vanirThe Syrian MiGs from these incidents had Jaybird radars (being handed over in the 70s), the same one in the 1958 MiG-21. It’s just a gun ranging radar for all intents and purposes but can be used for a beam riding version of the Atoll (sidewindski), in visual range. It has no doppler which means it can only target something right in front of it or at higher altitude, and it has no IRST.
The engine is a 98kN redevelopment of the MiG-21 engine (same as fitted to the MF), where the ML and MLD have a 128kN engine and can actually out-accelerate an F-16.
The MS used by Syria then is really more like a MiG-21 update than a Flogger, it’s sort of a Super-bis 21 and not very capable against anything more serious than a Mirage III/5.
The ML and MLD have a much better radar, IRST and much more powerful engine. It has some airframe improvements “optimised for air combat” (L designation means “lightened” and the D means “modified”), the MLD has countermeasures, ECM hardening, various systems changes, avionics updates.
The MF is an export version of the early series 23M (ca.1975), handed to WP nations initially and non-WP only after 1978 (when the ML and P was in Russian service). It’s got the early series engine, and an earlier version of the HighLark radar which is 200kg heavier than the ML and MLD, but has the IRST. It’s not much different to something like an F-4E/F.
And along the “central front” as you put it, the Soviets had the full benefits of massive logistical support and force coordination to work with, in theory. Their Floggers would’ve been working within the EWR networks and under SAM coverage at all times.
But it’s mute anyway. As of the West Germany Treaty ca.1963 any movement of conventional forces by the Soviets into western Europe would result in an immediate, full scale nuclear retaliation by NATO.
It was always the US threatening nuclear war, never the Soviets. Everybody agreed the Soviets would most likely win a conventional war in Europe.
I grew up in the Cold War and remember the climate, the paranoia well. The US was never a shining paladin, not ever. They were the other bad guy.
vanirI’ve watched recent documentaries (such as Aircraft of the Red Star on the History Channel) where ex-Soviet pilots specifically discuss the western propaganda of poor Soviet pilot independence and autonomy. It is this notion they laughed at, and specifically mentioned in their opinion, they enjoyed no less independence as pilots than US/NATO ones.
And the point is to be made that US Air National Guard regiments flying the F-106 enjoyed exactly the same constraints and GCI automated nav-system that PVO pilots in Russia did.
Then there is service reporting, in North Korea, in Vietnam and over the Sinai where Soviet pilots had been encountered clandestinely operating aircraft on combat missions when sent ostensibly to train an export customer or some other advisory role.
Consistently where encountered Soviet pilots were reported as skilled and independent, highly trained. If Soviet pilots in any way lacked autonomous thinking and independence, it has never been a feature of (admitedly relatively few) actual Cold War combat encounters. It this was such a theme, it should’ve been obvious like it was with Japanese pilots.
In all my research of air warfare, the only national air forces I have ever seen demonstrable and consistent reports, which are not just propaganda but supported with evidentiary inferrence, that the pilots lacked autonomous thinking and independence was the Japanese in WW2.
With the Japanese it became a doctrinal tactic for Allied pilots to shoot down the flight leader or any obvious veterans, and everybody else just plain fell apart, making all sorts of ridiculous decisions like just sitting there in the cruise condition whilst you shot down the entire squadron around them one by one. I have actual combat reports of this phenomenae, can provide names and pilot accounts.
The only time the VVS even gets close to this in any demonstrable sense, is for the first two weeks of the German invasion in 1941, which is a very circumstantial example.
Following the reorganisation of the VVS in 1942 the Soviets/Russians have never really displayed anything but a dedicated intention to form a contemporary and viable air forces doctrinal approach, including by culture and individual training.
The only genuinely significant characterisation I can give of Soviet air forces doctrine through the Cold War period is that it was defensive, where the US/NATO was offensive by characterisation.
And what kiwinopal suggests about technological codependence is quite true, but this is not a behavioural doctrine. It is a technical requirement, also circumstantially enjoyed by NATO forces.
The WW2 era Japanese military culture was notably, clearly, brutally domineering among its personnel, even among air forces, which demonstrably damaged independence and autonomy. I have seen no genuine, notable example of this among Soviet military culture, only domestic Soviet culture and here it is arguably circumstantial (meet the new boss, same as the old boss).
