Phantom – As I’m sure you know, when he was Chief of Staff, Gen McPeak was keen on maintaining air force heritage during a period of downsizing; as part of this, he dictated that no active duty units would have the same numerical designation, so one of the 1st TFW (as was) and 1st SOW had to be renumbered. 1st SOW was renumbered as 16th SOW by resurrecting the 16th FG and consolidating it with 1st SOW.

What became 16th SOW took on the heritage and traditions of both 1st SOW and 16th FG; the 1st SOW emblem and motto stayed the same after the renumbering.

So standing up the 16th SOW again when the 1st SOW is also extant is problematic: in effect, the heritage and traditions of the two units have amalgamated over the last decade or so, and re-forming the 16th would create the problem of trying to de-amalgamate (is that a word??) them so they could have two distinct identities, hence the use of the different number.

That’s from memory, and I suspect that some of the terms about amalgamating, as used in the UK are incorrect for the US – but the gist of the rationale is, I think, broadly accurate.

whitfc – the 3 Sqn chap was almost certainly giving you educated speculation, not the inside track. There was an awful lot of chatter in RAF rumour control about a Saudi buy of between 24 and 72 aircraft (48 was the favourite figure I heard) and of the aircraft for such an order being deducted from the overall total. The reason that this wouldn’t have been a practical idea at the time you got the info was because this failed to take account of the fact that for this to happen, the contract would need to be renegotiated (as per the story that’s been linked to).

There’s no guarantee that this will happen – you could equally see the Saudi buy being used by the MoD to extend the RAF’s purchases over a longer period, or possibly even to have a UK-only Tranche 4, which would come under the auspices of a different Comprehensive Spending Review and thus relieve some of the financial pressure the MoD is facing under this CSR period.

JN – the GBU-126 LCBD might be the answer to the problem of over-powerful 500 pound munitions (it was mentioned in Janes DW last week so I shouldn’t get chaps in black Omegas pulling up outside the house after mentioning it).

I read Ken as meaning ‘it’s all arms, stupid’ in the same sense as ‘Keep it simple, stupid’ – the ‘stupid’ being generic rather than person-specific.

Forgive the pedantry, but Trenchard wasn’t a cavalry officer – he was a Scots Fusilier.

I suggest that Richard Overy’s The Air War 1939-1945 and Why the Allies Won are worth consulting over the efficacy (or otherwise) of the bombing campaign of WW2.

The reason for British offensives in 1916 and 1917 owe as much to alliance politics as to Haig being mad keen on offensives. The Germans went in 1918 because it was the last chance they had: Russia out of the war and large numbers of Americans on their way, therefore try to win before the numbers game goes totally against you.

We only have 3 short-tail Nimrods, and taking one out of service to re-wing it would make the elastic go ‘twang’ very loudly as the fleet went beyond over-stretch. Also, the R1s’ fatigue index isn’t as much of an issue as it was/is for the MR2. Then, there’s the issue of cost – the original 21 airframe buy for the MRA4 went down to 18 and is now 12; even adding 3 R1 conversions (presumably to R5 standard) would have been an issue.

The FSTA PFI might have been a reasonable idea if it had been to provide an additional number of airframes above an outright purchase of A330s. Again, though, if the RAF’s aspiration to get the 24-36 A310 MRTTs that were offered in about 97/98 had been realised (the Treasury said ‘no’) we wouldn’t be having this discussion.

If we spent less money on frivolities such as quangos seeking to end social deprivation through the language of dance (I wish I’d made that up, but I haven’t) to the tune of £120 billion a year then we wouldn’t be having a lot of discussions about how the RAF (and the army and RN) are crying out for more funding to meet the requirements imposed upon them by the government that won’t fund them.

The report about the Puma OSD is incorrect – a contract has been let within the last two months for study into the possibilty of upgrading the Puma to HC2 standard – this’d involve fitting Makila engines and various other bits and pieces. This would extend service life until approx 2020.

DJJ,

I’d like to take issue with a couple of points. According to the book that I quoted previously, any engagements with the Israelis in the late forties were entirely one sided, and not in the RAF’s favour.

