Can you translate this Tphuang?

It seems to be focused on the MKI from AI-07.

Thanks

Nothing much just outlines HAL, Sukhoi colaberation. 65 MKI orders confirmed.
Sukhoi have no idea the porgress of J-11B production.
While sukoi can not have gained through J-11B, they can with HAL.
2004-2005 2 MKI assembled. 2005-2006 6 assembled. 2006-march 2007 13 assembled. indiginization of parts at 80% after 2009 they hoped to be 100%
indiginized but recently India considered ordering parts for Hydraulic systems as local production would be too expensive. Indian media reported the possibility of increasing the payment by 350 million to include parts. 2008 will also produce 13 MKI. Total production will cease in 2014, 3 years ahead od schedual.

Thats because it uses a cold launch system.

Heh no one has yet to see the HQ-16. Everything is still assumption.

Thanks to hyper for the new pics.
Hyperwarps’ latest pic shows what looks to me like hinged centerline exaust vent.

TThis mean the HQ-16 could very well be a hot launch missile.

I think Crobato made a good point on the all Russian content of the MK2 for Venezuela, these days they certainly are not making too many friends (or at least with the US which has far reaching influence).

But back to what I said about the MK2 being less complex, thus faster to produce. I was also under the impression that since IAPO is busy with Malaysian, Indian, etc orders, and KnAAPO receiving less orders from China.. buying an MK2 would result in it being delivered faster in order for Chavez to make a statement (or at least to give Venezuela something until a better Flanker, etc becomes an option for them).

People keep saying the MK2 Venezuela paid for is expensive, I was wonderng what the price is ??

Correction KnAAPO isn’t receiving any orders from China. THis has gone on for quite some time now.
Seems PLANAF is unimpressed with the thing as all follow up orders were cancelled. I suspect the MK2 does not offer any real improvements over the MKK and thus the chinese feel cheated…

J-STAR did participate in Desert Storm, and was part of the SCUD hunt. They were in much limited use in ODS than OIF, but they were in it.

LOL back tracking are we?

First you claimed PLAAF can not achieve the same results as USAF did in GF1 (i.e. “J-STAR equivalent in large scale operation deployment”).
But the fact is USAF only had 2 JSATRS in limited operations.

Look at PLA’s MRs and force in the Taiwan Strait area. Then look at the history of the amphibious warfare and the logistics involved. If by then it is still not clear why mobilization is necessary for a full-scale amphibious invasion, don’t bother showing up in military forums.

What amphibious warfare history? I wasn’t aware that PLA or PLAN had any. You have nothing to compare to aside from 1950s statics of the million man swim. Are you seriously suggesting that a PLA invasion will still end up on a march across the sea? I’m sorry but you are just going out of limb on this one.

BTW we have seen the effect and extent of PLA mobilization speed in northern sword exercise.

“Local War Under Hi-Tech Conditions” or its newer version “Local War Under Informationalized Conditions” does not make Air Power to be the main and sole instrument of warfare in PLA’s eyes. Air power is necessary, but never sufficient to win wars in PLA’s doctrine. PLA studied Desert Storm, but also studied Kosovo and the cost of holding ground force back. PLA invasion force needs to go in as soon as air defense is neutralized, certainly not waiting to mobilize attack force after air power attacks run the course..

Which really means that If PLA is focused on an decisive invasion of the Island pronto before involvment of USA. It does not mean that PLAAF would not be spear heading the attack. It also does not mean that suicide landing attemps will be undertaken.

PLA historically did not rely on air power but in the Taiwan scenerio this may not be the case. As artillery support can not be established until the troops land PLA may have no choice but to work with PLAAF. This is the reason why Joint ops is so much the deal in PLA training.

During wartime, assets of Second Artillery will be under direct control of the war commander. To PLA, there is no “preferable” weapon. Aircraft or artillery, it doesn’t matter as long as it achieves the objective of a fast victory.

I’m sorry I don’t think you have any clue as to what you are talking about. Second artillery is independant from PLA no matter the situation and tactical SSM does not belong to 2nd Art.

