LmRaptorI gave the Edward AFB definition of the Mach. = “The ratio of true airspeed to the local speed of sound”.
That is exactly the same as what I said.
Mach is a constant or as explained in the book it is “dimentionless”; it is a value on itself as expressed by the effects of compressibility, only airspeed variates depending on atmospheric pressure this gives you a corrected and true airspeeds based on this constant value.
Which means nothing on itself, without athmospheric pressure or altitude with standard atmospher at sea level you canot tell the airspeed and please would it be too much for you to translate on actual aerospacial measures?
Due to a variable air pressure.
NO Mach in itself is a measure based upon a standard and known phenomenons related to it.
NASA. http://www.grc.nasa.gov/WWW/K-12/airplane/mach.html
It is airspeed which is the variable, Mach 1 is still mach 1 regardless of the resulting airspeed it is the appearence of compressibility which physicaly define regimes, sibsonic, transonic and supersonic.
Mach value in airspeed might change but not Mach as a value itself it is based upon a standard atmospheric value, this is how you end up with corrected airspeeds and not corrected Machs.
You have failed to understand what I explained to you ealier. Mach is not a “constant” value for a given airspeed – it is dependent on one thing – local ambient temperature. Airspeed in the Mach equation is constant however – as it refers to the actual distance/time value achieved by the aircraft – and IS NOT related to air pressure. So when comparing aircraft knowing the F-22 can do 1600mph if its true is a perfect figure of merit for comparison to other aircraft.
Here are the equations: Mach = V/a
V = the actual velocity of the aircraft – a constant value.
a = the local speed of sound = Square Root(yRT) with y in air being 1.4 and R being 287 – 2 constants – and T (local ambient temperature) being the only variable measured in kelvin.
If the F-22 is capable of 1600mph then that is a constant V value – and converted to m/s it becomes 711 m/s!
F-22 M = 711/SQRT(1.4*287*T) where T is dependent on altitude. For 11 km up that value is +-M2.42.
LmRaptorI forgot nothing – you failed to understand. Mach is not a constant number and airspeed or velocity of the aircraft is not a variable either.
Mach is the ratio of the aircrafts velocity – in this case 1600mph – to the local speed of sound – the value which is a variable. The fact that the local speed of sound is a variable makes the Mach number a variable value and not constant. Local speed of sound “a” = Square root of (yRT) = Square root of (1.4*287*Temperature in Kelvin – which varies).
LmRaptorThat’s the WHOLE point.
Mach is a constant value, airspeed a variable depending on athmospheric pressure.
“The ratio of true airspeed to the local speed of sound”.
The Mach gives you the strutcural limit NOT the airspeed limit. :rolleyes:
Sorry but what are you talking about?!?!?!?!
LmRaptorMany thanks for the explanations.
But you stated:
Is the ASRAAM engine throttable? Because otherwise the problem is the same whether the aircraft just crossed or is simply “sitting” at 10 hours less than a kilometer away. A missile without TVC won’t be able to turn sharply enough to engage the target (not that it’s a very likely scenario).
No the reason – why I stated it needs to be a crossing shot rather than a close proximity shot is because the ASRAAMs off the rail performance will allow it to point directly at its target from the offset – before it even starts accelerating. So in effect it doesn’t need to maneuver to the enemy but fly straight to it. Once it is inflight and on course – so to speak – the missiles inherent KE advantage gives it better axial translation than any other western AAM – which means it is the hardest missile to dodge once on course. This shows its inherent design philosophy advantages and from all the RAF airmen I have spoken too – they believe it wipes the floor with 9X in any relevant envelope. We will have to see what Blk II brings though.
It can reportedly swing a full 180 degrees off the rail.
Cheers
LmRaptorWell, in case of >90° shots shouldn’t you try to minimize lateral translation?
No – there is no point in minimising translation as it is the measure – of the missiles anti-dodge capability.
I agree. That’s the part where TVC gives an edge, cutting the minimal engagement distance by half.
It is not so much about TVC as about speed – the only reason ASRAAM could be weaker here is because it might accelerate to a point where it is traveling to fast to react… which is what I tried to hightlight with regard to your response below.
I’m not sure I understand. Lock on after launch shots should rely on the trajectory fed in the missile INS, pro-nav is only used once the target is locked by the seeker. As IRIS-T or AIM-9X don’t have an INS as far as I know, this is an advantage for LOAL shots if the seeker can’t aquire the target within a couple of seconds.
Sorry what I am trying to say – doesn’t just relate to > 90 deg shots – I am talking about crossing shots – if the pilot fires within very close proximity of the 2 jets and the missile is then sent straight for where the target is at the point of firing but the 2 jets and the missile cross – resulting in the missile needing to turn 180 degrees – IF the ASRAAM has got to a point where it has accelerated to quickly and is already up to say Mach 2.5-3.5 the resulting arc and turning circle might limit its engagement envelope… if on the other hand it is accelerated slower to turn its body around and then futher accelerated… it will have no problem.. I am just highlighting where this extra speed might become a problem…
On the other hand if the seekers Pro-Nav or the onboard LOAL + missile inertial nav system forces the missile off the rail into the correct trajectory immediately then again it will have no problem…
Cheers
LmRaptorNot at all. I’m simply pointing that intercept at such a large distance is not a proof of a good turning radius.
