BS.

It is (normally) the resposibility of contractors to make a competative offer, it is NOT the responsibility of the military to alter its requirements criteria to fit/accomodate a noncompetative offer just for the sake of competition. But that was thrown out when Congress demanded another competition..

Interesting point of view. The contractor has ZERO responsibility. They offer products that they feel they can make money on and that’s it. If the requirements do not accomodate them than its not thier problem.
You are clearly unable to see where the real issue lies. The legal side of the procurement process ‘demands’ that a competitive tender process be followed.

That CAN only happen if the specification for that competition allows two products to compete. As one of the KPP was for the airframe to be a current production one then certain constraints were imposed on who could or could not compete. Airbus rightly made a call as to what it was prepared to offer (and hence invest a not inconsiderable amount of money) as its response to this. It chose for whatever reasons to offer the A330, not the A310 (out of production) nor an A300 variant. Airbus had no responsiblity to take part with a product it had evaluated would loose….

So the legal problem faced was one that if Airbus did not submit NO tankers would be purchased as the subsequent legal problems would have tied it all up for years. Therefore the ONLY route was to widen the scope of the spec in order to allow a competition.

Now you are contradicting yourself..

Please read what is written. The lease deal price was fair. The prices quoted in the competition are ones that both Airbus and Boeing knew would withstand examination, however without it then the game would have been different.

Yes the tanker lease was cancelled. But it was not because of unfair pricing by Boeing as you had stated..

Reading comprehension seems to be your greatest weakness….I specifically stated the lease was cancelled for other reasons.

Again, Boeing can not charge any price it feels like! The GAO would reject it..

Correct, but it charges what it feels it can get away with. A different matter altogether.

Not even close. Your ingorance &/or disingenuous is really showing..

Sadly your ignorance is proven by this view.

Not by Airbus’s request, by the demand to have a competition & Airbus/EADS inability/unwillingness to offer a competative product..

Wow, talk about ignorance. You demonstrate that you have zero grasp of the real issue. The contractor has zero responsiblity to do anything until it choses to be a part of something. It choses to be a part if it sees how it can win and make money….

Yes the physical size of the tanker is only one aspect but a CRITIAL aspect.

And as I have said before, even the 767-200 is larger/heavier than necessary. But at least is it not too big/heavy..

It is critical.. but no more or less than other aspects…

Not so such already selected a product but already recognized the proper size/capability of product to meet its requirements (recapitalization efforts stared in 1996). That the 767 was the only commercial product in production at the time made it obvious & even prior to 9/11/01 the USAF had all but selected the 767 as its next tanker..

I would suggest that from this statement you have not understood how these specs are created. The USAF knew that it would not get a ‘bespoke’ tanker…so knowing that and identifying an existing airframe that ‘fit’ its mission requirements is the basic building block of this requirement. This is the most effective and reliable way of creating a credible spec. The disadvantage is that there is a risk that the spec is too tightly focussed to permit competition to ensure ‘fairness’…

A ‘competitive tender’ only means opening up the contract to more than one contractor for consideration, NOT to alter criteria to accomodate a noncompetative offer..

Incorrect. A ‘competitive tender’ means having a specification that permtis two or more products offered by potential suppliers to compete equally.
The original spec was too restrictive and therefore by definition excluded competition.

Airbus/EADS COULD have offered the A300-600 as it was still in production & with as much comonality as there is between the A310 & A300 the A310 was not beyond the realm of possibility. But Airbus/EADS felt that the A300/A310 would have been noncompetative (no A300/A310 has the OEW/MTOW to match the payload/fuel capacity of the 767-200ER) & tried instead to trump the 767-200ER with the larger/greater capacity A330-200..

And where is the problem with a commercial concern making a commercial decision to not propose something it felt would not win. Just to ‘take part’?
Boeing and EADS are aimed at making money, no more no less. So EADS made a commercial choice to not invest in a product they evaluated as ‘not a winner’…So they made a rational call not to play.

The issue is then no competition can occur, therefore no purchase and the USAF is left with a problem. So the only way to unlock this is to enusrre the spec allows commercial concerns to make commercially viable proposals. Its not rocket science and its not difficult to see how and why this is the legal requirement set.

Altering requirements/criteria to accomodate a noncompetative offer is NOT fair competition! Fair competitoin is selecting the best fit for the requirements/criteria among the ‘competing’ offers..

See above…

Again, it is (normally) the resposibility of contractors to make a competative offer, it is NOT the responsibility of the military to alter its requirements criteria to fit/accomodate a noncompetative offer just for the sake of competition..

No the contractor has no responsibility at all. If they do not want to play they do not….It is the responsiblity of the requireer of services to ensure their demands fit the legal frame work.

