I’m just struck by what appears to be the smug complacency displayed by Boeing…ok the USAF changed the requirement to something favouring a larger aircraft during the process…but it appears that there was no protest from Boeing about this at the time only when they had lost…..was their attitude “hey,who cares what the specification says they’ll buy from us whatever” ?

Hmm..

The criteria were expanded to allow the larger airframe’s potential to be quantified and hence evaluated in the same way as the other aspects of each bid. It was not changed to ‘favour’ a larger airframe. Certainly from the open sources the other criteria, such as footprint, gronud loading, runway requirements were not altered in a way that would favour a larger airframe…

At the time Boeing was perfectly entitled to change the base airframe on which their bid was based in order to exploit this. It is therefore safe to assume the Boeing rerean their base airframe selection in see how this new scoring source could be maximised.

That they chose to retain the 767 base implies that when the analysis came back the additional points a 777 airframe would score on this new criteria were outweighed by losing points in the other categories. The reality is that on balance the 767 airframe offered the best solution that Boeing had to offer.

The USAF disagreed.

Now in political terms the choice is very different.

(BTW it would have been interesting to explain that the new tanker was unable to use its full load capability when operating from either Mildenhall or Brize when based over here…)

Peter is giving you good advice, which needs to be heeded.

However it is worth investigating if there is a specific land use allocation (via Planning Consent) to this ‘private car park’. If there is a consent on that land for it to be used as a car park it might be worth digging out the consent and making sure of it.

Depending on where it is it might ‘just exist’ and be used as a car park, even marked out etc yet completely illegal. It would therefore be a shame to attract undue attention to the same by locating an aircraft on it. These ‘illegal’ car parks are plentiful and very handy…

A private car park may or may not be subject to conditions which limit the type of road vehicle that may be parked upon it.. often there are specific limits to avoid attracting HGV and caravans for example. (Moggy, your Ferret, even tho its a big old thing was still a road vehicle and a small one in truth, so parking it on the street or car park was never an issue.)

However there are two issues that will be difficult to get over…
1) A Plane is not generally considered as a road vehicule and so parking one where these are permitted is generally frowned upon. Even a small jet fighter is larger than even large cars (Folland Midge excepted)….
2) Running it will definitely get unwanted attention almost regardless of location; if off an ‘aviation activity permitted’ airfield. Doing so on a car park will be an issue.. as the Environmental Health Enforcement will be a tad more difficult to deal with than Planning, as will the Police when they turn up.

So do some home work on what the potential location can actually permit, remember asking for this information does not mean talking to asking anyone for an opinion etc.. if there is a consent it should be findable and nobody can question you as to why and certainly you cna say anything you want to them in responsse.

Once you have done this you can then take a view on any options that you may have…

Spectre,

Good link, thanks…but did you miss the bit that the figure quoted was an ‘average’ and that substantial discounts were possible for large orders and the lauch customer….?

So being the launch customer means the ‘average’ figure will be discounted…by how much….it varies of course… but a ball park figure.. 10%.. 20% or more…some have been sold with upto 45% ….

So factor in that the cost is less than the $173 quoted…plus a few $ in flying boom, extra tankage etc.. and the $220m per copy (plus training material perhaps) is not completely un reasonable…remember the basic airframe has flown, has off loaded fuel etc. which give shte price a grain of reality..

Factor in the lower labour cost in the US.. than heavily unionised France.. and you never know its not a mad figure.

(Remember the KC-767 that has flown is a -200 based design, the KC-X proposalmixed a 200 fuselage with 300/ 300ER wings and other bits and pieces and has not yet flown in that format. Perhaps it is a seamless design, but perhaps not.

Aucrov…

The 767 is 30% ‘overseas’ content at best…as fuselage barrels are made in Japan and the verticla sta bin Italy.. so its hardly a 100% American aircraft. This plays heavily on the ‘technical/ industrial’ part of the evaluation, not in the media for sure…(BTW the NG proposal is 40% overseas content).

Boeing were hoping that the programme would ‘create 8,000’ new jobs in its plants however the loss of the programme does not mean job losses now, only planned run down when the 767 line closes in 2012.. if nothing else changes between now and then…so the job losses are a potential event in the future.

The NG plant promised 3000 jobs i the new assembly plant (not certain where you obtained your figures) for the KC-45A programme, plus 3000 for the A33F assembly line as well, so a total of 6,000 or so new jobs being created in the next 4/5 years. Politically the gains in one are to be balanced against the loses in the other.

This does not count the jobs being created as a result of the entirely new assembly plant etc etc….in the area. So its 8,000 jobs in Alabama or 8,000 jobs in WA and Wichita…which is better?

