Let’s not get carried away, because the implications of such an act or the implications of the environment having reached a stage where such acts are necessary, means it has probably reached world war three.

I don’t think any country has openly attacked another country’s shipping at such distances between port and port as you suggest, certainly not since World War Two.

One aspect of this OC control is to board ships loaded with Chinese export cargo and after seizing the cargo sell the cargo on the open market and give the profit to the destination buyers. In this way only China is cut out of the profits and pressure is brought to bear upon China to cease whatever action they were performing that prompted the action. And action such as proposed for OC would be happening in the times of extraordinary events. The world would be balanced on a knife’s edge.

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The so called secret to this so called strategy is no different to ASB because the end result of both strategies will include cutting china off from its SLOCs (freedom of navigation anyone? Lol), it isn’t like ASB will mean the US will keep China’s trade routes open…

Your statement is true. Because currently the USN is the protector of the world’s sealanes. And will be for some time.

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The big problem I see with such a large scale conflict,not merely confined to a region, is that it will effect other countries very much as well. There will be immense diplomatic pressure for china and the US to resolve quarrels peacefully, and whoever starts attacking shipping or cutting off trade routes will look like the bad guy.
Of course, if you have the worlds most capable military and biggest fleet of SSBNs I suppose you will always look like the good guy.

If it has gotten to the point where sealanes are threatened I don’t think being looked at as “the bad guy'” will figure into the equation. But in my humble opinion OC offers an attractive non-nuclear alternative to enforce your will on a nuclear armed opponent. It is an interesting bridge between conventional and nuclear war. And faced with a crisis between two power blocs to where nuclear weapons are part of the conversation, I think the rest of the world will do everything it can to keep the conversation confined to conventional combat

In any event your perspective is enlightening. I appreciate it.

Again, not seeing the same reality. Everything we’re seeing from China is suggesting that they are working very hard to overcome that particular weakness. OC might work right now, while China would still be very hesitant to go into conflict with the US, but two decades later I’m not sure it would be viable at all.

Lets see: Using your timetable it would take at least 20 years for China to overcome the structural weaknesses it suffers today. But since China’s opponents will not be sitting still wouldn’t the same gap China suffers today still largely be in effect 20 years later? What key areas do you see that China needs to make up ground in 20 years to achieve parity with the west?

I think for one, the paper underestimates how much economic inflow the new silk road will be capable of (A LOT of oil, gas, and minerals in that region of the world), and secondly, those choke points would not be uncontested. It’s also naive to think that China would consider being economically crippled by the US something they feel like they could save face in…since that’s exactly what happened with the British, and memories are still rather bitter 100 years after.

If something in a distant land kicked off in the next five years China would be hard pressed to influence the course of events.

For one I am watching the events unfolding in the Sudan in Africa to see how China responds to a serious threat to its oil lifeline. If China is to avoid a debacle like it experienced in Libya after the overthrow of Kaddafi they may have to put ‘boots on the ground’ to protect their interests in Sudan. Can China project power like that? Is the PLAN ready to step up to the plate and respond for the good of China? Or more importantly does it even have the stomach for the projection of power into a highly unstable situation like Sudan?

In the next few weeks may see what the future of modern China is really all about.

I think you overestimate how many people wouldn’t be able to bear parting with their “nice” lifestyle, since most of the adults in China have experienced some form of poverty in their life times and would know how to cope with it, and a US blockade would be seen as an act of foreign aggression, which would galvanize support for the state. Furthermore, it’s likely that with a blockade, all those factories meant to service exports that would be operating under capacity would simply be repurposed for war industries. China might not even experience a significant reduction in food stock. They could simply increase their imports from Russia and South East Asia.

Only time will tell

Now, that isn’t to say a containment strategy could not work, and it may stretch the PLA and present it challenges, especially if the US can get other countries apart from Japan to invest in such a risky proposition (that proposition is unlikely to say the least; remember, most countries in the region, even those which are “US allies” are careful about pissing China off as well given its economic importance, and also because the region’s geopolitics aren’t as black and white as the US thinks — even South Korea is leaning more with china than japan these days, partly because of China’s willingness to cooperate with the South on North Korea, and partly because of Abe going off spouting his nationalistic historical revisionism).
However, geography itself will hinder any anti China A2AD based upon Japan’s outlying islands. It’ll be a challenge to the PLA no doubt, but such a venture will also be immensely vulnerable during once the brown smelly stuff starts flying.

