thobbesThe most startling thing about Aleppo though is the staggering LACK of modern air power. Assad has an air force that seems straight out of the 80s with none of the precision strike capabilities that we would expect from a modern air force.
PGMs aren’t the magic bullet in an urban environment.
The defender has upside through local knowledge and if their smart they can relocate quickly using subways, sewers etc (again look at urban warfare in past).
The Americans found it amazing that Iraqis and Afghanis would simply hole up in a house and then get PGMd to bits. The Afghanis and Iraqis obviously expected Americans to charge them as opposed to calling in a bomber.
The other thing about PGM CAS is you still need good coordination between ground and air units. Even in Afghanistan, I’ve read of special forces struggling to get hits with PGMs (though practice makes perfect).
And in close quarters urban fighting, dropping a 250 – 500 lb PGM can be disastrous to your own forces even if it’s a direct hit on the target.
Then you get smoke and dust which can make guiding PGMs problematic.
And as stated the USAF has been practicing CAS for decades and has had decades of experience with it. They still get it wrong sometimes.
The Russians still struggled with effective ground-air ops in Georgia, despite prior experience in Chechnya.
What can be said of PLA with no such combat experience?
thobbesYes, I know what the definition is. What I’m saying is that house to house fighting of the kind you’re suggesting, drawn out over time, very quickly devolves into insurgent type combat, especially if prior fortifications are knocked down. What I’m essentially saying is that unlike with Stalingrad I do not think control of the city will be maintained by home field.
I really recommend you read about combat ops in Stalingrad etc.
It’s not about formal “fortifications”. Most common and effective ones involved filling in bottom floors with rubble (of which there is plenty). Cellars were also used extensively.
PLA would very quickly get control over the city.
That’s what the Wehrmacht, YNA and Syrian Army though too.
I’m not suggesting that air power is a cure all solution, but they would be effective at knocking down fortifications, which then prevent the ROCAF from holding the capital.
Even the USAF doesn’t have the airpower to level every house, every cellar, every snipers hide, etc unless it’s a nuclear one!
Anti air artillery is difficult to use in an urban setting with high rises obstructing the sky. Of course, high rises would also obstruct fixed wing CAS, but you wouldn’t be able to hide any non-hand held AAA from them. Helos would probably have to deal with handhelds of course, which may create more parity.
Look at Aleppo – high rises there and Syrian AF is active and losing both helos and jets. AAA can hide and then open up.
I agree that China may not yet have the level of CAS sophistication that the US does, but that would be very different in 2025. Furthermore, China doesn’t necessarily need to match American CAS abilities for effective CAS operations.
I doubt China will be close. Look at the Russians who are still lagging and they’ve had lots of experience.
It’s not just about lobbing a bomb, it’s about coordinating between air and ground forces.
Looks at Georgia – jets losts to friendly fire, bombings of friendly troops etc.
And it’s not just about friendly fire, it’s about target identification etc.
All diffcult in urban combat.
I’m not saying decoys and camouflaging wouldn’t be a factor, but I’m doubtful they buy much time.
This is how it works in real life.
Your tank column is chugging along a narrow road. Lead tank takes an ATGM/ATG hit and stops. Opfor shooter is neutralised.
Your advance is blocked and you need to remove that tank from the road. All of a sudden you’re behind schedule.
That means you’re not going to be where you are meant to. That makes other units more vulnerable to flanking attacks or they’re lacking in support needed to meet objectives.
Kosovo isn’t really an ideal example of urban fortifications holding out against air strikes. That said, you’re comparing the CAS abilities of the 90s with CAS in 2025, where sensors would have gotten that much better and communication and coordination technologies would have gotten that much more sophisticated.
And in spite of this, the Russians were operating using old fashioned CAS/intediction tactics in Georgia.
Assumption of China automatically adopting latest modern tactics is not plausible.
In fact China right now seems reminiscent of USSR army with it’s tiered division system whereby you had the best trained/equipped units and then progressively worse units.
