DJJJoe – forgive me if you’ve spotted this already, but it’s important to note the reason that this four-year old video has assumed such importance is because it has taken that long for the inquest into Lance Corporal of Horse Hull’s death to occur. (BTW, Lance Corporal of Horse is a higher rank than Lance Corporal, so the poor bloke is being posthumously demoted by about 90% of people commenting/reporting on this). As Ivan says, it is widely known that the video is old.
The MoD informed the family that the video didn’t exist. Clearly, when it became obvious that it did, the media started to ask questions of the MoD. The consensus seems to be that as long as the tape wasn’t to be used to directly incriminate the pilots (and it couldn’t, being an inquest) the DoD would have released it, albeit under the caveat that they’d prefer it to be played with the press not present.
It isn’t the case that this is simply a piece of opportunist anti-Americanism using old footage, since the story is very current thanks to the backlog in inquests into the deaths of UK service personnel bringing this to the fore.
Edit: Prowlus- at the beginning of January 2003, the former CO of 3 Royal Rgt of Fusiliers (the rgt that suffered the 1991 Blue on Blue) wrote to the press suggesting that the government should not send British forces to any conflict against Saddam Hussein since the IFF situation was no better than it had been 12 years previously. Geoff Hoon rebuffed this in the House of Commons, telling MPs that systems and procedures were in place to prevent (not reduce the risk of, but prevent [!!]) blue-on-blue from occurring between US aircraft and UK land component elements. Clearly, this wasn’t the case and Hoon was either being (a) disingenuous or (b) an idiot. Sadly, given his record as Secretary of State for Defence, it’s hard to judge whether it was (a) or (b) above – or both.
DJJ1. The blame for the story lies with the Daily Express, not the light blue PR machine. The Express (which last ‘saved’ the Red Arrows two years ago) has a habit of running this story when there’s little truth in it. If the RAF PR machine were involved, it might have garnered slightly more coverage than it has.
2. The Red Arrows will appear on a list of planning assumptions/ pain & grief statements drawn up before the spending round. The Express (assuming it’s not recycling the 2005 story which was a re-run of a 2003 story) will have become aware/seen the list, and thus assumes that the RAFAT is in danger of being cut. And they’re wrong. It is generally held that the Red Arrows are the ‘safety line’ – since no government is going to cut the Red Arrows, everything above the line (be it units, kit, bases, etc) is pretty much safe, while anything below it is open to being cut.
There is a risk, of course, that the government will not accept the decisions (I personally know of one particular thing that was recommended for being cut, but which was reinstated at the behest of the then Armed Forces Minister on the grounds that the item being saved by the decision, while operationally more useful, wasn’t as egalitarian as the thing being cut – the operationally more useful thing was cut back) but the chances are that the RAFAT are safer than the Express is shouting. Anything to stop looking even more ridiculous over Princess Di, I suppose….
3. Typhoon gun decision wasn’t leaked and the RAF never tried to sell it as being a result of cash problems. The press presented it as that, while the AVM responsible for the decision justified it on the grounds that it was an outdated capability. He was wrong, but neither he nor any part of the RAF PR machine attempted to t justify the decision to the sound of weeping violins while proferring begging bowls.
Did a member of the RAF upset you when you were younger, Jonesy? (Other than a mover, obviously – they upset everyone).
DJJAnd a certain contributor to this site produces some rather good articles for IAPR…
If it helps to give you some more idea, Martinez, the articles from Volumes 16-19 have been:
Volume 16
Focus Aircraft: HALE/MALE UAVs Pt. 2. Warplane Classic: Messerschmitt Bf 110. Air Power Analysis: US Dept. of Homeland Security. News Feature: Iraq – Air power in the counter-insurgency war. Special Feature: Sea Harrier farewell, Tucson Testers – the AATC. Air Combat: RAF Liberators at War Pt. 2. Variant File: Boeing 707 military variants Pt. 1. Pioneers & Prototypes: VTOL Flat-risers – Lockheed XV-4 and Ryan XV-5. Special Report: CVW-5 at home at Atsugi. Photo Report: Cruzex 2004. Debrief: F-16 EPAF M3 upgrade, Eurocopter Tiger for AAAC, Team 60 – Sweden’s ambassadors.
