A very interesting article. It seems accurate.
Anti-ballistic missiles: menace and myth
17:56 | 25/ 04/ 2007Print version
MOSCOW. (Alexander Khramchikhin for RIA Novosti) – The United States’ plans to build an anti-ballistic-missile (ABM) system in eastern Europe have sparked a heated debate, which is drawing in more and more participants. Meanwhile, some aspects of the controversy are surprising.
To start with, Moscow’s reaction does not seem quite appropriate. It is obvious enough that the deployment of U.S. ABM components in Poland and the Czech Republic does not present any threat to the Russian strategic nuclear forces so far.
It is common knowledge that ballistic missile trajectories are not straight lines on a map. They fly over the globe in a big arc. Thus, an ICBM launched from northwestern Iran towards New York or Washington will fly over Azerbaijan and Georgia, the Russian Black Sea coast of the Caucasus, the Sea of Azov, eastern and central Ukraine, Belarus, northeastern Poland, the southern Baltics, southern Sweden, Denmark, the North Sea, the Orkneys, the Atlantic Ocean, and between Newfoundland and mainland Canada. The American ground-based interceptors (GBIs) are designed to hit their targets head-on, and for this reason it makes sense to deploy them in Poland. This will make it easier for the GBIs to destroy enemy ICBMs because the angle between interceptor and target will be slight or even zero, lowering requirements for the former’s speed and range (the targets themselves would approach the GBIs).
At the same time, the trajectories of any missiles flying from Russia to the United States (and vice versa) pass over the Arctic. Let’s assume the impossible – a Russian first strike on the United States. In that case, north-bound Russian ICBMs would of course be launched earlier than GBIs. The ABM facility in Poland would then have to detect them, calculate their trajectories and launch interceptors to the northeast to catch them from behind. But GBIs have neither the speed nor range to do this. The further to the east the ICBMs start, the more useless GBIs based in Poland would be. The interceptors are supposed to have characteristics similar to the missiles they are meant to destroy. Their speed is about the same. This does not matter when the two missiles are meant to collide head-on, but to overtake a speeding missile, an interceptor must travel several times faster than it. For this reason, the current version of the GBI does not pose a threat even to Russian ICBMs based in the European part of the country, to say nothing of the Urals and Siberia. And of course, the European ABM system is powerless against Russian ballistic-missile submarines. Moreover, Poland is going to accept only 10 GBIs, a figure which pales into insignificance when compared to the Russian strategic nuclear forces. In any case, the American strategic ABM system can hardly be said to exist because many of the GBI tests have failed. On top of all that, bulky radars and GBI launch pads are highly vulnerable to conventional tactical weapons, cruise missiles and front-line aviation.
Some experts believe that the radar that the Americans are planning to deploy in the Czech Republic is much more dangerous for Russia than the GBIs in Poland. It will cover the country’s territory up to the Urals. Its mission is to detect missile launches and feed this information to the anti-missile systems. However, as I have explained above, such systems do not actually exist.
To sum up, the threat posed by the American ABM system to be deployed in eastern Europe is imaginary. The only bizarre point is that the threat of Iranian ICBMs to the United States is even more far-fetched. Up to this day, the U.S., Russia, and China have been the only countries capable of building their own ICBMs. Iran cannot even cope with producing medium-range missiles. Its technological level will not allow it to build nuclear-tipped ICBMs even in the distant future. Even if we assume that Iran obtains such missiles somehow, why would it wish to attack the United States? For all the peculiarities of the Iranian regime, there are no grounds to think that it consists of suicidal fanatics. It is perfectly obvious that a single strike against the United States would cause, quite legally, a massive retaliation that would completely destroy Iran. There are no goals for which the Iranian leaders would pay such a price. It is hard to believe that Washington does not understand this, and in this context its desire to seek protection against Iran seems very strange.
There are five explanations of why the United States wants to have an ABM system in eastern Europe, and none are mutually exclusive:
1. After 9/11, American leaders and society as a whole became so paranoid that they want to counter even mythical threats to national security.
