This is an article of 2 or 3 month ago:

Generals Dreaming of Cuban Missile Crisis. Sergey Ivanov’s Subordinates Are Prepared To Withdraw From INF Treaty

Russian generals are again raising the issue of deploying so-called ground-based medium-range missiles. The grounds for this conclusion were provided by a statement (which passed virtually unnoticed) by Major General Vladimir Vasilenko, chief of the Russian Federation Defense Ministry’s 4th Central Scientific Research Institute, that “the deployment of a group of ground-based medium-range missiles may be considered as an additional means of ensuring national security.” In Russia and abroad the 4th Central Scientific Research Institute is known as one of the most closed establishments within the defense department that are engaged in nuclear missile planning.

Generals do not make statements of this sort on their own initiative. They are always preceded by unpublicized decisions in the top echelons of the Defense Ministry and the General Staff. According to Vasilenko, he replied to Interfax’s questions (it was for Interfax that the general made his sensational statement) in writing, in other words in a deliberate fashion, checking every word, and his words were cleared by the censor and passed via the Russian Federation Defense Ministry press service to a representative of the agency.

In accordance with the Treaty on Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF) signed by the USSR and the United States in 1987, medium-range missiles were destroyed back in 1991. As the USSR’s successor, Russia is obliged in accordance with this document not to test or deploy ground-based ballistic or cruise missiles of medium range (1,000-5,500 km) or shorter range (500-1,000 km). Moreover, as Vasilenko points out, “the INF Treaty is of unlimited duration, although each side has the right to exercise its state sovereignty by withdrawing if it decides that exceptional circumstances linked to the content of the treaty would jeopardize its higher interests.” He focuses attention on the fact that “Russia has retained a technical and technological headstart in the creation of ground-based medium-range missiles and the corresponding production base.” A year ago there was discussion in the press concerning Russia’s possible withdrawal from the treaty, under which a whole class of missiles was destroyed. In March 2005 published an article maintaining that during a January (2005) meeting in Washington Russian Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov broached the possibility of the Russian Federation’s withdrawal from the INF Treaty to his US counterpart Donald Rumsfeld. Later, however, the Russian Federation Foreign Ministry officially confirmed Russia’s commitment to observing the INF Treaty.

All issues concerning this problem seemed to have been resolved. But then Russian Federation Defense Ministry representatives suddenly started talking about it. Maj Gen Vasilenko yesterday (28 Feb) confirmed to that the statements cited by Interfax were correct, pointing out that there are several reasons for the reappearance of the INF topic in the media, among which he named the Russian defense industry complex’s interest in increasing the state defense order. He shifted the blame, so to speak.

At the same time, the general pointed out that his statements in no way contradict the position of the Russian Foreign Ministry. Vasilenko’s argument is that his institute has not yet given practical consideration to the possibility of deploying medium- and shorter-ranger missiles and believes that in the current circumstances it will be necessary to conduct a comprehensive military-economic analysis when considering the deployment of a group of medium-range missiles. “In the course of that analysis, account will inevitably have to be taken of the fact that, given their ability to be used over a wide variety of ranges, ICBMs are a more adaptable deterrent than medium-range ballistic missiles,” Vasilenko said.

The contradictoriness of the Defense Ministry representative’s position is obvious. And the question of why he, who is responsible for strategic nuclear planning, had to publicize this position at this particular time remains unanswered. This looks more than anything like a sounding of public opinion, an attempt to establish how the public would respond to an attempt to renew the arms race.

“The creation of the United States’ national missile defense system will inevitably provoke a nuclear missile arms race,” Colonel General Varfolomey Korobushkin, first vice president of the Academy of Military Sciences, said the other day. Major General Vladimir Dvorkin, professor, former head of the 4th Central Scientific Research Institute, and now chief research associate at the Russian Academy of Sciences IMEMO (World Economics and International Relations Institute) Center for International Security, believes that Russian withdrawal from the INF Treaty is possible in the future. “Withdrawal from the Treaty is possible, but not obligatory,” he said, using those precise words, and declining to comment further. “Vasilenko is my colleague, I am not going to oppose him.”

