LOMAC assortment, this sim/game does great screenies.
None of mine are adjusted, I wouldn’t know how and don’t have things like photoshop.

IL2 sturmovik, just mucking around with some fictional scenes around Pearl Harbour (P-39 is actually a California based training group iirc)

Hopefully backtracking the thread to be on topic…

Agree with Sens about the numbers thing, in the mid-80s the numbers in service I’m unclear of if in Warsaw Pact or Soviet Union alone, are around 1800 MiG-23 of all versions. By early 90s there was already 600 MiG-29 listed on station among the CIS member nations.

ex-Soviets of the General staff have admitted themselves the primary strategy remained similar to that of the Great Patriotic War, the presumption that all sustained warfare comes down to attrition and numbers and reinforcement is most important over quality.

Certainly this is a completely different game to the modern RuAF which is vastly downsized, underfunded and functions with a large number of volunteer personnel. It is part of the process of recreating it in the new political environment, which will be much more like western air forces in organisation and logistics.

But the USSR/WP functioned by all accounts rather similarly to the popular ideas about Soviet conventional warfare tactics in the west, at least on a strategic scale. Large numbers of everything, quantity over quality, very robust equipment, use tenaciousness.

Some actual flight experience in service evaluation of the MiG-29 reposted for clarification of several points about the Fulcrum versus Eagle/Viper scenarios.

I’ve got over 500 hours in the MiG-29 and 2000 hours in the F-16 (I also flew the F-15A/C and the F-5E). The following is an excerpt from a research papaer I wrote while working on a Master’s Degree in aerospace engineering. Bottom line: F16 (and F-15) good, MiG-29 bad.

Of the four fighters I have flown, the MiG-29 has by far the worst handling qualities. The hydro-mechanical flight control system uses an artificial feel system of springs and pulleys to simulate control force changes with varying airspeeds and altitudes. There is a stability augmentation system that makes the aircraft easier to fly but also makes the aircraft more sluggish to flight control inputs. It is my opinion that the jet is more responsive with the augmentation system disengaged. Unfortunately, this was allowed for demonstration purposes only as this also disengages the angle-of-attack (AoA) limiter. Stick forces are relatively light but the stick requires a lot of movement to get the desired response. This only adds to sluggish feeling of the aircraft. The entire time you are flying, the stick will move randomly about one-half inch on its own with a corresponding movement of the flight control surface. Flying the Fulcrum requires constant attention. If the pilot takes his hand off the throttles, the throttles probably won’t stay in the position in which they were left. They’ll probably slide back into the ‘idle’ position.

The Fulcrum is relatively easy to fly during most phases of flight such as takeoff, climb, cruise and landing. However, due to flight control limitations, the pilot must work hard to get the jet to respond the way he wants. This is especially evident in aggressive maneuvering, flying formation or during attempts to employ the gun. Aerial gunnery requires very precise handling in order to be successful. The MiG-29’s handling qualities in no way limit the ability of the pilot to perform his mission, but they do dramatically increase his workload. The F-16’s quadruple-redundant digital flight control system, on the other hand, is extremely responsive, precise and smooth throughout the flight regime.

…the MiG-29 suffers from a higher energy bleed rate than the F-16. This is due to high induced drag on the airframe during high-G maneuvering. F-16 pilots that have flown against the Fulcrum have made similar observations that the F-16 can sustain a high-G turn longer. This results in a turn rate advantage that translates into a positional advantage for the F-16.

The F-16 is also much easier to fly and is more responsive at slow speed.
The Fulcrum’s maximum roll rate is 160° per second. At slow speed this decreases to around 20° per second. Coupled with the large amount of stick movement required, the Fulcrum is extremely sluggish at slow speed. Maneuvering to defeat a close-range gun shot is extremely difficult if the airplane won’t move. For comparison, the F-16’s slow speed roll rate is a little more than 80° per second.