2. The Pentagon’s budget has become so big that to keep it at this level or make it even bigger, the Defense Department and the military-industrial complex are presenting mythical threats as real, demonstrating at the same time their concern for the security of the U.S. taxpayer.
3. U.S. military and political leaders believe that in the (albeit remote) future, they will develop their ABM system to the level where it would pose a threat to the Russian strategic nuclear forces; now it is important to gain a foothold by deploying useless GBIs.
4. Washington wants to repeat its successful strategy of the 1980s, when it compelled Moscow to spend huge sums of money to counter a mythical threat. Almost a quarter-century has passed since the United States first announced Star Wars, but for all of its gigantic economic, technological and scientific potential, America has managed to produce almost nothing of what it announced then. It was very easy to understand then that the supposed ABM program was a pipe dream, but the intellectual level of the Soviet elite had dropped so much by that point that it was simply unable to adequately assess the situation. Nobody in America was ever going to make any combat lasers, but Moscow feverishly rushed to parry the threat just to realize shortly afterward that it could not cope with it either economically or technologically.
Under Mikhail Gorbachev, Russia began “perestroika and acceleration,” and only after we dropped out of the race from exhaustion did we go for “the new thinking,” with the end that we all know. Today, Washington may well try to at least exhaust Russia with another arms race, if not cause its complete disintegration in the wake of the Soviet collapse. At the same time, the U.S. will unite the rapidly decaying NATO alliance and save its combat potential in the face of “the new threat from the East.”
5. The final possibility is that America does not care much about either Russia or Iran. Rather, it knows that NATO has no future and wants to create a new security system that would be smaller but more coherent. The system should involve those countries that are truly loyal to Washington. The deployment of ABM components is a loyalty test.
As I have already said, one explanation does not rule out another. I am almost sure that the truth is a combination of several, if not all versions. This is why Moscow is on the horns of a dilemma: should it rush to beef up its armed forces, thinking about the third explanation, or should it pretend that nothing is happening for fear of being trapped by the fourth?
But these two courses are not mutually exclusive. Russia must not only build up its armed forces; it must largely start building them from scratch. If it adopts a serious strategy for military development that reflects real threats and challenges and ways of responding to them, Russia will even be able to deal with the third option – if it becomes a reality.
The author is the head of the analytical department at the Institute of Political and Military Analysis.
The opinions expressed in this article are the author’s and do not necessarily represent those of RIA Novosti.
Besides, it is a fact the Don-2P targeting radar, for example, is still unsurpassed in terms of target discrimination. Voronezh may have some infancy problems, but don’t try and sell your religious belief according to which the Russkies may want to learn something from the NMD programme that they don’t already master as a hard fact.
How compare the capability of the new Russian LPAR respect to the Don-2NP. As far I know this one surely have battle management capability. But have the Volga and the Voronezh-DM able to provide tracking-quality data or are they just early warning radars that provides signals with low resolution?
In principle, it will be based on the Tu-160 airframe. It will include some stealth features (but no to a “B-2 level), minor changes to the airframes, new materials and much more efficient engines. I will search for the article.
Back to the issue. How to compare the S-300VM radars with the S-400? Arte the Carlo Kopp articles accurate?
Actually, I think this conflict related to the pole ABM site will benefit third parties. I.e. as part of the “asymmetric answer”, probably Mr. Chavez will get his Amur class submarines to protect the Venezuelan oil from “sulphuric Mr Danger”. But here in Europe, certainly the security will worsen. It will be worse for Russia who will be encircled by NATO bases and will be worse for the E. U. that will be targeted by Russian missiles and/or bombers.
If you can orbit a satellite, you can make a FOBS work.
Off, course, but an accurate re-entry vehicle needs additional control mechanisms to re-enter from an orbital path. Nevertheless, if you are satisfied with a “Soyus-like” precision, everything is OK. In such a case you will need a large bomb that in turn will need a large launcher.
All that would really do is start a further arms race of ASAT-type weapons.
I wonder if this has yet started.
If someone put a number of FOBS in serice, it’s likely that their enemies would move to place ASAT-type kill vehicles in geostationary orbit above themselves for defense.
