Well, he hopes that the book is transparent enough for most reasonable readers to recognise that these men didn’t always get it right and were not perfect. For being transparent, I think his book is rather rude giving a clear picture what they thought of the Mig-23…and the point here was not to discredit them by citing from the manual, but to show that they`ve been discrediting them selves and their maintenance guys as well immediately when he has begun to interview them for the book.

I think that simply reading the back of the dust cover would inform the ‘reasonable reader’ that ‘Maintaining these “assets” without spare parts or manuals was an almost impossible task,…’ from which most reasonable readers would…based on their own knowledge of military a/c operations deduce that in spite of all the knowledge gathering capabilites the US had they were ‘making this up as they went along’ or ‘winging it’… and so everything in the operations was a ‘best’ guess’.

So its clear that the impressions given need to be taken with the benefit of hindsight and credit given were it is due.

On the notion that these ops gave a misleading impression and misleading tactical doctrine development…well I think that’s anotehr conversation entirely.

Now, in the light of presented facts taken from the aircraft documentation, compare them with Red Eagles comments when evaluating the Mig-23 about filling the aircraft and setting the fuel gauge to 400liters, or claims about the fuel gauge giving the fuel usage information from the fuel pipe only forcing pilot to be preoccupied with his fuel state…..and draw your own conclusion.

P.S. there is certainly more to comment.

Or one might draw a different conclusion that in spite of not having access to a full and complete set of documentation they derived, empirically, an operational manual as best they knew that permitted them to operate over a number of years and in a relatively intense manner a foreign aircraft completely removed from its logistic chain. From that operation they established a number of ‘facts’ as they saw things which helped them develop operational doctrine.

Now in hindsight and with additional knowledge the opinions/ ‘facts’ that were derived ‘professionally’ at the time may be incorrect or themselves deficient.

From there we need to be very careful in making a judgement on the level of professionalism of the test pilots who evaluated these a/c and established a basic POH and the maintenance crews/ engineers who developed the maintenance procedures. To further make a judgement on the professionalism of the tactical crews who then operated these aircraft as part of Constant Peg is equally demanding in care. What may come to the fore is not that the USAF did make mistakes in how they operated these a/c but rather bias that seeks to make objective errors appear as failures in subjective areas.

At the same time, I do believe that their skills in handling a type they were never trained for were greatly inferior to the skills of an average EastPac pilot who has been through the complete training procedure. If any jock could simply sit in, make a dozen flights and claim that he already has mastered the aircraft and is entitled to judge its capabilities, then why train the pilots, at all? So much for the ‘professional’ part.

I think that you are perhaps mis representing the training programme described by the book. It does outline the ground school work required and the number of training flights needed prior to a pilot being accepted onto the ‘team’.

I would imagine that the basic piloting skills of those able to enter the programme was far higher than the average USAF pilot (so we could perhaps draw parallels to the ‘average’ Warpac pilot on that basis?) and hence this Post graduate type specific training should be regarded as being applied to already highly skilled tactical pilots.

With that in mind one can imagine that their ‘evaluations’ are therefore based on a level of experience, knowledge of the USAF doctirne and skills as well a fundamentally high piloting skills which would permit them to bring a ‘professional’ opinion relatively quickly. In the same way an experienced doctor can diagnose an illnees from fewer symptoms than an inexperienced one.

So perhaps discussing the relative merits of the ‘professional’ level of these pilots needs to take into account that these pilots on average had fighter experience (in terms of total fighter time and number of types flown) far in excess of the Warpac pilots who were expected to take these a/c into combat. Indeed the Constant Peg pilots were possibly far better than the average USAF fighter pilot.

Now this does not in any way mean they knew it all.. or that their opinion may have been completely incorrect when the a/c was supported/ maintained and flown as the Warpac doctrine and support infrastructure was designed to do so…merely that when operated in a ‘Western mindset’ its failing in those areas were to them obvious and weaknesses to be exploited in order to ‘win’.

Our discussion therefore should be based on the differences that this evaluation highlights, in both operational doctrines (which influences what is procured) and the glaring weakness each doctrine reveals when the other side see/use the others’ equipment.

The comments made about the UAF Su-27s is very pertient…cockpit environments that are totally alien/ odd/ poor as view by the other side… difference in kerosene composition making the equipment perform in a very different way.. etc etc. Does this make the F-15 a poor bit of kit…only when you are experienced and trained in the Su-27 and are expecting it to be an analogue of it.

Steve,

I have read the book for what it is… an ‘ancedotal’ history of the programme.
It is full of ‘personal’ views and opinions.. that’s its charm and appeal.

The technical side is to a certain extent irrelevant..

