From what I’ve been reading…never flown one mind you, the F4 in particular was an extreme fuel burner when supersonic, I’ve heard former pilots mention you can literally watch the fuel guage drop when supersonic. The speed test used to advertise the Phantom’s top speed in combat trim involved burning the entire fuel load within a matter of miles, and it used external tanks with open throttle to get up the starting speed before the test recording began, it dropped the tanks when loaded speed topped out and then the speed run began on the timer, it had to land immediately following the speed test having burned all its tanks dry and managed to squeak past 2 Mach in this fashion, something that could never be achieved in service. Aircraft like the Phantom are really transonics with supersonic dash capability, due to fuel burn. True supersonics really cruise supersonic, the Phantom doesn’t but I’m guessing the Su-15 and MiG-21 does. Most definitely the MiG-25 does, but it carries a hell of a fuel load too. And there is the altitude restriction on early Su-15 and MiG-21 without O2 injected into the afterburner. But then, the Phantom had to have water injection for cooling during its prepared speed test also. F104/6 might be better comparison to Su-15/MiG-25? If so the Soviets seem to have raw performance edge, US technological refinement, a consistent theme between the two? Soviet strategic protocol right through to the end was numerical superiority and broader deployment adaptability to trump individual unit and support infrastructure expense?

Several months ago Vanir made a similar claim that L/M (and/or the USAF) publically acknowleged that stealth aircraft don’t work, and I had asked for a source for his/her statement…twice. He/she never once responded in that thread again after I had asked for sources.

Because I still haven’t found the original article which may very well belong to an expired webpage.

I did manage to find reference to the points it made (specifically about the civilian tech who identified the vulnerability of F-117 in the Gulf to any DoD use of the civilian mobile phone networks of any major city such as Bagdad).

The system uses a traditional mobile phone network to detect stealth aircraft as they pass silently through the ether. Although the aircraft have advanced coatings which absorb conventional radar signals, they apparently still reflect back enough radiation emitted from mobile phone masts to be detected by special ground receivers.

The receivers are linked to a central computer which – in sync with a GPS satellite – is able to position the aircraft to within 10 metres.

The central computer could conceivably be a simple notebook operated by ground troops. Once exposed, the stealth aircraft would be easy prey for convential ground-to-air missiles.

Disabling the system would require the complete destuction of a target country’s mobile phone mast network – in reality, an impossible task.

Considering the potential of this system to completely undermine the US’s stealth aircraft programme, it might be reasonable to assume that the military there is taking a close interest. Not so, according to Roke Manor Research, despite claims by the Daily Telegraph.

According to the Telegraph Peter Lloyd, head of projects at the laboratory’s sensor department, said: “I cannot comment in detail because it is a classified matter, but let’s say the US military is very interested.”

linky here is a collation of various articles from different sources examining stealth technologies in benefits and vulnerabilities (including what I’ve just quoted):
http://www.electronicaviation.com/articles/Military/1230

Honestly I’m not making up the original article I read, and I don’t understand why I can’t seem to find it in various wording for google searches at length. I recall very specific statements made, because they were of great interest since I thought stealth was the bee’s knees too, so even the casual, matter-of-fact notation that (aside from the case of the B-2 which is a high maintenance stealth system designed for penetration of defence networks, but unlike other stealth systems in use), so-called “stealth fighters” like the F-117 specifically discussed weren’t going to be very effective trying to penetrate the overlapping EWR networks of a major power like Russia (note, not SAM sites, but very specifically, overlapping EWR networks designed to cross-check any coverage gaps, like the strategic early warning networks of Russia, central Europe and the USA)

But in any case these points as being directly related to physics and sciences rather than manufacturer claims and “secret knowledge” despite being classified and regarded military Intelligence, nevertheless in several open source civilian studies of radar stealth technologies these are extrapolated.