The interesting part about this OC strategy is the seizing of export cargo ships and their cargo as war prizes to be sold with the profits going to America and her allies. And remember the secret to this OC strategy doesn’t just take into account the first island chain but involves chokepoints far away from the normal area of operations of the PLAN.

Even now we can see how this might work as China faces the difficulties associated with oil shipments being interrupted due to the turmoil in the Sudan. China has a 40% share in Sudanese oil field and is faced with major dilemmas in how to respond to this developing kink in their oil lifeline

http://thediplomat.com/2013/12/chinas-south-sudan-dilemma/

“..China will send its special envoy for Africa to South Sudan to help push talks, China’s foreign minister was quoted as saying on Thursday, as the world’s newest country spirals into violence.

The envoy will head to South Sudan “soon” to communicate with all parties, Foreign Minister Wang Yi said during a visit to Saudi Arabia on Wednesday, in comments carried on the Foreign Ministry’s website.

Wang did not name the envoy, but he was likely referring to Zhong Jianhua, an urbane veteran diplomat who has deep experience of the conflict in South Sudan.

The announcement came a day after China called for all sides in the South Sudan conflict to stop fighting.

Big investor

The conflict has killed hundreds and some 45 000 civilians are seeking protection at UN bases. Violence erupted in the capital, Juba, on December 15 and quickly spread, dividing the land-locked country of 10.8-million people along ethnic lines.

“China is highly concerned about the evolving situation in South Sudan,” Wang said

China has extensive energy interests in South Sudan…..”

We had a discussion about using A2D2 against China on SDF. The general conclusion was that A2AD is less effective against a local power that can manage a high rate prolonged sortie to repress and take out installations than against a force projecting far away from their territory, especially if that local power can also purpose A2AD assets towards neutralizing the A2D2 installations of other countries (not to mention that China’s military development will begin to emphasize more and more strike capabilities as the PLA continues to modernize). This OC strategy would certainly add another layer of considerations to a conflict between the US and China, but I’m unsure of just how effective it would be.

Offshore control OC is a much more enlightened strategy than A2D2. In a nutshell OC seeks to interdict China in arenas where China is weak and America and her allies are strong.

Keep in mind China does not need to out compete the US for global supremacy, just in it’s neighborhood. For that even a ten year gap would be all they need. But for the US to maintain that lead requires expensive and high risk innovation.

New strategies are moving the goal posts in favor of America and her allies. If its countering China’s goal of regional supremacy you may want to become familiar with this new strategy named OC. This goes beyond the old Air-Sea Battle idea and evolves a strategy of engaging China in ways that play to the strength of America and her allies while placing China at a disadvantage.

“In the highly unlikely event of conflict with China, the United States needs a strategy that plays to its strengths, minimizes the risks of nuclear escalation, and limits physical destruction.”

Offshore Control is the Answer | U.S. Naval Institute

“..Offshore control would deny China the use of the sea inside the first island chain, at the same time defend those islands, and dominate the air and sea outside that theater. It envisions a stand-off military campaign focusing on a war of economic strangulation rather than on penetrating Chinese airspace to physically destroy its infrastructure. It seeks to force China to fight in ways that maximize U.S. strengths while minimizing China’s. In essence, OC provides a strategic context for an operational approach that goes beyond Air-Sea Battle to use the U.S. geographical advantage to maximize the effectiveness of a campaign using our air, sea, and land assets.”

http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2012-12/offshore-control-answer

Note: We may already be seeing the early stages of OC with Japan’s proposed emplacement of surface-to-surface missile batteries on offshore island chains

