For a plane that is meant almost exclusively for the export market, you’d think they would market it better by pointing out its strenghts like FBW. Who knows? *shrug*

Neither China nor India feel much of a threat from the other directly at the border, especially from the other’s airforce. That explains the low priority given by both countries to their airforce deployments near that border.

India has nothing near the Chinese border other than some recce stuff and the oldest of the Mig-21 squadrons. The Indian Bisons, Mirages, Su-30s, Jags, Mig-27s, Mig-29s all face the western border. Also, during tense periods with Pakistan, even some of the old Mig-21s are pulled from the eastern sector.

Neither side is physically threatened by the other’s air asset deployments and BOTH sides have an interest to keep it that way. The border b/w India and China is a strategic issue not a tactical one.

Internet warriors aside, the issues b/w India and China are strategic in nature and it will be an economic and influence driven competition. India was extremely late out of the gate in that race though.

Here’s an article from today’s Asia Times

INDIA-US SECURITY
A partnership of unequals
By Ramtanu Maitra

India-United States military ties, relatively a new phenomenon, have advanced rapidly since September 11, 2001. Unlike the US-Pakistan relationship, which dates back to the 1950s, India’s military connection with the US is new and, hence, in a nascent stage. Yet during 2002 and 2003, the US and India held numerous joint exercises involving all military branches, including unprecedented advanced air combat exercises.

The bilateral security relationship has developed so rapidly that some analysts on both sides have been led to believe that the two militaries have a common agenda and common concerns. But while it is likely that both sides can agree broadly on the threats that stalk the world today, there are definite limits to the relationship. The perceptions and expectations of top US and Indian military leaders are, in fact, divergent on several key issues, in particular the approach to security in Asia and the Indian Ocean region.

The divergence is so clearly demarcated that no compromise can be reached in these areas without one side giving in to the other’s perception. Given the nature and history of these two nations, it is absurd to assume that such a compromise can be attained. India has a democratic setup of a billion-plus people, and the US possesses the most powerful military in the world.

Though some believe that the nuclear issue may hinder more fully developed military-to-military ties, it is unlikely that the issue could actually jeopardize the relationship. India is a full-fledged nuclear weapons state – whether the five nuclear weapons states like it or not. There is absolutely no possibility that the US or any other country would be able to generate enough pressure – economic, political or military – to force India to denuclearize itself. That is a pipe dream that, one assumes, is not entertained at the highest level of the American military.

Could the differences, then, lead to tensions between the two nations? Though it is difficult to speculate, the prospect seems unlikely. Much will, of course, depend on the political leadership of the two countries in the years ahead.

A success story
The joint Defense Policy Group (DPG) statements issued following the group’s August 6-7, 2003 meeting in Washington document the scope and pace of the new Indo-US military relationship. Established in the mid-1990s, The DPG was moribund prior to 1998, when it was briefly roused by India’s second round of tests of its nuclear devices. Still, the organization existed chiefly on paper. Only after the events of September 11 was it brought to life, and since then a fast and furious pace has been maintained to bring the two militaries closer. Three DPG meetings, out of a total of five meetings held since its founding, were convened between December 2001 and the end of 2003.

The August meeting pointed to the following recent achievements in the Indian-US military relationship:

A combined special forces counterinsurgency exercise in northeast India.

A combined air force exercise in Alaska.

Complex naval exercises off the east coast of India.

Delivery of “Firefinder” radars to India.

Senior-level missile defense talks.

Conclusion of a master information exchange agreement to facilitate cooperation in research and development of defense technologies.

Impressive as this list is, more and bigger cooperation will come, the DPG told the media. The two sides have agreed to establish a high-level dialogue on defense technology security issues, the DPG announced. They have decided to hold a missile defense workshop in India soon, as a follow-on to an international workshop attended by US and Indian delegations at the June 2003 multinational ballistic missile defense conference in Kyoto, Japan. The Indian delegation also accepted invitations to the July 2004 multinational ballistic missile defense conference in Berlin and the 2005 roving sands missile defense exercise.

In addition, the two delegations approved a range of activities for 2004, including:

Specialized training programs and joint exercises to be carried out by the armed services of the two countries, including an air combat training exercise.