The scenes in the (entirely fictional) movie Enemy at the Gates for example, of dehumanising Soviet military culture are clearly misrepresentative upon detailed examination of war records. It simply must be regarded as populisms with western marketing in mind and for all intents and purposes propaganda.
Stalin’s directorates regarding battlefield executions may certainly seem brutal compared to peacetime practises but are no different to classical western military culture, for example throughout the first World War. And notably there are dozens of examples of clear, autonomous independence and heroism among Soviet pilots even throughout that desperate war.
Pokryshin, who introduced vertical manoeuvring tactics into the VVS following his experience flying MiGs in the Ukraine in 1941. Litvak, Kozhedub, Golubev, the Night Witches, Circle of Death tactics, there are consistent examples of autonomous independence not only in record, but adopted as standing doctrinal approaches and training regimes.
Then there is the fact Belyenko did defect. A PVO pilot at that, took upon himself to steal their best interceptor and fly it to Japan, defecting to the west. This isn’t the act of a mindless automaton with little sense of autonomy or independence, quite the opposite.
vanirAddressing kiwinopal‘s post, he makes a good point and there are some differences in comparative avionics between Soviet/US models particularly in the 70s which lends to a difference in operational doctrine between them.
The 70s radar set for the USSR is really the sapphire which is J-band with limited lookdown/shootdown and too easy signal overload, doppler was a new thing and it had a lot of coverage gaps. Where US radar sets were becoming the familiar x-band multimodes with high data processing capabilities.
This didn’t bother the Soviets so much because the focus of the Cold War was the Balkans and East Germany, the Iron Curtain running down the middle of central Europe. In a tactical confrontation the battlefield would be here, so the Russians funded an EWR network along the border and would use the standing tactic of moving large number forces step by step like a rolling thunderstorm. I talked about this in another thread, flock the border, move in massive ground forces, bring up air. This way Frontal Aviation is always operating within an EWR network and protected by SAM coverage, the relatively low tech radar sets on individual aircraft don’t matter so much because they’re only being used when you actually lock a target, all the search/acquisition/tracking functions are handled by EWR datalink.
In this sense Frontal Aviation pilots must work in coordination with ground units (and Air Armies are attached directly to military district commands), but this is just the Soviet version of the NATO AWACS doctrine. Limited skirmishes aside, in major conflicts mixed groups of Eagles and Phantom/F-5/F-111/A-10 function in the combat environment under AWACS direction.
In this sense large force conflicts use similar doctrines, but the Soviet one is defensive and the US one offensive. Again individual pilot independence isn’t really muted by the technological need to work in coordinated units.
Where it breaks down is in small force skirmishes or limited engagements where it would be politically unsound to move up large scale support infrastructure, and fighter/attack aircraft operate largely independently. Here is where US comparative avionics give a clear superiority, but the Russians don’t work like that.
And where that hurts them is the export market, small force nations need aircraft which operate independently, without EWR or AWACS or even genuine force coordination. Here a US contemporary is just better than a Soviet one.
vanirOoh I’ve been wanting to weigh in on the whole “Soviet pilots are automatons” propaganda thing for a little while. nastle asks how much of this is fiction and how much is reality, well it is all fiction but has an element of truth for both PVO and US Air National Guard regiments.
Home defence interceptors of the 50s-60s design on both sides of the Iron Curtain had evolved to a GCI datalinked nav-system (remote flight control), tied to the EWR network and control was given to the pilot within weapons range of the target. He took the controls, fired his weapons and then went back to sleep.
This is just as true for the Delta Dart/Dagger avionics and FCS in the US as it is for the P-series MiGs for use by the PVO (P-interceptor, ie. fitted with the GCI nav system).
From about 1958-75 at the height of the Cold War the big boobies of the Soviet threat was considered the Foxbat, before that the MiG-21P which are PVO interceptors and so most US fighter pilots became familiar as it turned out with the home defence interceptor flight doctrine and simply assumed this was general Soviet culture.
