I would still say that Rebecca Grant’s article was a bunch of fluff, there is nothing new in this article other than what is already wellknown.I would say that Grants article was clearly soviet bashing.
You see what you want to see.
The premise of Grant’s article had nothing to do with criticism of Soviet equipment or methods. Instead, she presented an argument that the 1982 war represented a change in the previously widely held assumption that in a battle between fighters and SAM systems, the SAM systems would win. She contrasted the outcomes of the 1973 and 1982 Middle East wars to reach her conclusion that in this instance, a properly led, equipped, trained, and supported fighter force would win out over surface-to-air ground forces.
The fact that the nations involved happened to be Israeli and Syrian were incidental to her premise.
In her next-to-last paragraph, she does offer the opinion that the 1982 outcome caused concern in the Soviet military leadership of that time. To argue otherwise will be difficult to prove.
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mig-23MS and mig-21MF were not the latest soviet equipment of the mid 80s
Neither the author nor anyone in this thread has said that they were….but Mig-21s and MiG-23s were the standard for WP air forces in 1982.
it should be a combination of both, plus there is no description of how the soviet equipment was “top” at the time or how it contributed to the syrians defaet rather than syrians tactics
You continue to defend Soviet systems, training, etc. The article was about Israeli lessons learned, not deficiencies in Soviet equipment.
do we know who this czech general is that is the question
No…the question was that you claimed he was “ill-informed”. Now, we may be “ill-informed” because the author did not use his name…LOL…but you haven’t backed up your claim.
so ur saying that desert storm replicated the conditions of a NATO-WP conflict ? based on what ?
No, I didn’t say that or anything close to that. What I did say was that the US seemed to have learned lessons from the 1982 Israeli experience and put them to good use in 1991.
In any case, you have drifted far away from the thread topic. This isn’t a Soviet bashing thread, the articles weren’t Soviet bashing articles.
Let’s get back to the actual topic, if you don’t mind.
syrian but not the “latest soviet systems ” last page second last paragraph
The author did not use the word “latest”. She said “top”…and in the context of the article, the systems referred to were “tops” in the Soviet arsenal for that time, although not the latest. I think you are being too defensive of Soviet systems…the authors point wasn’t to put down these systems…it was to describe how the Israelis overcame them after their losses in the 1973 war.
She cites no sources , no footnotes quoting an israeli generally exclusively is hardly an objective source.
The head of the air force who played a significant role in the outcome of the conflict will suffice for now. Perhaps not 100% objective…but whom else to listen to? The folks who designed, built, and trained the operators of those systems that were so completely blown away?
same page, where she quotes an illinformed czech general that bekaa valley incident led to collapse of USSR !
“Ill-informed”?
Is that your opinion or do you have a source for that?
I think the soviet already knew very well how much they lagged behind the west they didnt need Bekaa valley to tell them that
OK…then what was this Czech general “ill-informed” about?
a far more authoritative source “arabs at war” by kenneth pollack does not blame soviet hardware alone rather their main criticism are the syrian tactics he cites mainly israeli sources.
You continue to defend Soviet equipment and systems. The article was not a criticism of the Soviets…it told the story of how the Israeli lessons learned from the 1973 war were put to good use in 1982.
thanks for pointing that out, but do you disagree with his conclusions ?
He mentions three lessons learned (his conclusions). One, that electronic warfare is important in today’s conflicts. Two, that effective doctrine and organization are also important. Lastly, he says this…
“But perhaps the most important lesson from the Bekaa Valley is not to try to infer too many lessons. There are many factors that make the Lebanon War in general and the Bekaa Valley battle in particular of limited relevance to the US military.”
LOL!! The cadet’s article was written in 1989. I wonder how he felt about that statement two years later when the US followed a similar game plan in Desert Storm.
But, to answer your question…no, I don’t disagree with his first two conclusions…they weren’t new conclusions in 1989, 1979, 1969, or even 2010.
^ e.g regarding the Bekee valley incident I remember reading a article by one rebecca grant
http://airbase.ru/users/rohan/files/0602bekaa.pdf
in which she claimed that the “latest soviet weaponry of the cold war was trounced” even though a more realistic assessment of the battle was made by a US airforce officer here http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj89/win89/hurley.html
But the fact is this…the Syrian aircraft and SAM systems were “trounced”. That is not a “ridiculous” statement.
What conclusion by this author (not a conclusion belonging to her sources) did you find “ridiculous”? Can you point out where she used the Syrian example as a reference for future NATO-WP confilcts (I don’t think she even mentioned NATO or the WP in her article)?