A multinational planning exercise to develop standard operating procedures for both parties to follow, to be hosted by India in coordination with the US.
Development of a defense supply relationship, through the government-to-government foreign military sales program.

US sale to India of training materials and specialized equipment to support India’s peacekeeping training capabilities.

A defense planning exchange to permit US and Indian defense experts to conduct discussions on defense strategy and planning.

This is an ambitious to-do list that will certainly sustain the momentum of the new relationship. But when one turns to the specifics of the security of the region that directly concern India, the difficulties emerge.

The limits of trust
This was documented extensively in a report on the India-US military relationship issued last year. The report, commissioned by former Rand Corporation academic Andrew Marshall’s Office of Net Assessment in the Pentagon, was written by Booz Allen Hamilton Associate Julie MacDonald. MacDonald presented the results of her study at an invitational conference in Washington in early December, “Bridging US-India: A Defense Perspective”.

The Indian military’s historic distrust of its US counterpart because of the latter’s on-going military support to Pakistan, its record as an unreliable supplier of hardware and the uncertainty of US intentions is well known. Likewise, the US military’s suspicion of the Indian military based on India’s relationship with the erstwhile Soviet Union and the present Russia, the lack of transparency in the Indian system and India’s weak export control regime is also relatively well known. But the key divergence between the Indian and US militaries, MacDonald finds, is centered on how the two look at Asia and the Indian Ocean basin.

Not only do the two have differing perceptions of the threats in Asia, but they articulate divergent ideas about the ultimate objectives for a military-to-military relationship, MacDonald states. The US views India as a longtime military partner that will take up more and more responsibilities in Asia and assist with US bases; the US appreciates India’s strategic relations, size and sophisticated military. By contrast, India envisions the relationship developing slowly, with tangible and immediate results all along the way in terms of technology transfer and investment in defense industries. In the Indian view, the relationship must be an equal partnership.

India’s evolving security policy
It is likely that as India becomes stronger, this divergence will prevent further consolidation of military ties, at least in terms of providing security to the Asian region. If it has not begun already, India’s security concerns will certainly shift from those of a defensive nature to preventive action in the coming years. More or less isolated, India has been worried about weapons developments in Pakistan and China – two areas contiguous to India. The close China-Pakistan relationship heightened India’s anxiety. India sought hardware and training in its use to develop a counter-strike capability. But those days are behind India now.

India is now developing a preventive security system. India is growing, and is in the process of consolidating its relationships in Southeast Asia and also in Central Asia. It is a matter of time before India begins to expand its relationships in eastern Africa in cooperation with South Africa. Recently, India, South Africa and Brazil formed a Group of Three (G-3) to derive economic benefits through mutual cooperation.

As this policy evolves, the key will be the Indian Ocean. That India’s security, as well as its prosperity, depends on how well India manages affairs in the Indian Ocean was driven home by the late Indian premier Rajiv Gandhi. The subsequent growth of the Indian navy caused some consternation in the area, but as long as the Indian navy worked in tandem with the US navy, neighboring nations breathed easily.

The present Indian naval strength, its development plans and composition of various carrier groups and fleets, point to the fact that the Indian navy is becoming much larger than its immediate defense needs dictate, and clearly suggest that it is in the process of securing the next outer ring of security and positioning itself to play a role in the future to provide security to its areas of economic interest in Asia, and perhaps in Africa. Moreover, recently India has made considerable headway in building its once-frayed relations with its South Asian neighbors in a way that is coherent with India’s assumption of responsibility for the region.

Given the crucial importance of Bay of Bengal for the security of almost half of Asia, and the Arabian Sea for its importance of oil supplies to enhance global prosperity, India’s security concerns will certainly remain pinned on the Indian Ocean as it grows more powerful in the years ahead.

The J-8G looks like a Gripen on steroids.

The big panel behind the canopy is for access to the avionics bay

Originally posted by user
and you are posting these images why ?

Perhaps because those images have something to do with aerial refueling. And lo and behold, so does the thread, what a coincidence, huh?

LOL 😀 😀

Why is the British gov’t hell bent to destroy BAe?

Isn’t the defintinition of plasma, super-heated gas where the electrons of the atoms are at a higher energy state? It’s either that or the electrons have been knocked off. Which again, means high temp.

I guess, one could say relatively low temps. I.e. cold fusion.