It’s seems that the option is in carpet and subject to analysis right now. Seems the correct move (for a while)

I can’t understand the “logic” of those who claim that the ABM treaty was “a relic” and was OK to withdraw from it but at the some time furiously argue that the INF treaty should not be scrapped. Double standards? It’s quite probable.

Lavrov should avoid launch warn words. The west simply will not listen. On the contrary, they are on hurry to incorporate these post-soviet states to NATO (in order to use as platform to put pressure on Russia) because puppet governments seems very unstable and rapidly weakening. They probably will succeed in some of these states but the fast incorporation will create problems as i.e. fierce people opposition and more instability. These problems can be exploited by Russia and the incorporation can be used as a cause to kill the INF. In the whole if Ukraine joins NATO and start to deploy forward bases targeting Russia, the deployment of IRBM will be an imperious step
Let’s see.

It’s not about waste money, It’s about saving money. Intermediate range missiles seems a cheap, flexible and effective option too. Some time ago it was an article about re-start production of Skorosts (in an updated version). It’s seems as a quite appropriate measure if USA deploy intermediate range SLBM. A few Skorosts could simultaneously target threatening spots from the south and from the west if located in Urals. Mobile Bulavas can be used as “Super-Pionners” too by simultaneously increasing its load while decreasing its range. They can be declared as “strategic” and then included inside the 2.200 warhead level to calm western anxiety.

The obvious matter is that the “Irani” pretext is not credible at all and it is just the last string of real movements toward the Russian borders. Baluyevsky clearly stated this fact. 10 or 12 interceptor are not a danger right now, but as usual this will change in the future (as you know, western words go in a direction and western behavior in the opposite one), and Russian forces must be ready to take effective countermeasures. So, if this threat is not aimed at Russia, NATO should not worry about Iskanders patrolling near Poland because “we are partners”.

Respect to “some of us do this for a living”, words are just words and they are completely irrelevant, since the “Irani” pretext was clearly not believed by Baluyevsky et al. This matter and seems they will take preemptive countermeasures increasing the production of Iskanders. According RIA Novosti production is going on and 60 systems will be deployed at 2015 timeline. Fortunately they will prevent any type of rogue pressure against Russia.

Well, in respect to election’s cleanness, we can safely assume that the 2005 Belarrususian election was not “the cleanest” but it was cleaner than the 2000 American’s one. Obviously, in American mouths, the word “democratic” is just a propagandistic label. I mean Condy Rice claims that Chavez (that won lots of elections) is “anti-democratic leader” but they supported the 2002 failed coup d’etat because it “will save the democracy”. So, the label “democracy” is adapted to American interests. It must not be seriously considered when it came from American politicians and/or propagandistic-men.

Respect to the threat to Russia and Belarus that will come from the polish soil, so far, it can be neutralized with just several Iskander deployed in Kaliningrad and near Baranovichi. After the predictable growth of the anti-missile net aimed at the east, it will be necessary to deploy mobile MIRV Bulava in the best regions (may be in the Ural region). In the whole Russia must assure itself against an extortive western behavior. If multiple MARV warheads are used, just a few dozens Iskanders and Bulavas seems enough.

May be , it is time to deploy a dozen Iskanders in Kaliningrad and another dozen in Belarus. To protect Russian “from the Iranian danger”, off course.

I don’t know if this is the right place to ask but there are some persistent confusion about the big-missile of the S-400 system.
According to Jane’s this system was incorporated to the Russian AF with the 48N6DM missile. This is a further upgrade of the 48N6e2 missile that have range of up to 250 km against aerodynamic targets.
According to Kopp (http://www.strategycenter.net/resea…pub_detail.asp), the 48N6DM has a range of 400 km, but as far I know this range correspond to the 40N6 “mystery”-missile that is still undergoing tests and that should be a further evolution of the 9M82M “improved Giant” missile.
There was a lot of speculation about this SAM, but I tend to believe in Jane’s. So; so far the S-400 is centered around the Grave-Stone radar and comprises the 96ME/E2 small missile a the 48N6DM with 250 km range and 2.1 km/s speed.

Rigth? More information-links, please.