For me, her article was as much about changes and improvements in command and control of modern air forces in combat as it is a summation of a particular Middle East engagement.
A minor note…the reference to the article by “a US Air Force officer” is incorrect. The author was a cadet at the USAF Academy.
…it makes you realize how wrong most pundits of aircombat ala tom clancy could be wrong.Esp certain “analyist” who attempted to draw some ridiculous conclusions from the middle east and south asian conflicts regarding any future NATO-WP engagement
Maybe, maybe not. I’ve read some good things and some not-so-good things.
What “ridiculous conclusions” did you have in mind?
I’ve just seen a thread saying that you are Andy Bush haha!
Correct…but my interest in posting here is to share my experiences with you folks, not to worry too much about identities!!
Have you written any books yourself and do you still fly anything? If not do you run any PC flight simulators?
My introduction to writing about aviation began with helping write the F-22 ADF Strategy Guide and a number of articles for sim magazines. At present, I’m lending a very small hand to the development of the new A-10 sim.
My day job, now that I’m too old to fly in the US, is to train airline pilots in the Embraer 170 and 190…simulator instructor only. I enjoy this immensely, keeps me feeling like I’m still part of the game. I’ve done a considerable amount of writing for the Embraer in the form of “how to’s” for the students.
Since this job keeps my sim squares filled, I haven’t found the time to continue my interest in flying air combat sims, but I do keep my association with SimHQ open, just in case!!
For years I thought only West Germany flew F-104Gs, can I assume the USAF kept a few to train WGerman Pilots? or was there any particular requirement for G models in the training program?
The G model was flown by all the European nations that had the F-104. The training program in the US used G models that were actually manufactured in Europe (although these aircraft were not as updated as the aircraft in NATO service).
…so the 2 man crew really helped keep up your Situational Awareness back then.
Very much so, particularly in a furball. In the F-4, the pilot could use the automatic lock on feature of the radar if he wanted to use the AIM-7…that allowed the backseater to remain ‘heads out’ to check six.
And I guess the view behind in the F-104G was not to good – but could you stick your head round the seat and see the Tail in the 104?
Not once strapped in, but if the seat harness was kept loose, we could get a reasonable look back…maybe 20-30 degrees off the tail…we would use check turns to see the blind spots.
Interesting how similar you say they were overall in some respects. Were you flying against slatted (F-4Es) or non slatted F-4s at the time?
I’m not sure what the TOPGUN students had…that was a long time ago. I think the data in question may have been for the non-slatted version.
I have a great thread from Andy Bush who flew F-104Gs at Topgun where he describes going up against F-5Es in 1978 and yo yoing off them in the vertical with ease.
What you are referring to was a flight test of energy maneuverability as that subject was taught at TOPGUN. The question was if the F-104 could use the same energy concepts that TOPGUN taught their F-4 students to use in a series of flat scissors against a F-5E. As it turned out, it could. Keep in mind that this was only an academic exercise where book data was tested in real life maneuvering. The data was correct.
I flew the G model.
Did any F-4 version give you particular difficulties consistently (with different students)? Were you strictly energy fighting in the vertical – or could the F-104 hold a horizontal fight with any F-4s? Andy Bush states he would only turn if required – and then only at corner with full burner, flaps where he could sustain 6-7gs below 15,000ft.
Having flown both the F-4 and the F-104, I would tend to favor the F-4 in a turning fight…partly because of its better turn below 400KIAS and partly because of its two man crew. Other than that, the two jets shared many similarities.
You sound like you have been there?
Best example…flying a F-104 in the USN TOPGUN graduation exercise as part of the adversary group opposing the students (in my case, all F-4 class).
The Welded Wing/Fighting Wing? Can you comment on this then – I have several accounts from Vietnam pilots stating the flighting Wing was weak/unworkable for fast jets in close combat. Useful in WW2 – but in F-4s everything happened too quickly to keep formation and protect the shooter.
I was trained in this formation in 1972 when I went through USAF F-4 training. At that time, the USAF had not yet adopted formations such as Fluid Two.
I have always considered the wingman position in Fighting Wing to be relatively useless when the leader is actively maneuvering hard against a bandit. The wingman will be fully involved in just staying in position and will have little time to check his or the lead’s six.
This formation was designed for a guns environment…in a missile environment such as Vietnam, the wingman’s position is too close to effectively see back far enough to visually pick up a bandit at IR missile range. It was only after we moved the wingman out to line abreast and increased the separation to 4000′-6000′ that he was able to check six against a missile attack.
