The Agni 3’s aim is to serve as a nuclear deterrent vs China who already has missiles with the range to reach all parts of India, India has a no first use policy but would just like to remind the Chinese Govt that it can most definitely reach Beijing if attacked first, there would have been no need for Agni had certain missile systems not ended up in other country’s hands.

http://internationalreporter.net/sc…ails.asp?id=274

VAJPAYEE KEPT INDIAN NATION IN DARK ON NUKE DELIVERY SYSTEM, WHY?
DRB
Date : SEP 01, 2004

New Delhi – The outgoing Chief of the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), VK Aatre, confirmed on Tuesday in the Press Conference that six years after India entered the nuclear club with Pokhran-II, it is still not ready with its missile-based nuclear delivery systems.

Not only this, he admitted at a press conference that India is still a long way from acquiring credible nuclear deterrence. As regards Agni-II Intermediate-range ballistic missile, he said that it was just to train the Army Officers and technical staff how to handle and fire such missiles since they never were trained before.

The shocking aspect of the Agni II, on which our previous government under the leadership of Mr. Vajpayee and the defence Ministry under Defence Minister George Fernandez and on which President of India has also unfortunately expressed great satisfaction on the progress of missiles on many occasions, have, in fact, kept the entire nation in dark since the missiles never were operational. However, the Indian leadership has been boasting like a paper tiger that they can smash their enemies and they shall wipe out from the world map. What a joke!

If such a situation had arisen to make use of this technology in previous years of tension and hotbed, India would have miserably failed, since the Indian Army had never known how to handle Agni II and how to operate it?

Every political leader has been talking tall without knowing how much damage they were intentionally and willfully causing to the nation by giving such false assurances. All are responsible right from His Excellency President of India to Former Prime Minister, Former Deputy Prime Minister, Defence Minister and the leader of the Opposition. In fact all were misleading the nation and in case of an attack if God forbid launched recently, India would have been decimated. Can you excuse these leaders?

So much so even the launch of July 4 for Agni A1 had the same purpose to train the Army how to handle and operate it and once this process starts, it takes minimum 6 months for the Army men to set his hand on.

Pakistan and China are practically much advanced, and India is far behind. Even the present government and their leaders who formed the part of the previous Opposition Party cannot escape from this national responsibility.

If the nation takes it seriously, I don’t think, it should forgive these leaders, whether of NDA or present Government, this act is abominable and cannot be forgotten so easily. MIL

😀
Link does not work, maybe its because the editor took it off once he realized that his worker was copying Thapar who himself misquoted Atre. 🙂

read again a certain number HAVE BEEN DELIVERED TO THE ARMY.

then see my previous posts from multiple sources about confirmtions of the May 99 nuke tests and the nuke warhead tests optimized to be carried on missiles. 🙂
Also see my sources wher it mentions the Agni 2 already in limited deployment.

All Atre said was that the Agni test was for the Army to train on 🙂
How this became him “admitting that no nuclear delivery system is ready” is beyound me. :

p.s Atre never said that india’s only option was planes, the author did 🙂
http://www.fas.org/news/india/1998/05/980500-conf.htm

Press Conference
(Dr. R. Chidambaram (RC), Chairman, AEC & Secretary, DAE; Dr. A. P. J. Abdul Kalam (K), Scientific Adviser to Raksha Mantri and Secretary, Department of Defence Research and Development; Dr. Anil Kakodkar, Director, BARC; Dr. K. Santhanam, Chief Advisor (Technologies), DRDO)

Q: How near is the thermonuclear device to a hydrogen bomb? What was the material used for the fission trigger?

A: (RC) – The hydrogen bomb is the popular term. In a hydrogen bomb there is a fission trigger and separately there is also thermonuclear material which requires appropriate configuring. It is therefore a two-stage device. The secondary stage provides the major yield. The range can go quite high but we were limited in the total yield by the damage it may cause to habitations nearby. We are not revealing the materials used.

Q: Do you have a strategic command system?

A: (K) – Please explain the meaning of command. We have here a partnership. The culmination of that partnership is in weaponisation. As for command and control systems, we have different forms presently, and are moving towards that.