Physics tell us that even with a 50g acceleration the missile turn radius will still be quite large (>1 km), at close ranges missiles with TVC (IRIS-T, AIM-9X or MICA) will have the advantage.
No mate, you are missing the concept of lateral translation… a missile that pulls 80G at mach 2.5 will translate at a slower rate and a cover a smaller lateral distance than the ASRAAM at Mach 3.5 and 50G… The only part of the envelope that could be inferior for ASRAAM – as I have stated – is within the immediate vincity of the aircraft… i.e. within the first few hundred meters… In most situations this won’t be an issue at all seeing as the ASRAAM has 180 degree off the rail performance.
It might however be an issue in an over the shoulder shot where the two jets cross each other… i.e. whether the Pro-Nav system that handles over the shoulder shots points the ASRAAM in the right direction to where the crossing jet is going or if it points ASRAAM to where it is just before they cross. Then it depends on how quickly the ASRAAM accelerates as it might find itself to fast to turn within the required circle.
Also could you explain why TVC gives them more agility than ASRAAM?
LmRaptorNo. It is the USAF perogative to ‘propose’ to meet the policy objective with their own system level objective in a way they see fit. In your view, as expressed earlier is that the Government is a ‘funder’… which is incorrect, it is a Client, and as such is free to pick and chose the elements within the contractor (USAF) proposals that it choses to pick to fit in with overall policy objectives.
You are correct.
The Government and DoD is an ‘expert’ in how to fulfil military policy objectives, because it sees both the technical military elements as well as those which are outside of that technical view.
You are correct here as well but it is a matter of how well the DoD evaluate the balance between policy and systems of a technical nature. The USAF believe they are wrong in their evaluation in so far as they believe… and in my opinion rightly so… that buying more F-22s now is essential for establishing the degree of aerial impunity over the battlefields of the future that has been enjoyed in the past… and whatever the “outside that of the technical” views are in their mind is largely irrelevant at this stage compared to lacking the hardware to fulfil the air superiority mission.
While this, as you will surely say, is irrelevant, and part of the real world… but systems engineers generally have the view – as do I, hence why my argument generally falls in this camp – that DoD/Gov interference at this system level due to their own misunderstanding of the overall balance between the factors of a technical and non-technical nature have often historically been detrimental to their overall end product that serves their policy. The USAF stick to the fundamentals that have been proven… i.e. their philosophy of AD… while to a degree the DoD are gambling… which is their right as you will correctly say.
The USAF only ‘proposes’ a solution.. it does not have freedom to do as they chose.. if they did they would be given a budget for tasks..not purchases. I agree that the USAF is not requesting further cash, merely a transfer from one purchase to another, one which the Client (the DoD/ Gov) do not agree with.. as is their right.
Fair enough.
And the same politicians are free to agree or not with the contractor’s proposal (USAF requirement….) if they fit into overall policy objectives.
Fair enough.
Agree with the fact that its a recent change…which does not change the fact that the USAF proposal is being watered down….regardless of the why.
Haha, I would settle on the DoD controlled USAF proposal!You may chose not to argue, but it does not mean you have given up that right. If there is any area of doubt about that choice you seek a second opinion…or if the contractor comes up with something you then determine you disagree with you retain the power to instruct a different material.
Yes that is true… but it is almost always better practice – historically/currently/and in the future — to let the contractor solve the problem with as little technical input from the client as possible – even though it is their right – and sadly this isn’t the case here.
The cash is for F-35s.. not F-22s. It requires Congressional (the ultimate Client) approval to transfer cash from one to the other (as far as I can see). The risk is therefore that Congress or the Appropriations Commitee actually retain the fixed 22 number and strike the ‘excess’ 35s from the budget.. a lose/ lose situation for the USAF. And in this climate reducing the Defence budget is a top priority.
It would be more prudent to get more F-22s now… slow JSF testing + evaluation + production… test the system properly so the first 500 airframes aren’t mistake airframes… forget trying to make this the biggest deal in the history of defence… sell the jets when they are ready and not for the sake of making money. If the whole F-35 program gets cancelled relatively early on or reduced massively, then at least they will have 130+ whatever else they would fund in F-22s that are not mistake jets and a fewer number of combat coded F-35s that have benefited from a testing program that isn’t rushed… as opposed to getting 130 combat coded F-22s – where not all will be available due to MC rates being below 100%… and 500 rushed and mistake F-35s and then you have nothing.…You have hit two nails on the head… the F-35 by virtue of its sales potential could be a far more effective tool of foreign policy than more F-22s, plus it buys more votes in the future for politicians…
It could be… or it might not be.
