If they are serious about high-tempo carrier ops they will have to use buddy tanking like the USN does — the USN hasn’t had a true tanker on CVNs since the KA-6Ds were retired. I know buddy tanking has been done on Flankers before, but I don’t know how much offload capacity a Flanker can carry when it is launching from a STOBAR deck.

Is there any evidence of PLAN aircraft, specifically J-11/J-15 carrying out buddy refueling? I was not aware of any.

And your point regarding J-15s lifting off a STOBAR deck with enough fuel to act as a tanker is important.

Without having a tanker acting as a safety net during blue water ops the PLAN may have to modify its ideas about how far from land they can operate.

One idea they might consider is to have a land based tanker aloft during PLAN flight operations. Its not an elegant solution but it is better than nothing. An H-6U equipped with RDC-1 aerial refuelling pods might be pressed into service as a temporary measure

Point taken. Its the US Navy and then all the rest. My point is that China will have to earn its place at the table

What are you talking about? India went from no carrier to a fully operational carrier in a few years, by buying an ex-British carrier & aircraft. The USSR didn’t try to build a fixed-wing carrier for many years, because it didn’t fit their plans. When their plans changed, they moved at a decent pace.

The Indians had the Brits to refer to and the Russians had as stated before many years of experience with aircraft at sea before they tried conventional aircraft at sea. Russia had always wanted conventional aircraft at sea and approached the subject in a cautious and systematic way. And even using that approach the Russians still lag in deck handling procedures and flight operations tempo.

The point is that there is no easy way to gain the experience necessary except by trial and error and hard won lessons

China has already spent many years preparing. Why do you talk of short cuts? They’ve been gradually, carefully, gaining knowledge. I expect they know everything there is to know about carrier operations without having experience, and now they are building up practical experience. They aren’t starting from scratch. They are not taking short cuts. It’s been a long, cautious, progress (they first got their hands on a second-hand carrier in the mid 1980s), which is now approaching fruition.

China has taken carrier operations as far as they can without going to sea. These first steps of a couple of J-15s on their starter carrier reflect the approach they are taking. Now China has stated that Liaong will begin blue water ops sometime this year. It will be interesting to see how this works out under the professional scrutiny of the navies of the world. I look forward to the developments

Japanese navy is hostile

To who? I’ve never had any problem with them

As for factors overlooked, there are indeed those that weigh in favour of the United States and its likely allies. I grant, for example, that the US is likely to retain a technological edge over China for the foreseeable future even as the gap is steadily narrowed. However there are also counter-vailing factors, such as the fact that the US power projection in the region is based upon a relatively small number of carriers and bases, all of which will be high priority targets for destruction, whilst China will be able to benefit from varying degrees of land-based airpower. We could go on listing qualitative factors all day, but I would deny that their balance weighs conclusively — if at all — in favour of the United States.

China has bigger problems to be concerned with than American power projection in the Pacific. China should be worrying about how it will project power to protect its vital interests,

For example look at how China is even today dependent upon a fragile energy lifeline that travels by sea, where interdiction of this energy lifeline is possible by other players not directly connected with the United States. Consider how China might respond if oil shipments from Angola were interrupted by a civil war in that country. Today nearly 40 percent of Angolan oil is exported to China, and this represents 16 percent of Chinese imports of hydrocarbons. China does not have the sea power to protect this long and vital lifeline, and will not have it for some time.

There are several structural problems of this nature that China will be forced to deal with in the near term that can threaten the integrity of Chinese society that America has nothing to do with. I for one am interested in the Chinese response to these problems

The (very) condensed version of my take on the world and Australia’s place in it is that we are entering a period of unprecedented global change manifested most obviously and significantly in the Australian context by the relative decline of American power in the face of a rising China. I do not believe that conflict between these two nations is inevitable, but I do believe that it is possible, and increasingly likely from the mid-2020s to mid-2030s, and further that in the event of such a conflict it is entirely possible that America will lose. Worst-case scenario is the eruption of major conflict between China and the United States, strikes conducted (quite reasonably) against US bases in Australia leading to Australia’s entry into the war, the defeat of the US-led alliance and imposition of terms on a defeated Australian nation.

In a China – America conflict during the time frame you mention it is just as likely and even more so that China could suffer defeat due to several important factors you choose to overlook. The wishful thinking of a linear rise of Chinese power is the most serious case of rose colored glasses I have seen in quite a while. And the incessant predictions of the decline of American power echoes as a clarion call to American ears all across the United States.

The US psychologically and economically needs enemies. Look at even little Cuba which poses no threat but the US still treats them as an enemy at the gate.

Don’t get it twisted. When Castro came to power the US welcomed him with open arms. He seemed like someone who the US could deal with. Then Castro went rogue and started acting crazy. His ambition to be a player in Latin America drove him into the arms of the Soviets and he nearly caused WW3. Remember the Cuban Missile Crisis.? The United States has been wary of him ever since. Please get your facts straight.

PLAN trains

According to this account the PLAN Red Flag exercise threw a couple of curve balls at the participating Red units

http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/feb/8/inside-china-english-speaking-enemy/#ixzz2KPG94nVy