Q: Is India holding nuclear weapons?

A: (K) – PM has said India is a NWS. Please refer to Article 9 of NPT.

Q: We hear that Shakti 1 is not a thermonuclear device but a boosted fission device?

A: (RC) – As I said earlier, a thermonuclear device has two stages a fission trigger and a secondary stage. This was a thermonuclear device as it had two stages.

Q: When were you told to go ahead with the tests?

A: (K) – T minus 30 days.

Q: Are we now moving towards subcritical, hydronuclear, hydrodynamic and computer simulation, including laser fusion techniques such as those in the National Ignition Facility in the U.S.?

A: (RC) – The yield depends on the extent of supercriticality; the more the supercriticality, the more the yield. It is below critical if k<1. We are aware of the U.S. programs for Inertial Confinement Fusion where you hit a pellet with laser beams and simulate some kinds of phenomenon. We have done what we have done.

Q: (NYT – John Burns) – Does India have a deliverable weapons system right now?

A: (K) – I refer to the Joint Press Release of DRDO & DAE. This is a National Mission. PM has said that India is a NWS.

Q: Does India need further underground tests or will the completion of this series achieve this?

A: (RC) – May I read out the Press Statement of May 13. This completes the planned series of underground tests.

Q: There has been a Pakistani explosion?

A: (K) – As of when we came for this Press conference, it was not known to us. What we have done is for India’s national security.

Q: Can you confirm that it is a thermonuclear and not a boosted fission test?

A: (RC) – As I said earlier, a thermonuclear weapon has two stages, a fission trigger and a secondary stage. A boosted fission device is not a hydrogen bomb. A hydrogen bomb must be two-part.

Q: We hear that you now going to separate the civil and military aspects of the programme with DRDO taking care of the military part and secondly are you now going to put your civilian reactors under safeguards?

A: (K) – I do not know what you are talking about. We co-exist and co-operate. We do not have to take over each other’s tasks.

A: (RC) – No.

Q: Will sanctions affect BARC/DRDO?

A: (K) – Technologically, we have faced sanctions for a long time. When we were refused the supercomputer, we went ahead and made our own. In the space programme, when we were refused cryogenic engines, we have gone ahead and made our own which should be ready next year. No one can trouble us technologically. There is a challenge to be met and we rise to the occasion.

A: (RC) – I would just like to add – for 20 odd years we have been facing technology control regimes. These may slow us down, but they also increase our self reliance. Our nuclear programme today is almost 100% indigenous.

Q: What depth were the shafts?

A: (RC) – We are not revealing this.

Q: How far is the nearest village?

A: (RC) – A little over 5 km. away – Khetolai. Our total yield was set by this.

A: (K) – The hydrogen bomb criteria was determined based on the location of this village.

Q: So you can carry out tests with greater capacity?

A: (RC) – Yes.

Q: Where is India in nuclear weapons technology today?

A: (K) – The 3 tests on May 11, the hydrogen bomb, the fission device and sub-kiloton device, as well as the two subsequent sub-kiloton device have proved clearly that our nuclear weapons technology has achieved a stage of self reliance. If there is a demand for it, we shall do it.

Q: What was the logic behind simultaneous detonation?

A: (RC) – The two devices, the thermonuclear and fission device were one km apart. We needed to make sure that the detonation of one did not cause damage to the other, since the stock wave has a time travel in milliseconds. So went in for simultaneous detonation. It was also simpler – use one button to blow three. We had close in seismic measurements and accelerometer data also.

Q: What fraction of the hydrogen bomb energy is due to the thermonuclear part? What was the cost of the tests and weaponisation?

A: (K) – As regards cost, this does not amount to huge amounts. These costs were met from the budgets of our respective departments, over and above what we apportion for regular activities.

A: (RC) – As regards what fraction – the total was 45 kT. The fission trigger was equivalent to that of the fission device.

Q: Can these nuclear warheads be fitted on Prithvi and Agni?

A: (K) – The missiles we have can carry any type of warhead, conventional or nuclear, depending on the weight, size and environmental specifications. The missiles are only carriers, they can even carry flowers.