Sorry, fouled up the editing of my post (trying to cut the length down). The kill was against the Egyptians, and the pilot concerned, Tim McElhaw, went on to be shot down by the Israelis. I was trying to say that the RAF maintained neutrality by fighting both sides in 48, but hurried editing put paid to that as I amalgamated my points. Bother 🙁

I wasn’t saying that the Indonesian C-130 had occurred – however, a member of 60 Squadron at the time is 95% convinced that it did. Otherwise why did a Javelin RTB minus a Firestreak on the same night as the C-130 went down, he asks…? I don’t know, but it suggests that the story may still have some validity.

As for the IFF issues with the F3s restraining their pushing over the border ith the F-15s, I’m er… being….er… general about it in a non-specific way that will ensure gentlemen driving black Vauxhall Omegas don’t arrive at my house and invite themselves in for a quick chat. There is, however, merit in the view that there was a degree of politics in the decision not to send them ‘sausage side’; likewise, it’s usually argued by those involved that the decision to put a Saudi F-15 onto the Mirage F1s was because of a desire that the F-15 (again) should get the glory, while it would allow the Saudis to show that they were pulling their weight, etc, etc.

Finally, my point about mistasking the GR3 was again confusing caused by some poor editing in haste. The point I was attempting to make is best explained by reading Jerry Pook’s book – in brief, though, mistasking in the sense that the ‘fisheads’ failed to exploit the GR3s as well as they could have and sent them off on sorties that were pointless – for instance, demanding that an early sortie with LGB be brought forward, despite the fact that the FAC couldn’t be told of this, so the bombs couldn’t be guided onto the target, because the FAC wouldn’t be there to do so. RN response was along the line of ‘you have your orders, get on with it’ the waste of two PW notwithstanding. Now that’s mistasking….

Fair enough, Sferrin. Only trying to cover your six from the risk of legal costs or a site ban should it be judged that your posting constituted libel, but if that’s the response, well, so be it.

Although the RN never mentions it for some reason, Lt Cdr Dave Morgan DSC RN (rtd) was Flt Lt Dave Morgan RAF at the time of the Falklands. It now appears to be generally accepted that he had four kills from the conflict, and was thus highest scorer.

The RAF provided about a quarter of the SHAR pilots and they scored about a quarter of the aerial victories.

The official position is that the last ‘enemy’ aircraft that the RAF shot down was in 1948, and it was Israeli in the series of engagements that took place at that time (the RAF maintained its neutrality by shooting down some Egyptians, as DD notes).

After that, despite the banter, the RAF hasn’t had the chance to engage in air combat. RAF fighters weren’t deployed to Korea and the next major conflict in which the RAF participated in which there was air-air action was the Falklands. If you read Jerry Pook’s recent book, you’ll get an idea of how effectively the RN used the GR3s (as a hint there are two chapters called ‘#More Navy C*ck Ups’ and ‘Yet More Navy C*ck Ups’ ), which were (mis)tasked purely on ground attack and recce missions.

During Desert Storm, the F3s didn’t push into Iraq because of IFF issues, and they flew defensive CAP. Two were pulled off an attack against Iraqi Mirage F1s that were running towards naval assets to allow them to be engaged by Saudi F-15s, much to the RAF’s irritation – not least since there are strong suggestions that the F-15s, faced with several F-1s, bodged the attack which allowed at least one Mirage to escape.

Unofficially, there is some fairly strong circumstantial evidence that an Indonesian C-130 was brought down by a Javelin during the Confrontation and slightly less robust evidence that a Hunter gave an Indonesian MiG-17 the good news in another engagement that was hushed-up.

Finally, there is disupte over whether a Tornado GR1 ought to be credited with a kill over a MiG-29. The MiG was hit by a JP233 munition, and there is some evidence that it had just taken off when it was hit, and thus counts as a kill. The consensus seems to be that it is technically an air-air kill, but not in the spirit of air combat (aircraft needs to be brought down by something being aimed in his general direction, not by colliding with incoming ordnance).