DJJIt is carrying the pods , just without the guns….
The pods are fitted because they help to improve lift in the vertical flight regime. There are also suggestions that one of the pods is now used to carry additional ECM gear (akin to the improvised ‘Blue Eric’ ECM pod created by stuffing the necssary kit into one of the cannon pods during the Falklands campaign).
DJJThe RAF decided against the GAU-12 system, preferring a revolver cannon for the reason Transall notes (no ‘winding up’ to full rate of fire with the revolvers), which was thought better for the A-A role.
Rather than simply fit 30mm ADEN pods as per the GR3, a new 25mm ADEN was ordered. This had huge problems with integration. IIRC, these included shell casings hitting the empennage, and (more problematic) an inability to get the gun to put the rounds on the target the pilot thought he was aiming at… The RAF intended to solve these problems, but in the end, the money wasn’t there, and the capability was abandoned.
The guns that had already been bought were (again IIRC) placed in store, and I suppose (in theory) that if money was available, the ‘unsolved technical difficulties’ might be sorted out. However, this seems unlikely. GR7 pilots of my acquaintance are divided over whether they the guns it or not (although those who think not wouldn’t object to getting them, but contend that they aren’t essential when the aircraft carries an accurate HV rocket).
The 25mm were occasionally fitted, and could be distinguished by the muzzles extending beyond the end of the pods.
DJJDave,
There was certainly some training conducted by the RAF, and there is a document ‘Statement of Russian, Japanese, Brazilian, Roumanian and French pilots trained by the R.A.F.’ dated 10 November 1918 in the National Archives at Kew Gardens (AIR 1/39/15/5). I would guess that your two chaps were involved there at about this time. There is a fair chance that the records could be ‘lost’ in that file (there is so much in Air 1 that files do sometimes have a little more inside them than the contents list suggests), or it is quite possible that the file was weeded as being of no apparent interest.
This would explain why the IJN, when it became enthusiastic about aircraft carriers, turned to Britain and why the Master of Sempill led a (ostensibly civilian) mission to Japan to train pilots, etc, etc in about 1920. There may be some detail in John Ferris, ‘A British “Unofficial” Aviation Mission and Japanese Naval Developments 1919-29’ in the Journal of Strategic Studies, Volume 5, Number 3 (1982) pages 416-39.
By the by Sempill was suspected of ‘going native’ in Japan. There are two Security Service files on him (in the National Archives) as part of their ‘Japanese Intelligence Agents and Suspected Agents’ list of files….
DJJDJJ,
I don’t know where you got your ISD information, but it’s rather misleading. ISD may still be 2014, but the first operational JCA squadron converts in 2017,
A House of Commons Select Ctte report was the source. I couldn’t recall if 2017 date was in the public domain when I typed, and being in a hurry simply went with the slightly less accurate date that I knew to be open source. I subsequently realised I first read that date on Pprune…
Moreover, the last RAF Tranche 2 Typhoon (not the last Tranche 3 aircraft) is to be delivered in 2014, though since Spain and Germany will be taking Tranche 3 jets from 2012, all late T2 aircraft will probably be to the later standard.
Ugh. One typo and overly hurried typing got me there. I meant last Tranche 2 in 2014 (typo), and my bit about the RAF not waiting years for T3 was based on the 2012 delivery of T3 jets to the GAF & Spain you mentioned. Though since I didn’t type that, how on earth anyone was meant to work that out…. 😮
Like you, I suspect that while we may get CVF by 2014, the number of Harriers available for use by that date could be in serious question if money isn’t freed up to deal with the fatigue issues the type is facing…
DJJThere’s already (in theory) a gap between the service entry of the CVF and the JSF. The projected in service date for the first CVF is 2012, while the ISD for the JCA (as the UK is helpfully calling the JSF, thus causing confusion between the JSF and the Joint Cargo Aircraft…) is 2014. The House of Commons Select Committee on Defence noted that this was a bit of a worry.
However, since the government has still not signed up fully for the CVF, this gap might not exist…
I’d be interested to see the evidence that the CV(F) can’t be adapted to CTOL operations, since most sources (official, demi-offical and general open source) make much of the ‘future proofing’ of the design.