Q: Are you going in for miniaturisation of warheads?

A: (K) – As I said, weaponisation is dependent on size, weight, performance characteristics and environmental conditions.

Q: General Sunderji and Shri K. Subrahmanyam have said we need 100 warheads. Do you agree? When willyou begin production?

A: (K) – The numbers stated vary from expert to expert. No comment.

Q: The U.S. has stockpiled nuclear devices. What is the critical number for India?

A: (K) – I have studied the issue of proliferation of nuclear weapons. The U.S. has some 10,000 warheads. Nuclear warheads are used for political and commercial purposes. In our area we have seen proliferation for commercial interests. Our developments have nothing to do with this. Our development is for our national security.

Q: Was the U.S surveillance system deliberately fooled by you or was it accidental?

A: (K) – No comment. We have done this job in the required way.

Q: Do we have the technology to gauge the size and power of Pakistan’s bomb?

A: (RC) – Before or after they detonate? Of course we have methods of detecting their tests using teleseismometers. I have no idea of their programme. I have never been to Pakistan. In our tests the waveforms recorded have been confused because the detonations were simultaneous. In fact the American IDC has recorded our tests as an earthquake.

Q: Is the Agni project now to be further developed?

A: (K) – If needed, we can make it in the numbers required. The ranges can be adjusted, if needed for higher ranges.

Q: Do we require more tests?

A: (RC) – I think I will refer you to our Press Statement.

Q: How many seismometers were used and what is our capability to distinguish background noise made from 3 simultaneous tests?

A: (K) – We will not disclose this.

A: (RC) – When we record a seismic signal there is background noise and cultural noise. There is also a limit to detection. In the CTBT this is 1 kT. We have software to distinguish between the waveforms of earthquakes and those of explosions – but may lose by a factor of 2 regarding intensity or yield.

Q: There is speculation that the same site as was prepared for the 1995 tests was used this time. Is this the case?

A: (RC) – At that time I said I do not respond to reactions of irresponsible reports in the media. I stand by this.

Q: Was it prepared afresh from scratch?

A: (RC) – No comment.

Q: After 1974, why has there been a delay of 24 years?

A: No comment.

Q: From your 5 tests you have collected data. Can development now be done within the ambit of the CTBT?

A: (RC) – Good question. But no comment.

Q: Why was testing done in May? Why always May?

A: No particular reason.

Q: What is the commonality to 1974 and 1998? What next?

A: (RC) – This is the next milestone. As appropriate, we’ll tell you.

Q: Is there any change contemplated in the Agni – from solid-liquid to all solid? What is to be the configuration for extended range?

A: (K) – Range can be modified.

Q: How long have scientists been ready?

A: (RC) – Since 1974 we have had the knowledge. The technology and knowledge has been undergoing improvements and refinements.

Q: Did you specifically prepare the tests so that they cannot be detected?

A: (RC) – No.

Q: But not even by the CIA?

A: (RC) – You must ask the CIA.