So the narrow part of the Air Dominance policy that requires F-22s to be in place is unchanged, however in overall terms of gaining and maintain Air Dominance over the US Air Space and theatre air space the situation has evolved…
Perhaps – perhaps not. Whether AD – a fundamental policy objective – can be achieved in a high threat IADS environment without sufficient F-22s is again… a… it could be… or it might not be – as the threat will and has, also evolved too… It is the professional opinion of the USAF… that the F-22 in greater numbers is vital… unless you believe that their current stance is their real stance. Their opinion here is more relevant than DoD civil servants.
The USAF has a pot of money for the F-22 and one for the F-35…and it cannot move the cash from one to another without Client approval. If that is not forth coming its tough….
And in that regard the DoD is an expert in how the overall military policies are deemed fulfilled.
That is true… and unfortunately they failed…
Nobody resigned….they got sacked.. a very different beast.
Firing = sacking… they didn’t resign and that is my point.
No.. they sat there fat and happy and were picked off. Had they stuck to their principles they would have resigned when it was clear that they were being over ruled.
That’s not how I would describe it… if anything … that wouldn’t be acceptable and would have brought the USAF/DoD relations into further disrepute… and embarrass a SecDef/President futher… Instead they tried to make the best USAF case in congress…
Cheers
LmRaptorPeter all trade offs with regard to greater speed and acceleration can be translated into greater cost… there is no relevant agility(axial translation) trade off with regard to making a missile kinematically superior – if anything it increases its translational envelope.
The only problem that I could see becoming a small issue is in the very very very close game – a few hundred meters and depending on the shot attempt, ie whether the opponent is crossing your jet – depending on how the missile accelerates and how it utilises Pro-Nav; you may get to a point where the missile accerlerates to quickly to a speed that doesn’t allow for optimum axial translation in the early off the rail game. So I suppose it depends on how controllable the acceleration is – how effective its Pro-Nav is – and only would be a problem in the very very close in crossing shots. Beyond that the greater KE should afford the ASRAAM some of the best axial translation in the business – a vital quality for nailing the high speed interceptors like a Mig-23/F-22 supercruiser or Mig-25 that might not go slow – meaning AIM-9 envelopes shrink to a few miles.
LmRaptorASRAAM is more than just a good weapon – its a world beating weapon – and public source G-ability is rather irrelavent – in the terminal phases these missiles dont pull their max advertised Gs… it’s only relevant for their off the rail performance… and ASRAAM can swing 180 deg off the rail… is faster and has longer range than any other western WVRAAM and can translate in the XYZ planes more rapidly aswell… TVC is effectively another control surface – it’s nothing special – and it loses its authority when the engines run out of propellant.
LmRaptorLook at the inlets on the prototypes….
LmRaptorInteresting…not sure I fully understand how you see the process. I’m guessing here because I do not know how the process had been presented to you, but the step I do is between a Client (say a Government) saying they would like such and such a mission to be carried out, and actually being able to provide a detailed brief of that mission and its critical parameters to contractors (say the USAF). They then develop their technical brief for their specialist sub contractors (say LM).
Yes it is taught like that – but one needs to properly distinguish between a policy level objective (Gov – USAF) and a system level objective (USAF – LM). Air dominance as the yanks now put it was a policy level objective that the Gov/DoD put to the USAF; which resulted in the USAF ATF program, which was a system level objective… It is the USAF prerogative to meet the policy objectives with their own system level objective in a way they see fit… this is their area of speciality as it becomes a very technical issue with an intimate understanding of air ops required. This is not the Gov/DoD area – although they would be advised presumably by ex-Air Force officials…
Exactly but the Client/ Contractor relationship we are dealing with is the Government/ USAF one.
That is the point! This isn’t just a Gov/USAF relationship – we deal with both the policy and the system level objectives here – one is an objective that the government have set out – which requires the AF has sufficient AD /AtG/other missions and fighter recap within a set budget… The system level objective is the way in which the AF chooses to meet this policy objective. Their view has been that they require fewer F-35s within the existing budget and existing policy for more F-22s – what is deemed a more sensible mix in their mind… It doesn’t mean the USAF are demanding budget cash that isn’t there – they are prepared to use existing cash for what they believe better meets this policy objective.
Sadly politicians have a dual responsibility.. to the nation as a concept and to their voters, their own constituents…to do both the interests are often contradictory. Hence detailed procurement issues are a local issue as much as a national policy one.
I appreciate this – but the point is politicians also serve business ventures… which don’t actually diminish what the USAF determine to be their requirement in order to fulfil the politician’s policy!
Agree. The USAF have stated that in order to conform with the DoD policy 381 F-22s are required, with a low risk factor.
You need to realise that, this lingo has only been adopted only now – after a DoD appointee was put in charge of the air force – when the AF leadership was free to publicly voice its own true opinion – there was no risk associated with this decision – it was 381 to get the job done – end of story – that being the requirement.