What thread are you reading?.

The one which understands the real issues.

It does not matter if it is YOUR money or sombody else’s. Your 1st responsibility is the select the right product based on your needs, NOT to alter your needs to accomodate one that doesn’t when one that does is offered..

So wrong it sad. The ONLY responsibilty is to ensure that the choice of product you spend somebody else’s money one is legal. You have two choices :
1) Single source and have somebody challenge you, resulting in you not receiving the goods.
2) Modify your requirements set in order to permit competition

No, the USAF requirements/criteria were NOT established based on what the 767 could do. The USAF requirements/criteria were established based on what its needs are/were & the 767 was obviusly the best fit for its requirements/criteria.

Don’t confuse the tanker lease requirements/criteria with the KC-X requirements/criteria..

I disagree. The USAF based its specification on a known product. Had it really sent out a ‘requirements based spec. it would have permitted bespoke airframes….not the ‘based on current production’ clause.

Again, it is (normally) the resposibility of contractors to make a competative offer, it is NOT the responsibility of the military to alter its requirements criteria to fit/accomodate a noncompetative offer just for the sake of competition..

This is getting boring. The contractors have no responsibiltiy to do anything, even take part if they do not feel it is to their advantage. They will not submit a product that they evalute as being a ‘loser’.. so they will not bother. Free markets and all that…

So the responsiblity of enabling a ‘fair competition’ is that of the person setting it up…

No, I ‘jump’ to the reality that the selection is SUPPOSED to be a technical exercise but that unfortunately politics play far too great a role.

No you stay stuck in this mistaken view that military procurement is a technical exercise.. its is solely political. The ONLY reason there is military procurement is to serve political aims. That is reality.
With that in mind then politics will always play a part, its importance varies from project to project, so for example the F-35 competition was biased towards technology as the product was all cutting edge stuff… this one where the technological aspect is relatively minor politics plays the major role.

So where does all that leave us…
1) The lease spec was the ‘best one’ in that it permitted competition and evalution to occur in a clear manner. The lease deal foundered not on technical aspects but on the manner of attribution.
2) The revised spec was written in such a manner as to prevent two products to compete for the contract (based on the evaluation of one of the only two realistic contractors).
3) When this was made clear to the ‘requireer’ of products they realised that in order to have a legally accpetable competitive tender they needed to have two products submitted. One contractor had said they would not submit with the original spec, so that had to be altered in order to have a competition.
4) Revised competition evaluation was not carried out in accordance with initial criteria and the changes were not robustly established. Boeing legitimately challenges the result and order is cancelled.
5) USAF still uses KC-135 tankers a decade later…..
6) USAF now has to wait a few more years for its new tankers and the chances are that it will get one tanker type to replace its mixed fleet and in lower numbers than its ‘wants’….because of the new politicla climate in DC and the global financial situation.

Yes it is taught like that – but one needs to properly distinguish between a policy level objective (Gov – USAF) and a system level objective (USAF – LM). Air dominance as the yanks now put it was a policy level objective that the Gov/DoD put to the USAF; which resulted in the USAF ATF program, which was a system level objective… It is the USAF prerogative to meet the policy objectives with their own system level objective in a way they see fit… this is their area of speciality as it becomes a very technical issue with an intimate understanding of air ops required. This is not the Gov/DoD area – although they would be advised presumably by ex-Air Force officials…

It is the USAF prerogative to meet the policy objectives with their own system level objective in a way they see fit

No. It is the USAF perogative to ‘propose’ to meet the policy objective with their own system level objective in a way they see fit. In your view, as expressed earlier is that the Government is a ‘funder’… which is incorrect, it is a Client, and as such is free to pick and chose the elements within the contractor (USAF) proposals that it choses to pick to fit in with overall policy objectives.

The Government and DoD is an ‘expert’ in how to fulfil military policy objectives, because it sees both the technical military elements as well as those which are outside of that technical view.

That is the point! This isn’t just a Gov/USAF relationship – we deal with both the policy and the system level objectives here – one is an objective that the government have set out – which requires the AF has sufficient AD /AtG/other missions and fighter recap within a set budget… The system level objective is the way in which the AF chooses to meet this policy objective. Their view has been that they require fewer F-35s within the existing budget and existing policy for more F-22s – what is deemed a more sensible mix in their mind… It doesn’t mean the USAF are demanding budget cash that isn’t there – they are prepared to use existing cash for what they believe better meets this policy objective.

The USAF only ‘proposes’ a solution.. it does not have freedom to do as they chose.. if they did they would be given a budget for tasks..not purchases. I agree that the USAF is not requesting further cash, merely a transfer from one purchase to another, one which the Client (the DoD/ Gov) do not agree with.. as is their right.