As for ‘national’ purchase…its an somewhat difficult to enforce… especially as even if the 767 purchase had gone ahead, some 30% by value was going overseas….hardly national…especially as it potentially includes Chinese parts (as does the A330…) so nationality is a moot point. Remember that boeing really made a big deal of the overseas content of the 767 airframes at hte time, and the RR engine option….making ti a truely internationla airfraem, yet now it is seen as a US product.

Several studies of the ‘value’ of the sigle source UK designs that have been developed over time, the rationale being that the investmetn was worth it to maintain skills/ employment and so forth.. the overall conclusion was that in financial terms it would have been less expenisve to provide the entire company work force with 100% pensions for hte rest of thier naturla lives than the investment in the program. In term sof moving skills forward there was ‘some validity’ however it was an extraordinarily high price to pay for those skills and experience. But politcally it was the correct thing to do at the time. In the same way this tanker decision may be viewed as the correct political thing to at the moment…it can always be kicked around and maybe changed later…to say nothing of the follwo on KC-Y and KC-Z programmes, due to enter service in 2023 and c2033..so we can see a KC-Y competion launch in say 2015…

Its been a while since I visited but you should be able to manage both…

Even with toruble and strife…

La Couple is a full-on museum and is the one to ensure she comes to visit inside…it really is an amazing space etc ..well worth it.

The Blockhaus is very different, it takes far less time as there is (was) far less museum aspect to it, its more a walk thro the bunker and woods to see the expanse of the thing…should take far less time and if the weather’s good a nice walk.. or she can grab a sunny spot…;)

We took these in after a week of general D-Day visits and even so she was only baulked at the last minute..

Worth a try…

In terms of the Typhoon pilots being along for the ride I’ll conclude that my own conversations with the pilots who manned the QRA F-4s, F6s and F3s provide a more reliable and accurate source of information. It’s is from them that the scenario is established, so our personal opinions are moot.

Your view of the capabilities of the AMRAAM is correct, however the fact that they can does not mean they do…the fundamental issue is there. I am certain that everyone involved is fully aware of the potential…and tries very hard to do ensure that risks are contained.

As to risks… is a Bear in international airspace on a non convergent track a threat? Not until or unless it releases weapons and to be honest even in these times that risk is slight.

So lets see an SR approaching the Soviet airspace at M3.2, its present course would take it directly into the sovereign airspace is less of a threat; if so then why did the air defence troops feel the need to ‘lock –up’ a potential intruder.. if the threat was so low and the interception was not ‘live’.. just practicing no doubt. I also seem to recall that when the SRs were on operational missions they had not yet retired, and that after 1990 no SR left the US or carried out another operational mission: good use of smoke and mirrors as a debating tactic.

I love the implication that ‘because it’s a Cessna’ it’s no threat….yet you clearly imply that American airliners flying in the US 14 years later were obviously a threat. No doubt there were clear indications that there was a risk that airliners would be hijacked and used in such a manner before hand, amongst the many other threats and risks being considered and evaluated…its separating the wheat from the chaff that counts… and the PVO had no way of doing so… it has been implied that the KAL 007 incident had created a level of ‘trepidation’ in the PVO WRT to civil aircraft that they were only to happy to get rid of the problem…. I am certain however that even a couple of pounds of HE in the Kremlin, causing minor material damage would have terminated the lives of the senior PVO leadership….to say nothing of the MVD leaders.

The same if spying gear had been found…your argument that ‘its only a Cessna’ and ‘no gear was found’ are great post- rationalisations of what a monumental ****-up. In the same way the non interception of the now hijacked airliners represented a massive flaw in the Us air defence network. The fact that there was no plan to intercept airliners within the US after such an occurrence was demonstrated and the consequences paid….and still being paid. In the circumstances it is not completely surprising that there was this gap, the gap in the USSR’s provisions were less ‘natural’ at the time.

Agreed Rust flew from Finland.. now so used to thinking of Estonia etc as independent nations rather than ex USSR…nevertheless 650 km over USSR at c.100 knots is a good few hours….

As to the KAL incident… Just for the record in 1983 when the incident took place the USAF had a total of 4 747 type airframes in service. These were E-4A command and control aircraft based at Offutt AFB, and at the time were limited to ConUS daily operations with one following AF One when it was taken overseas. It is inconceivable that the Soviet Air Force were unaware of this and that they knew exactly were Reagan was at the time….There are now a grand total of 7 (seven) 747 type airframes in US military service, 4 x E-4B, 2 x VC-25A and 1 x YAL -1. Three roles are undertaken, Airborne command and control, Presidential/ Executive transport and airborne laser test vehicle. Clearly a large number of 747s in service doing loads of different things… in 1983 there were 4 doing one thing…But again good diversion tactics….