Fulcrum pilots have enjoyed their most success with the HMS/Archer combination in one versus one training missions. In this sterile environment, where both aircraft start within visual range of each other, the MiG-29 has a great advantage. Not because it is more maneuverable than the F-16. That is most certainly not the case regardless of the claims of the Fulcrum’s manufacturer and numerous other misinformed propaganda sources. The weapon/sensor integration with the HMS and Archer makes close-in missile employment extremely easy for the Fulcrum’s pilot. My only one versus one fight against a MiG-29 (in something other than another MiG-29) was flown in an F-16 Block 52. This was done against a German MiG-29 at Nellis AFB, Nevada. The F-16 outturned and out-powered the Fulcrum in every situation.

And I should add I’ve personally watched Eagles outdo Vipers at Red Flag on camera due to pilot skill, and those were highly experienced aggressor squadrons. Ergo, Eagles with good pilots can get Fulcrums in dogfight, easy enough. Just that simple, there is no great chasm between them and the flight systems on Eagles/Vipers are so very much more advanced than the Fulcrum. Flight systems, not talking BVR, talking aircraft-pilot interface and making it do what you want when you want, how you want.

Regarding the Super Hornet from the Wallace ppt:
CAP: 380 nm with 2 h loitering (3 x tanks, 4 x AMRAAM, 2 x AIM-9)
Ship attack: 805 nm/1135 nm (3 x ET, ATFLIR, 1 x AMRAAM, 2 x AIM-9, 2 x AGM-84)
Maritime Patrol: 300 nm with 2.3 h/3.2 h loitering (same config)

No idea why there are two values for the ship attack/maritime missions, maybe dependent on wheather 330 G or 480 G tanks are used.

Those figures look ridiculous to me.
According to Janes:

150nm CAP (the typical distance, CAP isn’t anywhere near 400nm away from the carrier, that’s more than 700km or if your carrier was near Malta your CAP would be doing circuits of Athens, if your carrier was in the Persian Gulf its CAP would be over the Caspian Sea or in Georgia) with 3x 480gal ET, 4x AMRAAM, 2x AIM-9 a 2.3hr station time.

Same spec for F/A-18C is 1.75hr station time (150nm from carrier).

Interdiction (ie. ship attack) inc. 3x 480gal ET, FLIR, 3x AAM and 2x AGM-84 is 390nm for hi-lo-lo-hi (standard mission parameter)
Same spec for F/A-18C is 290nm

Minimum wind over the deck for launch with these loads is 35knots.

(obviously your figures aren’t intended as combat radius but range, although combat radius doesn’t take into account some manoeuvre reserve, so range is always slightly more than double combat radius, this held true for WW2 aircraft I found so I’m sure it does for modern ones too).
(the dual figures given in your figures are most likely with/without buddy-refuelling I’d say, the only plausible explanation, increasing CAP station by a third, or in the interdiction scenario a topping up of the tanks once at altitude after take off)

kiwinopal surely you would concede there are specific cases of circumstance where the Eagle outmanoeuvres the non-FBW versions of the Fulcrum (which are the ones in service).
There are plenty of evaluations using the German MiGs of this, most particularly at lower altitudes where the MiG can’t sustain Gs like the Eagle can (and bleeds airspeed), but it is noted at higher altitudes the Fulcrum gets the agility advantage in turn.

Also evaluations of the Indian AF Flankers versus F-15C are muted by the TVC of the Su-30MKI. The regular Su-27P/S/K/M2 series in service elsewhere (using analogue FBW without TVC), are noted for their low speed handling superiority but again the excellent G-capabilities which are reliable in the Eagle can only be matched by a Flanker under certain conditions, which includes an internal fuel load no greater than 5 tons (9 is maximum). At full load Flankers are restricted to 7G and at speeds above 0.85M the MiG-29 is similarly design limited to 7G where on both counts the US aircraft are limited only by stores restrictions, the F-16 can pull 9G anytime with anything except iron bombs strapped.

