alfakiloCan you tell us what the intended altitude range the F-4 was designed for? I assumed up to 30,000 ft seeing it was to be an air superiority fighter.
Since the original design purpose for the F-4 was as a US Navy interceptor, then we would have to include high altitudes in the list of mission types.
I flew the F-4E in a NATO air defense squadron in Europe (Soesterberg). The only high altitude work I can remember was intercept training done against RAF Canberras where they flew at very high altitudes (above 40,000′) and we had to fly a ‘snap up’ profile to get up to that altitude. I remember it quite well because one mission was flown at night where the snap up was done on radar, not with a visual. We reached the Canberra’s altitude but got a little too close to him in the process…scared us both. The Canberra was very maneuverable at these altitudes, but we were basically ballistic.
Otherwise, our missions were flown at low to medium altitudes. That’s where the threat would be.
alfakiloAnd no in a typical dogfight, the F-104 would bingo out before the F-4 did.
I don’t know what a “typical dogfight” is but Sens has the right idea about fuel load comparisons.
It all depends on weight and configuration…but the point is that the F-104 had one half the fuel capacity of the F-4 and only one J-79…the result is similar consumption rates under the same conditions.
I can remember one situation that was somewhat illustrative…we were ingressing at low altitude with some F-4Ds…I think we had tip tanks and a centerline bomb dispenser, the F-4s had pylon tanks and a dispenser on an inboard pylon. When we pushed it up to enter the target area, the F-4s had to go into burner while we stayed in military power. No big deal but it said something about drag and thrust.
alfakiloOk, so you are in a position to give an informed opinion on the matter. Why dont you do that then?
I already have.
As for the exact numbers, I said I don’t have specific energy maneuvering F-104 data for high altitudes. Without that data, I can’t make an informed opinion. If you want a wild ass guess (WAG), then my opinion is that the differences would be negligible for comparable weights and configurations, the edge resting solely on pilot proficiency.
Then I noted my experiences with high altitude flight in both aircraft…and I have no reason to expect that my contemporaries had anything different. We flew these jets at low to medium altitudes for one simple reason…that was where the fight was.
alfakilocontext.
sens mentioned that A/G determines where in the enevelope A/A engagement will be. I simply offered that only determines the one side’s initial starting point in the envelope.
Sorry…I don’t understand what you are trying to say.
F-104 was a better energy fighter at high speed and altitudes, than comparable F-4s. do you require me to dig out charts?
Yes, if you don’t mind. My F-104 energy data doesn’t cover altitudes above 20,000′ or so.
Or you could just say what you mean by “better energy fighter”.
Did you co-worker happen to mention that nobody flew the F-4 or F-104 at these altitudes other than in tests and in training? The only time I ever saw 40,000′ in either aircraft was in initial training where the instructor was demonstrating high altitude performance.
I see you have a F-104 patch as your avatar. did you drive a star fighter?
Of course. I’m not making comments based on what somebody else may or may not have known anything about.
I did some work with some one who was intimately involved in F-4.
OK…I met Chuck Yeager once.
alfakilomy point is if F-4 (or any oneelse) choose to loiter at 30Kft 300 kts protecting trucks then F104 would not slow down first and start a turning fight at 30K ft.
You made no such point. Instead, you opined about what a fighter-bomber might do if attacked. Now you have changed direction and are opining about what an escort fighter might do. Which is it?
You did, however, offer an opinion about F-4 vs F-104 high altitude combat that you have yet to explain.
alfakiloIf the F-104 pilot remember to stay above 40000 and Mach 1 he can eat any F-4 for lunch.
Can you explain what you mean?
alfakiloI don’t think that airlines want to go back to having flight engineers and navigators and radio operators and the like, for that’s why we have so much electronics on an airliner – to reduce workload on the people flying them, and on those servicing and repairing them.
In the airline business in the US, there was a day when pilot unions pretty much ruled the roost when it came to relations with management…management acquiesced to labor simply because profits were so high that it wasn’t worth the effort to challenge the unions.