Interesting view. The DoD are the ones who pay for everything. By that virtue they are allowed to have the final say over every purchase they make. The view of the USAF is only that, it is informed, professionally competent and all that, but there is no obligation (thankfully) for it to be respected if the Government assign greater priority to other issues that over rule the USAF view; in this case its the financial.
Of course, however the USAF is much more versed and capable in assessing and coming up with system level objectives than the DoD! This is a USAF job, not the job of the DoD which by virtue of contracting out to the USAF to come up with the right technical solution for its policies gives up that prerogative in most cases. An example is if you contract a specialist to build you an F1 car – and he deems after analysis that the best alloy for the chassis is X – you as the customer generally don’t argue with him – especially if your overarching objective remains the same and if he can validate and verify the end objectives and requirements. If the objective changes and you have lose 80% of your budget and the cheaper option is required – then yes you get involved – but this isn’t the case with the AF and the DoD – they have plenty of cash that could be used from the F-35 program which is currently as expensive to produce as the Raptor if not more so – especially if they feel they need a slightly more even mix to meet that DoD objective.
OK so the client changes the requirements, for its own reasons.. and the contractor ends up complaining he won’t get all his new toys. I believe that one of the aspects of the real world that University does not teach you is that Clients do that.. and as a contractor there is little you can do to challenge the change in requirements.
Yeah, but has the client really changed the requirements? The same general policy objectives still stand and it’s the USAF view that more F-22s are needed to fulfil this current – existing – Stan/Iraq/Post Cold war requirement! A big money maker is standing in their way of getting a relatively small amount of F-22s to meet what they deem is the best mix for the DoD policy.
Agreed the 243 and 187 numbers are compromises..to take into account the reality that there is a change in policy… ie to not fund it as before.
The AF has stated they would internally fund the F-22 through cash from programs like the F-35 – because they believe it’s the right mix! There is no real financial change in policy – if anything they are getting more money – the problem is the DoD are interfering on the system level side – not really their speciality – for their own agendas, that slap, the USAF assessment of what’s really needed to carry out DoD policy, in the face!
From what I have read the Apollo was the first to cover every aspect of a political object’s deliverables. It covered simultaneous and contemporaneous development of science/ technology/ operations etc to deliver the policy objective. In that regard I would rate it as an Apollo creation.
I remember we had one lecture dedicated to the origins of systems engineering – where my lecturer: http://www.bristol.ac.uk/aerospace/contact/honorarystaff/mrmhempsell/index.html seemed pretty adamant that despite the emergence in other industries… systems eng was born in the aerospace industry with LM becoming the big player at the start… This is about Polaris and PERT… http://g2sebok.incose.org/documents/assets/MSS//Final/sh%20hdbk%202.1.pdf
Agreed… but the truth is the USAF didn’t stick its neck out…
Oh they did – a gagging order and a few firings put that right in short order – though.
The risk of sacking is part of the job… the big boys know it and make their own choice as to what is more important.. getting the job done or getting their job saved.
Or…. in other words sticking their neck out.
Wrong. The Government does know what it thinks is the right solution in its terms, to achieving its policy objectives, that covers the procurement of the equipment it feels is able to contribute to meeting that aim. Whether or not they are ‘right’ is a different conversation.
Yes but the USAF are still the experts – they are the ones with intimate knowledge of how these systems work and operate – a degree of knowledge only gained through experience – hence why setting system level objectives and requirements is a USAF, not a DoD thing. The DoD may think they know – and of course are advised accordingly – but they are advised either by people in the USAF or people with USAF experience – and that includes think tanks…
LmRaptorIn your terms I would be the one who defines the requirements and objectives that you then apply your Systems Engineering approach to…I am the one who defines the requirements you capture. And to be straight with you, you have absolutely no idea about 95% of your job. It’s not a reflection on you, just a reality of the education you receive in both under and post graduate work at University. I cam out of my design based undergraduate, graduate and post grad education with a vast amount of knowledge…yet the reality of being in the industry soon revealed that the real world presents an alternate set of challenges that University has no real grasp of..it’s a fantastic ride so enjoy it.
That is also the role of the systems engineer or at least an engineer who has formal systems training – this is with regard to complex systems such as figter aircraft or space stations for example – and not really an approach thats vital on building things like a FIAT 500. While I don’t have that real world experience you talk of I do believe this is one aspect of the course that is very much in touch with the real world – benefiting from lots of real world examples such as the formal drafts to requirements capture and requirements specifications on projects from from BAE/Astrium. It was a course aimed to streamline the students mindset into what is actually needed for real world projects to succed – with glowing testimonies from former students in the work place.
Interesting perspective… I see the US Government as being the Client, who defines a set of military tasks it wishes to ensure it has at its disposal. It ‘contracts’ this work out to a specialist contractor, the USAF who then provides a list of equipment it deems necessary to do the job. The Client then agrees or not to purchase some/ all or none of the list, as they are the ones who control the money.