Volume 17
Focus Aircraft: SEPECAT Jaguar. Warplane Classic: Douglas AD/A-1 Skyraider. Special Reports: Swiss Hornets, 82d ATRS Det 1 Air Combat: F-84 Thunderjet in Korea. Variant File: Boeing 707 military variants Pt. 2. Pioneers & Prototypes: De Havilland DH.108 Swallow. Special Reports: Garibaldi at Sea, Army Air – White Sands Missile Range, CFAS at 50. Debriefs: HAL helicopter upgrades, Dominican republic, German Border Police. Type Analysis: Fiat CR.42 Falco. Unit Report: HX-21 – Rotary-wing Test.
Volume 18
Focus Aircraft: Sukhoi Su-17/20/22 ‘Fitter’. Warplane Classic: Vickers Valiant. Air Force Reports: Philippines Air Force and Navy, Armenia. Special Reports: Althea Dragons – Belgian helos in Bosnia, Desert Testers – 586th FLTS. Variant File: Douglas A-26/B-26 Invader. Pioneers & Prototypes: NASA’a NB-52s. Air Power Analysis: Royal Jordanian Air Force. Technical Briefing: Denel AH-2 Rooivalk. Photo Feature: Nevada Airpower. Unit Report: HT-18 ‘Vigilante Eagles’.
Volume 19
Focus Aircraft: Bell-Boeing V-22 Osprey. Warplane Classic: Junkers JU-88. Air Force Reports: Gambian Air Wing. Special Reports: Last Cruise of the Tomcat, 425 Squadron Canadaig Forces. Variant File: Supermarine Swift. Technical Briefing: Boeing 737 AEW & C Wedgetail. Exercise Report: CEIBO 2005. Special Feature: F-103 Brazilian Mirage retirement. Unit Report: 509th Bomb Wing: Whiteman Spirits. Photo Feature: US Navy in Korea. Type Analysis: F-4E(S) Shablool. Debrief: Lockheed YF-117 retirement, Sikorsky CH-53K, LUH competition, Joint Cargo Aircraft, SAAD SHARC and FILUR, BAE Systems HERTI, Raven and Corax
There’s also a news section. This is good, but given the nature of the journal, the chances are that you’ve read much of what’s there well before you read it in IAPR. On the other hand, I do find it easier to search through the news section of IAPR before trying to find in which edition of AFM, or Air International, or Flight, or Janes Defence Weekly or (you get the idea) I read the piece of information I’m looking for. Search through three copies of IAPR or about 25 other magazines/journals? Mmmm.
DJJAlso, indefinite article or not, you’d have thought that the Soviet crew would have known that they were seeing British aircraft if Lightnings were involved…
It also lacks credibility because:
1. If the base commander knows that US aircraft are in the area, what the hell is a Lightning doing there? Has ATC broken down and sent assets from two nations to investigate something in the UK ADIZ? Or is it somewhere on the IGB, with USAFE and Lightning F2A from 19 or 92 squadron at Gutersloh the airframes involved – in which case, what’s a Bear doing in a position to be intercepted?
2. If the Bear is hit by ‘a Lightning’, does that mean deliberate shooting act, or collision?
3. If the former, then the chances are that an intercepted signal will merely add to the knowledge of the chain of command, who will already know something’s up. An intercept on a Soviet aircraft that requires shooting down brings in people very high up the food chain in, very quickly. The base commander is unlikely to get through to the President…
4. If the latter, why risk raising tension by the nature of the response? You don’t raise DEFCON as the result of an accident. If you do, you risk suggesting to the Soviets that you’re up to something, possibly a first strike. “Mmm. First they destroy a patrol aircraft, now their bases are all on maximum alert. We can’t take chances, comrade. Bring our forces to readiness.” You find out the known details before ramping up the alert status. Relying on a phone call from an intercept station to get the President to move you to DEFCON 2 is rather dangerous…
Richard – are you thinking of ABLE ARCHER 83, where the Sovs appear to have been under the impression that the US was on the verge of launching a strike because they suspected that the US was about to attack (misreading a complex exercise scenario as preparations for war)?
