Cruise at supersonic speeds was something the Suchoi 15 could only dream off (like nearly all aircraft of that era). Subsonic LoD was bad, supersonic LoD was a catastrophe. Engine consume vast amounts of fuel, and a mission with a supersonic dash normally ends 300nm behind the base’s fence. As target acquisition and attack without ground radar support was rather pointless, there was no need to fly that far off the base.

A number of fairly clean aircraft of the 60s-70s can cruise supersonic, Foxbat and Flagon among them, it’s listed in published specifications.
You’re talking about Phantoms, yeah? They’ve got a subsonic max cruise. The Flagon (and Foxbat) are listed in published specifications with max cruise exceeding 1500km/h and faster. The Phantom you’ll find has a max cruise in the transonic range, it’ll only dash supersonic.
The Phantom has a lot of excess thrust for great power down in thick air, but at higher altitudes aerodynamically cleaner aircraft like the MiG-21 encountered in Vietnam were stated by Phantom pilots as much quicker. You wouldn’t notice this on paper but it’s hidden away in the cruise performance, Phantom has a great dash but the needlelike Soviet aircraft are much cleaner.

Aircraft like the Foxbat and Flagon have both an economy cruise and a supersonic cruise at altitude. The normal range is reduced by around 30% for supersonic cruise. Many other aircraft cannot sustain a supersonic cruise but must dash-accelerate supersonic at maximum afterburner, top out and then decelerate subsonic when throttle is reduced, which would be aircraft like the Phantom or Tu-22 Blinder. Aircraft that can supersonic cruise can accelerate supersonic then with careful throttle management hold an intermediate supersonic speed for extended periods. The Hornet can maintain supersonic flight at 75% power for example (lightly loaded).

The combat radius of the early Flagon in interceptor configuration, internal fuel only is about 375km with an average speed following the climb of some 1500km/h. It’s about 400km and 1700km/h for the later versions. This isn’t just past the runway, and would allow for a very short maximum speed dash during the contact phase (ca. 850-930km total range supersonic).

By comparison a Phantom would intercept at transonic speed, include a short supersonic dash to the target and engage transonic at altitude. Hence Phantom pilots say at higher altitudes the newer Russian aircraft were quicker and very dangerous. The F-15 was designed to deal not just with the Foxbat but just as importantly the MiG-21 future variants and derivatives, based on Vietnam experience with this aircraft (which was more concrete than any Foxbat intel at the time).

As such Schorsch, the restrictions you’re talking about are really much more relevant to the Phantom or similar aircraft, not so much the needlelike or very high thrust hotrods like the Fishbed, Flagon, Foxbat, or even several Century series fighters of the USAF. The F-104 is so clean it can reach over 1400km/h at sea level, it would have no problem at all maintaining supersonic speed at altitude under intermediate power.

One of the major redevelopments of the jet fighter engine into the modern type we see today is efficiency, the main benefit an F404 class turbofan has over a J79 class turbojet is fuel efficiency for sustained thrust output, particularly in the cruise condition. It’s actually a similar story with piston engines and supercharger developments back in WW2 when they were cutting edge, multiple speeds, multiple stages, intercooling, etc. In actual fact top speed listings aren’t as much a reflection of how speedy an aircraft is, as it is what its flight envelope is like, a Ki-84 looks nowhere near as quick as a Mustang on paper but actually it’s damn near uncatchable at the 3-5km combat altitude (where the Mustang’s strength is an effortless high speed cruise up around 7km alt, the fantastic thing about it was being so clean it was tremendously fuel efficient in the long range escort scenario at bomber cruise height, whilst retaining contemporary but not necessarily superior fighter performance at the typical combat heights).

Fuel load and specific fuel consumption is certainly one of the main considerations for pilots irrespective of their job. A jet fighter pilot or a civilian recreational pilot are both aircraft pilots first, then the other takes second place (if you can’t fly the plane capably you’re not going to make a very good jet fighter pilot).

When learning licensing, including military licensing (perhaps moreso) one of the main lessons revolve around calculating fuel loads and fuel usage, with efficient reserve for the flight plan. Carrying too much reduces overall performance efficiency, reduced efficiency means increased requirements, it’s a vicious circle.

