crobatoROC (Taiwan) — Small and heavily bordered. Island surrounded by seas, but mainland threat is closeby with straits only a 100km across at its minimum. Ideal fighter type: Small to Medium, preferably twin engined as aircraft fly over seas most of the time. What it got: F-5s, F-16s, M2000s, IDFs. Close to an ideal mix, but personally I think the right aircraft for them are F-18s.
Japan—Archipelago type. Ideal Fighter type: Heavy or Large with plenty of range. What it got: F-1s, F-4s, F-2s, and F-15s. F-4s and F-15s are ideal for this country, but not F-1s and F-2s.
crobatoCanada—Large region, plenty coasts and islands. Preferred type: Large to medium jets with better range. Ideal fighter type—Heavy. What it got: F-18s—medium fighter with short range. I don’t believe Canada has gotten an optimum mix.
Australia—Same like Canada. preferred type: Large to medium jets with better range. Ideal fighter type: Heavy. What it got: F-111s, which is perfect for it and F-18s, medium fighters albeit with shorter range, not too ideal.
S. Korea—Small heavily bordered country (N. Korea) but has coastlines and water zones to protect. Ideal fighter type: Medium to Large. What it got: F-5s and F-16s. What it wants to get: Medium to Heavy fighters, which is what the FX competition was all about where four medium to heavy fighter types competed.
crobatoIt depends on the geographical location and size of the country.
A country that has coastlines or surrounded by water, a country that has a large amount of territory to cover might need larger fighters.
A small country that is heavily bordered with neighbors might go for smaller jets.
There are tons of examples for both.
crobatoBigger planes means more costs per plane to operate. Smaller planes however, means more planes to operate, hence more costs in total.
The larger airforces—US, Russia, China, and India—are the ones often in grips with this issue.
crobatointeresting points. it could be that SAC simply got the upgrade ready sooner then previously planned (cant be that suprising considering the iffy start it got off to with the J11). or the 200 could have just been a ‘guessetimate’ made my janes or someone else that just got spread around and took on a life of its own.
I’m predicting now that China may likely pass the SKM upgrade to do their own upgrade. I think China may also not add to the kits they already have.
crobatowell, the link is to the successful development of some kind of new material vital for SSN/SSBNs (i think its a new radition sheild material but cant be sure). lots of technical terms that i can translate off the top of my head. 😮 might have to try and dig out that old chinese dictionary i have in the attic. :s
as for the quoted bit, well that is very detailed stuff, and could be one hell of a scoop if accurate.
80~100km lockon range and 4~6 simo-engage, very impressive! but somewhat overkill i feel, especially for the J10. its got 11 hardpoints, 2~4 can only be used for small bombs and pods while the centreline one if ususally for a droptank. that leaves 6~8 for AAMs. not sure any pilot would be tht happy using his whole missile load in the first few seconds of an engagment.
also, does china have any AAMs that has a range of 100km?
100km lock on is also the required specs for the FC-1 radar if you like to know.
It’s not really about having a missile that can lock on with that range. That 100km is a nice round figure because the Su-27 has the same lock on range (MKK=110km).
About the radar material that was stuff I’ve seen posted in the Chinese language forums. JL-15 project has been going on for quite a while, and KLJ-4, I’ve seen that mentioned in the forums, and Hui Tong mentioned it in his site. I’ve mentioned the KLJ-4 a number of times in this forum before. I’m not sure if KLJ-4 is the right number, but it is a radar being developed by NRIET institute.
There are two projects here, one by LETRI and the other by NRIET, which will lead to an inevitable standoff where only one will win the contract. My betting is that NRIET might probably win it, at least for the PLAAF contract. A PLANAF J-11 contract would favor LETRI’s offering with its YJ-83 compatibility.
Basically I think what NRIET and LETRI will do is rather predictable. NRIET will take the J-10’s radar, resize and re-watt the antenna to fit the Su-27’s nose, while LETRI will take the JH-7A’s radar, resize and re-watt it likewise. Since they’re just evolving existing designs, the development rate would expectedly be rapid and smooth.
I am both surprised and not so surprised about these happenings. I am thinking that China might go for the SKM upgrade, but it’s not very likely now with these developments. At the same time, it’s reflective of the maturing state of Chinese avionics.
crobatoin regard to the 200 number. well if the whole previous set of ‘rules’ regarding the J11 is now proven invalid, then it could be that the 200 be a minimum number of kits the PLA must buy from russia so that the russians get a good enough return on their design. after that, it could be that the chinese could do what they like.
but still, i think we should not just too quick to new conclusions and wait until we get some more information to back up or overrule what we have thus far.