What I find interesting in the different views epxressed here is the seeming inability or unwillingness to understand that the USAF may indeed not have known and understood all of the operating proceedures that the WP would have to hand. So whilst those looking at the history from a perspective of day to day operations backed up by formal training and support infrastrucutre willl point out some obvious ‘errors’ in maintenance and operation they give no credit to the fact it was done at all.

I can imagine that when a comparable book about the Soviet operation of western fighters emerges that a similar issue may arise….oobivous operational omissions are easy to point out.

Looking forward to the next book dealing with the more recent fighters…

Very short.
I suggest RADAR-war Page 8-9

L40.3.1 Chain Home (CH). English Coast Radar l=12m
The Germans observe 12m pulse signals at the western front without being able to recognize
their origin and purpose.
June 1940
In the middle of June the German Aeronautic Research Institute (DVL) is given the task of
explaining the nature of these signals. A special group under the direction of Professor von Handel
finds out that the signals originate from radar installations and from the coast of the English
Channel. They pinpoint the location of the 12m CH installations that up to then had been thought
to be coastal radio stations. The scientists observe that the transmissions of the individual stations
are pulse modulated to avoid mutual interference. In addition more radar installations in the 6m
and 3m range are discovered and located. After two short weeks a map of the complete system of
CH installations in the south of England is delivered to the Air Force Ministry of the Reich (RLM)
that had so far been completely unaware of their existence. Air Force captains are informed that
clouds provide no protection from being discovered prematurely, only flying low does.

L40.3.2 German Aviation Research Institute’s Jamming Station
l=12m
The fact that the CH stations are connected with each other through pulse modulation raises the
possibility that interfering with one station would disturb the whole system. Therefore the German
Aeronautic Research Institute (DVL) immediately builds a jamming station with sound barrage jamming.
5 July 1940 Its deployment at the beginning of July 1940 at the coast of the English Channel is successful and puts the CH out of operation for some time. 😉

Very interesting.. yet this technical knowledge was insufficient for the German High Command to realise the advantage this gave to the RAF. So knowledge is reduced to an ‘interesting’ status in this case.

This is supported by the stopping of attacks on the Home Chain during August 1940…a combination of the lack of understanding of its usefulness and a belief that any measure that promoted the RAF to increase its airborne numbers was a good thing…

The Germans had no idea of the wavelength of the Home Chain radar…

They used the Graf Zepplin as a ‘ferret’ at the beginning of WW2. All they heard was static as they were looking in the wrong sector of the spectrum; as a consequence the Home Chain was ‘dismissed’…

The Horten flying wings were primarily an aerodynamic exploration. Stealth advantages were a beneficial by product.

The YB-35 was discounted as a bomber because it was not as steady on the bomb run as the B36…and so the view was a degraded accuracy. In other areas it was viewed as a platform with greater potential, even in the absence of FBW…

What is interesting is that when considering the use of an airfield the first considerations are whether or not an aircraft can:-

1) Land on the runway with a ‘reasonable’ payload…
2) Depart the same runway with the payload the mission requires.

Then you look at the remainder of the infrastructure, runway width if back tracking is required;taxiway widths/ capacities, ramp space etc etc…

All or any of these are indeed ‘show stoppers’ but its the runway that is the first element to be examined.

In the case of the Fairford/ Mildenhall/ Brize examinations there is no doubt a 767AT can take off from the runway legally, with a payload below its max capacity. It may well be that for 90% of its missions this is OK. Conversely a 330MRTT can lift its max payload (already greater than the 767’s) off that same runway all of the time and for a unit similar cost.

This capability offers options and flexibility that may or may not be exploited for much of the time.. but its there to be used if needed.

The question is then one of ‘value’…does the USAF spend its money on a product that is now an ‘orphan’ airframe (like the 135s + 10s) which offers spec exceeding capability or on a ‘maturing’ airframe which has even greater exceedence of spec for a similar cost?

Its throws into question the reliability of the RFP or perhaps more its omissions…Perhaps USAF interests would be better served in the KC-X department by a ‘smaller’ airframe, with much greater adherence to the 135 airframe?

I think we need to take ourselves away from which is ‘better’… and think like the USAF are potentially thinking… ‘we are likely to only get one airframe to replace both 135 and 10s (regardless of the desired mix).. so which ones covers both bases best?’

In that perspective the 330 covers the overall scope more comprehensively than the 767….but to admit that means ‘giving up’ on a larger strategic tanker to replace the 10s in years to come…

[QUOTE=F35b;1428766]Please stick to the facts. We don’t know what was in the original USAF proposal, we don’t know what will be in the new proposal and we don’t know how points will be awarded. All we know is that KC-45 won last time.

QUOTE]

Err… the RFP is pretty clear as to what the USAF required ….afterall they have been working (with help from Boeing) on the spec for it for years.