Emphasizing the importance of adaptability during wartime does not make military planning obsolete, and it is not an excuse to be unprepared. Tactical deception is good, but it does not dictate the overall Grand Strategy. If the situation demands it, PLA will act.

PLA will act regardless of being prepared or not but that is besides the matter. In fact what you are saying is that becuase PLA is good at adapting it will for go military planning. This is just absurd and you know it. If Korea,1962 and 1979 showed you anything, then you would’ve seen that PLA knows their limits. Military planning is essential to massive coordinated attacks. Logistics is much better than it ever was, the proof is the establishment of NCO corps and their involvement in logistic support.

Great article and an informative read.

China’s War Chest
http://www.sinodaily.com/reports/China_War_Chest_999.html
by Martin Walker
UPI Editor Emeritus
Washington (UPI) May 23, 2007

“So a fleet of 10 state-of-the-art CVN-21 carriers with their warplane, crew and task force support could be had for about the $300 billion that China is planning to invest — not counting the savings that Chinese manufacturing techniques and labor costs would bring. So China could in theory afford to challenge the traditional U.S. naval dominance in the Pacific Ocean.”

With more than $1,200 billion in U.S. dollars, T-bills and securities in its piggy bank, China has been losing money as the value of the dollar has fallen against the euro.
This helps explain that startling announcement last week that China is planning to launch a state investment fund that would seek better returns on its money. It plans to start by investing in stocks and private capital funds like the Blackstone group, which this week announced the infusion of $3 billion of China’s massive hoard of cash.

Put this into perspective. At current market values, China’s $300 billion fund could buy the whole of Wal-Mart, and still have enough left over to buy the Big Three American car makers: Ford, GM and Chrysler. Or it could buy British oil giant BP and still have enough left over to buy Germany’s Siemens. If China wanted to put all its $1.2 trillion into stocks, it could buy Exxon-Mobil, Shell and BP and still have enough left to buy Wal-Mart.

Or China could put some of the money into its defense budget, buy aircraft carriers and challenge the traditional U.S. dominance of the seas. The standard U.S. Nimitz-style carriers cost around $6 billion each, and America’s next generation CVN-21 carriers will cost about double that sum. Then there will be the cost of the warplanes, training the crews, and the other surface vessels in the standard task force that support and protect the carrier.

So a fleet of 10 state-of-the-art CVN-21 carriers with their warplane, crew and task force support could be had for about the $300 billion that China is planning to invest — not counting the savings that Chinese manufacturing techniques and labor costs would bring. So China could in theory afford to challenge the traditional U.S. naval dominance in the Pacific Ocean.

Were it to choose to do so, it seems they would have a helping hand from the U.S. Navy. Adm. Tim Keating, who now runs the Pacific Command and used to serve on the carrier Nimitz, has just completed a five-day friendly visit to China. And at a lunch with Vice Adm. Wu Shengli, commander of China’s navy, Keating stressed the difficulty and complexity of developing, building and operating an aircraft carrier. But at his news conference the following day, Keating said the United States would be willing to help if that is what China decides to do.

“It is not an area where we would want any tension to arise unnecessarily,” he said. “And we would, if they choose to develop (an aircraft carrier program) help them to the degree that they seek and the degree that we’re capable, in developing their programs.”

The immediate response from many armchair strategists was to wonder if Admiral Keating had taken leave of his senses. Why would the U.S. Navy want to help a potential challenger for the control of the seas?

And yet the immediate Chinese response was very cautious. Maj. Gen. Yang Chunchang of China’s Academy of Military Sciences told the Chinese-run Hong Kong daily, Wen Wei Po, that he “was concerned about (the implications of) Keating’s remarks.” Chinese strategists are wary of U.S. plans to infiltrate China’s military machine and gather intelligence through joint exercises and exchange visits.

U.S. Navy officials have been thinking about China’s plans for an aircraft carrier for more than a decade, since China first began talks with Russia about buying one of their small and obsolete carriers, so that they could start the long climb up the learning curve of naval aviation.