Militaries will also evolve their doctrines based on lessons learned from previous campaigns. I’m doubtful China wouldn’t apply lessons learned by observing NATO’s operations in Kosovo.
Except China doesn’t have result to tactical data the NATO guys have.
A Serb tank getting smacked down by a PGM tells the Chinese nothing. NATO on the other hand has all the relevant bits and pieces – approach, speed, effectiveness of communication, ISR etc etc.
Fortifications and ambushes may bleed the PLA, but 1) it’s a matter of degrees, and 2) it needs to be considered in comparison. Bleeding only makes sense if you can bleed your opponent faster than they can bleed you. I once again refer back to the overall size and power difference, but personally I think the biggest thing holding back Taiwan from mounting an effect urban defense is the problem of supplies. Taiwan is an island. Without a supply chain that can restock munitions it wouldn’t matter if they could effectively bleed the PLA, since the PLA could replenish their supplies while the ROCAF would be wasting theirs.
I agree with this 100%. I assume any Taiwanese resistance is based on assumption of relatively quick US intervention. Whether that intervention happens or not is another part of the story.
I hope it doesn’t sound like I’m exaggerating, but I’m pretty sure the PLA could close off Taipei from help within a week’s time. From there it might take a month for them to gain full control of the city, but I would expect a surrender long before then.
Yep it could.
But by the same token, it could be a dismal failure.
China’s military is an untested force and one that is going through some major upheaval. It’s true capabilities are not known.
thobbesIt’ll be very interesting to see urban warfare in a modern metropolis, if not a little disheartening for humanity.
We’re seeing it in Aleppo right now.
Place is starting to look like Stalingrad.
We’ve also seen it in other cities ala Vukovar, Grozny and Misrata.
thobbesYet you couldn’t repeat your performance against Vietnam and you certainly couldn’t kick the Nationalists off even some of the smaller islands right on the coast of China.
Interesting.
Also you completely disregard the Korean terrain advantages or restrictive US rules of engagement (e.g. no combat sorties above Yalu). If the US operated against PRC with same ROE as against Germany and Japan, Beijing, Shanghai etc would be levelled.
Nationalists are such a sad lot to debate with.
thobbesSyria and its Labnese allies are very central to Iran. and you dont see the connection?. and after that Iraq comes.
What’s that got to do with Russia selling Pak Fas, S300s and Yasens to Iran?
Syria is an old Russian/Soviet ally plus the Russians are using them in their great game of diplomacy against the US.
That they are Iran’s ally is probably inconsequential to Russia in this instance.
thobbesThanks Hopsalot.
As stated they’ve still got LRIP 8-11 to push costs down.
I think the biggest risk to F-35 program is the US budget itself.
The death spiral so long predicted could emerge if Government cutbacks force production numbers down, thus removing economies of scale.
But apple such an environment to P-47, P-51, F-84, F-86, F-104, F-5 and F-16 and you get the same result!
thobbesMy inclination is that even with urban fortification the urban war would essentially turn into a block by block insurgent-coin campaign if you include air superiority into the mix.
Insurgent-COIN? Do you know definition of insurgent/COIN? It certainly doesn’t apply to members of a formal army engaging in a formal combat operation even if it house-tohouse fighting.
Or was the Red Army, Wehrmacht, NVA, Croatian Army, Hungarian Army etc etc all insurgents?
Also air power is of limited value in such conflict zones – just ask the Syrians or Libyans who have levelled much of cities such as Aleppo and Misrata but gained nothing. Urban warfare is the domain of infantry.
And the Taiwanese certainly have better MANPADS/AAA than Syrian and Libyan SA-7, manually guided cannons and or Iraqi and Afghan insurgents equipped with DShk, Ak-47 and RPG-7.
This forces the Chinese higher up and I doubt they have the same level of CAS coordination/delivery abilities that the Americans do (decades of experience delivering it).