I appreciate this – but the point is politicians also serve business ventures… which don’t actually diminish what the USAF determine to be their requirement in order to fulfil the politician’s policy!

And the same politicians are free to agree or not with the contractor’s proposal (USAF requirement….) if they fit into overall policy objectives.

You need to realise that, this lingo has only been adopted only now – after a DoD appointee was put in charge of the air force – when the AF leadership was free to publicly voice its own true opinion – there was no risk associated with this decision – it was 381 to get the job done – end of story – that being the requirement.

Agree with the fact that its a recent change…which does not change the fact that the USAF proposal is being watered down….regardless of the why.

Of course, however the USAF is much more versed and capable in assessing and coming up with system level objectives than the DoD! This is a USAF job, not the job of the DoD which by virtue of contracting out to the USAF to come up with the right technical solution for its policies gives up that prerogative in most cases.

I agree..the issue is that the Client retains its approval or not of the proposal. It balances that proposal with possible budgets, the impact of where that money is spent.. alternatives to that expenditure etc etc. The only prerogative the USAF has is to propose a solution (requirement) to meet the task defined.

An example is if you contract a specialist to build you an F1 car – and he deems after analysis that the best alloy for the chassis is X – you as the customer generally don’t argue with him – especially if your overarching objective remains the same and if he can validate and verify the end objectives and requirements.

You may chose not to argue, but it does not mean you have given up that right. If there is any area of doubt about that choice you seek a second opinion…or if the contractor comes up with something you then determine you disagree with you retain the power to instruct a different material.

If the objective changes and you have lose 80% of your budget and the cheaper option is required – then yes you get involved – but this isn’t the case with the AF and the DoD – they have plenty of cash that could be used from the F-35 program which is currently as expensive to produce as the Raptor if not more so – especially if they feel they need a slightly more even mix to meet that DoD objective.

The cash is for F-35s.. not F-22s. It requires Congressional (the ultimate Client) approval to transfer cash from one to the other (as far as I can see). The risk is therefore that Congress or the Appropriations Commitee actually retain the fixed 22 number and strike the ‘excess’ 35s from the budget.. a lose/ lose situation for the USAF. And in this climate reducing the Defence budget is a top priority.

Yeah, but has the client really changed the requirements? The same general policy objectives still stand and it’s the USAF view that more F-22s are needed to fulfil this current – existing – Stan/Iraq/Post Cold war requirement! A big money maker is standing in their way of getting a relatively small amount of F-22s to meet what they deem is the best mix for the DoD policy.

You have hit two nails on the head… the F-35 by virtue of its sales potential could be a far more effective tool of foreign policy than more F-22s, plus it buys more votes in the future for politicians…
So the narrow part of the Air Dominance policy that requires F-22s to be in place is unchanged, however in overall terms of gaining and maintain Air Dominance over the US Air Space and theatre air space the situation has evolved…

The AF has stated they would internally fund the F-22 through cash from programs like the F-35 – because they believe it’s the right mix! There is no real financial change in policy – if anything they are getting more money – the problem is the DoD are interfering on the system level side – not really their speciality – for their own agendas, that slap, the USAF assessment of what’s really needed to carry out DoD policy, in the face!

The USAF has a pot of money for the F-22 and one for the F-35…and it cannot move the cash from one to another without Client approval. If that is not forth coming its tough….
And in that regard the DoD is an expert in how the overall military policies are deemed fulfilled.

I remember we had one lecture dedicated to the origins of systems engineering – where my lecturer: http://www.bristol.ac.uk/aerospace/c…ell/index.html seemed pretty adamant that despite the emergence in other industries… systems eng was born in the aerospace industry with LM becoming the big player at the start… This is about Polaris and PERT… http://g2sebok.incose.org/documents/…hdbk%202.1.pdf

Interesting links, thank you.

Oh they did – a gagging order and a few firings put that right in short order – though.

Nobody resigned….they got sacked.. a very different beast.

Or…. in other words sticking their neck out.

No.. they sat there fat and happy and were picked off. Had they stuck to their principles they would have resigned when it was clear that they were being over ruled.

Yes but the USAF are still the experts – they are the ones with intimate knowledge of how these systems work and operate – a degree of knowledge only gained through experience – hence why setting system level objectives and requirements is a USAF, not a DoD thing. The DoD may think they know – and of course are advised accordingly – but they are advised either by people in the USAF or people with USAF experience – and that includes think tanks…

The USAF are expert or specialist contractors. They are the ones who propose a solution based on their expertise on a technical level. The DoD do have a the ‘same level’ of expertise.. in that they have all the USAF experience…in addition they have their own political expertise that the USAF does not have..and so in the end the DoD makes the call… all based on advice from the USAF as technical contractors and its own political expertise.