The G-meter in the Flanker-B doesn’t even go past 8 (though it is recognised it can do 9 with a light fuel load, clean). The G-meter is also red past 7, meaning you’re not supposed to go that high.
Talking about sustained G here. For all intents and purposes, with light loads all these aircraft types might be characterised by similar structural capabilities with the exception of the MiG, which is celebrated as less robust than a Viper despite MAPO claims. That’s a matter of service evaluation and comparative testing experience in the west with both 9-12 and 9-13 models.

Quite simply the non-FBW and some poor structural strength around the base of the fins, plus a tendency to bleed airspeed at low alt really let the Fulcrum down. At higher altitudes like say 15,000+ft sure it’s a butterfly with a deadly sting, but up there its BVR capabilities really let it down.

The Eagle is a great dogfighter, not so much because of low speed handling which the two newer Russian fighters have but because of its ability to sustain very high G turns at low altitude, which few aircraft can.
Under the same conditions an Eagle can pull at 9G turn at 5000ft a Phantom can pull 3G and a Hornet or Fulcrum can pull 7. This is documented. I dare say a Flanker-B will match an Eagle turn for turn, but it’ll need to have no more than a half fuel load and light stores to do it…and certainly an Eagle cannot match Flanker low speed handling, so Flankers can lead Eagles into manoeuvres which bleed airspeed and take the advantage that way.

Eventually, y’know it’s still going to come back to pilot skill, experience and training.

Also, turn rates are by altitude. You need the full conditions given for the test to make valued comparative judgements, because what you’ll find is that a superior turn rate at one altitude can still mean an inferior one at a different altitude. Even excess thrust varies by altitude differently between different engine types, which plays a part here.

For nastle, obviously the nature of the Cold War means western publications in the 80s are largely misinformed or misleading, possibly due to the stress of those times the whole Cold War thing was largely abandoned in publication since, with most editors concerned with “now and the future” rather than digging up the past, except for some publication of events in the Middle East which is roughly associative.

So it’s difficult to find a comprehensive and accurate western publication of Soviet Cold War doctrine, whilst the domestic political culture of the east leaves such publications there equally difficult to locate.

With this in mind, you could check out publications like The Encyclopedia of World Military Power by Chris Bishop and David Donald (the Military Press, New York 1986, ISBN 0-517-49597-X)
But keeping in mind it is an Americentric Cold War view.

So for example, technical specifications include 3.2M top speed for the reconnaissance versions of the MiG-25, the Foxbat-E is called MiG-25M (where it is the PD, the M was an early series prototype for the MiG-31), the Foxhound is assumed to be the first Russian fighter with “true lookdown/shootdown capabilities” (in fact lookdown/shootdown is demonstrated on MiG-23), and the MiG-29 (NATO codename: RAM-L) and Su-27 (RAM-K) are known only by poor photos of early prototypes, they are assumed to be less capable copies of US aircraft like the F-15 and F/A-18.

Turkey is characterised as using the F-104S (where it had begun license production of F-16s and fielded F-4s), the Chinese fighter force as being comprised by large numbers of ancient MiG-19 (indigenous MiG-21 derivatives for the fighter force, actually), whilst ADV Tornado performance is entirely overstated as 2.2M with Eagle like equipment (with a tandem cockpit, 8AAMs and 72kN engines I don’t think so).

Essentially the theme runs thick throughout, that America! is the mightiest! the smartest! the best! of everything and everybody! Brits are okay too. The rest of you are useless and dumb especially commies.

I really don’t think you’re going to get much technical value out of American and probably most western Cold War era publications, or eastern ones for similar reasons.

And as far as I know nobody has really wanted to touch the whole matter in depth ever since, perhaps a latent market for current writers?

Sens I think you might be being a little dismissive and relying on wikipedia rather than proper research and independent data processing.

The VVS was completely restructured in the second half of 1942 into the form which it retained as a basic structure throughout the Cold War. It has only very recently been restructured again.
I’m talking about command structure and organisation, which directly evolves doctrinal culture.

Prior to mid-42 the VVS operated unchanged from Imperial times, it was structured as an extension of the artillery corps and commanded from Stavka.