The F/A-18E/F for example has characteristics such that RCS is reduced on frontal and tail on facings, but remains unchanged to the sides. This is of minimum concern for its specific mission, not to penetrate networked strategic EWR systems but to fly high speed strike missions with a high survivability against independent SAM stations (by the time they pick it up, it’s gone past and has a low RCS again, so a lock would be fleeting).

The B-2 has the benefits of being highly radar absorbant rather than scattering signals, even trapping some amount of signal with internal structure, otherwise using radar absorbant materials as well as a low RCS general airframe design, all working together. This is the most effective of all, but has some tremendous drawbacks in maintenance and cost, its stealth system is extremely subject to wear and tear so it’s basically a very expensive first strike weapon best reserve for limited, first strike use (conventional or nuclear, such as in Iraq as one of the first strike missions).

F-117 and F-22/35 style low RCS is largely achieved with signal scattering on all facings, although they are inherently concentrated towards certain angles (variously upwards, to a wide flank front and rear, etc.), so that again it is much less suitable within a networked strategic EWR systems environment like in the hardened defence zones of a major power, like say scooting around above the Pentagon, than it is for foiling the seeker lock of individual missiles or independent SAM systems.

These studies, some masters theses are published throughout the web and open sourced, anyone is invited to look them up with a simple google search or discuss it at various science forums like physics/web. It’s just science, despite being associated with classified militaria. You can download published theses on pdf, but some have to be purchased.
There are some good chinese-translated blogs examining western stealth technologies closely and failings of various stealth systems, but they’re a poor reference because they’re just blogs.

But most importantly these circumstantial failings, very important to consider when regarding radar stealth, are a matter of science. It doesn’t really matter what anyone says about it, physics is what it is.

I will continue searching for the original article I keep referencing, or stop referencing it, one or the other.
What surprises me is the counter argument appears to be founded on the ridiculous assumption stealth aircraft are equipped with some kind of invisibility paint, combined with a general lack of faith in your very own strategic early warning systems. They work by physics, their natural enemy is a networked strategic EWR system, at the very least that should’ve always been an abject suspicion.

I do agree 1982-85 would’ve been a prime time to have a conventional war east versus west if you were ever going to. Eagle numbers were up and the 70s Phantom force had finally retired as a front line type (still even AIM-7F and AIM-9J/L aren’t very good weapons and R24/R13-1M1 are most definitely contemporary or if you believe the Russians, superior).

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Don’t forget that the F-117 went IOC in 83 and 1st flew in 81. It would probably have been rushed into service during hostilities. I can bet you that it would have given the soviets a nasty surprise. I can bet you that all command and control would have been dead within hours without the Russians knowing what hit them.

Interesting point about the F-117, this from statements made by USAF officials immediately after its vulnerabilities became public knowledge after the Gulf.
Low RCS doesn’t work within networked EWR environments. Basic physics.
As it is it has enough troubles operating near major population centres because of virtually universal modern telecommunications networking (which functions a lot like an EWR network by accident), low RCS a/c come in and start scattering signals which shows up as gaps in the coverage from towers that don’t return faults, along a traceable flight path.

In the case of overlapping EWR networks all low RCS tech does for you* is bounce signals from one emitter to a different receiver. Low RCS only works well when you have isolated receivers so that scattered signals aren’t picked up by alternate receivers and the data networked to provide common signal interpretation.
Unfortunately all EWR networks are based on common signal interpretation and data processing from multiple, overlapped receivers. So as stated by USAF officials, low RCS technology isn’t suitable for overlapping EWR networked environments such as you find with major military powers like Russia. It is very suitable for use against small nation militaries like Iraq or Pakistan.

*note that low RCS is still very effective high survivability tech for fighters because AAMs and their platforms are a different story.

Nice angle on the Soviet strategy there MadRat. Now I wonder what the standing reserve in the satellite frontiers was. Could they have supported their traditional strategy for a month, a couple of weeks, a few days?