The politicians do indeed, in theory step aside once the requirements are set and leave the specialist contractor define how best to carry out the task. The issue is that there are those in Government who do not agree with the opinion given by these experts..they have other advice, from vested interests, from ex-military experts and so froth who provide alternate views. So the politicians are then obliged (because they are elected to represent people) to get interested in the contractor’s proposals…thus clouding the issue legitimately.
The last point is that I would dispute your view that the USAF defines the objective… perhaps on a military level but not beyond.
The thing is the USAF and the DoD/Gov are both clients… but there is a difference.. on a policy level the DoD/Gov is the client and the USAF is the contractor.. the DoD/Gov set the policy objectives and draw up a list of policy requirements with the USAF in toe – a client/contractor relationship that is vital for success. Policiy objectives are very broad in nature and allow room for the USAF on a system level/equipment level to best meet those objectives in a manner they see fit. Which is exactly as you have described it – where the DoD/GoV give the green light….
The politicians getting involved has a long history of failure – it is formally taught in most systems engineering books and there are means to combat it – let the professionals do their job – that’s not to say politicians shouldn’t be interested in what happens – but they do need to understand the ramifications of their tampering.
“they have other advice, from vested interests, from ex-military experts and so froth who provide alternate views.” They also have a whole host of political commitments that often get in the way of pure national security issues or giving the nation the best bang for buck in any field – i.e. the making a lot of money off alternative programs despite the USAF argueing against such decisions at a system level – if the policy objective had changed as in fighter recap – then the Gov would have an argument – but the fact is it hasn’t – they still aim to buy 2456 F-35s – while on a systems level the USAF say they would sacrafice some of those for more F-22s.
I stated the USAF define the system level objectives – when they meet with their contractor – i.e. LM – that being the objective of the F-22/F-35/F-16 that is desired by the USAF who then use these systems to conform to the DoD/GoV policy objectives!
Correct. And that is the key. They might get the job done, in fact they will if all goes well. The USAF at no point is empowered to assume the risk of failure of US policy.
They have done exactly what is asked of them. Once they made it clear it was possible but with high risk they were going to be stuck with that number.No – the problem here is the DoD/Gov are interfering on the system level – instead of doing their job on the policy level – for what ever reason – thus the USAF gripe, as the Gov are trying to play around with their job. The USAF are the ones who take care of the system level objectives and mold them into giving the USAF the best options for meeting the policy level objectives. The fact that the DoD and GoV are getting so involved for their own silly reasons on a system level as highlighted by the sackings of Wynne and Mosley – and the DoD take over from the KC-X, despite the airforce CHOOSING the best tanker – has strained the client/contractor relationship massively at policy level! This has happened again – in this case where the airforce want more F-22s and are prepared to accept fewer F-35s to achieve this… but the DoD get a lot more economic benefits and clout in the aerospace and defense sector if the they opt for fewer F-22s and more F-35s. Not that it’s the right decision in the view of the airforce!
If the USAF is convinced that with 187 airframes they will fail in getting the job done then the statements they have made are at best misleading and at worse negligent. If one of my contractors came back to me saying.. with X I can do the job.. low risk of failure, with Y its medium and with Z it’s a high risk I would hold them to the Z with high risk. If they then said ‘Ah well, we cannot do the job’ then we would be into a negligence situation. I do not read the USAF statements as saying they cannot do the job with 187.
Agreed the simulations and systems analysis have provided the 381 number as a low risk, high success robust option. But it’s only if low risk is a critical factor. AS soon as risk is acceptable the number is therefore completely different.
Oh and on a side note the Systems Engineering approach is not that old.. it’s derived from the Apollo programme and was only applied to US military procurement in the very late 60s and early 70s. In fact the only airframes procured in this fashion are the F-15/F-16 and F-117…they have tried to use it for the tanker programmes but so far have been frustrated. It was not used to purchase the C-17.
But the point here is the USAF is not convinced that they will be able to do the job with 187 airframes… they haven’t stated they can do the job with that number for starters, the study was a generic risk analysis, not associated with any particular job – one that only came about POST Gates getting his hands dirty. Prior the threat library being changed 381 was the minimum requirement… prior to the change in AF leadership 381 was the minimum requirement … after the sacking of Mosley and Wynne a DoD puppet was effectively put into leadership – with a gagging order that shut up all media reports or complaints on the matter – since the AF had suddenly becomes so outspoken against Gates – resulting in the DoD forcibly changing the real requirement on the face of things. But the reality is the AF still wants those numbers – and using the compromise of 243 they are attempting to get more jets as they know if they ask for 381 they will get nothing.
Systems Eng is relatively new but really isn’t an Apollo creation – at least not from what we were taught – the real origins lay in the creation of the B-29+nuke combo and the first system truly engineered in such a fashion was the Polaris SLBM missile – LM are attributed with doing most of the ground work for it in the 50s.. And it has matured ever since to become a vital cog in the design of everything in this league… It’s a vast vast subject and doesn’t just cover what I spoke about earlierI would disagree with your view of how the USAF contributes to the policy objectives. The USAF advises if those proposed policy objectives are achievable and if not defines what is required to make them realistic.. see the SAC development under LeMay or they demonstrate that the objectives needs to be altered.