DJJIIRC, Meteor was meant to be cleared in the order Gripen-Typhoon-Rafale.
Since one of the key drivers for the Eurofighter consortium in getting Meteor integrated is to make it attractive to nations who might find the US unwilling to provide AMRAAM, I can’t help wondering if this is a shot across the bows from Drayson – along the lines of ‘quote us a sensible price, or we give Dassault the opportunity to bid for contracts with Meteor cleared on their aircraft but not yours’.
Jackonicko knows more about this than I do, but the MoD does seem to be playing hardball with the consortium now: ISTR that the air-ground capability came along rather quicker than anticipated thanks to the MoD getting stroppy around the time the Tranche 2 contract was signed.
DJJIt is for safety purposes rather than comfort, although I have to say that last time I was in the mighty 10, I thought the seat rather more comfortable than the one I’d recently occupied in an A320. And the take off was more sprightly. And the butty box was better (apart from the crisps). The GR4 misjudging his approach to the pod and nearly rearranging the trailing edge also made for far more interesting viewing than was provided by civair….
DJJYes, think you’re right, JN – having reviewed an e-mail, I think misread a joking suggestion along the lines that smart procurement would demand that the RAF have all the Danish kit removed before issuing a specification for all the Danish kit, which would then be refitted badly and at even greater expense…
DJJNo – as long as the F-35C was still extant, we’d buy that instead. Since CV(F) is designed to be able to accommodate CTOL gear if needed, this wouldn’t represent a major drama.
DJJRather than type it out myself, I quote from m’learned friend Jackonicko, over on ‘t’other means’
All Danish Merlins have an advanced NVG-compatible EFIS cockpit with six ruggedised flat panel, 6.3-by-6.3-inch active matrix liquid crystal displays (AMLCDs) instead of the cathode ray tube displays in the earlier variants. They also have a nose-mounted FLIR Systems Star SAFIRE II FLIR, a laser obstacle avoidance system and a Telephonics RDR-1600 multi-mode search and weather radar. The radar display can be presented on any of the cockpit IDUs. They are much more comprehensively equipped than the RAF’s existing HC.Mk 3s, which look pretty austere by comparison.
I believe that the Danish equipment will be removed and replaced by RAF-specified kit which may (or may not) include some of the stuff specified by the Danes.
DJJCF – yes, the plan is to replace the VC10 and the Tri*. The RAF will have a grand total of 9 available out of a fleet of 14 (compare with the number of 10s and Tri* nominally available today, factor in the demand for AAR and ponder whether this is enough). There have been serious issues over who bears the risk for certain aspects of the aircraft operation, plus the fact that the 5 ‘spare’ airframes can be used for income generation by the contractor. All sorts of questions then arise (e.g. what about whast happens if the contractor has to break a contract because the RAF wants the 5 spare airframes yesterday?).
PFI madness in this case – particularly when one considers that Airbus offered up to 36 A310 MRTTs in the 96/97 timeframe (and which would have been in service now).
DJJThe Blue Vixen radar pod is, for various reasons (some best not gone into) that wouldn’t be practical. The GR9 is more Navy friendly in that it has a bigger engine in the GR9A variant, improving bring-back, but the upgrade is predominantly in the form of improved avionics.
However, the point is that if the Argentines took Mount Pleasant Airfield, then even a two CVS task force with SHAR 2 would have some difficulties in defending from air attack – one of the crippling factors for the Arg AF/Navy pilots in ’82 was the lack of AAR and range limitations. Park sixty aircraft on MPA and the equation alters somewhat, and not in the favour of the UK.
The presence of the airfield changes the situation, be it in Argentine or British hands in this projected conflict, yet every ‘what if there was a Falklands Mk 2?’ scenario seems to ignore this and consider that the subsequent war would be a re-run of 1982, albeit with better kit and no Sea Harriers.
There are 2000 British personnel on the islands, and while not all of them are ‘rufty-tufty warfighters’, they represent rather more of a challenge to an invading force than NP8901 that was there in 82 (and that’s not to be disrespectful to NP8901, who demonstrated that upsetting 40 members of the RM is a very bad idea, even if you do outnumber them 100 to 1).