I do know their standing infantry was equipped and trained for a NCB warfare environment, they assumed any major conflict was going to be nuclear or chemical pretty much immediately, so certain of it that NCB hardening of all regular army was an expense they were happy to take. NATO standing infantry weren’t nearly as well equipped, not down to company level and right across the board like the Soviets.

I also know the Soviets listed smoke and tear gas as chemical warfare agents, both of which NATO use routinely and don’t consider chemical warfare. And that naval strategy virtually depended upon tactical nukes.

What I’m thinking was the Soviets counted on nuclear escalation and would seek conventional warfare either only as a prelimenary step or for a post-nuclear battlefield. They may only need traditional conventional strategy to hold out for 2-3 days at most, time for negotiations to either mature or break apart before nuclear escalation.

Pure speculation on my part.

Yes I see what you are saying Vanir – and if we use 1976 as a late 70s scenario then that changes and evens things out somewhat in regards to aerial platforms (Note I’m not including F-14As here).

I realise the Soviet technology was well into its development stages – but I’m coming from a “what can actually take off” in 1982 and effect a conventional air war in the first few weeks.

Conceded. I suspect at that time Soviet military spending had switched to the navy, which had languished through the 70s. Come 1980 and they had essentially, mostly refitted old 50s-60s ships whilst the USN was really gathering stride with Aegis and all the rest of its modern equip in use today. The Kiev project turned out unsatisfactory (poor deep water characteristics) so it needed the Kuznetsov class redevelopment whatever the case and that was necessary, the only significant new thing they did with surface warships in the late 70s was lay the Kirov class but they’re a bit like a Russian Yamato/Musashi supership meant to take on whole battlegroups alone, it wasn’t altogether very realistic so the entire Soviet surface fleets needed a dedicated maintenance and rebuild, especially things like the escort frigate force, the Krivak was unsatisfactory yet it was the most numerous surface action support/patrol ship in the navy.
That was super expensive, the USSR wound up economically broken when it was only half done, but those efforts started around 1980.

I do agree 1982-85 would’ve been a prime time to have a conventional war east versus west if you were ever going to. Eagle numbers were up and the 70s Phantom force had finally retired as a front line type (still even AIM-7F and AIM-9J/L aren’t very good weapons and R24/R13-1M1 are most definitely contemporary or if you believe the Russians, superior).

But in 82-85 you had F-16s and Hornets coming on the scene and F-15C deliveries gathering real momentum, along with its MSIP update. Despite the fairly poor AAMs this still changes the game.

The US Navy was in far better shape than the Soviets, although they always had some fearsome surface action potential. Soviet Marines and paratroop forces were in better shape than American but where are they going to use them, Alaska? Like the movie Red Dawn? It’s a bit of a fiction, their real function would’ve been expelling NATO insurgents in satellite territories.

But even so the Fulcrum-A in East Germany was there pretty much when the F-16/30 had arrived and that was a pretty nice match up, considering too the Fulcrum would’ve been used with mass tactics to the Vipers better avionics, and Fulcrums are far more mobile with deployment.

To catch the Soviets early enough without them NATO would itself still be stuck with F-5’s, Mirages, Tornadoes and Phantoms, the USAF Eagle force is a bonus but even so you’re looking at numbers around 550 serviceable Eagles plus their friends, against 1500 Floggers plus somewhere in the region of 2500 Fishbeds, and about 500 Foxbats.

I mean most of this is just estimation on my part but it’s what I was thinking about.

Hi Flogger,

from the present Russian defence minister, what shows that some shortcomings from 1982 are still in need to be patched.

http://translate.google.com/translate?js=n&prev=_t&hl=en&ie=UTF-8&layout=2&eotf=1&sl=ru&tl=en&u=http://www.runewsweek.ru/article/v-rossii/24943-ya-byl-obeskurazhen-obemami-vorovstva

“Concluded that the conversion should be performed immediately and decisively. Conflict showed that the Army desperately needs in the modern system command and control technology. What you need to change the whole system of training officers, soldiers and sergeants.”

