Chrom,

Your last statement does beg a few pertinent questions….such as…how can you justify what you have said?

Lets look at a few important issues here…The SR was designed during the 1950s when knowledge of both the RCS calculation methods and the Soviet radar threat were both scarce and more anecdotal than factual.

Looking at the time line of the A-12 (as in the Lockheed design number) we would have the first metal being cut in 1959, implying a high level of confidence in the design at this date.
This is a year prior to the U-2 shoot down and exactly in the period when it was realised that not only could Soviet radar track the U-2 but that SAM guidance radars were able to lock on to it as well.

The issue being that the design was already far enough advanced to make the weakest link of the U-2, its relatively low speed and altitude, irrelevant; and coupled with the known RCS reduction, it was assumed that whilst tracking was not going to be a denied, lock–on was more likely on the exhaust plume than the airframe.

If we review Blackbird operations we can see where and when the airframe was actually tested against its primary threat, namely a fully integrated Soviet-style anti aircraft system. We can discount operations launched from the UK as over fights were not deliberately undertaken against the Warsaw Pact nations…and we can discount those the may or may not have occurred over the Middle East at various times as information about these is too scare and vague to be relied on currently.

If we look however at both A-12 and SR operations launched from Kadena then a far greater database of evidence is available.

It is clear the all Blackbird flights from Kadena were observed by Chinese, Soviet and other observers and reported back very quickly to respective HQs and no doubt passed onto the North Vietnamese AA net; this was regardless of whether or not they were operational launch against Vietnam.

We can also assume that the Chinese were paying very close attention to the operations, ensuring that their radars were able to track the flights, and that information was similarly passed onto the NV radar net as a heads up. There is no doubt that the SAM radars, both search and tracking were able to track the SRs and possibly lock onto the SR as they passed overhead. Numerous SR aircrew have reported back on the SAM launches against them as they passed over NV territory.

Now comes the interesting bit… whilst numerous SAMs were launched, none actually managed to bring down and SR or damage it sufficiently to prevent it from carrying out its mission. Why would that be?

Could it be that the crews were so inept that they could not hit it? Difficult to justify in view of their other successes.
Could it be that they did not have the very latest equipment? Well seeing as the SAM system in NV post dates the design of the SR airframe and hence it’s basic overall RCS; we can assume that they were using later version of SAM than that on which the SR RCS calcs were based.
Could it be that it was all a fluke? Perhaps.
Could it be that the initial design intent of the A-12 configuration, which was to use the trio of speed, altitude and RCS reduction, actually worked as advertised? This may well be the case…Speed and altitude made tracking and lock-on a challenge at the best of times… ensuring it was a race between the airframe and the computing power of the SAM system in order to achieve a launch solution…and that the addition factor of a reduced RCS (for the time) made that time frame just a bit less.. but sufficiently shorter to ensure consistent misses for the SAMs.

If we look a the last option as being the most likely then one could argue that the RCS reduction was exactly the complement to the speed and altitude to ensure the aircraft was able to operate as required over hostile territory…. thus RCS reduction was this particular aircraft’s greatest advantage…

The real reason why the omission of the gun in the gun was so heavily criticised is that the reliance on missiles meant a whole set of fighting abilities was lost.

For the war the Vietnam became BVR was not able to perform as envisaged, firstly from an ROE point of view and secondly for technical reasons….

This meant that the skills to fight a dissimilar ACM had been lost. In turn a number of US aircraft were lost to crews and aircraft whose performance was both quantitively and qualitatively lower; but with a better skill in that particular area…and whose training enabled them to achieve that mission.

This was largely redressed by Top Gun for the Navy, as the performance of the aircraft was reemphasized as part of the aircraft’s weaponry, not just its missiles……

One thing that is interesting however is the return to this ‘missile’ arguement…..

BVR is easily defeated…either by one’s own ROE or poorly performing IFF. Unless there is great certainty, from a constant tracking of a target or positive deconfliction; BVR is hampered by that doubt..and in the current climate of intolerance of blue on blue incidents and lack of certainty BVR has to be regarded as the long reach secondary weapon of any fighter…

The WVR missiles are then elevated to the role of primary weapon and the gun completes the set as the real close in low tech secondary weapon… Whilst there are examples of WVR blue on blue they are far more pilot based than inherent issues of a system…

This matches the configuration of planes like the Raptor, who can, by their nature be located in places where BVR, for them is far more acceptable..and they can close to WVR range with greater ease of surprise.. and with their agility manage to gain a guns advantage if needed…

The later two being far less vulnerable to politics…..

