To keep the carriers a safe distance from shore, the USN and RN needs an airplane with a 1400+ mile combat radius (A-6 and Buccaneer replacement). Unfortunately, the airplane they will receive only has half of that radius.
A-6 and Buccaneer 1400+nm combat radius?
Is this the same Harrier that many were speaking so gushingly about in another thread?
There are pros and cons to speed. If you’re already on station, then high speed isn’t as necessary/desirable. If however you have to fly 200nm or more to quickly provide support to a unit that’s in trouble, then speed is very important.
In my opinion as one who has actually done CAS in combat, high speed is a negative when locating a hard-to-see enemy is the case. From CAS in the Vietnam War (F-4), to CAS in Germany in the 70s and 80s (F-4 and A-10), I found speed to be a double-edged sword. Nice as far as defensive considerations went…not so nice when it came to finding the tanks in the tree lines.
Another factor was the weather in the target area…navigating and locating the target was a heck of a lot easier in the A-10 at 300kts than it was in the F-4 at 500kts over the same terrain.
Target distance will vary from conflict to conflict. What we see in Iraq and Afghanistan as far as how far away the target is does not resemble the conditions that we saw in Vietnam or Germany during the Cold War. It will always be difficult to select an airplane based upon these kinds of considerations. There is always the danger in choosing a new weapon system based on the lessons learned from the last war…and ending up with something not well suited for the next war (as we F-104 pilots knew far too well).
For the USMC when it is conducting an expeditionary campaign against a foreign coastal area, then something like the AV-8B is a good answer to response time. In the Vietnam War of the 60s and 70s, the A-4, F-8, and F-4 provided this capability, both from the carrier as well as from coastal bases. In both situations, response time was minimal.
Another consideration for CAS is loiter time…the ability to remain over the target area on an “on call” basis. In this case, the A-10 holds the advantage.
Well austere field capability is nice and good until you have to actually deploy aviation fuel, weapons, spares, technicians and so on. As someone said already, a logistical nightmare.
It’s all nice and good to have that capability, but on the other hand how many times has it ever been used operationally?
Exactly.
The A-10 demonstrated the ability to operate off a stretch of autobahn in Germany in the early 80s. Looked great on the evening news.
But the idea didn’t pan out. It was easier to fix holes in a runway than it was to relocate all the required ground support to a piece of road somewhere.
I think we can agree that the A-10A stall speed without external loads and at an unspecified weight, which is probably not MTOW, is around 120 kts (public sources). Add typical loads and safety margins – 140, voila. But I’m of course open for divergent estimates …
I’m not giving you an estimate. I’m giving you the flight manual recommended speed.
120-130kts.
I admit it’s been a while, but in my 6 years and 1200 hours in the Hog, my recollection is that we flew final at about 120, day in and day out.
As for stall speed, your number is wrong. At normal landing weight and configuration, stall speed was about 100KIAS.
and third, they already had a better CAS aircraft in the AV-8B.
According to whom and based on what criteria?
As a result, Harriers were the only fixed wing aircraft that did not need aerial tanker support.
Correct…instead, they needed ground tanker support.
It’s worthy of note that Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf identified only three aviation assets that were critical and game changers in the conflict: The F-117, the AH-64 (he pretty much had to say that) and… the AV-8B.
Please post the source for that comment…I’d like to see how the AV-8B was a “game changer”.
The AV-8B was, and as far as I know still is, more accurate…and can operate with lower ceilings/visibility.
Based on what criteria? What weapons?
…but there’s lots of places the AV-8B can operate that the A-10 can’t.
Off a ship? A soccer field? OK…but what else did you have in mind?
…It can’t tolerate small arms fire as well as an A-10…
True enough. Do you happen to know the loss rate comparison between the AV-8B and the A-10 in DS?
More like 140 knots. High for a thick straight wing; could be considerably lower with flaps/slats.
Where do you get this 140kt figure from? Perhaps you could include your A-10 experience?
Approach speed is a little high for the A-10, but nothing that a basic flap/slat arrangement and a computer-age wing profile couldn’t fix.
120-130KIAS is a “little high”?
OK so ANg aircraft bought using fed money.
What I intended folks to understand is that the individual states to whom the ANG units belong (for administrative purposes) do not have to come up with the funds to “buy” aircraft as such. This removes cost as an issue with individual states.
Which one would the ANG “buy”?
The ANG doesn’t “buy” aircraft. New aircraft for ANG units are purchased under a federal program.
In my opinion the Soviets were never comparable to Syria…
What has been interesting in this exchange of posts has been the demonstration of some poster’s inabilities to critically understand what was being said in Grant’s article.
It would seem that nationalistic hubris has interfered with some folk’s ability to discern an academic argument from jingoistic blather.
Too bad. Her premise was an interesting one…and one worthy of informed debate. Unfortunately, some folks seem far too hung up on nationalistic angst to permit a reasoned examination of her conclusions.
The position of the anecdote within the article (in the last 2 paragraphs where one would expect to find conclusions) is disturbing.
How is this “disturbing”? Are you suggesting that this anecdote replaced any conclusions?
I hope not. The last section of the article is sub-titled “A Change In Warfare”. In that section, the author posits three conclusions:
1. “…Israel’s 46-hour Bekaa Valley air war set a new standard for orchestrated air operations and proved that even sophisticated
mobile SAMs could be dismembered by well-coordinated air attacks….The lopsided scores against both Syrian SAMs and fighters put orchestrated airpower back in the center of modern warfare.”
This was the conclusion that answered her basic premise.
2. “Yet the Bekaa Valley air war also helped drive Middle East strategy in
a new direction…”.
3. “In Moscow, the Bekaa Valley operation threw military men into a
kind of shock…”.
One could see these last two as ‘collateral damage’…outcomes resulting from the first. Without it, the two would not have happened.
She did fine until this third party anecdote…
An anecdote is not a conclusion.
There was a premise in this article and a conclusion…and that was that the long standing idea that SAMs were ascendant over fighters was overturned in the 1982 conflict. To date, that conclusion has held.
This premise was not based on criticism of a particular array of defenses or their origin. Instead, it was a premise based upon improvements in intell, training, and command and control. Her conclusion was based on the demonstrated effectiveness of those preparations.
shes saying that loss of 70 or so second rate syrian migs led to collapse of USSR.Thats idiotic
Please show where she said that.
Contrary to Ms. Grant’s conclusions…
What conclusions are you taking exception to?