So from the still archaic and backward country, and a similar aviation industry level, of the mid/late seventies, they have evolved into THIS: world’s most successful communist country, world’s second economy, and an aviation industry matching that stature and growing every day. It’s products while in some respects still behind (to varying levels) other aviation industries, they are competitive, competent and can stand in the ring with almost any peers out there. Especially the new generation set to dominate this decade like J-10B, J-15 and J-16 (Sukhoi based), J-20 and J-31, H-6K, Z-10, Z-19 and now Z-20, the Y-20, upgrades to legacy platforms like JH-7, Z-8, Z-9, Y-8 and the continuing advance of chinese avionics, electronics and airborne weapons are further reducing the gap. Engine wise, it is almost certain that past 2020 China will be fully self-sufficient in this regard too (through the fully developed by then WS-10, WS-13, WS-15 and WS-18 and others smaller) and will not need imports anymore thus completing the circle so to say. Remember they would have reached this level, almost on par with the best, after their main competition had a FIFTY years head start! Don’t you think this is astonishing? And given this evolution, can you imagine where they will be in 2030?

I take a different view. China has enjoyed the significant tailwinds of robust and detailed espionage programs against the west. This has allowed China to cut into the lead held by western countries. However as western powers become more aware of China’s espionage efforts steps are being taken to deny China access to secrets they once were able to help themselves to at will. Further more dis-information programs are being designed and deployed that will allow Chinese access to bogus information designed to look genuine but in reality is designed to confuse and send Chinese spies down paths that lead to time wasting dead ends.

These efforts will slow the progress of Chinese development of sophisticated weapon systems.

Where once Chinese weapons designers and aircraft designers were able to “peek over the shoulders” of western designers, that access will not be available as it was before. Systems that have been established by China to integrate western designs into Chinese designs will no longer be valid. And China will be forced to rely upon its own resources. This is something that has not been done before and will slow the progress of Chinese military and technological progress as they struggle to regain their footing. Going ‘cold turkey” as it were will dramatically slow Chinese development and deployment of 21th century weaponry.

Thought as much. Erickson is hashing 2-4 year old information. His information isn’t inaccurate mind you. It’s just not up to date.

As for your question, maybe a solid 20-30 years, but maybe less? Part of the answer really depends on how long it takes for Western aerospace to make the next leap, which isn’t just a function of technological capability but economics and demand. China may have an F119 or better class engine in production by 2020 (the WS-15). Going into 2020, if the US is still iterating on the F119 and hasn’t made a leap to a different core, the gap will be better defined by the time difference between China’s next engine after the WS-15 (which is already being researched) and whatever new engine technology the US comes up with after the F119.

Another way to understand this point is to look specifically at the length of time between each engine design for the US and China. The F100 engine went into production in 1979 and the F119 went into production about 20 years later. Nearly a decade and a half after the F119 went into production, we’re still iterating off what is now a 30+ year old design, and it’s uncertain if or when we would be expecting the next generation after that. The WS-10 went into production in 2009, and there may be as little as a ten year gap (or perhaps as much as 15) before the WS-15 is introduced into service. Research into the WS-15 was already under way before the WS-10 had reached maturity, and the same is true for whatever comes after the WS-15. This is why pace must be considered.

The explanation for the lag is rather obvious. Before Reform and Opening in 1979 China was incredibly backwards technologically and didn’t have a strong scientific or industrial base. It takes a while to close that gap in human and industrial capital, even with money invested (investments take time to mature). Furthermore, China doesn’t benefit as much from tech and skills transfers like with other developing countries because of the 1989 embargo. For China to have made progress in that front, they would have had to strengthen their technological capabilities from the very bottom on their own at the academic and research level, and then need to figure out how to scale that knowledge up to the industrial level. That said, they wouldn’t have to do ALL the research from scratch, since that’s part of the open nature of academia. As mentioned earlier, it takes longer to figure out the next technological breakthrough than it does to catch up, provided that the resources are there, which is why we shouldn’t expect for China to be behind forever.

Point taken. thanks for answering my questions

Your definition of innovation appears vague to me, and more than that, we all know China isn’t a leader in many of the industries we’re talking about — they’re using this time to catch up technologically as well as to catch up by producing machines that the military needs as quickly as possible. You can only innovate once you’re truly in the leading position, or at least, once you master the technology.

I agree with your statement and it seems so do others

BEIJING, Oct. 29 2013 (Xinhuanet) — China has seen the world’s biggest growth in terms of research and development spending over the past year. But it still has a long way to go before its companies lead the world in innovation, a study has found.