The F3s, GBAD, and the ability to move troops around via helicopter into defensive positions (as opposed to using a couple of scrambling motorbikes) would complicate an invasion considerably, even allowing for the complete lack of reinforcement prior to the arrival of the invasion force.
Add to that the fact that the intelligence community is less likely to drop the ball quite so spectacularly and actually pay heed to the threat indicators any ‘next time around’ and MPA would (probably) have an interesting mix of F3s, Typhoons and GR4s, backed with AAR and probably an E-3 or two, maybe a Nimrod, plus an infantry battalion waiting to add ‘Falklands 20??’ to the regimental battle honours after being flown in direct, supported by artillery and … well, invading becomes a rather interesting prospect.
Add to that the knowledge (broadcast through the press) that a couple of TLAM-equipped SSN are on the way, programming the target co-ords for a variety of interesting airfields into the missiles, with more aircraft and troops deploying or on reduced notice, and the RN on the way to join in, with the SSNs leading the way.
It wouldn’t be a walk in the park for us Brits, since the Argentine non-conscript forces are good. But even getting into a position to get ashore would be nightmare-ish for them unless we fouled up spectacularly.
Of course, that pre-supposes that we aren’t down to a single tanker airframe because FSTA still isn’t ready, and that the int is good. But all things being equal, something would have had to go very, very wrong indeed for the UK to need an invasion force to re-take the islands. The question is can troops and aircraft be bussed ‘down south’ quickly enough to make any Argentine govt contemplating an invasion think ‘Mmm, not sure we fancy this any more’? Again, all things being equal, the answer to that question should be ‘yes’.
However, having worked with a number of Argentine officers in recent years, I’d far rather that the ony hostilities between our two nations are conducted on the football field.
DJJNathan, generally, yes – but it can be a little more complicated that that, since the four units can draw on the whole pool of aircraft at Marham.
It is quite possible, therefore, for a 2 (more accurately II(AC)) squadron crew to be flying a 9 Squadron airframe, or for a 31 Squadron crew to be on board a GR4A belonging to 13 Squadron.
As a for instance, there is a photo from IX(B) Squadron’s pages on the Marham website showing a GR4A tanking from a KC10 during Op TELIC here: at least, they’re claiming it as one of theirs, although the single code letter on the tail hints at II(AC) origins for the airframe, suggesting that the crew was from IX. The Tornado shot down by a Patriot during TELIC was a GR4A, but the crew of Dave Williams and Kevin Main (may they RIP) were members of IX Squadron, returning from a SEAD mission.
Slightly complicated answer, but hope that helps.
DJJThe Adour 106 isn’t quite the answer to the thrust problems that people thought it would be. IIRC, Jackonicko recently quoted a Jag pilot as stating that while the Adour 106 offered an additional 10% thrust, ‘Ten per cent of b*gger all is still b*gger all!’
DJJThe MoD doesn’t need to reactivate the Jag fleet, since 6 Squadron is still flying them (and will do so until March 2007). I’m sure the RAF would love to extend the Jag’s life, since they might then be able to run 6 on without having to disband the unit, thus breaking the thread of the squadron’s continued existance without disbanding. The issue with the Jag is one of lack of engine power in the sort of conditions found in Afghanistan.
DJJThe main issue with the Jaguar is that the Adour isn’t really powerful enough to get it airborne with a meaningful load in not and high conditions, apparently (quite how the Omanis and Indians manage….).
UK Apaches are out there and being used. Loden wasn’t entirely complementary about them, either (some of the press seem to have assumed that they’re RAF, and have used this to bolster their gleeful reports of this apparent inter-service bitching), but the general thrust of his commentary was that they are a good thing and doing pretty well.
Young – you should be aware that the chances of anyone in possession of the full text of the e-mails publishing them here is rather slim (unless some kindly journalist from one of the media outlets that has them does so, or they are released officially by the Army). Anyone serving who starts posting the things on internet fora can only be said to have a strange way of handing in their resignation…
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