Good stuff as ever Lm…

Hey michelf, I understand where you are coming from and respect your opinion and knowledge… Yet I don’t know what industry you work in or what level in the system procurement process you are at.. so I won’t speculate… but I will tell you what I do know. As part of my degree course – we do the core Aerospace research in things like aero/fluid/thermo – dynamics structures and materials – engineering mathematics – flight dynamics/mechanics and a whole host of other things etc. But in addition to such things we also are trained in Systems Engineering – in fact it’s got a very large emphasis on my degree course – being taught my a rocket scientist from Astrium/BAE… this as I am sure you are aware deals with the whole engineering process that’s required to mature a machine that’s to complex for anyone person to understand into something that meets its requirements and objectives – in short… thus I feel I have a decent understanding of how the whole process works from requirement capture/generation – concept generation to detailed design, verification and validation – so I wouldn’t say we just specialise, as far to many programs have died due to a lack of Systems knowledge…

Lm,
I see where you are coming from and it really does explain pretty much your whole perspective. Just as a clue..I work to develop the requirements a Client may have to exploit and opportunity and budget they are responsible for..In your terms I would be the one who defines the requirements and objectives that you then apply your Systems Engineering approach to…I am the one who defines the requirements you capture. And to be straight with you, you have absolutely no idea about 95% of your job. It’s not a reflection on you, just a reality of the education you receive in both under and post graduate work at University. I cam out of my design based undergraduate, graduate and post grad education with a vast amount of knowledge…yet the reality of being in the industry soon revealed that the real world presents an alternate set of challenges that University has no real grasp of..it’s a fantastic ride so enjoy it.

Where we differ here is our definition of the customer… I believe when it comes to procurement the USAF is the customer and the politicians are effectively the bank – a bank with the same goal as the air force in that they serve the public and therefore work together – but in short the politicians leave it up to the air force to decide how best to meet those objectives and requirements of serving the public within a budget that the politicos can handle – the USAF on a systems level define the objective and therefore the requirements – with the number of airframes being one of those requirements – that they want from any weapon system.

Interesting perspective… I see the US Government as being the Client, who defines a set of military tasks it wishes to ensure it has at its disposal. It ‘contracts’ this work out to a specialist contractor, the USAF who then provides a list of equipment it deems necessary to do the job. The Client then agrees or not to purchase some/ all or none of the list, as they are the ones who control the money.

The politicians do indeed, in theory step aside once the requirements are set and leave the specialist contractor define how best to carry out the task. The issue is that there are those in Government who do not agree with the opinion given by these experts..they have other advice, from vested interests, from ex-military experts and so froth who provide alternate views. So the politicians are then obliged (because they are elected to represent people) to get interested in the contractor’s proposals…thus clouding the issue legitimately.

The last point is that I would dispute your view that the USAF defines the objective… perhaps on a military level but not beyond.

With that in mind I think we need to understand that the study conducted isn’t an indicator of can the USAF do the job like you claim but rather risk analysis of the choice to procure 187 vs. 243 vs. 381… in your mind the 187 is a point where the USAF think they can do the job – but its not – its just a pointer or gauge for the politicians to know that its the cheaper but a higher risk option – that the USAF might get the job done if the threat is low but they might not if its high.

Correct. And that is the key. They might get the job done, in fact they will if all goes well. The USAF at no point is empowered to assume the risk of failure of US policy.
They have done exactly what is asked of them. Once they made it clear it was possible but with high risk they were going to be stuck with that number.

The USAF’s system level requirement generation process has lead them to conclude that 381 is the REQUIREMENT to sufficiently replace the F-15s and retain the level of capability that they had for protecting the US and its other missions – a capability they will lose with 187 F-22s only – when making this decision they take into account the impacts the low numbers have on maintenance/cost/upgrade potential/aircraft life etc – which are lost on the politicians – hence why this has been the system used forever.

If the USAF is convinced that with 187 airframes they will fail in getting the job done then the statements they have made are at best misleading and at worse negligent. If one of my contractors came back to me saying.. with X I can do the job.. low risk of failure, with Y its medium and with Z it’s a high risk I would hold them to the Z with high risk. If they then said ‘Ah well, we cannot do the job’ then we would be into a negligence situation. I do not read the USAF statements as saying they cannot do the job with 187.

Agreed the simulations and systems analysis have provided the 381 number as a low risk, high success robust option. But it’s only if low risk is a critical factor. AS soon as risk is acceptable the number is therefore completely different.