Once China took control over Taiwan air space they would soften those fortifications with strikes before moving troops through. This would occur in sections as they take out fortifications along their way into the capital.
Assumptions of Taiwanese not practicing even limited preparations such as camouflage, decoys etc.
Look at 1999 Kosovo campaign for how the “lowly” Serbs often tricked NATO with decoys etc. Russians call this maskirovka and it’s a big part of warfare.
If mighty USA with years of actual bombing experience can get it wrong so much, then what chance does PLA have of doing it right?
And each fortification/ambush just bleeds PLA combat forces.
I don’t think China would try to level cities for various reasons, but they wouldn’t have to.
They could always try to starve them out.
Also keep in mind that Taiwan has no place to really move their civilian population in the event of urban combat, so this would hamper the ROCAF’s ability to mount an effective offensive to push an invading troops out. It might also have political consequences, mainly that of a quick surrender.
All possible. It depends on how vested they are into their country, how quickly they expect US reinforcement etc etc.
thobbesSorry but I have no idea what you’re talking about – I don’t understand what Russian ships crossing Dardanelles has to do with reequipping IRIAF or what $700b procurement even means.
With regards to Caspian, Iran has started beefing up its forces there – a new Iranian light frigate (the Iranians call it a destroyer) was launched in Caspian and not the Persian Gulf.
There are disputed waters there too with a lot of potential oil.
I doubt the Russians would load up Iran with weapons that it could then use to bolster it’s claim against Russian allies as well as Russian oil interests in the area.
Some small scale purchases would be authorised as have been done in the past but no massive overhauling of Iranian capabilities.
thobbesNot talking about an insurgency.
I was actually referring to ROC Army drawing PLA into urban combat, not insurgents.
Given you assume some lead up to war, cities can be fortified and preparations put into place.
As for decapitation strikes – we are unaware as to what measures the Taiwanese have in place for protecting their C3 – I assume it’d include extremely hardened facilities.
I have not heard of anyone actually ever accomplishing a successful decapitation strike even when opponents were far smaller and weaker countries ala Georgia or Kuwait.
And if the PLA is dumb enough to level Taiwanese cities it’ll actually aid the defenders. Ruined cities are far more defensible than nicely laid out whole cities – just look at Stalingrad or Caen.
Also any targetting of civilian sectors has risk of alienating any support the Chinese have internationally.
Of course this is assumes Taiwanese willingness to fight as well as PRC willingness to engage hostilities in the first place.
thobbeshttp://www.zacks.com/stock/news/110530/lockheed-seals-final-f-35-deals
So LRIP 6 and 7 still seem to be being brought at about $116 million a piece and that’s excluding engine costs.
LRIP6 (excludes engine)
F-35A – USD$103 million
F-35B – USD$109 million
F-35C – USD$120 million
LRIP7 (excludes engine)
F-35A – USD$98 million
F-35B – USD$104 million
F-35C – USD$116 million
LRIP 6 engines cost $1 billion for 39 engines (36+3 spares):
That adds about $25.6 million per aircraft BUT the distribution is difficult to work out without details as F-35B engine is more costly than F-35A/C and I’m not sure what contract is made up of in terms of support packages.
Good news is costs are falling. Bad news is this plane still costs a mint!
In anycase it seems LRIP 6/7 is still chugging along at $120+ million a piece.
At least there’s still LRIP8-11 to get price down.
All assuming US government can get it’s @#$% together – 2013 and another Congress v President budget showdown. Is it news if it’s a regular occurence?
thobbesI think it’s safe to say the idea has been at least floated in French military circles.
Whether it gets implemented is another issue entirely – government announcements don’t always result in action.
thobbesIDF/AF scrambles jets to intercept flock of birds
Interesting because the flock of birds apparently had a similar electronic signature as a slow flying UAV.
thobbesIt’s a much prettier jet than F-35.
thobbesThat crack pipe must be on fire by now.
thobbesGoldust’s secret weapon:
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