The lesson learned in the second half of 1941 and coming into 1942, the time when individual Soviet pilots were beginning to make their names known and asked for their opinions, was that the Soviet Union was too large for a centralised air force command.
For example the first order to respond to the German invasion in June 41 wasn’t received at the airfields until 6hrs after the Germans crossed the border, some 12hrs following the initial bombardment which was designed to and succeeding in cutting a lot of communications lines with the forward fields. Particularly in Belarus the bulk of Soviet aircraft, the forward deployment of fighters and close support models destroyed had their airfields overrun having never left the ground.

In the Ukraine the German Heersgruppe Süd didn’t cross the border until nearly two weeks after Heersgruppe Nord and Mitte began their drive, under orders from Hitler. The VVS in the Ukraine was much better prepared and German drive through the Ukraine didn’t enjoy anywhere near the whirlwind success as north of the Pripet Marshes, primarily because of the air war in the south. When Heersgruppe Mitte was at Smolensk, “the gateway to Moscow” the Heersgruppe Süd was still caught up on the approach to Kiev and Pokryshin was making a name for himself in a MiG.

The VVS was then organised into the Air Armies regiments with their own independent commands, training and reserve squadrons and support infrastructure, individually attached to the military districts or Army Fronts (such as at Stalingrad) and operating autonomously, although coordinated with army units in the field. They would be left to make their own decisions in the field without having to wait for orders from Stavka.

The change was largely organisational, not much changed in appearance at existing airfields but in deployment and command protocols. It was a tremendous change in terms of effectiveness, which began to show in the Stalingrad region and moreso as Soviet experience grew with the new system, in the Kuban and at Kursk. This is noted by Luftwaffe field command.
Part of the reason for the long build up of Soviet forces around Stalingrad was to move up the new air armies and their training regiments under the new system, clearly the army was ready to move by late October as noted by German observers and reported to Berlin.
I can give you German reports of the Soviet forces at the Kletskaya and other bridgeheads during October, such as “twenty artillery batteries per kilometre of front and 900 tanks.”
But the attack was held off until some 5 independent Air Armies were moved into position and their crews had been trained and familiarised with the new system, a full month later. Their reserve/training squadrons, equipped with new La-5 fighters had been operating from across the Volga since September in preparation, testing new tactics and protocols in a hit and run fashion also designed to explore weaknesses in the German air coverage. They were all shepherded by Stavka until Operation Uranus.
Previously assigned district squadrons continued to operate as before flying Hurricanes and early model Yak or LaGG to actually attack the Germans. The new air armies underwent training at the rear lines and were moved up later, so that the shift in Soviet air force capabilities in the Stalingrad region was sudden and dramatic, it was like a whole new nation suddenly joined the war on that front.

This doctrinal change of the VVS was an absolute and intentional paradigm shift, it was not a gradual thing. It was purposeful, conceived and administered through the second half of 1942. The real effects of it were dramatically noticed by the Luftwaffe, and commented upon in the Kuban in early 43, where German field reports are a parity with the Luftwaffe in equipment, combat tactics, pilot skill and doctrinal approach.

This new system is the one which continued to develop and evolve through the Cold War, largely unchanged. Only very recently the RuAF has reorganised itself again, this time to reflect the changes following the collapse of the Soviet Union. The Russian air forces substructure have been centralised again, but retains regimental organisation in the field for attachment to military districts, the recent change is mostly logistical.

Most importantly what it means is that throughout the Cold War Frontal Aviation was probably better set up for Army support operations than NATO, being even more cooperative and coordinated with army units. The military districts are like US theatre commands, the air armies are more like German Luftflotte than tactical and strategic air forces.

The VVS restructuring of 1942 was, after all modelled on and somewhat adoptive of, the Luftwaffe but also lessons learned in general by combating the Luftwaffe, or trying to.

And my comments regarding Japanese military culture are documented, they are a reporting of war records and not really an opinion. Personally I’d have thought the whole Samurai thing would lead to good independence in the field, but that was not the case as according to the historical record.
I can give specific examples, as well as comments to this effect by Japanese and American service personnel, on record.