Oh and on a side note the Systems Engineering approach is not that old.. it’s derived from the Apollo programme and was only applied to US military procurement in the very late 60s and early 70s. In fact the only airframes procured in this fashion are the F-15/F-16 and F-117…they have tried to use it for the tanker programmes but so far have been frustrated. It was not used to purchase the C-17.

Although the politicians jointly with the USAF determine the air forces overall objectives, the fact is they have not changed those objectives yet – they are still required to provide the capability they had and improve on it – and its more a question of the right F-22/F-35 mix – a technical system level decision (a USAF decision – since the objective remains), not an overarching political decision (to change the objective) as to the role of the USAF. If congress or the DoD say no – its not because the requirement has changed – it is because they do not have the funds or they are wrongly getting involved with the USAFs actual work of defining the system level objectives and requirements to best meet the politicians goals – perhaps because there is a big business to capitalize on and to defend the interests of the people they serve?

I would disagree with your view of how the USAF contributes to the policy objectives. The USAF advises if those proposed policy objectives are achievable and if not defines what is required to make them realistic.. see the SAC development under LeMay or they demonstrate that the objectives needs to be altered.

Now the policy objectives function on two levels.. the policy that is defined and that which is funded. The mission may not change but if the cash is not authorized then the mission the USAF needs to fulfill is automatically altered. Its up to the USAF to make it clear that if the funding does not allow it to fulfill the mission an alternative is proposed or allowed or whatever in order to make it clear to its boss (the Government) that what it is asking it to do is either not possible or has a risk factor applied to it.

The facts are the USAF said 381 was the requirement – 243 was the attempted compromise when they realised that the DoD had bigger fish to fry… the politicians then grant the cash based on the two arguments… I trust the air force not Gates and not Obama and not the potential money making machine. The DoD which provides the USAF threat library on which they base their system level requirement analysis – changed the threat for the F-22 alone to get what they wanted.

Exactly. The USAF worked on a 381 figure based on its view of the mission requirements. Once the other ‘mission requirements’ became clear it revised it figure; to 243….now the mission requirements have changed again and they have proposed a further figure.

The issue is that it is misleading to concentrate on the military mission and ignore or forget that the military only exists to support political objectives and is only funded to the extent that the current politicians believe the military are needed. The military don’t exist outside that view.. they have no purpose to ‘serve’ anything or anyone else. We know that they protect the ‘people’ in an abstract and theoretical manner, but since the US military are primarily federally funded that is who they serve.

The point as I have stated above – is the objectives are still the same – the politicos have the same broad agenda of recapilitilisng in the tactical fighter fleet – but on the system level the USAF who have to carry out the goals of counter insurgency vs. tactical/strategic warfare would still rather get fewer F-35s and more F-22s… which has been documented on many occasions. The USAF doesn’t really care if the F-35 becomes a 400 billion dollar procurement deal for LM, Congress and gives the DoD world wide clout – what the USAF care about is how they want to carry out the mission laid out for them – and 381 has always been the number – not 187 or 243.

Agreed. But the USAF mission is to do the job with a more restricted pot of money than the one they had. So the mission has changed, its military component has not altered but its financial one has. Remember money is the best weapon that exists. In fact it’s the only one that does exist.

No, 381 was the requirement – it was the minimum and 187 and 243 were and are compromises – the risk analysis were studies to aid in procurement – but its not just about risk, but also fighter recapitilisation. The DoD evaluates the threats and the USAF judges how best to combat them – I find it weird that the threat libraries were changed as Norman gets in… they agreed to it after their top top brass was sacked for getting in the way of Gates… after that Norman is put in to let Gates pull the strings – and pave the way for a business…

Risk again. The 381 is low risk.. everything else is higher. But so what? If the USAF is not confident about being able to do the job at all with less then that needs to come thro’.. it does not. So neither 243 nor 187 are figures that should have been provided.

It is about who owns the risk. If the USAF gets 381 it owns the risk, because it will have been given the tools it said it needed to do the job. If it gets less then the Government owns the risk as it has not provided the contractor (the USAF) with what they have estimated is required. Now only the Government can make the call to own this risk or not, certainly not the USAF.

Agreed that bullying and other factors are present and inherent in the system.

All I argue is that F-35 is a program that is challenged beyond F-16… its relevance is a different topic – one I’m not decided on yet.

We can discuss.

A valid argument – one I don’t have a problem with yet – and it largely depends on how effective the survivability and lethality of enemy SAM systems have become.

True enough and it’s the central facet of the argument.

They USAF don’t choose the wars but they do generally choose the equipment – and how best to conduct those wars – they then request that politicians grant their will… the politicos say yes or no – they don’t provide any alternatives… so the USAF are the experts – the confirmation is signed by the politicos but they don’t magic up a weapon system themselves and they don’t write the objectives or requirements of them and that includes the numbers or how to conduct the job.