Hui Tong is saying that the first flight of a new J-11 model is confirmed by the Chinese Aerospace Newspaper.
Don’t know about the others, but I think China is not buying the entire 200. As early as 2000 it was planning to buy only as much as 80 kits, prompting Jane’s to erroneously conclude that China will be making Su-30MKKs after the 80th aircraft.
Pibu has noted in this forum he thinks about 104 kits were delivered.
The last Jane’s article put the numbers of kits around 95 delivered.
Based on the orbats of PLAAF formations early this year, we can account for at least 90. We have three regs with at least 26 aircraft each. Another reg has like five J-11s in it, and fifth has at least 4 J-11s. This does not count J-11 substitutions on other regs for attrition, or experimental versions. The J-11 regs has at least three to four UBKs,but the UBKs appeared pulled out of the 33rd and J-11s were used to fill those holes in the 33rd div in exchange, so the numbers even out.
So it’s possible that China may not need to buy more kits in the future, and they could acquire the Russian engines in a separate contract. They can construct the plane entirely from local materials and use the Russian engine until WS-10A engine is ready. So yeah, the 200 kits is not fixed. We’ll see, and I have a feeling it has already started to happen this year.
crobatoDamn it, Crob!!! 😀
I thought you knew better 😀 !!!
That’s a photoshop!!!
First time I saw it, I thought it was a clever fan CGI and ignored it for the next few days. But then the pictures kept coming…
crobatoNow that’s my ship. The swath ship looks like it’s born from a sci-fi movie.
crobatoFor all their independence rhetoric, Taiwan isn’t backing it up with their wallets. The Kidd purchase had a very difficult time of getting through their parliament interested in budget cuts. You wonder whether they will walk the talk on the Aegis issue.
The ROCAF training budget has recently been cut—their F-16 pilots won’t be going to Luke AFB this year.
crobatoThat’s a new one to me :rolleyes:
There are about a half dozen batteries at the most in China with probably about 200-300 missiles.
Google made a computation of 1000 missiles and over based on past purchases, plus backup stock included on the contract. That’s in the one of the threads in the missile forum. (Guess which). Roughly 1500 is the figure if you include the recent S-300PMU2 purchase, but of course those missiles will only be delivered next year.
crobatoWell sure, it sounds plausible, but how reliable and accurate is that source? We know from PiBu that the Chinese have not purchased the Su-27SM upgrade package, and that the Russians have been attempting to peddle it to them. Why haven’t they purchased the upgrade plan? Well, I suppose that means that they’ve developed an indigenous upgrade program that would either be ready to roll sooner and/or better than the one that the Russians have offered.
Considering that a J-11 is supposed to have flown with a WS-10, I would not consider this information unlikely, as I’m sure the PLAAF is itching to indigenize the Flanker.
The author of the site appears quite detailed and serious about his work, as you can see from the rest. This is not to say that he is perfect, but he seems serious enough on his research.
KANWA is also saying that China has not yet purchased the upgrade plan. Overscan also posted a Russian news article in the CDF saying the same thing. This Russian article mentioned the same reasons quoted in the airforceworld article, that the Chinese are not willing to forego of their investment licensing the avionics components. If you go to the SM upgrade, you would be forced to buy Russian components again for the time being, or be forced to license the upgrade itself, causing additional money investment.
This is in alignment with a very early Kanwa report in 1999 that the Chinese, through the NRIET company for starters, licensed the N001 radar for local manufacture.
In the CDF, and here as well, we have seen a pic of an IRST that seems like a virtual clone of the one in the Su-27.
Overscan has also said that the ECM pod was licensed for manufacture to the Chinese.
So indeed there is indeed consistency in the data that the avionics are to be manufactured in China, or at least inevitably destined to. There is no requirement imposed by the Russians that the Chinese have to BUY the avionics systems from Russia as previously believed. The new interpretation is that China is only buying avionics from Russia only until they mastered the technology and production of said items. This means right from the start, the Chinese do have the right to inevitably install their own avionics of either Russian or indigenous design on their J-11s.
Our entire understanding of the Su-27 agreement needs a massive overhaul. All our previous understanding of the license agreement may need to be tossed down the garbage can.
