But also indicating that there was a potential solution to production limitations for the Swift at Supermarines, so that cannot really be said to be a reason why it was not produced in quantity.

True.

Yeah there are a few dubious claims made in those brochure pages.

Then we have the RAM issue so correctly picked up. It cites a PK of .3 against a manoevering AShM which may be accurate. It fails to note that 3 rounds fired will make that a .9pk as the evasive manoevre will likely defeat the first missile but the second will have more opporunity to process the bearing and angular deviation and the third even more so. With 21 shots in the pack that is a much higher success rate against a 4-inbound ‘dancer’ attack than stated.

I might be picking this up wrong, as I don’t know how you’re factoring the Pk increase for the second and third shots – however, taking just a flat Pk of .3 three shots fired at an incoming missile will only yield a 3-shot Pk of about .6.

A Pk increase of +.3 seems a bit large to me.

Whats wrong with “hun”?

Well in Northern Ireland it’s a derogatory label that Catholics use to refer to Protestants…

Does anybody have access to a copy of Norman Friedmans ‘British Carrier Aviation: The Evolution of the Ships and Their Aircraft’

It would probably be the best source of information for the 1952 carrier but my particular interest is for the pre CVA-01 studies. Some of those designs used the mysterious Type-985 electronically scanned radar and I would love to here a description or see a picture of the layout for that system.

I own the book, but sadly it resides halfway around the world from me now. Been a long time since I saw it – but from what I can remember the info on the pre CVA-01 studies consists of tabular data and text – no new pics beyond the standard CVA-01 ones as far as I remember.

Brown and Moore’s Rebuilding the Royal Navy covers the carriers well – but no Type-985 info sadly beyond a brief reference note.

From Time Magazine

Looks like there’s not so many places to hide in the big, wide ocean:

While the intersection of two sonar-equipped nuclear submarines in a vast ocean may seem an unlikely event even without communication, there are environmental anomalies in the Atlantic that make a collision more likely, according to Ferguson. Submarines on a deterrent mission, for instance, tend to congregate in places where they are unlikely to be found by other submarines and spy-planes. “There are oceanographic factors in which you can be on either side of an ocean front where the temperature is slightly different on your side than the others. Where the gulf stream comes across the Atlantic is a prime point of this. Sometimes these barriers can be quite hard – no sound penetrates at all. And if your business is hiding than you would hide in that vicinity. There is an added risk that given the environmental factors maybe you don’t hear another submarine in time to do something about it.”

Also this:

NATO operates a traffic control system that alerts allied nations to the deployment zones of friendly submarines. The system is designed to avoid collisions. But because France is not part of NATO’s military command structure, it does not provide information on the location of its mobile nuclear arms to that system, according to Julian Ferguson, who commanded one of Britain’s four V-class nuclear submarines until retiring in 2006.

From http://news.yahoo.com/s/time/20090217/wl_time/08599187977700

Also, if Subs have the same kind of suction problem large ships have then they may have a much larger ‘danger zone’ than their actual physical size suggests.

Yes, but statistically the chances of them colliding rendomly are mighty close to zero even if they couldn’t hear each other. There must be more to this than meets the eye, still we will probably have to wait 30 years or so before they release the file. 🙁

Maybe so, but if both navies use the same charts and same navigational principles to choose their routes then perhaps the odds are not so astronomical at all…

My experience of the inner workings of Japanese society is mostly from my Japanese relatives, but I’ve not come across such extreme deference. I’ve also been made aware by them of the idea (there’s a word for it, I think) of saying “Yes sir, at once, sir” and then doing nothing. Of course, the armed forces may be different. The people who choose to join them may be more traditional & more willing to submit to hierarchy than the modern Japanese norm.

I guess there’s a range of responses in any society, in the case of the AEGIS leak a Lt. how had access to the AEGIS files was asked for them by another Lt. who’d been involved in his training – and so was his Sempai. Anyhow, that was what the papers said.

In the case of General Tamogami, the now ex-Chief of the JASDF he’d been arranging lectures by right-wing extremists for his staff officers, palling-up with the head of APA-Group (they moved in the same right-wing circles). The APA boss got given a free ride in an F-15, and the General submitted an essay in an APA-sponsored. Surprise-surprise – the General won top prize: 3 million yen. His essay was nuts, and I’m being charitable. The most damning thing about the whole affair was the General was surprised at all the hoo-haa his dealings caused.

There have been other scandals recently, but those two bear most on how capable the Self-Defence Forces are in handling secrets.