By the by, the last Tranche 3 Typhoon is due to be handed over to the RAF in 2014, so the idea that the RAF will be waiting ‘many years’ for Tranche 3 Typhoons is a slight over-statement, even allowing for the fact that there’s likely to be slippage (assuming the MoD doesn’t find some way of getting out of Tranche 3 without massive cost penalties).
The Typhoon’s ‘austere’ air-ground capability is intended to be in place from 2008 (although the ability to self-designate for four or six [over short range] LGB/EPWs will be less ‘austere’ than anything else in the RAF inventory). Storm Shadow is to be integrated on Tranche 2, allegedly at some point toward the end of next year, but more likely in 2008. The idea that the RAF won’t have a meaningful A/G capability until the Tranche 3 Typhoon is a little off the mark.
DJJPhillip,
I suggest you have a look in ‘Who’s Who’. As far as I’m aware, the second Viscount (MRAF Trenchard’s son) is still with us, and being a member of the peerage, he’s likely to have an entry in there.
Also, it might be worth checking with the archive section at the RAF Museum. They may be able to help with your enquiry, as they have Trenchard’s papers. These may well (it’s been some time since I looked at them, and I was concetrating on the WW1 stuff) contain details of places he visited either when he was CAS, or during World War II when he went around visiting stations, squadrons, etc.
DJJSqn Ldr Neil McDougall had the probe problem on XM597, after a SEAD mission – diversion was to Rio de Janerio rather than Uruguay, though. Required a rather impressive bit of flying to get the Vulcan in to land safely (Neil McDougall was awarded a DFC as a result).
DJJOnly 6 Squadron still operates the Jag, and the type is due to be fully retired in 2007. IIRC, there are about 16 in use.
DJJThe RAF went through quite a long process of getting to the name ‘Merlin’ for the F-111; they rejected such delights as ‘Harrogate’ on the way. As DaveF68 says, there’s quite a lot of material in the PRO on thie process. The alternatives included (I’ve not got my notes to hand) Gyrofalcon and Buzzard; if the principle of naming bombers after towns was to be followed, then Richmond would have been the choice (but it was not particularly favoured by the Chief of the Air Staff, who steered the RAF towards Merlin instead).
The files also include suggestions from Australia – 20 odd Aboriginal names that the files suggest the Air Staff found quite impossible to pronounce before politely rejecting all of them..
DJJThe sad truth is that the RAF’s current and (future fleet) of combat aircraft is fundimentally useless in most post-9/11 defense scenarios.
The Harrier hasn’t done too badly in Afghanistan, and the GR4 has done pretty well in Iraq, so the fleet isn’t that hopeless. By that measurement, most western air forces’ combat fleets are useless, unless I’ve misunderstood your point – can you elaborate on why the fleet is fundamentally useless?
In retrospect, it seems incredible that the RAF failed to learn the value of long range offensive capabilities from the Falklands.
After the events of 1982, it should have occured to the Thatcher government that the total replacement of the Vulcan B.2 fleet by the range deficient Tornado was a mistake. The retention of even a small fleet of Vulcans would have allowed the RAF to maintain a limited but useful long range capability.
Of course, the first Gulf War again revealed the extent of the Tornado’s range deficiency. The Tornado required 3 inflight refuelings while the Buccaneer required only a single refueling for the same flight profile. In the post-Cold War draw down, the RAF again made the choice to prematurely retire the longer ranged aircraft.
The problem was money. Even before the Falklands, a study was done into re-lifing some of the Vulcans, updating them and giving them the ability to carry ALCM (or something similar) and possibly laser guided bombs. However, the cost killed this, since the defence budget at the time couldn’t bear the burden of brining the GR1 into service and updating Vulcans.
In the context of the time, replacing the Vulcans wasn’t a mistake. The main threat was in Europe, and the Tornado was more than adequate for the task it was due to adopt. Had it begun operating from the start with laser-guided weapons, the quantum leap in accurate weapons delivery over the Vulcan would have been remarkable (it wasn’t unimpressive even with iron bombs).