The idea is that the pilot aims for maximum efficiency and governs his aircraft through the flight plan with a conscious idea of everything that’s going to happen at least one step ahead. As they say in flight training, probably the biggest adjustment from something like driving a car is the fact you can’t just stop off at a gas station in the clouds and ask for directions, check the oil or top up your fuel. If you don’t plan it on the ground, you don’t have it on the flight. Yet at the same time it is counterproductive to carry anything you don’t need in an aircraft, which performs better the more efficiently it is trimmed, that includes in terms of fuel consumption.

It is counterproductive to carry more fuel than you need for a mission. Airframe stresses are increased, loading is increased, carrying any useless payload reduces overall performance efficency, it is conceivable to have less range carrying more fuel. A low altitude penetration will use much more fuel over a short distance than a high altitude intercept over a longer range. Altitude raises your combat radius, payload increases fuel requirements in climb regimes, these factors must be balanced for the mission requirements.

In the Flanker for a basic counter-air mission a fuel load roughly the same as the internal fuel load of an Eagle, about 5tons is common. For a straight intercept with a high loiter or a low altitude penetration attack role it might carry the maximum 9tons but has reduced G-loading limitations until some fuel is burned off.
If you are just responding to a basic counter-air mission that isn’t going to lead you too far from friendly airbases, carrying the full fuel load just means you’re going to take up and bring back literally tons and tons of weight you just don’t need, and some of your extra fuel is burnt in order just to carry the extra fuel, it’s that vicious circle of counterproductive surplus.

For most modern, twin engine supersonic fighters you want something like 4-5tons for air superiority, 8-9tons for penetration strike or force interdiction and it really depends on the circumstances for interception, Russians sort of combine the CAP and intercept missions in PVO (high loiter periods followed by GCI interception at high speed), so again you want as much fuel as you can get, but for the actual interception phase you either want as little as possible (high climb rates and acceleration) or a very high performance aircraft that can overcome large fuel loads with sheer thrust and aerodynamics (like a Foxhound). The F-16 in interceptor layout for example carries 3tons fuel for a rather short mission to respond to GCI directors, climb high and fast, kill intruders and RTB, never straying more than 200 miles from a friendly airfield and never loitering to take in the scenery.

Part of the reason for subsonic, dedicated attack aircraft like the S-3 Viking, A-10 or others is fuel efficiency. They can make about 4tons fuel work for them like it takes twice as much fuel to do the same thing, carrying the same loads with a supersonic aircraft. Even where complexity in the increased technological environment means they aren’t necessarily less expensive, they are much more efficient for their specific mission type.

Similar story with penetration strikers, designed to cruise very fast at low altitude that would take much more fuel to do in an air superiority fighter that is designed for best performance at high altitude. The SEPECAT Jaguar was very popular for a long time because its performance is as good as a much more expensive fighter when at low altitude, it’s a great strike fighter even though it’s no good for air superiority for reasons more than just avionics. It also uses less fuel to go supersonic at 100ft than an Eagle and at that height an Eagle isn’t really any faster with their throttles firewalled. A Jaguar is as fast as a MiG-21bis or an F-104 at 100ft, the old school treetop hotrods.
Problem is it doesn’t go much faster when you climb, where the others double their speed capabilities with altitude.

So these are an example of the possible factors when considering the question of “how much fuel is enough?”

The F-35 is being entirely overstated here.

“no real competitor” what exactly are you talking about here?

One of my most consistently repeated statements, in response to what is effectively ridiculously effective commercial marketing; is there is no such thing as stealth. Period.
This whole marketing strategy of low RCS is for the most part a complete non-presence in any large scale, extended conflict between any, no kidding, really any, major powers.

Stealth is fiction. Let me just mention that again. The whole low RCS stealth hollywood movie thing is a complete fiction. It’s not stealth. It isn’t.
Here is what Kelly Johnson, who initiated development of modern “stealth technologies” with the original HaveBlue project, calls it, “I prefer to call it High Survivability Technology, Stealth is a fiction.”