You know. The always race between the shield and the sword.
It could be, it could be.:confused: Anyway, I doubt even China to have the technical background to develop a precise space descent nuclear charge. Russia deployed some of these stuffs in the SS-9 but I don’t know if it will be feasible to deploy a FOB charge in smaller ICBM like the Topol-m. Technically is feasible, but the yield delivered would be quite small.
Anyway, it would be interesting to test the sincerity of claims that the GBI deployment plan doesn’t have Russia in mind with such a deployment. If USA start to deploy GBI in Mexico, this claim would be definitively dead, except, off-course, that such a deployment will be based on “the need to counter the threat of the ICBM forces of Hugo Chavez”. 😀
Originally Posted by SOC
It has nothing to do with range directly, it has to do with target speed. An ICBM travels up to 15,000 mph. ATBMs like the S-300PM-1/2 cannot engage targets travelling that fast. The S-300PMU-1/2 can engage targets travelling at 2800 m/sec, or around 6500 mph. Now, the Antey-2500 can smack a target flying at 4500 m/sec, or around 10,000 mph. If it could accurately track an ICBM, it might be able to have an outside chance at hitting one, and therefore also hitting a GMD interceptor (the Antey-2500 is advertised as being able to hit individual warheads). But anything using a 48N6 missile (S-300PM-1/2, S-400) isn’t going to have a chance in hell. The S-400’s 40N6 might be able to hit a GMD vehicle or an ICBM if it can engage targets moving around 6500 m/sec, but we need more data on that missile in order to make that claim.
So, the advertised S-400 capability against IRBM of up to 3.500 km IRBM (4.8 km/s) can be only carried out with the “mystery” 40N6. 48N6 series rocket will only be able to down MRBM of up to 1.500 km (2.8 km/s).
Summarizing, current S-400 (without the 40N6) being deployed near Moscow have superior anti-air capabilities (up to 250 km interception range against aerial targets) but inferior ABM capabilities respect to the S-300VM.
What’s the range of BM that can be engaged by the S-300PMU2? It’s better than the Antey-2500 im terms of ATBM capability?
It will not be a SS-20. It may be something like a nuclear tipped 9M82M. This thing weights 5 tons, 20% more than a Iskander. Launched in a sort of parabolic trajectory, it will have a very interesting range. It was stated that the “asymmetric answer” will come from the “fifth generation SAM”, now in early design stages.
So the obvious solution would be to reinstate the SS-20 but alter the three MIRVs so that they all airburst and call it a SAM for destroying any airborne stealth aircraft over their base of operations. The targets are therefore aircraft, which are not ballistic so it isn’t an ABM system.
It sounds crazy, but this is actually the solution.
Yep Soc, That were some thing are apparently going. Supposedly, the “fifth generation system able to repel aggressions from air and space” (S-500?) will be part of the “asymmetric answer” the GBI base in Poland.
Now technical questions.
– If it is a SAM system, to be able to deal with GBI going to Russia , it should deploy a boost phase interceptor. Right?
– Supposedly 40N6 have a range of 400-450 km, a ceiling of 150-185 km and a speed of 3-4 km/s. Is that enough to intercept an interceptor?
Technically I could go out and shoot a few cops but I doubt I’d like the repercussions. I doubt the Russians would either.
USA isn’t the world cop anymore. It was near to be in the 90s, but not anymore, after several failed movements like Iraq, influence lost in many places (even in Latin America)…
Note that Iran have, so far, defied swiftly every American threat. So if the former world-“cop” shot to Russia, I don’t think the Russians will passively accept it. Shots FROM Russian in the opposite direction should be expected.
End of off-topic.
Actually I would expect Antei-2500 could probably already do it if the system in poland has a range of less than 500km.
The range of the GBI is around 3.500 km. You have the advantage that, in case a GBI is launched to Russia, the ABM will have to travel a shorter distance to the interception point (it will have to be a boost phase interception ¿?).
Now, it’s matter of kinematics. 9M82M have a terminal speed of 2.7 km/s. Enough?