Again, the Buccaneer went mainly for financial reasons. It made a lot of sense logistically to remove an entire fleet of aircraft, and if you speak to some of those who were on the Bucc fleet (both air and ground crew) in the early 90s, then you can sometimes extract an admission that the Bucc was perhaps getting close to its sell-by date, for fatigue and maintenance issues, and because of the lack of money to upgrade the avionics.
Bear in mind that by the time the Bucc was retired, the cunning plan was for the Tornado to go out of service (after an MLU) in 2015 (now extended to about 2020-ish). The Buccaneers would probably have required a complete rebuild to achieve this out-of-service date, and certainly would have required a great deal of cash to be spent on them.
In both cases, the RAF actually had no choice. With a much-expanded pot of money, then the Vulcan would probably have gone through a major update programme and some would still be in use. The RAF would have loved to have retained the Bucc as a second strike aircraft, but couldn’t afford to.
Interestingly, some rather senior officers go misty-eyed when the B-1 is mentioned. If the maintenance burdens/costs of the beast were sustainable in the RAF budget (which they’re not), it has been put to me that the US would have been asked if about twenty could possibly find their way into RAF service to sustain a single squadron, an embedded OCU and a couple of attrition reserves.
If the UK is serious about a long range strike capability, the likely solutions are to buy into the ‘B-3’ programme, or to buy the Boeing 737MMA to reduce the burden on the Nimrod – although the idea of the de Havilland Comet’s little brother being the RAF’s strategic bomber would have the ghost of Sir Geoffrey de Havilland chuckling quietly…
DJJA random set of points:
1. ‘Charlie’ Chan went on to be the CO of 17 Sqn when it formed on the Eurofighter Typhoon.
2. The Harrier being shot down by the Lightning comes up every now and then on Pprune, and the consensus (helped by the fact that people who were at Gutersloh at the time have contributed…) is that it didn’t happen. Events were, in fact, as DGH thinks, with the GR3 crashing of its own accord.
3. The C-130 that was stolen by a groundcrew member is also discussed on Pprune on an on-and-off basis. Consensus is that *if* it was shot down, it was brought down by an USAF aircraft, probably an F-100. The event occurred before the UK had bought Phantoms (1966)
4. As for the unacknowledged shoot-downs, the Javelin kill in Borneo is quite plausible given the circumstantial evidence; I gather that there is also some circumstantial evidence to suggest that a Venom FB4 bagged an Egyptian aircraft during the Suez campaign.
5. RAF pilots made up about 25% of the SHAR force during CORPORATE and were responsible for about 25% of the victories gained.
6. There is strong circumstantial and hearsay evidence that a Tornado F3 CAP was ordered off prosecuting a contact with two Mirage F1s by the orbiting AWACs during Op Desert Storm to allow a Saudi F-15 pilot to destroy them.
With respect, the notion that the RAF hasn’t had to shoot down enemy aircraft since 1945 and therefore doesn’t need a fighter simply doesn’t make sense. For a variety of reasons, the RAF simply hasn’t had much opportunity to do so, bar examples offered above and in a couple of earlier posts.
French pilots haven’t shot down anything since 1945, so should they get rid of their Mirage 2000s and do away with air defence altogether?
If a nation loses control of the air, it’s done for. Relying on a friend who might not be willing or able to turn up on time is dangerous beyond words – we still have Trident to put off adversaries (and have never used our nuclear weapons), so investing in a multi-role combat aircraft doesn’t seem too bad in comparison…
DJJYes and no…
The 24 Saudi aircraft have been allocated places on the production line that were originally for the RAF. All this means is that the RAF has to wait for the balance to be made up later.
In effect, the Tranche 2 production will be expanded by 24 airframes, with the Saudis taking delivery of some of the earlier ones, while the RAF has to wait for 24 of its 89 airframes.
The contract for the Typhoon doesn’t allow the RAF to surrender 24 airframes from its buy and then not replace them, since this would have implications for the workshare agreements. Any attempt to do this would almost certainly require renegotiation of the contract, and this could cost the UK a fair sum of money.