And here’s why, even during deployment of F-117s in the Gulf what was found was as it so happened a civilian technician managed to demonstrate his ability to track the fighters throughout local mobile telephone coverage because of gaps caused in the coverage between towers returned faults to the station for them. As described you could “track Nighthawks because of gaps they caused in local cellphone coverage.” Luckily the Iraqis hadn’t thought of this and the major point it demonstrates, which is also one Kelly Johnson is acutely aware is that a wide receiver coverage area negates signal dispertion designs simply by coordinating signal reception from all facings of the intruding enemy aircraft into the coverage area. In others words it does nothing for you inside any EWR/GCI network, and is directly combated by the Soviet PVO airborne datalink system that’s been in standing doctrine since the 80s.

Here’s what all this “stealth technology” really does for you: if you happened to be in a basically one versus one scenario well outside enemy controlled airspace (in terms of any major powers with mobile EWR/SAM coverage and other datalinked wide area detection systems on multiple facings, ie. including enemy fleet forces), then it makes it really, really super hard for individual seeker heads to track effectively, for airborne radars to find you and lock you, for any point defence to have a really good shot at tracking you, for blahblah etc. you get the idea. Great penetration development, really changes the game (especially SEAD), great survivability features, almost kills the fully active missile seeker head dead in the water (note, Russians place the SARH seeker on the same development priority to ARH missiles, partially I would speculate because of the PVO intercept doctrine and datalink system for target engagement).

It’s just coincidence perhaps, the way all this works out is that technically speaking East/West are really each other’s biggest weaknesses: US military hardware winds up best designed for defeating other NATO hardware and outdated hardware from any quarter, whilst CIS equipment is virtually single-purpose designed to defeat NATO equipment but only in open, extended hostilities. Russian equip is not designed for policing actions or border disputes, whilst US/NATO equipment, including the Stealth emphasis in design technologies very much is. It was an economic decision made by the US in terms of cost-benefit ratio and most particularly the export marketplace.

It’s actually a shock anybody buys anything other than US to tell the truth. That’s the war being fought. After all, economics is what wound up bringing down the Soviet empire, it had nothing to do with military technologies (which many argued the USSR was conventionally superior, without question).

I think I get the basic theme of what you’re asking/suggesting OP.

I’m inclined to think that high survivability technology aside (stealth is a somewhat fictionalising term), the F-35 has taken some compromises in terms of pure single minded engineering like bomb trucking and air-air. In this sense equalling the capabilities of the F-16 in these areas is a big win, I don’t think it’s designed to supersede them.

By that I mean of course the whole purpose to the F-35 is to bring high survivability technologies to the roles of the Viper/Hornet (even to an extent attack helicopters), whilst achieving as close to their capabilities in these roles as design constraints for the use of high survivability technologies allow. Then there is the further compromise of combining the mission requirements of at least three warplane types in service onto a common airframe production line.

Most of the time it’s going to perform as well as alternatives, it’s going to be better in any penetration of enemy defences, including SEAD (word is no truly satisfactory replacement has been in service since the F-4G), but in outright fighter performance air-air you might find times you’d rather be in a Viper. In controlled airspace you might find times you’d rather be on a strike mission in a Hornet.

But ultimately these speculations are superfluous because the F-35 isn’t in service yet, who knows? Give it about five years of active service in the field and I think we’ll have a much better picture of comparative mission performance and combat capabilities (or shortcomings) of the F-35.

Schorsch the manoeuvring qualities of the Fulcrum versus Eagle at low altitude are outlined at the F-16.net website by an experienced fighter pilot with hundreds of hours in both types, and is a lecturer at the USAF Fighter Weapons School.

My analogy of the Eagle versus Fulcrum in low altitude manoeuvre is a quite direct reiteration of his comments at those forums, which I find an impeccable reference.

Irrespective of whether and what should or shouldn’t be, he said simply the Eagle turns better down low, the Fulcrum turns better up high. He gave the physics reasoning for this, but it was a matter of noting the characteristics in comparative test, flight evaluations and then having to find the reasons why.

Real world physics doesn’t work by making a hypothesis and then proving it or disproving it, nor to do some math and figure out a conclusion. It works by observation in nature and then understanding what just happened, hypothesis must be amorphous being falsifiable.
In other words even if the math says it’s physically impossible, if an Eagle consistently outperforms a Fulcrum at sea level during flight test then the math is quite wrong, the hypothesis (of a more manoeuvrable Fulcrum) is falsified.
And this is what the pilots confirm, given they also state clearly the roles are reversed at higher altitudes, presumably in the 15,000ft and higher class.