Now the policy objectives function on two levels.. the policy that is defined and that which is funded. The mission may not change but if the cash is not authorized then the mission the USAF needs to fulfill is automatically altered. Its up to the USAF to make it clear that if the funding does not allow it to fulfill the mission an alternative is proposed or allowed or whatever in order to make it clear to its boss (the Government) that what it is asking it to do is either not possible or has a risk factor applied to it.
As stated above there is a difference between system level objectives and policy level objectives – the Gov set out the policy but the AF use their system level objectives that they set out with their own defense contractors to best meet the Gov policy requirements and objectives..
The facts are the USAF said 381 was the requirement – 243 was the attempted compromise when they realised that the DoD had bigger fish to fry… the politicians then grant the cash based on the two arguments… I trust the air force not Gates and not Obama and not the potential money making machine. The DoD which provides the USAF threat library on which they base their system level requirement analysis – changed the threat for the F-22 alone to get what they wanted.Exactly. The USAF worked on a 381 figure based on its view of the mission requirements. Once the other ‘mission requirements’ became clear it revised it figure; to 243….now the mission requirements have changed again and they have proposed a further figure.
The issue is that it is misleading to concentrate on the military mission and ignore or forget that the military only exists to support political objectives and is only funded to the extent that the current politicians believe the military are needed. The military don’t exist outside that view.. they have no purpose to ‘serve’ anything or anyone else. We know that they protect the ‘people’ in an abstract and theoretical manner, but since the US military are primarily federally funded that is who they serve.
The USAF still want 381 F-22s, 243 was a compromise that attempted to get them more than 187 when they realised that despite their system level requirements the DoD refused to grant them the cash that they believed best fulfilled the policy objectives – the DoD intervened forcibly and things got messy… they never wanted or were satisfied with 243 and now 187 – they want and still want 381 – but they are now lead by a personal appointment by Gates who is following his personal agenda against the wishes of a host of USAF studies – and backed by the realisation that asking for 381 is going to get them no more but asking for 243 might work. The fact is there is foul play at work – in order to push forward other agenda’s that don’t agree with the USAF sentiment on how best to get the job done with regard to the national policy objectives. The fact that they were prepared to take fewer F-35s within their existing budget highlights this – but again they have been blocked by the DoD due to the threat imposed on the money maker…
Agreed. But the USAF mission is to do the job with a more restricted pot of money than the one they had. So the mission has changed, its military component has not altered but its financial one has. Remember money is the best weapon that exists. In fact it’s the only one that does exist.
They were prepared to work within their existing budget – but were stalled by the MIC…
No, 381 was the requirement – it was the minimum and 187 and 243 were and are compromises – the risk analysis were studies to aid in procurement – but its not just about risk, but also fighter recapitilisation. The DoD evaluates the threats and the USAF judges how best to combat them – I find it weird that the threat libraries were changed as Norman gets in… they agreed to it after their top top brass was sacked for getting in the way of Gates… after that Norman is put in to let Gates pull the strings – and pave the way for a business…Risk again. The 381 is low risk.. everything else is higher. But so what? If the USAF is not confident about being able to do the job at all with less then that needs to come thro’.. it does not. So neither 243 nor 187 are figures that should have been provided.
They were provided because USAF leadership was prudent enough to realise that asking for 381 was a no go with regard to actually getting anymore despite their requirement – and the strict gagging order was in force so talking about the whole issue had become very sensitive – Gates had already forced their previous top dogs out of a job because of their opposition.
They USAF don’t choose the wars but they do generally choose the equipment – and how best to conduct those wars – they then request that politicians grant their will… the politicos say yes or no – they don’t provide any alternatives… so the USAF are the experts – the confirmation is signed by the politicos but they don’t magic up a weapon system themselves and they don’t write the objectives or requirements of them and that includes the numbers or how to conduct the job.
The politicians also impose RoE on the military.. sometimes is does so with good input from the experts, at times not…and they certain do ‘magic up’ weapons systems on their own….F-111 for one, Bradley fighting vehicle, M16…all the result of political interference on a technical level of military hardware.
The USAF are not experts in fighting wars. They are experts at the air force aspect of a military campaign. The overall campaign has elements that define objectives and requirements and influence the numbers of aircraft and their employment which at times places massive non-military constraints on how the USAF carries out its actions within the overall mission. That is the key that people tend to lose sight of in this discussion because it diminishes the technical to a very small (but vital) part of a much bigger system that is required to actually conduct military operations in support of political objectives.
They interfere but it still boils down to an engineering – contractor / client – USAF or service relationship.
They are not experts at fighting wars but they are experts at procuring what is necessary for policy objectives to be met… something the Gov/DoD aren’t.