Wow! The USAF indeed do not choose the wars they fight. They use what they have…sometimes its suitable and at others its totally unsuited and they make do as best they can until the right or better kit is procured. See Vietnam.

GW1 however was a pretty good example of getting it right. Current ops in Afghanistan show how a war that lasts can be fought with inadequate numbers of incorrect kit…

The politicians also impose RoE on the military.. sometimes is does so with good input from the experts, at times not…and they certain do ‘magic up’ weapons systems on their own….F-111 for one, Bradley fighting vehicle, M16…all the result of political interference on a technical level of military hardware.

The USAF are not experts in fighting wars. They are experts at the air force aspect of a military campaign. The overall campaign has elements that define objectives and requirements and influence the numbers of aircraft and their employment which at times places massive non-military constraints on how the USAF carries out its actions within the overall mission. That is the key that people tend to lose sight of in this discussion because it diminishes the technical to a very small (but vital) part of a much bigger system that is required to actually conduct military operations in support of political objectives.

Any adversary with modern SAMs is going to be a problem for legacy aircraft to deal with, without huge strike/support packages, and high risk of losses.

VLO aircraft allow these targets to be attacked with much smaller forces, and much lower risk.

Perhaps I wasn’t clear… a significant number of VLO aircraft are needed.. but from there to create an entire fleet of VLO airframes is a stretch that many would say is not needed. A VLO first strike fleet backed up with non VLO modern designs is an alternative. Sure its less capable ultimately but also more affordable.. and that is better than a rump VLO fleet that is too big to be affordable yet too small to get the job done in other areas….
Note I make no mention of legacy airframes… your assumption and its one that is incorrect.

Any foe with late model Flankers or Western aircraft is going to be far more challenging with Legacy aircraft. You never want to fight at parity if you can help it, and you certainly don’t want to be at a disadvantage.

Whilst I agree with you there is no reasonable current scenario that creates the need for an exclusively VLO airframe based fleet. If you exclude China and Russian as reasonable enemies for the next 20 years (plus NATO and current allies) then who is likely to create an air force that could threaten the USAF beyond a few well planned first strikes based on the VLO fleet….comprising say 187 F-22s and 300 odd F-35s with Navy F-35s in support? Its this notion that the entire fleet has to be VLO to get the job done…that is an aspect that is currently too weak to gain widespread support.

A solely legacy based force is vulnerable and unacceptable.. but there is a way of creating a lower RCS airframe than the legacies which does not have the on going maintenance (and hence cost) issues associated with a VLO airframe.

It would be ironic in the extreme if due to cost issues the USAF was forced to integrate the F-18E/F models into its fleet…..

Lm..

I don’t think I did… I’m pretty sure I understood it from the start! It’s the kind of logical simplicity that’s essential for engineering – understanding requirements and how to solve them. But one must also be careful of oversimplifying something to make it understandable.. I think thats what your doing here with a very messy procurement issue and I’m going to attempt to explain how I see it.

1) This is the reason why you are still missing the point. You are thinking of solving a problem. Reality is rather ‘is the problem the right one to be solved?’
I spend my working life making sure Clients do have a well defined problem to resolve; and that the means to solve it are realistic. I take the problem they have and work with them to make sure it is what they want solved and that the means to solve it are rational and realistic…Then it goes to specialists like yourself to provide a detailed solution.

Now this is the key line, and I implore you to take note without dismissing this out of hand.. Mosley and Jumper wanted 381 jets – a view that seemed to be deemed justified by a lot of the outspoken members of the airforce.. Mosley – a key F-22 advocate for 381 F-22s and an undoubted thorn in Gates’ side – gets sacked effectively and Norman is brought in to clean up the mess. Norman – a former airlift man – being appointed by Gates initially adopts a view that the USAF need more F-22s than 187 but not 381… a compromise for Gates who had put him in charge. He then says he wants 243 which is based on a study that claims 381 low risk.. etc as you know! It then turns out that he is prepared to accept 187 unlike Mosley! That being after a gagging order had been placed over the USAF because the USAF top brass were taking pot shots at Gates – which was embarrassing when they had to be disciplined! Now don’t you find it weird that views changed suddenly after Norman arrived… the skeptic in me thinks Norman was pressurised into this decision.

2) The issue is entirely there. The USAF, pressured etc as you wish it, has stated on the record that the job can be done at a high risk of failure, with 187 airframes.
How the USAF got there is irrelevant. They have reached a point where they state they can do the job with 187. Yup there is a high risk of failure, of problems; whether or not its acceptable is not a USAF call to make, it passes to the politcians.

