I spent 12 years in the USN. Sailors have a talent for exaggeration
(What is the difference between a fairy tale and a sea story? A fairy tale starts ‘once upon a time’ a sea story starts ‘this ain’t no s**t’)
Most carriers & destroyer/cruisers have a top speed in the 30 knot range.
Granted when you are on one of these ships, the speed seems high, but the reality is they are not going anywhere close to 40 knots
You can not discuss the merits/disadvantages of the US carrier size without discussing the embarked aircraft. They are the carriers ‘main battery’. Not discussing a/c would be like evaluating the size of a battleship without comments on the main battery of the ship.
You can not evaluate any ship as a ‘stand alone’. The merits of the US carrier design have to be considered in light of the mission of the USN and the composition of the carrier task forces. The carrier is just one piece of a larger puzzle.
The larger the carrier, the more versitility. You have more space for aircraft and their ammunition. There are less issues of space/weight limitations of future a/c designs.
No doubt in the next decades we will see alternative aviation oriented platforms emerge as UAV’s come of age and demonstrate the ability to conduct a broad range of operations.
However, there will always be a place for manned a/c. We cannot place all our reliance UAV’s
While in the USN I had the opportunity to serve on one of the Garcia class (Bradley DE/FF-1041) and one of the Knox class (Cook DE/FF-1083) as plankowners.
They were interesting ships to say the least.
The Bradley was originaly planned to be part of an Escort Squadron but soon got reasigned to a Destroyer Squadron. We had the same electronics & better sonar than most of the other units in the squadron, although we were a few knots slower. The main issue was the boilers – they were a unique, high pressure design. For the most part they operated fairly well, but there was one instance where the Bradley had to be towed into port due to boiler failure (Part of the problem with boiler operation, was that there were only a few ships with this installation, so new crew members had no previous experience with the design, and there were limited training opportunties – compared to the more standard engineering plants) Another downside to the Garcia class was the use of the single 5″/38 mounts. They required more manpower than the 5″/54 installations. During the early years of service in the Pacific, the Bradley had little opportunity to serve in the ASW role, for which it was designed, but rather was used as a plane guard and shore bombardment unit in Vietnam. This design was originally intended to operate the DASH unit, but the helo hanger was enlarged and the flight deck reinforced to handle the LAMPS2
The Knox class was larger (434′) than most contemporary destroyers, even though it had only a single 5″/54 gun. The Sea Sparrow Basic Point Defense Missile System (BPDMS) was installed after commissioning, but it was more commonly referred to as the Basically Pointless Defense….., as it relied on a optical aimed director (a optical 40mm director, with illuminating radar equipment hung on – the ultimate in cheap air defense.
The ship’s CIC was large and could have easily accomodated NTDS, but plotting & tracking was grease pencil era. The ship had extra accomodations for squadron flagship personnel. The Cook, along with other of the Knox class were assigned to Destroyer Squadrons. They had substantial potential but were underequiped with ‘to be installed later’ the mantra.
One issue that effected all the Garcia/Knox family was that they had only a single screw so they lacked the reliability through redundancy factor and maneuverability that smaller DD types had. They also had a large bow mounted sonar that added 10′ to their draft.
Considering that most of the Garcia & Knox class have been transfered to foreign navies and they are still in active service, means the USN did not realize full value. In the case of the Knox class there was considerable potential for upgrading their original equipment.
It is remarkable. However the goal of the ultra-small crew seems inappropriate for a combat vessel that is intended to go in harms way and be a risk of damage.
It takes a goodly number of individuals to fight fires and deal with damage control in a platform as large as this. Small crews may be sufficient for steaming from point A to B but when the ship suffers damage or casualtities more personnel will be needed. Just because many of the damage control functions are automated can reduce the need for people. Automated systems can be damaged and their ability to replace crew lost -then what.
Even in day to day operations, ship equipment suffers casualities and requires on-site repairs. It may be that every thing is modular with replacement modules in stock but nothing is predicable except chaos. You need to plan for the worst case senario.
I hope that these ships live up to their reputation. If they suffer damage like the USS Cole or Stark I hope their small crews in remote locations can save the ship.
I am concerned about the reduced crew. Physically the ship is quite large. There are a lot of systems to maintain. There is a lot of space to be responsible for.
When the ship is in a combat situation you need sufficient personnel for damage control. Does this reduced crew have enough people to insure the ship’s survivial in these situations?