http://silverstone.fortunecity.com/silver/384/military/fauj.html

Until the detonation of three nuclear tests on 11 May 1998 and the two on 13th May India has previously conducted one underground nuclear test of 12 kilo tonnes at Pokhran in the Rajasthan desert in 1974.
India has now developed a uranium enrichment plant and has 10 nuclear reactors. In 1985 India commissioned the Dhruva reactor, which produces about 2.5 kg of plutonium per year. In 1986 India’s Prefre reprocessing plant began separating plutonium from the Madras facility. Recently, another reactor has been commissioned by BARC in Rajasthan State.
India has also developed delivery systems capable of carrying nuclear weapons. After all, India does need a credible deterrent to protect itself from China and also from Pakistan who have several long-range missiles targeting the Indian cities.
Having shown that India is capable of exploding thermo-nuclear devices has been just one of the many aims. There are many others. The most basic need was to demonstrate that India has the technology to repeat the 1974 nuclear experiment, produce a low-yield device that would be of tactical use and also deploy a high-yield thermo-nuclear device. For Indian scientists it’s not the explosions themselves but the raw data that emanates which is of considerable excitement. Indians have long discovered that the good old partial differential equations can be used for mapping spatial as well as temporal behaviour of materials as well as processes. Parallel computing algorithms (which incidentally, are run on the indigenous PARAM supercomputers, which were designed and developed in India by CDAC (Centre for Development of Advanced Computing), after USA refused to give India the CRAY supercomputer) have also shown that given sufficient computing power and designing of ultra fast data buses on computers, it is possible to emulate in real time entire ranges of physical phenomena. The problem hitherto has been the lack of raw data. It took a few seconds to gather invaluable data for two aspects of the three explosions – one, the behaviour of the detonating mechanisms and the behaviour of the nuclear material. This data will fuel work for thousands of man-days of lab work. It will also obviate once and for all the need for similar tests. India can therefore go ahead and sign the CTBT, after the other Nuclear Powers ratify it. These same class of nuclear weapons need not be tested on Indian soil again.
Pakistan has slipped down in India’s threat perceptions. The conventional Pakistani military machine is run down, including its air force and will not be able to fight a sustained war of 14-days-plus. The Pakistan Air Force in particular will be able to fight coherently for six days if they wish to keep their F-16 assets intact. Thus Pakistan does not want total war with India but at the same time wants to keep open its option for limited war in Kashmir. Just how resolute Pakistan is in keeping the Kashmir war option open became evident following the announcement of the 1500 km Ghauri ballistic missile being tested. Pakistan was determined to keep its option of a limited war in Kashmir open by any means including bluff. This set in motion a trail of thinking that led to the three peaceful nuclear explosions of 11 May 1998.
More important perhaps was the necessity to end ambiguities regarding nuclear/missile capabilities of India. There are credible reports to suggest that Pakistan has acquired some long distance missiles procured from China (and not North Korea), which the Pakistanis has conveniently repainted and renamed (ghauri, shaeen, hatf etc.). These missiles can be armed with the crude uranium fission devices, which Pakistan can manufacture, as china provided it with complete know-how and the equipment for the same. Pakistan needed to be told in no uncertain terms that while it has every right to take steps to ensure its security it must know the peril of endangering another’s security.
India now has been locked on to a course, which no government can reverse. Scientists and the military policy-planning establishment have kept their silence for far too long. Anybody in the future trying to derail the move to develop command and control systems, satellite imagery capabilities and terminal guidance capabilities would be exposed. India, in short, is committed to following the path to full nuclear capability, albeit of a low order. The aim is regional security and not global dominance. India shares with other great democracies the desire to contain the nuclear arms race and prevent global proliferation. It has gone nuclear not because of any sense of misplaced national pride but because of its security environment. India lives in a dangerous neighbourhood and must make it amply clear to the powers in the immediate vicinity that any arms race is futile because it continuously risks escalation. India fully appreciates its neighbours’ steps to ensure their own security. Having said this, India has also sent out the signal that all forms of warfare or the quest for military solutions in the subcontinent will not work.

From the Indian armed forces themselves 🙂
http://silverstone.fortunecity.com/silver/384/military/fauj.html
In May 1989, India test-fired its first intermediate-range ballistic missile, the Agni. It is a two-stage missile with the first stage using the first-stage solid-fuel booster motor of the SLV-3 satellite launch vehicle. The 18-meter long, 7.5-ton Agni has a range of up to 2,500 km (allowing access to southern China) and is capable of delivering a 1,000-kg payload. The Agni is believed to be fairly accurate, employing a closed-loop inertial guidance system. A second successful test of the Agni occurred in February 1994, firing at a sea-based target 1,200 km into the Bay of Bengal.
Recently the 3rd successful flight test of Agni with increased range was carried out. This time the launch was from a portable missile launcher thus validating and proving that the missile is highly manuverable and can be fired from any part of India.
On September 22nd 2000, the Indian Defence Minister announced that a Upgraded version of Agni, called the AGNI – III, with a range of 3200 km. is ready for test firing.
Recent Media reports suggest that Agni – III will have a 5,000 km. range and will be able to carry multiple nuclear warheads, a capability only with USA and Russia till date

oops they forgot China 🙂