This is where we disagree quite clearly… your view of the program has convinced you its a preference only. 381 was the requirement… then 243 which then withered – but why? Firstly though, one must understand that decisions like these have a degree of subjectivity and you can’t discount preference especially from experienced professionals – you can’t truely model the future mathematically and thus preference should have a big say. BUT 2ndly USAF studies claimed 381 was the requirement… THEN it was revealed that when the whole 381-243-187 thing came about, it was based on a USAF simulation which was updated by a threat library from the DoD… who suddenly changed their threat analysis during Norman’s early reign for the F-22 program – where initial anaylsis had showed 381 was the requirement – now it presented a lower number of jets required – but the threat library wasn’t updated for the other weapon systems analysis.. clearly a means to kill off support for the F-22… I think I read this on the Dewline or Ares some months back.

3) The job the USAF has to do is the one that the politicians define as their job. They are the ones, via the DoD, who establish the job and are free to alter it in line with political realities they view as important.. not the USAF view. So what if the threat library was only altered in order to kill the F-22? This is where you need to understand that the procurement of military equipment is not a military process, its political. The politicians define the job they want the military to do.. that changes over time regardless, over changes in the political landscape, individual agendas etc. Nobody, certainly not the USAF can say with any degree of ‘correctness’ that it needs 187/243/381 F-22s to do ‘the job’ when it becomes necessary to do it. All they can do is say that if we create these scenarios as reasonable rational ones we would need X,Y,Z airframes. The experience of the USAF lends credibility to those numbers associated to those scenarios. The issue is how realistic are those scenarios…and there the USAF is looking at its informed crystal ball.. just as the politicians are and they might be giving different answers, neither might be correct…

The fact is 381 has been a requirement.. until recently because it was forced upon by the DoD… it was never a mere preference..

4) 381 was a requirement to do ‘the job’ with a high level of guarantee that it would be done (low risk). I do not recall it ever being the minimum required to do ‘the job’ with a low level of guarantee (high risk). The USAF has done its work and given options (as they were instructed to) and the politicians, whether you like it or not are the ones who make the call on the level of risk they want to assume….not the USAF.

So the 187 is the requirement with a high risk. Again the USAF has been asked its professional opinion and the risks associated with it. That has been given, those empowered to make the call have done so in line with the advice given. Reason and rationality be damned.. how the 187 figure was beaten out of the USAF is immaterial, they have agreed to it, with all the caveats you want, the brass in the USAF did not but ‘cocks on blocks’ about this so somewhere along the lines the number is acceptable.

It is the scale of the program – from the outset that makes it such a big challenge.. the advertised goals are really tremedous achievements – if they come to fruition – also the same roles in one form or another have existed since WWI – but the the degree of complexity has increased 100 fold in addition to being compliant with many new regulations and saftey demands. The projected sales and tech insertion and complete multi mission requirements at such an early stage dwarfs the F-16 in its youth. Even with the money invested – this is a tremedous challenge.

I understand what you are saying. However its as refered to 1) above.. ooo it’s a tough job…how are we going to do it? I’d say.. tough job..is it the correct one? On a number of levels the F-35 is an answer looking for a relevant question.

They are reacting to the present… the F-22/35 are planning for the future. They are totally different arguments.

5) History… the F-22 and F-35 are planes for a future that has long since evolved.
The definition of both programmes had their genesis to fight the USSR. Now there is absolutely no doubt that VLO airframes in good numbers are a vital asset to have within the fleet. But to create the primary fleet as VLO airframes…that is far harder to justify. We can say..” but we are planning for the future”…how far into the future? It could be argued that there is no credible threat that justifies a majority VLO fleet for the next 25 years. Equally we could create rational scenarios that state it’s a requirement to be able to do this job or that one. The reality is that the only threat that is real is the current money threat.. it is here today and will be resolved today.

The F-22 brings bundles of capability to the table right now… the “wars” however at this present time don’t require a jet that only rechieved FOC in late 2007 early 2008. Additionaly the answer does come from experts – the chaps who put in the requirements – else you would have a totally reactive policy toward defense – where you build equipment based on validated and verified results in warfare – which is not suitable to surviving top end threats… it definitely wouldn’t have been adequate against the Soviet Union.

6) The F-22 brings capability that is not required right now. Many would argue it will not be needed for a long time and certainly if there is a need the current fleet will do the job.. aided by other assets. Others will have their own view. Who is correct? The only ones with the answer; right or wrong are those with the money. Your snapshot of who provides the answer is very enlightening. The answer is provided by the politicians…nobody else. Going into Iraq and Afganistan is not a military choice.. it’s a political one. The politicians deceide which battles to fight not the ‘experts’….so lets agree that politicians are often not experts at very much…

You an even bigger F-35 skeptic than myself !
Yup.