This is as much a cultural proxy for developing morale than it is an honest mistake. The automated nature of GCI doctrine at that time (65-80s) was also really due to technological limitations, the lack of complex digital flight computers to multitask complex fire control/weapons systems with navigation and general pilot tasks, in a single seat interceptor (for lightweight and high climb rates), the weapons system of the Foxbat and Delta series, whilst basic tech now were pretty complicated then and required full pilot attention.
The radar in a Delta Dart has its own joystick and requires the pilot to stick his face into a CRT shroud. The Foxbat requires full attention for signal control, it is very powerful and piggy-backs multiple frequencies to defeat ECM. On top of this interception vectoring is directed by the EWR and GCI networks anyway.
Since the breakup of the Soviet Union there has been much more open contact with Soviet era combat pilots, and they say pretty much exactly the same thing which is true for US military pilots. There is a fairly strict OP standard and doctrine on paper, which in practise most pilots just joke about and ignore, so long as the paperwork looks good and the mission is successful nobody cares.
By all accounts Frontal Aviation pilots have always operated with just as much independence and individuality as NATO regular air forces pilots.
vanirHere is the relatively little I know. The Fullback/Platypus went down three development paths, equipment between them varies.
There is a side/side dual control trainer for the AV-MF stationed on Admiral Kuznetsov (Su-27KUB), it has the Meich-33 radar/fire-control/datalink set and regular ACS so is basically an Su-33 with the the Su-27IB cabin, which makes sense being a conversion trainer. It’s very distinctive with a Fullback cabin and a Flanker radome. It’s combat capable and a cost effective strike variant has been proposed.
The Su-32FN is a naval strike aircraft for the AV-MF. It has the magnificent V004 digital multimode phased array (Sukhoi claims it can reliably detect a periscope on the water at 250km), giving it the flattened nose that earned the name Platypus. It has the tail boom similar to the Su-33 for carrier landing but has full authority DCS like the first canard equipped Su-35 (27M). Convention suggests ASW, elint, mid-course guidence and conventional strike roles with a high survivability. Closest western equivalent would be the Vigilante.
The Su-34 (32MF) is for the VVS and adds digitally scanned phased array on the rear quadrant with a rearward facing antenna in the tailboom. A handful of regular production series have definitely been delivered to the VVS and theoretically there should have been two squadrons operational this year. This version has been described as a “theatre bomber” and roughly speaking has a role like the F-111, with high on station times, loiter and long range precision capabilities, including deep penetration strike.
There are no real modern western equivalents to these aircraft, excepting the proposed F/A-22. They make sense for the Russians however, since the US uses its carrier battlegroups in the force projection stakes, the VVS/AV-MF can use high on station times to similar effect, a sort of sky-based force projection. The Su-30 for example was designed from the beginning for up to 10hr mission times (a remarkable fighter endurance), the Fullback doubles or triples it and does it much nicer.
Typical max endurance of modern fighters for continuous operation is more like 3-5hrs (where fuel is no issue). So the Flanker really blurs the lines between fighter types like the Eagle and long range strike bombers like the F-111 that can cope with a 24hr mission.
A Fullback and Strike Eagle comparison is limiting for the Fullback’s capabilities. It can do things the F-15 just can’t. As for the question whether it can do the Strike Eagle’s role, yes it can do its role. You wouldn’t buy Fullback and Strike Eagle exports to put in your air force, that would be redundant. In deployment you might mix Su-30 with Su-34 for better air-air defensive coverage, in contested airspace I think but it should operate independently quite well.
vanirSince you said reasonably modern, the MiG-23MLD and MiG-25PD were current into the 80’s and used J-band.
vanirThe particular appraisal in question is inappropriate to apply to Soviet tactical and strategic doctrines.
Whilst it is true Libyan pilots were trained to some extent by Soviet instructors and inherently use some elements of Soviet sourced air combat tactics, this doesn’t mean it has any relevance to Soviet doctrine using Soviet-only equipment.
