Alfakilo, could you elaborate the fine differences between a loose duece and a fluid two? Is either one related to German formation theory from WW1?

I’m not sure how German WW1 tactics fits into this subject.

The differences between DA and LD are best illustrated when looking at using these formations on the offensive.

Both give the free fighter (the wingman in traditional terms) freedom to maneuver when the engaged fighter (let’s call that the flight lead) is on the attack. The main difference is in the freedom of the free fighter to assume the engaged fighter role on his own. The LD free fighter can do this on his own while the DA free fighter needs to get clearance from the engaged fighter to assume the new role. In this sense, the DA free fighter is more of a supporting role, while the LD free fighter plays more of a co-equal role in pressing the attack. The DA free fighter tends to be more defensive while the LD free fighter actively looks for a way to enter the fight as the attacker.

In general, the USN flew LD, and the USAF flew DA…but that is a very loose ‘in general’. In my experience, we would fly one or the other based upon our own comfort level with whomever we were flying with. Inexperienced wingmen were briefed to fly the DA free fighter role, while two experienced pilots might well agree to fly more of a LD concept…this would be particularly true if they were comfortable flying with each other.

Perhaps more emphasis should be put on the fact that the training was the area in which massive changes were needed rather than the F-4 itself not getting a gun originally (which of course was fixed).

As a note of clarification…the issue with “training” is what was being trained and the environment that this training took place in. During much of the Vietnam War, the USAF deliberately de-emphasized advanced air-to-air training, particularly with dissimilar opponents. The reason was to avoid accidents. The USN did not.

Next…during this time, the USAF was still flying Korean War era formations and tactics. The USN was not. When I went through F-4 training in 1972, we were taught a type of formation called ‘fighting wing’ where the wingman flew in a relatively close position behind his leader. This formation went back to WW2 and before and was based on the idea that the wingman’s job was to protect the leader’s six o’clock. This was based on being in a guns-only environment…in a missile environment, fighting wing was close to worthless because the wingman was too close and too fixed on the leader to see the attacker at missile ranges. In this formation, the wingman followed the leader and had little authority to act on his own. The RAF had a similar bad experience with the formations that they were flying at the beginning of WW2.

The USN on the other hand was flying a much more maneuverable type of formation called ‘loose deuce’ (or ‘double attack’ to some) where the wingman flew a wider and looser formation that allowed the wingman the opportunity to engage or defend without being tied to his leader as much as was the case with the ‘fighting wing’ concept.

The result was a general state of mind in the USAF that limited effective air combat training, and the outcome was the lower kill/loss ration in Vietnam. USAF air tacticians recognized this and the result was the establishment of Aggressor squadrons and a switch to “Fluid Two/Four” formations and tactics…all of which came a little late for Vietnam.

What you missed to point at and what rises some further questions about the credibility of someone too. 😉

Why don’t you put that in German and I’ll run it through a translator to see if it makes more sense.

Some nonsense to stay polite. Nearly all GAF 104Gs were retired in the 80s, when the units were reequipped with F-4F and Tornados in the late 80s.
The F-15s from Soesterberg/NL 32d TFS/TFG for the 2. ATAF and the F-15s from Bitburg 36 TFW for the 4. ATAF were tasked for intercepts with in the ADIZ. A no go area for the GAF units, which were all under NATO command of their related ATAF. The low level training were at given routes and times of the week and the GAF units were A2G tasked, when doing so. Contrary to the 70s strict rules were imposed in the 80s to rise safety. By that the minimum heights were raised and the allowed speeds reduced. To enforce that common rules low level radars were set up to control that. At that time-scale the F-15s operated with AWACs support too and flying had become very boring for the F-15 pilots, when the most challenge were adverse weather conditions not used to.

That’s a nice summation of air command and control arrangements over West Germany…I’m not too sure of what that has to do with that post, but you didn’t say anything about the poster’s story about F-15s bagging German F-104s.

Other than to call it nonsense, that is.

Could you elaborate on this? I seem to recall that when the F-104 was flown using it’s strengths it pretty much had it’s way with anybody they wanted- until the F-15. I remember bits and pieces of a story told by an F-104 pilot and his encounter with an early F-15 that was pretty amusing, but not enough of the details to relate it.

I wouldn’t go so far as to say that the F-104 had the superiority that you mention. Its main advantage in my experience was that few other pilots knew much about the plane’s performance, and much of what they did know was false.

It didn’t help when some F-104 pilots flew the plane poorly…when I was flying F-4s at Soesterberg, we encountered F-104s quite frequently, and too often the plane was badly handled, ending up too slow. Some of these pilots seemed to equate landing flaps with better turn performance, and in the F-104 that is completely untrue.

But, when flown to its strengths, the F-104 was a better competitor than most realized.

The story you recall was most likely the outcome of the first F-15 vs F-105 DACT engagement that I know of, at least in the US. The outcome was all in the favor of the F-104 pilots and had as much to do with the errors made by the F-15 pilots as it had to do with the 104 pilot’s abilities. It was a funny story and pointed out how people shouldn’t underestimate an opponent when little is known about it.

So, if the incidents took place as described and in the mid to late ’70s and the F-15s were flying against the Superheats, the outcome described might not be too far out of the realm of possibility. In this case, though, it wouldn’t be so much the training as to who the Eagles were flying against (plus the fact that the F-4 is two crew) — even allowing for the well-known superiority of Navy fighter jocks.

They took place alright. I had a similar outcome when we flew the 104 against the Nickle at Luke…with target arms in a two seat 15.

This wasn’t all that unusual at that time. I thought it had something to do with the incredible turning ability of the 15 for all of us who had flown nothing but F-4s and other things. I had a back seat ride in 1977 or so and was blown away by the performance.

The result was, I think, a bunch of 15 drivers who, having been out-turned by A-4s, F-5s, etc wanted to out-turn somebody else for a change. The problem was that those other aircraft were little airplanes that turned well, whereas the 15 was a tennis court sized jet that turned well.

Another factor was the PD radar…all of us were so used to a radar that couldn’t down into the dirt very well that the PD set was too spiffy for words.

So, too often, the 15 guys came into the fight relying too much on radar, were too slow in order to keep their turns smaller than ours, and, maybe most important, too full of themselves. The result too often was a good spanking. Even Nellis had problems with this.

But eventually the word got out about not forgetting the basics, and pretty soon the Eagle guys were pure pursuiting us, stayed fast, and drove us out of energy.

As it should be. But it took a while to get over the euphoria of the spectacular improvement in turning performance.

Not a single data from your side to stay polite. How about the corner-speed of the F-4B/C and the related max inst. and sunstained for that at low level and the same for a F-8C/D f.e. No problem for a former pilot, when that data are no longer classified and the related mannuals are available for public use. 😎

I’ve tried to explain to you before that corner velocity is of little interest other than to allow amateurs to think they know something about air combat.