Systems;

>Have Quick I/II Radios;

>Link-16 Multifunctional Information Distribution System-Low Volume Terminals;

>SNIPER (formerly known as AN/AAQ-33 PANTERA) targeting pod capability;

>Reconnaissance pod capability;

>Advanced Air Combat Maneuvering Instrumentation Units;

>MDE included in the MLU modification and structural upgrade kits
21 ALQ-131 Block II Electronic Countermeasures Pods without the Digital Radio Frequency Memory (DRFM) or ALQ-184 Electronic Countermeasures Pods without DRFM;

>60 ALQ-213 Electronic Warfare Management Systems;

>1 Unit Level Trainer; and

>10 APG-68(V)9 spare radar sets.

Also included are radars, modems, receivers, installation, avionics, spare and repair parts, support equipment, CONUS-personnel training and training equipment, technical assistance, publications and technical documentation, system drawings, U.S. Government and contractor engineering, and other related logistics elements necessary for full program support. The estimated cost is $1.3 billion.
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Pakistan – F-16 Engine Modifications and Falcon UP/STAR Structural Upgrades

On 28 June 2006, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Pakistan of Engine Modifications and Falcon UP/STAR Structural Upgrades as well as associated equipment and services. The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as $151 million.

The Government of Pakistan has requested a possible sale for modification/overhaul of 14 F100-PW-220E engines, 14 Falcon UP/STAR F-16 structural upgrade kits, de-modification and preparation of 26 aircraft, support equipment, software development/integration, modification kits, spares and repair parts, flight test instrumentation, publications and technical documentation, personnel training and training equipment, U.S. Government and contractor technical and logistics personnel services, and other related requirements to support the program. The estimated cost is $151 million.

Pakistan – Weapons for F-16C/D Block 50/52 Aircraft

On 28 June 2006, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale to Pakistan of Weapons for the F-16C/D Block 50/52 Aircraft as well as associated equipment and services. The total value, if all options are exercised, could be as high as $650 million.

The Government of Pakistan has requested a possible sale of:

Major Defense Equipment (MDE);

> 500 AIM-120C5 Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAM)

> 12 AMRAAM training missiles

> 240 LAU-129/A Launchers

> 200 AIM-9M-8/9 SIDEWINDER missiles

> 500 Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) Guidance Kits: GBU-31/38 Guided Bomb Unit (GBU) kits; 1,600 Enhanced-GBU-12/24 GBUs

> 800 MK-82 500 pound General Purpose (GP) and MK-84 2,000 pound GP bombs; and

>700 BLU-109 2,000 pound with FMU-143 Fuze.

Associated support equipment, software development/integration, modification kits, capability to employ a wide variety of munitions, spares and repair parts, flight test instrumentation, publications and technical documentation, CONUS-personnel training and training equipment, U.S. Government and contractor technical and logistics personnel services, and other related requirements to ensure full program supportability will also be provided. The estimated cost is $650 million.


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This news is may be the half truth… ATGMS , small and long range ammunation is been requested by Coloumbo, what it calls “swift millitar assistance”. Details are not official yet.