Cheers
LmRaptorI’d go with ASRAAM any day… it’s got tremedous translational potential due to its big motor and no fighters going to out maneuver it… especially with its top end ability off the rail – only real place it needs to pull massive G to hit something.
LmRaptorYou misunderstood.
For the money you spend on one F-22 for it’s entire lifetime, you could get 3-4 F-35s.
This is how.
1. At over $150 mil for each F-22, you get two F-35s.
2. With the cost savings for the lifetime costs of the F-22, you might get another one. The pilot training and salary costs are in this category also.
3. If you took funds from the F-35 program to pay for a F-22, the cost of the remaining F-35s increases to the point of almost reaching another airframe.
So in total, if you took funds from the F-35 program to pay for, and maintain for a lifetime, a F-22, your total lost F-35s would be 3-4 airframes.
Nope I didn’t misunderstand – WLCC includes procurement and all costs associated with a product throughout its lifecyle.. including disposal and looking at advanced studies for replacements – or at least good WLCC does..
You still haven’t explained to me how 1 F-22 WLCC = 3-4 F-35 WLCC, as firstly you don’t know the price of the F-35s yet – we are currently flying prototypes not full production models… All the prices associated with F-35 are estimates; so its premature to judge that it will be around half the flyawy cost of the F-22.
In addition I don’t see where the cost savings of the F-35 through its life cycle costs vs the F-22s lifecycle costs amount to getting another F-35 let alone supporting its lifecycle costs – firstly I assume it’s more of a hunch on your side and secondly if it were true – procuring another F-35 is useless without the cash to support it and its 2nd pilot.
LmRaptorLm..
1) This is the reason why you are still missing the point. You are thinking of solving a problem. Reality is rather ‘is the problem the right one to be solved?’
I spend my working life making sure Clients do have a well defined problem to resolve; and that the means to solve it are realistic. I take the problem they have and work with them to make sure it is what they want solved and that the means to solve it are rational and realistic…Then it goes to specialists like yourself to provide a detailed solution.Hey michelf, I understand where you are coming from and respect your opinion and knowledge… Yet I don’t know what industry you work in or what level in the system procurment process you are at.. so I won’t speculate… but I will tell you what I do know. As part of my degree course – we do the core Aerospace research in things like aero/fluid/thermo – dynamics structures and materials – engineering mathetmatics – flight dynamics/mechanics and a whole host of other things etc. But in addition to such things we also are trained in Systems Engineeering – infact it’s got a very large emphasis on my degree course – being taught my a rocket scientist from Astrium/BAE… this as I am sure you are aware deals with the whole engineering process thats required to mature a machine thats to complex for anyone person to understand into something that meets its requirements and objectives – in short… thus I feel I have a decent understanding of how the whole process works from requirement capture/generation – concept generation to detailed design, verification and validation – so I wouldn’t say we just specialise, as far to many programs have died due to a lack of Systems knowledge…
2) The issue is entirely there. The USAF, pressured etc as you wish it, has stated on the record that the job can be done at a high risk of failure, with 187 airframes.
How the USAF got there is irrelevant. They have reached a point where they state they can do the job with 187. Yup there is a high risk of failure, of problems; whether or not its acceptable is not a USAF call to make, it passes to the politcians.Where we differ here is our definition of the customer… I believe when it comes to procurement the USAF is the customer and the politicians are effectively the bank – a bank with the same goal as the airforce in that they serve the public and therefore work together – but in short the politicians leave it upto the airforce to decide how best to meet those objectives and requirements of serving the public within a budget that the politicos can handle – the USAF on a systems level define the objective and therefore the requirements – with the number of airframes being one of those requirements – that they want from any weapon system.
With that in mind I think we need to understand that the study conducted isn’t an indicator of can the USAF do the job like you claim but rather risk analysis of the choice to procure 187 vs 243 vs 381… in your mind the 187 is a point where the USAF think they can do the job – but its not – its just a pointer or gauge for the politicians to know that its the cheaper but a higher risk option – that the USAF might get the job done if the threat is low but they might not if its high.
The USAF’s system level requirment generation process has lead them to conclude that 381 is the REQUIREMENT to sufficiently replace the F-15s and retain the level of capability that they had for protecting the US and its other missions – a capability they will lose with 187 F-22s only – when making this decision they take into account the impacts the low numbers have on maintenance/cost/upgrade potential/aircraft life etc – which are lost on the politicans – hence why this has been the system used forever.
Although the politicians joinlty with the USAF determine the airforces overall objectives, the fact is they have not changed those objectives yet – they are still required to provide the capability they had and improve on it – and its more a question of the right F-22/F-35 mix – a technical system level decision (a USAF decision – since the objective remains), not an overarching political decision (to change the objective) as to the role of the USAF. If congress or the DoD say no – its not because the requirement has changed – it is because they do not have the funds or they are wrongly getting involved with the USAFs actual work of defining the system level obectives and requirements to best meet the politicans goals – perhaps because there is a big business to capitlise on and to defend the interests of the people they serve?