DJJThe RAF has only ordered 144 to date – 55 in Tranche 1 and 89 in Tranche 2. Negotiations for Tranche 3 have yet to take place (this applies to all the partner nations). IIRC, the plan is for the contract to be signed next year (or perhaps 2008). As things stand, the contract is so well written that it would almost be cheaper for the RAF to buy all of Tranche 3 and then stick them in a hanger/give them to museums rather than not buy them and thus incur hefty penalty clauses.
DJJThere was some surprise at 25 being chosen, since it was thought that squadrons with an allegedly more distinguished record ought to have been chosen. RAF squadrons are reformed based on their seniority based on continuous service. 25 is rather high on the list, and was at the time. The service record of the unit doesn’t come into it, since it was agreed in about 1957 that making judgements about which out of two units had a more distinguished history was subjective and unfair.
One of two things can happen. The first scenario is that a newly-forming unit will be given the most senior numberplate not in use at the time (when the F3s entered service, numberplates used by Reserve Squadrons were not considered to be in use). Some regard will be given to whether or not the squadron has previously served in that role, so if – say – 50 was the senior numberplate and a fighter squadron was to be formed, it might be the case that the most senior fighter squadron numberplate was chosen instead (which is why, in 1984, the F-4J(UK) Phantoms went to 74 Squadron rather than to 39 Squadron).
The case against 25 rested solely on the fact that the unit was a frontline squadron with Bloodhounds. However, the Air Staff decided that the Bloodhounds should all be under the control of one squadron rather than two, so 25’s missiles were absorbed by 85 Squadron, and 25, in effect, took the other means of giving a squadron new equipment, namely by re-equipping it. If the idea that a squadron equipped with SAMs was in some way a ‘second tier’ unit was held, then the case for ‘restoring’ the most senior fighter squadron not equipped with fixed-wing aircraft was quite strong.
Had 25 not been chosen, the next most senior numberplate was 45. However… at about this time, the fact that many of the OCUs with reserve squadron identities were increasingly identifying themselves with those squadron numbers rather than the OCU numbers meant that the idea that a numberplate was in use if applied as a reserve plate for an OCU gained credence.
This, in turn, means that 58 would have been the first ‘free’ numberplate (limited fighter heritage), followed by 26 (much more of a fighter heritage – fighter recce with Mustangs, then Spitfires; followed by a fighter role with Tempests, Sabres and Hunters).
So – as far as can be ascertained, nothing ‘dodgy’ happened with the reforming of 25 on the F3. It was the most senior fighter squadron numberplate available once the decision to place all the SAMs under the control of a single squadron was made (whether the decision to do this was influenced by ex-25 Sqn types is another matter…), and the RAF’s policy outlines on choice of a numberplate were met.
Had it not been 25 Squadron, then the aircraft would have been with 45 Squadron instead if the policy that a reserve squadron numberplate was not ‘in use’ was still being observed (as noted, this was a bit of a grey area at the time); if that principle no longer held, the next most senior fighter plate was 58 Squadron: if 58’s lack of heritage as a fighter unit had been held against it, then 26 Squadron would have been the most likely number.
Sorry that’s rather long, but the process itself is quite complicated – since the 25 Squadron query pops up around the place every once in a while, I thought it might be helpful to outline what actually happens. While senior officers can have some influence over the process, it would be difficult for an individual to ensure that their old unit was preferred over another that had better claim.
(NB – I suspect that given half a chance to reform 92 on the Typhoon, the RAF will throw the policy paper out of the window, and given the chance to reform 74, they’ll set light to the paper it’s written on before defenestrating the document)
DJJSwerve, with respect, I think you’ve misread the question – question’s about ASRAAM, not AMRAAM. ASRAAM doesn’t require a radar to support it (or were you just taking the thread down a slightly different track by adding more info? Apologies if you were…).
You’re quite right, about the AMRAAM and the Harrier, though. The idea of fitting Blue Vixen to the GR9 to allow the use of the weapon was suggested a few years ago, but was dropped fairly swiftly.
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