CIA use for spying….what a hoot…..sources please. To even bring this as a straw man argument is beyond comprehension.

Not only did the pilot of the Flagon fire no tracer rounds.. so how the hell would the crew of the 747 see them? there is no corroborating evidence from other airborne airliners or ground sources etc of the Soviet radio calls to the 747….In addition the pilot knew the aircraft was civil type, recalling that he saw two rows of lit windows and that the lights were flashing…..but as his testimony confirms he ‘knew that is was easy to convert a civil airliner into a spy plane’…

So clearly he knew he was shooting down an airliner, exiting Soviet airspace. He was also somewhat indignant that the shot down could have been the result of him mistaking the 747 for an RC-135….its his professional reputation on the line. It brings to mind the KAL incident in 1978 where the same airline did the same thing and was shot down…this time the aircraft was not destroyed, and no evidence of ‘spying’ was found. Not to say that 007 was not spying, just the conclusion that it was over denied airspace therefore it must have been spying is erroneous.

But as you say it was off course and over very sensitive installations.

The West’s provocation’ was indeed well known.. as were the Soviets’ provocative acts in others areas of the ‘cat and mouse’ game. Neither was innocent of such brinksmanship, so painting NATO as the bad guys belies bias.

The parallel between the use of light aircraft to smuggle drugs into the US and Rust is interesting. Whilst you may well intend for the reader to conclude the US air defence net is just as incapable of shooting down light aircraft because of this the reality is slightly different. Of the many of light aircraft flying between the US and its southern neighbours a few are indeed used for illegal purposes. However the number of light aircraft entering the Soviet Union airspace is ‘somewhat’ lower, was it not? So whilst absolutely correct that they do come in illegally into the US, they are not as ‘easily identified as being illegal amongst the others that are perfectly legal, hardly the case with Herr Rust? He was not exactly hidden amongst the other Cessna, Piper and other light aircraft drivers pottering about the sky that day was he? Again a good straw man argument.

You are of course right in that that the SR used its deliberately designed and developed sideways looking sensors to look in denied territory without entering Soviet airspace. However to then link the fact that no SRs were shot down by the Soviets as a sign of how ‘law abiding’ they were is illogical. Its is but one reason for not doing so, the other being they were unable to do so in a manner that would guarantee success.

As for implying they were trigger happy, its your inference on what I have written. Your need to deny that is symptomatic of your own perception that they were regarded as such.

Satellites are indeed even less vulnerable, but whilst ASAT weapons were demonstrated and tested, the unilateral and bilateral bans at various times ensures it’s a valid assumption to exclude them from the debate… again good diversion tactic…

If we take your facts…. A 180 degree turn needs 70 km, OK, assume a speed of M3.2, that 3,920 km/h. If the SR begins to turn at the 70km mark it’s is 61.2 seconds from the ‘denied’ airspace. As a 90 degree turn is all that is needed to go from a perpendicular approach to the line to a parallel track and the mid point of a 180 degree turn is 90 degrees we can use the same figures for a ‘180 or 90’ degree track change.

So we have a window of about a minute between the SR reaching its turn point and incursion… I‘m willing to bet that the interceptors were in place, SAMS lined up and ‘locked-on’ so that the instant it came closer to the denied airspace on a ‘penetration course’ the fire order was to be given….that way by the time actual contact or proximity was made the SR ‘would’ have been in denied airspace.. to believe otherwise is to imagine the Soviet Union was prepared to allow incursions.

As for the risk to Bears… hmmm your opinion is your own, however I think that shooting down an Bear in international airspace flying along a course that does not intercept with UK sovereign airspace is completely different…had they had a history of aiming directly for the airspace then the parallel could be drawn, but they did not, so the parallel is only tenuous at best, disingenuous more likely….

And to cap it all the final paragraph.. a kill was’ probable, not guaranteed’…so whilst the 25 and 31 were designed to shoot down the SR; even with all of the parameters which favour the interceptor, such as known presence, early warning of launch etc it is only ‘probable’ that they would have shot it down. This is exactly my hypothesis… it was probable but not guaranteed….which leaves sufficient doubt as to how reliably the 25 and 31 could actually have intercepted it.