Authoritive sources (such as global security org) repeatedly publish the Libyan MiGs in that incident were 23MS Flogger-E which are comprehensively downgraded and effectively more like an updated MiG-21 than a Soviet or Warsaw Pact Flogger. Their line formation was probably more related to their 10-20km radar track range and the need to limit BVR vulnerability than it is to standing aerial doctrine. Also even the Soviet-only 23ML and MLD would have trouble locking up a target at 27 miles, the MS non-Soviet export version has exactly zero chance. To lock up Tomcats, flying even slightly lower altitude the Flogger-E would need to be at something like 5km and a Flogger-G would have trouble past 20km. Those early sapphire sets were analogue J-band with barely more than a simple signal interpretation projected to the HUD, vulnerable to ECM and range halved on lookdown/shootdown, the best they had at the time. The Jaybird in the Flogger-E, dude it’s from the fifties, barely more than a gun ranger and not real good at that.
What is likely is that Soviet instructors provided tactics which were suited to the Libyans and other export operators, but not in practise by the VVS/PVO/AV-MF themselves.
Soviet air combat tactics are defensive, contrary to popular western thought, and designed to work within EWR networks, GCI coverage or datalinked to fleet command ships. The idea is they flock a border with everything, move ground forces forward, move up air forces.
Also yes the GCI digital-nav system was only fitted to PVO aircraft (MiG-23P version of the MiG-23ML, Su-27P as opposed to Su-27S, etc.), but Frontal Aviation still uses datalinks for the EWR network, which would work with PVO interceptor/controllers (MiG-31, Su-30) or Russian AWACS. It is true however that opening hostilities and border conflicts would rarely see PVO aircraft unless there is a strategic threat.
If the Soviets were going to actually invade NATO-style with an aerial blitzkreig, the smartest move would be using PVO controllers, like was suggested. They’d do it too, being this is a strategic objective (invading enemy nation) and thus comes under the command structure PVO, not VVS or Army.
They wouldn’t do that though. They’d do it like Afghanistan. Flock the border. Move in ground forces. Bring up air.
vanirOkay I’m just not getting where any of this relates to the anti-armour design requirements of the GAU-8
The only reasonable comparison in an aircraft gun is the AO-17A of the Su-25 which Russian pilots of this aircraft clearly state is less effective than the GAU-8 and that external stores are used for anti-armour missions. The GSh-301 is a specialised air-air gun without even the barrel life of individual GSh-6-30 barrels (2000 as opposed to 350rds), they use similar rounds but the gatling version is at least meant with strafing in mind, whilst the 23mm in any form is only useful for light/soft targets, admitedly more effective than any 20mm pound for pound.
According to the Russians, in order to make the GSh-301 very light the barrel life was compromised (worth about two and a half reloads before replacement), and it is not an effective ground strafing weapon, optimised for air combat only.
You could use a MiG-27 gun for ground strafing, or otherwise the various 23mm mountings (including pods). The 301 is for air combat, accurate, selective, deadly but not long winded.
And who cares anyway, the Su-25 gun is the only reasonable comparison. It doesn’t stand up.
vanirThe volumetric flow rate of an axial compressor rise with the square of the RPM.:rolleyes:
not to be contrite but the thrust output however, also involves EGT, a function of fuel/burn feed to the given airflow.
So the same volumetric airflow can provide different thrust ratings. Also is bypass to consider, and whether or not that is being reheated, plus how much heat is being transferred in the first place.
Up to ~60% nominal max fuel flow in a bypass turbojet may not affect rpm but will affect thrust. The classical problem of “runaway rpm” in a non-bypass turbojet is caused from what I can determine by hot area induced vacuum spooling up the turbines and drawing fuel on their own (under earlier generation mechanical/analogue management).
The A-4 Skyhawk is as infamous for this (in transonic dives) as the Foxbat (in level max speed attempts).
vanirIt was essentially a coincidence the Gripen design requirements mirror “STOBAR” ones so the Gripen has been offered in Asia as a carrier based fighter (they were trying to temp India and I have my suspicions you might see China take an interest).
About the only modification would be a possible gear reinforcement and hook. Otherwise they’ll just be operated in their normal “dispersal” role, like the Viggen the Gripen was designed to operate from automotive highways with truck loaded logistical support in wartime. This doctrine is perfect for navalisation out of the box.