When the B-727 was initially designed, there were four cockpit positions…two pilots, a flight engineer, and a fourth position that was described to me as being for a “radio operator”. Why so many people in a cockpit of what was then a modern jet transport?
Simple answer. More flight crew members meant more union members. More union members meant more union dues.
Then the economics of the airline business began to swing the other way…and management gained an advantage in concessionary negotiations. No more radio operators…no more flight engineers. Amazed observers watched as two pilots miraculously performed the tasks of flying, navigating, and communicating all at the same time and all by themselves.
No argument that avionics can reduce workload…FMS and an autothrottle/autopilot make life easy these days…but when these decisions were being made, it was all about money. Corporate folks wanting to save money…union folks wanting to collect money.
alfakiloWrong. In NV the US attackers had to deal with the main threat of ground defences at first. The intercepting MiGs did hit and run attacks whenever possible to bolster the ground defences. US-escorts had to stay with the strike packages to fend-off such attacks when ever be possible and not to be lured away by chasing such interceptors.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Bolo showed the result, when the USAF got the tactical freedom to deal with the MiGs in a serious way.
In Korea the USAF lost a similar number of aircraft of all types, when the USAF limited its claims to the F-86 versus the MiG-15 only.
Good points.
Swerve has continued the often seen practice here of posting ill-founded opinion masquerading as fact. It isn’t beneficial to the other readers to have this go unchallenged, so let’s take his last statement apart, piece by piece.
A Korea comparison shows that US performance in air combat had declined dramatically. Given a much greater technological & numerical advantage than over Korea (where US fighters did extremely well, despite being subject to similar tactical limitations to those over Vietnam), far worse loss ratios were achieved.
The Korean air war is a lousy comparison. Swerve is mixing apples with oranges. In Korea, we saw dedicated fighter-on-fighter engagements, often with relatively large numbers of participants. Such dedicated engagements over NV were rare, an exception being the Bolo operation that Sens mentioned. In Korea, the Migs were sent in to engage the F-86 flights…in NV, the Migs were used to attack the strike package. That is not an inconsequential difference.
A “technological advantage” is only good if it can be used and then only if it works. Swerve wasn’t clear in whatever he was alluding to…but USAF ROE and systems limitations and deficiencies negated much of any advantage USAF “technology” may have brought to the engagement. To put this into specifics, ROE took away the BVR AIM-7, pulse radar difficulties in look down and low altitude situations severely limited USAF radar acquisition and lock on capability, and AIM-7 and 9 missiles initially were not nearly as effective as had been expected.
The last time the USAF/USAAF operated without secure rear areas, at least technical equality in equipment, & the ability to bring at least equal numbers to bear whenever it chose to, was probably in 1942.
…and your point was? How does this fit into this discussion?
The VPAF always had to operate with the knowledge that the USA could attack its bases at will, & could only match US numbers in an engagement rarely.
To the contrary, the NV were quite aware of US political restrictions in the NV air war…one of those was a restriction against attacking NV airfields.
Swerve offers no proof that a “numerical advantage” existed with regard to the fighter vs fighter engagements over NV. Of course, the USAF had more aircraft in the region, but total numbers mean nothing. Instead, we have to look at those situations where combat actually took place. In those engagements, the adversaries were more evenly matched. Since each engagement was unique, generalizations are difficult, but a reading of engagement summaries easily shows situations where one side or the other had more aircraft in the fight.
It was always heavily outnumbered by a technologically superior & more experienced enemy.
The limited impact of US technology has already been discussed as has the relevance of numbers. Swerve has offered no proof regarding the effect of pilot experience in a US vs NV context. From my personal experience as a F-4 pilot at the end of the war, my recollection is that few of us, if any, denigrated our adversaries on the basis of their experience.
Throughout the air war over NV (1964-1968, 1972), the makeup of a USAF fighter squadron was remarkably diverse…everything from pilots with previous Vietnam tour experience to pilots whose prior experience was in non-fighter aircraft to junior ranking pilots right out of pilot training with no experience at all. Add to that the prevailing restrictions on air-to-air training in the US and one ends up with an organization that would be hard pressed to be called “experienced”.