As for the radar track versus radar track game… I wonder how much radar tracking would have remained ‘untouched’ for examination, the Soviet one would have shown the SR in denied airspace, the NATO or unaligned ones the contrary, as you say stalemate, but the message would have been sent and the public, at least on this side of the argument would have forced a more ‘respectful’ approached to it….hence a win for the Soviets… those sideways looking sensors would have seen less…

On balance… still favours the original hypothesis…the Soviet Union had far more to gain than to lose in doing so…

Those always believe that the US/NATOare the biggest baddie on the block will always be blinded by bias and unwilling to see beyond it…those who see that both were capable of deceit, disinformation and hypocrisy will be able to stand on the shoulders of those giants to see beyond the it.

Sean,

An F-12 flying a CAP pattern? Interesting point of view. Physically there is of course no reason why it should, not, save as you say, the comfort of the crew and more importantly the nitrogen capacity.. loafing around subsonically in a really low efficiency part of its flight envelope goes against the grain..but its possible.

I think you’ll find that ‘by design’ it was intended to minimise the time spent subsoncially and transit thro to M3 cruise as quickly as was mission compatible in order to fully exploit the design…which was recon primarily. I’ll need to read up again on the F-108 proposals to see what they were aiming for…

As to the range at 2.83….better than any other operational interceptor? 😉
seriously not quite certain how that exact figure fits the picture…in reality is it not the range of the MiG 25 in the M2.5+ speed range that is important? That differentiates it from the F-15 say and gives us a yardstick with which to measure. We know its range at very high speeds was far lower than that of the F-12, but that comparison is not valid, again I’ll need to do some more F-108 research to see where they were going with that…

Gary B,

Please don’t assume you have any idea what ‘my problem’ is or not.

Also your example displays a remarkable a shallowness and disregard for facts. Your admission that ‘you assume the Typhoon pilots go thro all the steps short of launching missile’ confirms it.

Lets look at Bear intercepts shall we?

1) They take place in international airspace
2) There is a mutually agreed proceedure for the aircraft joining up.
3) There is an agreement that neither party trains its weapons on the other, this includes no stern conversion from the interceptors and the tail guns (if relevant) are pointing upwards. This ensures all parties know that its a ‘peaceful intercept’.
4) No radar lock-on.

All of this is used (or certainly was during the Cold War) to ensure that ‘accidents’ did not happen.

So in the instance you use the fundamental parameters are entirely different.

However it serves as a good example of how both sides use their aircraft to ‘send’ messages. The UK is demonstrating its capability to intercept the Bears at a distance and by shadowing them until they are heading away from the UK that the intercept range could be greater…the Soviets are showing how close they can get before intercept occurs, and that they could well have reached a launch solution for their armament prior to interception. Both sides are maintaining their position and in addition trying to expand their knowledge. It is a game of ‘cat and mouse’, each side trying to gain a slight upper hand each time.

So lets look at an SR mission..

1) No agreed rules of intercept
2) No agreement to not assume a threatening position
3) According to you they were regularly ‘locked up’.

So it is hardly comparable is it?

Lets also look at the SR flight. The missions, say over the Baltic, were considered ‘combat missions’ as they were carried out ‘live’. The ground controllers on the Soviet side were not ‘practicing’ their work, they were doing it as if they were facing a ‘real’ hostile. They knew, from experience that it was likely the SR would turn parallel to the international airspace boundary, but there was no guarantee. So they reacted as if the target was fully hostile, launching interceptors whilst the SR was still heading directly at them. The nature of the intercept changed once the SR had turned and established its new track.

Another fundamental difference is the proximity to the boundary on international airspace. The SR flew far closer to the limit than the Bears do…increasing the ‘risk’ factor on both sides. The SR, whilst enjoying a very accurate nav system, was deliberately flying as close as possible, pushing the limits. Either the MiG pilot or the ground controller could have made the call that the SR was within their airspace..According to their information the SR may well have been within Soviet airspace..a call unlikely to be made on a Bear intercept due to its fundamentally different nature.

You are however correct about the AAMs being part of the integrated system. The pilot was far more restricted in his ability to determine a launch, depending far more on the ground controller for both launch information and permissions. The SRs played on this as they knew the GC radar was more likely to be showing them as still in international airspace hence reducing the likelihood that a pilot determined they were intruders and acting accordingly.

Your point about keeping the capability secret is interesting. Certainly there would be advantages in keeping it secret, however perhaps the SR was ‘holding back’ and had additional performance which would negate any experience the MiGs had acquired in all these intercepts….so both were playing their cards close to their chests…however I think that after 1973 and certainly by 1976 the entire picture changed as the US was far better informed of the threats. On the other hand one can imagine that the Soviet advisors in Vietnam took great interest in the data from the SR missions there to refine their information.