In port security requirements have increased. More of the ship’s company is being used as part of the security watches? Can smaller crew’s meet these requirements?
The USN has a lot of daily operating requirements for a ship. Will the overall workload of the DDx crew be altered to allow a smaller crew to meet all of the routine operational requirements?
What about personnel taking leave or having medical emergencies? Will the smaller ship’s company be able to cover for absent crew?
Reliability is key. In the military it seems you can achieve reliability through redundancy. You build in redundancy into the systems. Are we including redundancy in the manning levels as well?.
Well, aren’t the people on the vessels, ‘marine life’?
If you had a chance to save your ship with a system like this or save the whales, what would the appropriate choice be?
(I realize this sounds rather cruel, but war at sea had devasting impact on marine life as is – how many fish have been killed by depth charges in the past for example? When you engage in a life & death struggle, the impact on nature takes a back seat. It is easy to be environmentally concerned when you participate in war through TV images)
The DD(x) family seems to have a case of ZPG (Zero Population Growth). It is supposed to be the ultimate solution to naval warfare but is becoming so pricey that maybe only 10 will be ordered.
There is also “In Harms Way” with John Wayne about a WW-2 cruiser in the Pacific. It was filmed on the heavy cruiser USS St Paul (so the ship board background is ‘authentic’) even though the ship was supposed to be a older Washington Treaty CA.
It was filmed in B & W to give it a ‘wartime’ appearance.
I have trouble in naval movies where the ships don’t match the story. Several of the Pearl Harbor attack movies were filmed on location, but it was distracting to see 20th ships where 1940 era vessels should be. I guess this comes from 12 years in the US canoe club.
The Russians have a s/p 13cm coast defense battery (guns, tracking vehicles & f/c vehicles). I don’t know if any have entered service.
Quick comment – most ships coming out of drydock are relatively ‘high in the water’. ( have been on several navy ships that went through the process) Fuel, ammunition, stores, and even personnel items have probably been removed. Also there are no electronics and no armament, all of which could result her ‘high in the water’ appearence without the removal of the machinery.
A lot has to do with how the electronics and the command & control facilities are located. In the case of the Spruance/Ticonderoga’s CIC is in the superstructure (the Spruance class already had an imposing superstructure prior to the CG mod)
The superstructure of these ships was light weight metals. Stealth was not factored into these designs as in the case of more recent ships so comparisions are necessarily valid.
There has always been an ongoing debate about where CIC should be located. In the current environment, the CO is generally in CIC during l/r engagments, but still needs to be close to the bridge. Some other designs have CIC in the hull so it is more difficult for the CO to split his time between locations.
I don’t think the Phalanx is the best of the bunch. It is largely automated. I don’t know if there is an ability to use it as an anti-surface weapon with optical control.
Most other systems seem multi-function in the type of targets they can engage and the types of control.
A ‘cheap’ DDH is hard to image. A normal DD with the standard ASW & AAW fit (sensors, tactical data system, etc) is already a pricey item. Expand this to include more aviation assets and the cost increases.
Since a DDH would be by definition a combatant and would be subject to battle damage it would have to be built to naval standards with all the associated redundancy.
The ideal DDH would include the normal DD outfit along with the capacity to operate mulitiple rotary wing a/c and UAV’s.
(some possible examples: the Japanese DDH or the proposed DDH variant of the Spruance DD’s)
The use of large merchant hulls to support amphibious operations is part of the “Sea Basing” concept. It appears to be an extension of the pre-positioning concept. Use the cargo hulls at the scene to provide support bases for operations ashore. This does make sense in low-intensity areas but would seem to put a lot of resources at risk in a high-threat environment.
Regarding using older ships – from my experience in the USN, the ships are pushed to their limits. A lot of sea time. Repair time is shortened to increase operating time. A 15 or 20 yr old USN ship comes close to being worn out. It would take a lot of money to bring it up to contemporary standards and the cost of operations would probably be higher than that of a new ship, and the service life would be limited.
I think the whole concept of carriers is going to undergo some major changes in the next few years. With increased emphasis on stealth and the growth in the use of unmanned aircraft, the need for the ‘huge’ CV in most instances will decline.
Navies should begin to invest in small platforms suited for operating the next generation of air combat vehicles. Navies other than the US will have a real advantage in this area as they do not have to deal with the ‘legacy’ of the super CV’s in their service.
Rather than debating on how big a aviation platform needs to be the question should be how small could an effective aviation strike platform be in 2010?