This is no different to the Su-33 or any other CATOBAR operator, they can carry a heavier load from proper airbases than they can from the carrier, but were designed to carry enough from a carrier to be potent and useful.
vanirEchoing StevoJH on that sentiment, adding the Gripen is pretty much good to go and by far the cheapest option with the most stick time to its credit.
It’s design requirements mirror those of STOL (ramp style) carrier operations. It’s so small you really don’t have a problem storing 30 on a fleet carrier too. Anything you give away in arguable “fantastic technology” to a JSF you more than make up for in reduced complexity and cost-benefit ratio with no real loss in relative potency.
The Superbug I wouldn’t even consider. You’re not going to start building supercarriers.
vanirMSphere, the radar set in the MiG-29 is a sapphire (N019 Sapfir-29, NATO reporting name SlotBack).
MiG-29-prototype 9-01 was fitted in fact with a cut down version of the Flogger’s radar set, Sapfir-23ML-2 which was initially intended for production.
The Sapfir-29 that was developed and fitted to production series is basically a modified Flogger-G/K radar set converted to X-band and fitted with a digital computer attached to its original analogue signal processor. It’s the same basic set as the Sapfir-23ML-2 but more tailored for the Fulcrum airframe and added 80s features like x-band and limited digitalisation.
The N019M Topaz is a further modified Sapfir-29 with a lightened and technology updated digital processor, which allows two target engagement and has naturally higher ECM resistance (and reduced signal overload tendencies).
The N019MP for MiG-29SMT has further developed digital processor, same set again aside from further technology development in line with computer processor advancements.
The first entirely new set which is not just a rebuilt MiG-23 radar for the Fulcrum is a drawing board proposal called the N019M1.
I should mention a cut down version of the Flanker’s Zhuk set, which is brilliant but initially lacked development was proposed for the defunct MiG-29M (9-15) back in the 90s but it died with that proposal afaik.
vanirInitially US advisors were sent into Afghanistan with Exxon industrialists whilst the invasion of Iraq was underway. Over the next few years control of the Caspian gas pipeline was secured (a major link between Russian industry and Asia).
Everything about the Middle East and central Asia is about the oil (Persian Gulf and Caspian tables).
In the same way Japanese “expansionism” was actually all about oil. And Hitler only managed to sell planned warfare to the Prussian field marshals he reinstated to help create the Wehrmacht quickly, on the basis of Caucasus oil and German occupation of the Ukraine (which were pointedly the only solutions to Göring’s crippling five year economic plan).
The last hundred years has been all about trade ownership and oil for the major powers.
Responding to terrorism was fluff, any good illusionist distracts the audience with a “rub” which in this case was terrifying their own population with Patriot Acts, those ridiculously mediaeval “terror alerts” and everybody else with Special Rendition. Bush could’ve started cross dressing at that point and nobody would’ve noticed.
LordJim et al, be careful about political statements in an open forum, it’s a can of worms.
vanirDigitalisation, FSC, and fire control sets (more multirole capability) were all planned upgrades of the Su-33 (bringing it roughly in line with the Su-27M/35 initial multirole-optimised Flanker, actually one might virtually consider the first 27M/35 to be a refinement of the 27K/33 with a datalink difference from fleet use). I got the impression the AV-MF (naval aviation) had put the type on the backburner though, considering any program involving them is a fair bit of expense for less than 30 aircraft, the cost benefit ratio for such a small number is probably the same as just replacing them with new airframes.
If they chose a MiG over Flanker-update in this it maybe significant of a shift in naval doctrine for the carrier group.
As for a good fixed wing STOL for the RN I would’ve thought a navalised Gripen would’ve been just what they were looking for. All the other choices seem poor by comparison, to my reckoning.
vanirlolol I’ve never heard of the term “Australian centric”
Americentric on the other hand is a proxy of the NATO-Soviet/CIS extremes of political disassociation, which reflect cultural memes and affect international relations.
Our idea of patriotism is backing sports teams. The American patriotic ideal is apparently invading somebody (termed “a policing action” or “international terrorist/WMD concerns”). If our national religion was football, American is the dollar.
You could call us Australipithecans, but it’s yanks who’re Americentric.
😉
Disclaimer: this entire post is just some hard-luvin tongue in cheek. Don’t take it too seriously.
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