In the case of the Bekaa 1982 it was not the win of the fourth generation fighter over the third generation fighter. The main difference were the way they were operated and the related control technology.
The Syrians like the Israelis were aware about the detection shortcomings of the E-2C in 1982. It was unable to detect fighters sneaking-in in ground-clutter. The E-2C was used as early warning device and relay station at first.
The EC-2C high-up were able to spot the take-off of the Syrian fighters from their bases in the Syrian plain till they disappeared in the ground-clutter entering the vallies of the Anti-Lebanon mountains leading to the Bekaa. Their target area was around highway 1 in the Bekaa and so their appearance over the target area could be predicted by a “stop-watch”. The Israelis were just in need of a flight of fighters over the assumed target area, when they had the option to hide more west of Lebanon mountains. Even when tracked by Syrian radars inside Lebanon, they were unable to transmit that informations to the own fighters. The Syrian pilots never got a real idea about the arial picture over the Bekaa to adjust their tactical behavior to that in time. The single option left were some hit and run attacks close to ground level to leave that danger zone as fast as possible. By that most got through, when the results from the air-strikes were limited at best. The Syrian strikers got no updates about the real tactical situation and were in a constant danger to be challengend by the Israeli fighters waiting. Such conditions did allow a single pass attack-run with the highest possible speed only and the Syrian fighters were less than 5 minutes inside Lebanon. It did not allow a real cooperation of the Syrians fighters for mutual support when escorting own fighters. When the preplanned target did not pop-up at the right place and moment the ordenance was dropped somewhere at least, the Syrian pilots where under constant pressure and cut-off from the own forces control. Under such conditions and a high number of own sorties the result was a desaster for the Syrian. The number of Syrian fighters shot down were just the cream, when the Syrians were forced to fight to the Israeli conditions.

The article of Grant was about the more important achievement to bring down a ful-scale AD netting in short notice, when the related surveillance work was done properly. The Syrians never lost that lesson, when the Israelis used that to trap Syrian fighters. The S-200 SAM pushed the limited E-2C to much more distance from the battle-field and they were withdrawn by better own assets.

That’s a low blow even for you sens.

He’s talking about the Georgia war, not Bekka Valley.

The Georgia war displayed a need for modernisation of command and control and you’ve taken this statement way out of context. Allow me to enlighten you.
The Russian Parliament didn’t want war in Georgia, the Kremlin did. They used their influence over district commanders when Parliament gave Tblisi an assurance their bid for a unified and independent Georgia would be heard. So Russian Parliament said one thing, the Russian military did another under instruction from the Kremlin.

So he’s talking about that.

It has nothing whatsoever to do with the context you’re suggesting sens, it has to do with modern Russia still trying to wrest control of the military from the old communists. The way it stood in the 90s the creation of the CiS handed strategic control of militaries back to the Kremlin from their individual Parliaments.

His use of wording is precisely what I suggested earlier that any reference to technology here is in fact discussing doctrinal approach and not war materiel.

Look, I just don’t see the correlation in what is being fielded today for these claims of yours sens.

The CiS southern (caucasus region) defence infrastructure in SAM deployment and phased defence echelons precisely reflects traditional views and hasn’t changed since the 60s. It is perfectly viable and effective SAM defence subset for today.

S300P sites at Rostov and Novorossyysk, replacing old SA2/3. Buk at Krasnodar and Yeysk replacing old SA6. Osa brigades at all the forward deployment areas from Chechnya to the Sea of Azov.

If the Bekka Valley had any impact whatsoever on Soviet/Russian SAM deployment it is being completely ignored, nothing has changed since the 60s except the very same deployment has had its systems updated but is otherwise completely unchanged. These sites are current, you can look at them on Google Earth right this minute.

So you’re saying something that “brought down the Soviet Union” is being completely ignored by the defence systems deployment of today’s CiS and Russian Federation. Doesn’t that strike as just slightly odd?

Careful now, sens is likely to tell you you’re missing the point before saying what you said back to you as the real point.