7) Both F-22 and F-35 were born of the Cold War and are best suited to that war…
Do they bring great things to the table? Yes they do.
Are those things needed? Yes…
In those numbers? Errrr well ….possibly yes.
Do we need stuff now we do not have? Yes…
Where does the money to get those come from? Errr see the programmes that need lots of money but provide things we might not really need right now.. and might not need for a while..

Firstly that is there job – no matter the hardware – they attempt to get the job done – so I believe they won’t claim it is a complete no-go, as its against their whole philosophy and outlook of adapting and improvising. But the point is they have implied through numerous top brass opinions that they feel 187 IS to high a risk to take – whether they have stated that outrightly or not. .

The reality is that whilst they are there to get the job done and improvise and ‘imply’.. they have stated that 187 allows them to get ‘the job’ done. Yes the risk is high that they will not get it done as best they can.. but get it done they will.
The record reflects that and you know what.. the rest is rendered irrelevant..it is correct and maybe more accurate.. but it is not what has gone on record. The be clear…if those same highly ranked brass had felt strongly enough that the number insufficient (say 120 had been proposed) then their duty was to speak out…see Adm Tom Connolley re the F-111B…
However none felt strongly enough to say so formally and 187 is the record.

With regard to your 2nd paragraph.. perhaps not rushing into an exceptionally ambitious program so quickly would be a more prudent approach – which would allow funding a larger and safer F-22 mix and perhaps a better F-35! How many F-35s will be resigned to the non combat coded lot if they don’t have enough time to iron out the kinks? Its happened with the Raptor.

Interesting view point… is the F-35A such a ‘high risk’…exceptionally ambitious programme? Certainly I’d say the step change to the F-16 was a greater change than from the F-15/F-16/F-117*/F-22 fleet to one that has the F-35A as a component.

Sure longer would deliver a better F-35…or a dead one.
Is the F-22 any better than the F-35 as an A2G airframe….I’m sure it could be made into one… but who funds it?

It would appear that both the F-22 and F-35’s primary battle is being diminished here…they have to be purchased at all.
Currently there is zero demand for a VLO airframe in combat ops. Yes there is a ‘threat’ but there are real battles, both physical and financially speaking that are being fought and neither is suited to them. So I would ask again.. do you push for an increased number of F-22s and win that procurement battle and the F-35 gets axed…or do you say OK the 187 F-22 airframes are ‘just enough’ but we need the F-35 as well.

The other option is of course that you get 187 F-22s and zero F-35s…

There is nothing about which is best or a technical risk profile here…that has been done and dusted..its about money and power.

The posts about the Typhie are illustrative of what this internal political battle is doing to the procurement of US arms overseas.

And what are those other reasons? Why does the USAF prefer the boom over the probe and drogue?

Historically the USAF selected the boom becuase it delivers a higher fule flow rate, essential for the SAC bombers it refulled.

This is the prime reason…. the boom also has ‘derivative benefits’…the higher fuel trasnfer rate deos mean smaller units are tanknig for less time.. so more can be done in the time window…

The pilot flies straight and level.. the boomer flies the boom.. important when pilots are tired/ injured etc.

Other air arm, including the USN did not have the same need and relied on the probe and drogue method and doubling up of recievers.

For large quantities the boom is the way forward, but for tac air perhaps the p+d method offers advantages.

These debates are waste of time. It is widely known that simple putting stickers with American flag on an aircraft reduces RCS by an order of magnitude, increases radar range by 10-15% and enhances flight performance**. Relabeling the product as ‘Made in USA’ would immediately shift the product into a higher generation adding completely new features. In the light of this I wonder why that aerospace companies outside of the US are wasting resources since they are forever doomed to stay in the ‘cheap junk’ or ‘expensive junk’ subcategory anyway.. Both these subcategories are unified in the ‘cannon fodder’ category.

** source – LM test pilot

I assume you deliberately forgot to mention that if it has a ‘Skunk Works’ or ‘Phantom Works’ sticker it is guaranteed to win…:)

Seriously guys…the basic jist of much of this is that the equipment has strengths and weaknesses that need to exploited by well trained pliots in order to maximise those strengths and minimise the weaknesses.

The key thing is ‘well trained’.. that covers both experience in terms of number of flight hours, knowledge and training in the equipment they use and knowledge of the oppositions’ equipment, tactics etc etc. The team with the strongest ‘weakest link’ will be that which generally wins. So if the IAF had some very weak pilots who were removed quickly from the team the more experienced ones were left having to work harder to win and as a result were more vulnerable….

The actual performance of the different radars/ missiles/ airframes will only ever be as good as the pilots who use them in combat and their skill and judgement as to the developing fight.