As for the 200 plane license, it also appears from reading the rest of the article, particularly the earlier paragraphs, that there isn’t a number limit on the license. So where did the number 200 comes from? The contract says that China could purchase up to 200 kits of Russian components to assist them in their production in view that the Chinese may not have mastered the production of key parts of the plane, like the engine. So it’s a purchase agreement, not a limit on the number. If the Chinese mastered all the key techs, including the manufacture of the engine, it is not necessary for them to purchase up to 200 kits, but simply end the purchase of the kits anytime anywhere within the 200 number.
This seems to explain why the Chinese are rushing to get WS-10A in production as early as 2005. It is possible for them to get a completely indigenized J-11 by the end of that year. In the end of this 2004 year, J-11s could be a hybrid of sorts—still flying with Russian made engines, but the radar and fire control systems may already be Chinese in design and manufacture.
The article also mentioned the difficulties in obtaining the license; the Chinese threatened to stop purchases after the first 48 planes. This implies another condition with the license, that in good faith the Chinese must continue to purchase planes directly from Sukhoi even with the license granted. This may explain why the MKK isn’t licensed at all, but is continued to be purchased year after year.
So is this all true? As far as I can say this, our previous understanding of the agreement no longer seems consistent to the evidence and observations we are beginning to see. Once we saw that picture of the J-11 with the WS-10A engines, that previous understanding is shaken right from the very foundations.
crobatoYou should read the article. I need your opinion as the content is quite radical. Radical as in saying “On December 6, 2003, the new J-11 model type made its first flight, featuring new technical material (composite?), a new radar and fire control system, which can use domestic product.” The text goes on to the reasons why China may have rejected the Russian proposed Su-27SM upgrade plan.
crobatoPL-12 or SD-10 it seems.
The old picture does not have rings on the missile located on that same hardpoint.
Note the AAM on the wingtip—it’s a type I have not seen before. I believe it may be a possible scoop—the next generation PLAAF IR-AAM.
This Su-27 model resides in SAC’s company exhibition hall.
The website I got it from has even more “disturbing” news.
http://air.xuexue.net/pla/j11.htm
2001年底中航一集团614所的某型发动机大修线竣工。该配套建设项目于1998年3月启动，2001年5月竣工。614所通过三年努力达到了设计要求。该项目为国家节省了大量外汇。之前该项目已通过了环境保护、消防、劳动安全卫生、财务决算审计、节能、大修线验收、档案管理等各单项验收工作。据信此项目即AL-31F的大修线。
同时，国产的苏-27/歼-11模拟器也已经由沈阳某学院研制成功。据称采用了“空间立体三维成像”技术，以进口的SGI图形工作站为系统核心。2003年4月，经过100小时安全飞行验证之后，完全依靠解放军自身力量对进口苏-27进行的大修顺利通过质量检验。这标志着空军航空修理系统已经初步具备了对苏-27自主修理、持续保障的能力，开始了由主修第一、二代机向修理第三代机的历史性跨越。随着空军航空武器装备科技含量的提高，特别是三代机等新型装备服役时间的延长，客观上要求自主修理、持续保障能力与之相匹配。
2003年12月6日，歼-11新型号由毕红军驾驶完成试飞，标志着该型号的研制工作进入了全新阶段。新11改型采用了大量新技术新材料，航电系统与苏-27相比有了较大提高，雷达火控武器均采用了更为优秀的国产产品。至此国产歼-11基本上可以说是大功告成，只欠国产涡扇即可基本实现全面国产化。下图为沈飞展览上带有霹雳-12主动雷达制导空空导弹的歼-11模型。
在2003年9月闭幕的第十届北京产国际航展上，俄罗斯努力推销其苏-27现代化改造方案。但俄方表示，负责生产苏-27及安装仪器的中方工厂的领导坚决反对签署这一合同，如果在他们所生产的飞机上安装最新的俄罗斯航空电子系统，这些工厂今后就不可能继续为这些设备提供维修和养护服务了。展会期间通过磋商似乎已找到了解决问题的办法。中国一飞机维修企业的经理认为，苏-27的现代化改装不应该在得到授权的那些企业进行，而应在飞机维修企业进行。站长认为，由于歼-11的自行改进计划较为顺利，甚至在部分领域优于俄罗斯的改进方案，我军很可能选择性的在国内厂家和俄罗斯厂家各自提出的改进方案之中抽取最为有效的部分，融合为歼-11最终的改进方案。
国家领导人视察沈飞，参观新型国产战斗机
Now tell me what you think?
crobatoJ-10 model. Not so accurate at that. Lacks the wing blending on the roots, an d the hardpoints should be under the wing, not the wingtip.
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