The Aurora Black budget line was ‘attributed’ to bomber studies…tha’t’s not to say it was doing something else…

However on the SR retirement the ‘financial’ justification does bear examination…

Remeber the vast majority of its ‘product’ was not used by the USAF.. but rather by the NRO, who contributed $0.00 to the USAF for that product. In the budget concious days of the late 80s and early 90s this was not paareciated by the Senior USAF ‘management’..anyone relember Larry Welch? He of the 900:1 exchange ratio for AA missiles and other late 60s wonder studies under McNamara…oh and a non selectee forthe SR prohgramme? He only got an SR ride as a VIP later on…

Also the removal of the KC-135Q fleet operating budget from the overall tanker fleet ot the SR budget was a great way of increasing the per hour rate when needed.. never mind that the KC-135Qs were often taked elsewhere and ‘plain Kc-135Rs were used…

Beyond that the untimely death of Jerry O’Malley (ex- SR commander) deprived the SR community of a Senior voice in the puzzle palace..leaving the aforementionned Larry Welch free rein with the budget (and the ladies) to retire the plane that had been a thorn in the SAC community for a generation..

So it was expensive, its product was being used by others rather thna the USAF and the ranking manager had a grudge against it…waht hope did it have….

After its initial retirement several airfrmaes were retained by the USAF in flyable storage (but not flown) whilst three (2 x A model and the only B) went to NASA. These were flown…a little prior to the research funding being termeinated. In 1995 the USAF initiated a limited return to service… using Lockheed as a primary operator..and the NASA flight crews as the instructors for the USAF. A number of ccertification and currency flights were undertaken.. but the line veto by CLinton terminated hte program for good.

Now this is not to say that the SR was reflown operationally after its 1991 retirement.. but all flights since then sems ot appear to be what they were stated as in terms of flight time, departure and arrival time, lack of tanking assests and so forth…also there is no evidence that she deployed to SR compatible locations elsewhere in the world… such as Okinawa or Mildenhall etc.. where such a return would have been noted…

So whilst a concept replacement may have flown, and even that is unconfirmed…the increasing paradigm of using unmanned low speed assest for both tac and strategic recon means its unlikely to be a high speed item..

That is is kept secret is not surprising…both ‘the Whale’ (Tacit Blue) and the ‘Bird of Prey’ carried out their entire test programmes and flights without a single mention.. only becoming known when they appeared in Dayton……

The Tigercat is indeed leaving….

Sadly…

Blame the rules about age of pilots and multiengine ratings….the reason why the Beau is going…

To add to the posts higher up… DO NOT mention the inicdents at all.. it is going to be used against continued flight operations at Duxford.

The reasons to opbject fall into two camps:-

1) Planning policy guidelines… which we can go into in great depth if you wish.. but amoingst which are the ODPM’s own guidelines on the development of the Greenbelt….(use Prescott’s own guidleines to trip him up.. its great fun.
2) A more ‘subjective approach’…which goes along the lines of highlighting the unique nature of Duxford.. as a historic location and as a world class centre of excellence for the historic aviation community…all of which leads to money….also mention Veterans….they are a very powerful group and many have children and grandchildren who vote….remember its all about making usre the Councillors understand that by approving this htey are affecting thier own supporters…

To be honest they do seme to be objecting.. but the more support they have to justify and rational ise their decision the longer it will take for somebody to return with the same proposal… which will happen……unless either another site is developed to provide and MSA or somebody more in favour of the IWM purchases that land.

Not going to know unless you look..and possibly in less hurried and harried circumstances than in 76.

Its lessons are however likely to be less technology than the intelligent and economical application of technology and resources to obtain the most with the least…which is not a skill to be sniffed at…or discounted..

There may be lessons which could be ably applied to current programmes in that regard, not be cause they deliver a ‘poor product’ but, because of their cost deliver a product which merely performs as it should in view of the resources devoted to it….

Or even the engines which appear to have a transonic first stage, allowing the engine to use supersonic airflow at the compressor face…a feature not overtly ever employed in the West….

However its a shame as the NMUSAF example appears to be missing its wings….I wonder how many others were ‘recovered’ by the USAF and shipped back home…perhaps even flown.. now that would be interesting.

Fluffy,

I know….its a real shame…but as she was restored to ‘airworthy’ standards.. as required; there was perhaps a perception that the paper standard was sufficient..a physical demonstration was therefore not required… 😉

Who knows an engine run may have lead to more temptation…to prove she was airworthy…by flying her…. 😮

And that, of course, would never do…. :diablo:

However, its never too late to thank you for giving her a second flying life and allow us to see a genuine 109 fly…..

Fluffy,

I think the reason you were permitted to restore but not run was one based on the IWM’s and RAFM’s policy of having aircraft in the best possible (as is reasonable) condition and preserved/ conserved in that manner….hence the risk of running was deemed to be outside of those policies…(does it make sense? Not necessarily, but that’snot the point)

Look also a Bob Ponds P-51…it was donated to the RAFM as a fully airworthy aircraft…it flew only days before it was crated for the UK…once assembled there was no reason for it not to be returned to the skies…other than policies and money…which are often the real drivers.

To me, luckily I saw Black 6 airborne often…and saw her demise, her grounding is more a temporary one….she is more ‘in store’ than permanently out of action….after all the RAF have another genuine complete 109 at Hendon……which as its own perhaps more appropriate ‘history’…Who knows what may happen in 10 years time?