As for your view of ‘combat’.. I would suggest that both sides treated an SR flying in the Baltic as a combat situation. The SR crews certainly viewed is as a ‘real operation’ and it would be logical to assume the ground controllers viewed the approaching target as a genuine ‘hostile’. Until the SR turned and adopted its new track it was a combat situation….and unlike the Typhoon pilots it would appear that they did carry out all the actions save missile launch.

‘An Act of War’…..Let’s see.. a high speed recon plane shot down at say 0.5 miles into international airspace, travelling a M3+…not exactly a tough call to defend.

Perish the thought that it might actually be a mistake and an interceptor pilot actually cocked it up, afterall his missiles are locked on…launching them is not exactly impossible. (just look at the incidents where RAF Phantoms shot down Jags during practice bounces, of USAF fighters downing their own etc..) It does happen. However adopting a more cynical approach one can easily see how that genuine mistake scenario could have been used as a smoke screen for a deliberate incident, and trying to prove it would be almost impossible.

Again the real value of the Rust incident escapes you. You are right, a Tornado would have been a different threat, but it does not mean that the communications, the control and the reactions, the decision making would have been any better, any faster and an intercept any quicker….

As for your Osama comment, well ‘straw man’ comes to mind. He has no assets and considers his own demise as martydom… the Soviet Union prized its own assets considerably and its leaders treasured their own lives.

Let me reassure you that I do not have the power to ‘send messages’ that result in people’s physical death, but certainly what I do involves exactly the same mind games and strategic positioning that is involved. Its about reducing the other side’s options, forcing them to behave the way you want them to, to give you the results you want.

Chrom,

Whether or not you believe the basic western philosophy of quality over quantity is irrelevant. It was there, regardless of you. It is the reason why the West’s war machines grew exponentially in complexity, potential capability and so forth to the extent that their cost reduced the numbers that could be afforded. Read up about John Boyd…..Why do you think the F-16 was developed? Because the F-15 was too expensive to procure in the numbers that were needed. Its overall numbers a confirmation that the balance between cost and capability is very palattable to many.

The issue of the carriers is the same. The USN wants 16 carriers, but they can only afford 12. When you actually look at how many are at sea at any one time it just about fulfils the US’s stated desires to have global presence. If they could afford more they would have them..

Certainly the notion that the US buys as many as it needs is routinely demonstrated to be false. But that is the subject for another thread.

You perception that the SR was not the pinnacle of technology is incorrect. On so many levels it represented a global high water mark in technology. From materials to systems to its sensor suite, it was the very best the US could achieve at the time of its design and construction. There is enough there alone to justify its own thread….

Shooting down an SR is a publically ‘low key affair’, as I said shoot downs happen by accident, as do real accidents, the Orion/ Flanker incident in China, all of which result in a relatively low impact public outcry, but a far more serious military message; so the PR value of an SR shoot down is low, its military message value is very high.

Conversely sinking a carrier has a massively high negative PR cost…to say its an ‘accidental sinking’ would have had implications that affected the Soviet’s strategic importance. To use Gary’s ‘Act of War’ analogy the deliberate sinking would have resulted in retaliation, again affecting the Soviet’s strategic influence and on a more basic level the continued existance of the leadership..the loss of life woudl guarantee it, added to which the nuclear element on both sides would amplify the issue beyond the protagonists.

As for your insistance that no sane message could be sent by shooting down an unarmed recon plane in international airspace its all matter of risk and benefit…afterall shooting down a clearly marked airline 747, even if many miles off course does not exactly naturally fall into the ‘sane’ category, yet it happened and which ever reason you put to it it remains that an armed, clearly marked airliner was shot down.

Yes I know it was off course, had overflown highly secret bases etc etc.. but I don’t recall the US downing the Aeroflot airliners wandering ‘lost’ over airbases in the north east US at relatively low altitude.

But the message sent was clearly understood by all, civil and military alike.

As for the later higher tech Soviet weapons…indeed some are comparable and in many ways ‘better’…but its totally irrelevant. The West adopted the quality over quantity decades before this…and have maintained it to date. That others have changed their stance is noted but has not changed the US’s stance….in fact one can argue that this increasing quality came at such a high price that the type of regime that created it was no longer sustainable and has now been replaced.

Seriously Chrom, Gary…your reactions are those of people trying to defend something has has no need to be defended. There is no attack on the technical performance of the Soviet equipment or denigrating its quality…. nor is there a ‘moral’ attack on the Soviet Union. However the fact remains that the game of ‘cat and mouse’ as played by both sides caused deaths. Provocation is/ was the name of the game.. reaction to it the known consequence. It is a game played by those who are not above bending the rules, a game of ‘chicken’ played by those who suffer little physical risk, but paid for by the lives of others.