There is a school of American thought that would actually welcome a massive Chinese investment in aircraft carriers, on the grounds that it would take them as long as 20 years to be able to build the ships and aircraft, train the crews, and learn the tactics of operating carriers, and they would be very hard put to catch up with the U.S. Navy’s 80 years of experience. (The U.S. Navy paid a stiff price for a similar over-confidence regarding another Asian fleet back on Dec. 7, 1941.)

Others maintain that luring China into building such a navy would be a clever fiscal trap that would overwhelm and distort the Chinese defense budget for decades to come, and simply offer some very fat targets for the U.S. advantage in stealthy hunter-killer submarines. There is also a view that in the age of stealthy submarines and super-fast torpedoes like the Russian Skval and precision-guided weapons, big aircraft carriers are already obsolete.

Maybe. But do not forget that China has already put men into space, and earlier this year a Chinese anti-satellite weapon knocked out an obsolete satellite orbiting high above the earth. The Chinese may be technologically behind the United States, but they are evidently catching up fast.

And the argument that building a carrier fleet would bust the Chinese budget looks very thin against the potential tsunami of dollars that Beijing is planning to pour into the world’s financial markets. If the Beijing government decides that a carrier fleet is in the national interest, and that China’s strategic goals require the ability to control its own waters and the key shipping lanes and oil tanker routes, they can certainly afford it. And there would be no more visible symbol of China’s new role as a great power than a carrier fleet that embodies a challenge to America’s command of the seas.

We have, of course, been here before, at the beginning of the 20th century when Kaiser Wilhelm’s Germany decided to build a High Seas Fleet that could challenge Britain’s dominance of the seas. The subsequent arms race as each side vied to produce more and more Dreadnought-type heavy battleships played an important role in the escalation of tensions that helped bring about the First World War.

This time, we have a third candidate for the new naval arms race. Indian Defense Minister A.K. Antony told his country’s parliament last week that India plans to have three carriers on the seas by 2017. They already operate the Virar, bought from Britain (where it was known as HMS Hermes), and are currently refurbishing the former Soviet carrier Admiral Gorshkov. India is also now building at Cochin its own new 41,000-ton carrier, designed to carry Russian-designed Mig-29s.

But remembering the cost of all this, it should be emphasized that China’s current account surplus grew by $136 billion in the first three months of this year. At that rate, they could afford to build a 10-carrier fleet with just half of this year’s surplus. And last week, Credit Suisse estimated that China’s total war chest, or rather its total reserves, could hit $2 trillion, or $2,000 billion, by the end of next year.

As China decides whether it wants to take the risk of challenging the United States for the command of the seas, or even just for the command of the waters around Taiwan, money will be no object.

I say we take off and nuke the entire site from orbit. It’s the only way to be sure.

Why not pre-emp terrorist movement and nuke the site to prevent them getting their hands on the weapon that may become a threat to american sir assets.

who cares what your analysis of this whole situation is- its their money, their tactics and their planning for an eventuality- for you to come along stringing a “stunt” theory and calling this all a waste of time and money is pretty remarkable ! :rolleyes: of course they dont have anything better to do than to tear dividers apart and get multimillion $ jets streaming across highways for attracting crowds..what a novel way to recruit new kids and get some much needed PR, is’nt it !? and the tactical use of such ops ? or the possibility that such training could come in use someday ? zilch since you said so, O Great One.

your nationality has a lot to do with the “holier than thou” attitude you’re displaying and it obviously does’nt go down well that they’re trying to work out different tactics for some eventuality ..”stunt” and “ulterior motives” indeed..:rolleyes:

LOL it you pay the slightest attention to Taiwan politics you’d have figured out why we are criticizing it.

Evertime when the government support dwindles due to domestic unrest (ie. scandles now involing all members of the first family), president Chen pulls some anti-china retoric and backs that up with a military show of force to divert public attention.
What they should’ve been doing is more regiment level tactical menuvres and joint-op but instead we keep seeing crowd pleasing acts of shelling the empty horizons or landing planes on highways. Those officers that dare voice objectionsare subsequently replaced. In essence Taiwan have already fallen into this weird vicious circle.

Using tax money to forward ones’ political agenda does’t constitute as wasteful to you?