Plus anyway, something else to consider. The size of the gap in airframe performance between say the Eagle and the Viper is a tiny one at best. We talk about the Viper being “much” more manoeuvrable than an Eagle and yet the simple fact is I’ve watched an Eagle get the better of a Block 52 Viper with a highly experienced pilot at the controls at Red Flag on camera, in CWC dogfighting at about 5000ft. They are so close in capability to start with it hardly makes a difference which one you’re in, not as much as pilot skill and dumb luck is going to play a role. Now that’s a Viper, which is absolutely more manoeuvrable than an Eagle and according to every qualified reference, a Fulcrum too, on any score, anywhere through the envelop except straight line top speed at high altitude clean, at low altitude the Block 52 is actually much faster than the Fulcrum, and has far better acceleration anywhere, and turns harder anywhere and has higher demonstrated stress ratings, better SA, etc. The Block 52 is soundly better than the Fulcrum in every and any area besides the HMS/Archer thing (which is entirely circumstantial), and yet the Eagle can get the better of the Viper down low. That’s how close the Eagle is in dogfight capability: an indiscernable gap when it comes to guns on and seat of the pants flying.

That’s just he way it is. Yes the Eagle, with analogue FBW and last generation engines is slightly outdated, but hey the Fulcrums in service are still using Phantom-era technology, if anyone’s too outdated for modern service it’s them, not the Eagle which can still do Flankers, just we can at least say the Flankers have some superiority advantages with no disadvantages and that’s already doing a hell of a lot better than the Fulcrum.

To further extrapolate the MiG-29A from 1985-90 you’d often see with 2x R-27R or T, 2x R-73 and the outer pylons just with R-60T self defence missiles.
It is basically what you said Sens, it appears to me the VVS intended two Alamo fired BVR to take one out on approach and then two Archers upon closing for targets of opportunity. In addition there was two Aphids carried for self defence when turning for home. What happened very quickly though, possibly as stockpiles of R-73 increased with production, the Aphids were swapped out for four Archers to be carried. MiG-25 and 23 still in service also started swapping out Aphids for Archers until retired.

A popular practise among export operators (former Soviet satellites) was to drop the Alamos entirely and carry either four or six Archers by themselves. Basically the radar set on the Fulcrum is that bad and the contrast of HMS/Archer in CWC is that good. This was also the findings of the Luftwaffe during service evaluation of the Fulcrum-A.

What is highly likely, during any service use by experienced operators of the Fulcrum, would be employment of any possible tactics to close for close weapons combat (CWC) at the earliest possible time, preferrably avoiding BVR conflict by any means available (masking, beaming, passivity, point defence protocols, etc.).

The 9-13 topaz set is an improvement on the sapphire of the 9-12 but it’s still just not in the class of frontline 80s NATO radar set. BVR is only a smart play in the Fulcrum if you’re up against outdated enemy equipment, like small nation forces. Most of the time you’re only going to be a couple of seconds short of Archer range before you can get a reliable Alamo lock anyway, from what the Germans say.
If there had been a conflaguration of hostilities with VVS forces this would’ve been discovered very quickly in practise, as it is I have photos of Fulcrums patrolling in mixed formation with Flogger-Gs. I think what you’d find in a large scale Cold War conflict at the end of the 80s, is attrition being used with everything and the kitchen sink tossed into the fight so Fulcrums can close to CWC and start making an impact dogfighting.

Love the Dora. I remember reading the Wright(?) postwar evaluation which noted a very rough build quality and a real hotrod aspect to it. What impressed them was achieving such good performance out of something plainly built under extremely desperate circumstances.

Myself, if I was uberwealthy I’d love to do a 1:1 Ta-152C replica to go club flying in, surely could track down something like a DB-603G to rebuild as an LA or EC motor. That would be my aircraft fantasy.

I don’t think the real point of the article is about the range capabilities of the Su-34, that’s not what impresses me about it but certainly something does.

For a while now KnAAPO has been talking about offering the Su-27MK- with optional external fuel tanks. The article infers these are now available for the Flankers and they increase total maximum range clean by 2000km.