The problem wasn’t that things happened too quickly…it was that the wingman position was too close to be able to clear the formation’s six.
I don’t see how they could keep this formation either. – although I am aware its still listed – well its in the 1996 F-16 operations manual. 🙂
Sometimes, old ideas die hard. Also, there might be a time and place for FW, but not often in a modern WVR environment.
…if you find yourself with no SA in an all aspect missile environment in say >1985 wouldnt you say its time to hit the CMs and get out of there and regain some SA ASAP?, because a Missile could be on its way.
Absolutely!
How is that different from single combats e.g most of the classic moves that we associate with dogfights are they even possible when dozens of planes clash at the same time ?
Good question but one that needs a little definition.
It sounds like you have a “furball” in mind…what we used to refer to as a “many v many” where the adversaries engaged when within visual range.
If that is the case, then here are a few observations…
Once the fight begins, any attempt at sticking to a “plan” is pretty hard to do. The “furball” environment is just too unpredictable for anything other than the simplest of plans.
Formations tend to go out the window at the merge…at best, the only manageable formation is the classic ‘fighting wing’ where the wingman sticks to his leader…too often, anything else falls apart once the fight is on.
The only restriction on the type of weapon to be used will be one of acquisition time, minimum range contraints, and out-of-limits attack geometry.
One of the more common observations about “furballs” going all the way back to WW1 is that it is surprising how quickly the pilot finds himself alone…as in “where did everyone go?”!!
It is possible for individual opponents to engage in classic ‘one v one’ maneuvering during a “furball”…but it carries the definite risk of getting shot by an unseen bandit because one is so occupied with maneuvering against the opponent. The better choice is to stay fast and take shots of opportunity (shots that present themselves to the pilot where he has to do little to no maneuvering to set up the trigger pull). Using this idea, the pilot will keep his speed up and make dashes through the “furball” looking for the easy shot. Whether he does this alone or with a wingman is up to the ROE of the flight leader.
In these kinds of engagements, it’s really helpful to have another set of eyes in the cockpit. It is also possible to have this come from AWACS or GCI in some cases.
Another Dutch F-104…with a Soesterberg F-4E, March 1976.

Too much airspeed. Glide path didn’t look too bad. Pilot kept trying to raise nose to get into the landing attitude, but extra speed resulted in a series of short climbs (what are called “balloons” in the US) instead.
Once down, he seemed to get it stopped pretty fast. There were little puffs of smoke or something as he slowed to a stop…may have been blown tires.
Do you like the idea of replacing the WSO with electronic eyes, imaging infrared technology, and smart computer interfaces? Should cut down a couple of hundred pounds and quite a bit of space compared to a two-seater.
No.
Here’s why.
All that fancy Star Wars avionics is going to be there one seat or two.
Assuming it works as expected…and that has always been a risky assumption to make…what results is information overload for one person. Adding a second human processor to the mix allows all of that cosmic info to be better and more completely used.
Fantastic. How did they compare in ACM for starters? F-4E with slats vs. F-104 with very high wingload. My hunch is the F-4E should out-turn the F-104. In the vertical they’d be fairly similar? (Similar T/W)
I flew the F-4C, D, E, and slatted E. The slats on the E lowered its top speed and acceleration a little, but the differences were pretty academic. In actual use, I didn’t see much difference other than the slats made the jet easier to fly at high AOA.
The F-4E (with slats) had a better turn below 400KIAS…above that, the jets were equal. Corner velocities at typical A2A loads, altitudes, and weights were basically the same…in the 400-450KIAS range. As you said, vertical performance was also similar.
Which model of F-104 did you fly by the way? F-104C or G? Any big difference in how they flew?
G only. Performance was similar but the G had better all weather intercept radar capabilities. The model with the best intercept capability was the Italian S model.
Lastly, for interception, which one was better in terms of raw performance? (Time to climb, supersonic acceleration etc). I won’t ask about avionics & weapons systems, because they’re hardly comparable.
Aside from the avionics differences, basic performance was similar. Climb rates, acceleration, range, etc differences were minimal. The G internal fuel was 6000lb, the F-4 was about 12,000lb…but it had two engines, so the practical outcome was pretty much the same. The F-4 was a little faster perhaps in mach number, but most folks operated the jet at much lower altitudes.
For me, the main advantage of the F-4 was having an extra set of eyes in the back seat…a good WSO was a tremendous asset to have when things started to heat up.
A Simple question. Which was more fun to fly :diablo:
My be is on F-104.
You would be right!!
But both jets were excellent machines!