The facts are the USAF said 381 was the requirement – 243 was the attempted compromise when they realised that the DoD had bigger fish to fry… the politicians then grant the cash based on the two arguments… I trust the airforce not Gates and not Obama and not the potential money making machine. The Dod which provides the USAF threat library on which they base their system level requirement anaylsis – changed the threat for the F-22 alone to get what they wanted.
3) The job the USAF has to do is the one that the politicians define as their job. They are the ones, via the DoD, who establish the job and are free to alter it in line with political realities they view as important.. not the USAF view. So what if the threat library was only altered in order to kill the F-22? This is where you need to understand that the procurement of military equipment is not a military process, its political. The politicians define the job they want the military to do.. that changes over time regardless, over changes in the political landscape, individual agendas etc. Nobody, certainly not the USAF can say with any degree of ‘correctness’ that it needs 187/243/381 F-22s to do ‘the job’ when it becomes necessary to do it. All they can do is say that if we create these scenarios as reasonable rational ones we would need X,Y,Z airframes. The experience of the USAF lends credibility to those numbers associated to those scenarios. The issue is how realistic are those scenarios…and there the USAF is looking at its informed crystal ball.. just as the politicians are and they might be giving different answers, neither might be correct…
The point as I have stated above – is the objectives are still the same – the politicos have the same broad agenda of recapilitilisng in the tactical fighter fleet – but on the system level the USAF who have to carry out the goals of counter insurgency vs. tactical/strategic warfare would still rather get fewer F-35s and more F-22s… which has been documented on many occassions. The USAF doesn’t really care if the F-35 becomes a 400 billion dollar procurement deal for LM, Congress and gives the DoD world wide clout – what the USAF care about is how they want to carry out the mission laid out for them – and 381 has always been the number – not 187 or 243.
4) 381 was a requirement to do ‘the job’ with a high level of guarantee that it would be done (low risk). I do not recall it ever being the minimum required to do ‘the job’ with a low level of guarantee (high risk). The USAF has done its work and given options (as they were instructed to) and the politicians, whether you like it or not are the ones who make the call on the level of risk they want to assume….not the USAF.
So the 187 is the requirement with a high risk. Again the USAF has been asked its professional opinion and the risks associated with it. That has been given, those empowered to make the call have done so in line with the advice given. Reason and rationality be damned.. how the 187 figure was beaten out of the USAF is immaterial, they have agreed to it, with all the caveats you want, the brass in the USAF did not but ‘cocks on blocks’ about this so somewhere along the lines the number is acceptable.
No, 381 was the requirement – it was the minimum and 187 and 243 were and are compromises – the risk analysis were studies to aid in procurement – but its not just about risk, but also fighter recapitilisation. The DoD evaluates the threats and the USAF judges how best to combat them – I find it weird that the threat libraries were changed as Norman gets in… they agreed to it after their top top brass was sacked for getting in the way of Gates… after that Norman is put in to let Gates pull the strings – and pave the way for a business…
I understand what you are saying. However its as refered to 1) above.. ooo it’s a tough job…how are we going to do it? I’d say.. tough job..is it the correct one? On a number of levels the F-35 is an answer looking for a relevant question.
All I argue is that F-35 is a program that is challenged beyond F-16… it’s relevance is a different topic – one I’m not decided on yet.
5) History… the F-22 and F-35 are planes for a future that has long since evolved.
The definition of both programmes had their genesis to fight the USSR. Now there is absolutely no doubt that VLO airframes in good numbers are a vital asset to have within the fleet. But to create the primary fleet as VLO airframes…that is far harder to justify. We can say..” but we are planning for the future”…how far into the future? It could be argued that there is no credible threat that justifies a majority VLO fleet for the next 25 years. Equally we could create rational scenarios that state it’s a requirement to be able to do this job or that one. The reality is that the only threat that is real is the current money threat.. it is here today and will be resolved today.A valid argument – one I don’t have a problem with yet – and it largely depends on how effective the survivability and lethality of enemy SAM systems have become.
6) The F-22 brings capability that is not required right now. Many would argue it will not be needed for a long time and certainly if there is a need the current fleet will do the job.. aided by other assets. Others will have their own view. Who is correct? The only ones with the answer; right or wrong are those with the money. Your snapshot of who provides the answer is very enlightening. The answer is provided by the politicians…nobody else. Going into Iraq and Afganistan is not a military choice.. it’s a political one. The politicians deceide which battles to fight not the ‘experts’….so lets agree that politicians are often not experts at very much…
They USAF don’t choose the wars but they do generally choose the equipment – and how best to conduct those wars – they then request that politicians grant their will… the politicos say yes or no – they dont provide any alternatives… so the USAF are the experts – the confirmation is signed by the politicos but they don’t magic up a weapon system themselves and they don’t write the objectives or requirements of them and that includes the numbers or how to conduct thay job.
Cheers
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