Victory was impossible: its only option was to stay in the game & by doing so impose costs on the USA in the hope that the US decided the game wasn’t worth the candle & gave up. That’s what MiG-17s going after F-105s were doing. Any Thuds they shot down were a bonus: the real aim was to make the US spend a lot on escorting every strike in case of MiG attacks which rarely came, & in that they succeeded.
Define “victory”. Define “costs”. Define “spend a lot”. Define “rarely came”. Take this rhetoric and try to say something that has relevance and substance.
alfakiloSome people understand that perfectly, but also know that the best tactical conditions for the VPAF were worse than anything the USAF has faced since 1942. A comparison with Korea is revealing.
Interesting. But confusing.
What 1942 conditions for the USAF [sic] are you thinking of? What has a Korea comparison revealed to you?
alfakilowhat aerodynamic aspect od Mig-25 makes him not maneuverable? Or, should i say less maneuverable than lets say mig-21 or F-4.
Is it only the type of engines that made it very unsuitable for low speed/high maneuvers, or is it actual physical shape as well?
To me, mig-25 shape always looked more like close combat fighter, than high speed bomber interceptor only.
thanks
Good question.
The Foxbat airframe has a relatively low structural load limit…a max of 4.5g. That limitation is quite a bit lower than that of a F-4 or MiG-21 and is a direct measure of maneuverability in “dogfight” situations.
The Foxbat is a heavy aircraft, consequently its wing loading is much higher than the F-4 or MiG-21…this weight also results in a relatively low thrust to weight ratio…these factors all limit its ability to maneuver well at the lower speeds common to “knife fights”.
alfakiloBecause someone points out that an overwhelmingly larger force with more up to date equipment managed to lose more heavily than its adversary?
Simple counts of aircraft lost don’t mean much. One should factor in what those aircraft are, crew losses, etc. For example, if I spend twice as much per fighter as my adversary, & deploy two-man vs his one-man fighters, I have to achieve a two to one kill ratio to break even. If I’m fighting over his territory & losing most shot-down crews while he recovers all those that survive, I need to do even better, & can find myself losing a lot more crews even if we both deploy single-seat fighters.
More ROFL.
alfakilo1. Nobody shoots down half a MiG. That’s pilot credits, including unconfirmed, not the actual number. Fairly close to reality, though, AFAIK.
2. Even assuming that all USAF attributions & claims were correct (VPAF fighters claim 9 F-105s attributed to AA or SAMs by the USAF), the MiG-17s (no MiG-21s were shot down by F-105s) shot down cost much less than the 21 F-105s officially listed as lost in air-air combat, & the crew losses were very heavily in the N. Vietnamese favour.
3. The MiGs were almost invariably heavily outnumbered, & the F-105 victories were mostly achieved by some F-105s flying cover for others.
The real wonder is that MiG-17s managed to score kills against Mach 2 fighter-bombers escorted by fighters.
ROFL
alfakiloThe F-105 got that by chance related to the special circumstances. 😉
The circumstances certainly were special to the NV pilots…lesson #1…don’t get in front of a F-105.
alfakilo5 tons of overweight, amongst many other things
The airplane weighs something like 33000lbs empty…so you are saying that it is about 50% heavier than it was supposed to be?
What are these “many other things” that don’t seem to meet your expectations?
alfakiloIMO, over-engineered is to make a immense efford that is not proportional with the result, so for example an airframe that becomes 10 times more complex to build and maintain ,to save 5% of weight from a conventional layout, (considering that the change was only done to decrease it weight), is a case of over engineering.
If that 5% weight reduction achieves the design objectives, then the project is not over-engineered. To make your point valid, you have to show that this 5% reduction could have been achieved from a less complex design.
I must agree the Raptor is a case of under-engineering, things just went wrong.
What things went wrong?
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