I could swear it was posted here. Maybe my memory is fouling me. I’m getting old.:-(

That is better, so you managed to find the the correct information.

Now, regarding KS-P/KS-U. It does seem indeed that the nose KS and tail KS has the same number of windows and same style of them. Hence it is either:

a – Both are same system, KS-U.
b – Nose one is still KS-P, although it looks the same as tail one from external POV.
c – Tail one is not complete and will have more windows so the alikeness is only illusion for time being.

I think i will send him a PM and see if he can clarify the issue and if the nose one is still KS-P or if he was mistaken. I found the “evolution” comment weird too.

Of course it wasn’t too difficult, but when I did the first search I haven’t had much time and thus did no more intensive research and didn’t read the surrounding posts of that forum. The description fitted the sensor position and did sound like the usual “Russian English” descriptions of that kind found in such advertisements. I thus accepted it for the time being. However, having thought about the entire OEIS arrangement afterwards I quickly realised that this makes no sense and when I found some time latter I was particularly looking for a highres bottom plan view images of the T-50-4. This confirmed my thoughts, this sensor beneath the front fuselage is the same as the one on top of the sting, it also includes a forwards and rearwards facing window and the optics in there are exactly the same, also the same as those on the side mounted sensors. In other words, definitely no FLIR. As said a dedicated FLIR wouldn’t make sense anyway as such a capability isn’t often required for an aircraft like the T-50 and as it can be incorporated into an IRST, like the KS-V. What made me more curious however was the fact that if that sensor would be a dedicated FLIR, the KS-U wouldn’t provide any lower hemispherical coverage and much restricted frontal sector coverage and that’s totally unacceptable for a sensor suite (KS-U) that is supposed to provide allround coverage for missile detection. WRT the smaller windows seen on the earlier mock-ups I would expect them to cover laser warners. Maybe they have not been implemented in the current design as seen on the actual prototypes or maybe they have been deleted from the requirements for whatever reasons. We may see in the future. What’s interesting is that the KS-O is missing from the T-50-4. Once again that solution was somewhat curious as stand alone anyway, a second sensor somewhere beneath the fuselage would certainly not hurt. That it is gone and replaced by coms antennae is somewhat dubious. We’ll likely see in the future whether it was just temporary or whether it’s permanent. Maybe it’s just being relocated, who knows?

Baby Jesus is crying in heaven for your horrible google-fu.

What about giving an answer, correcting what I said instead of such nonsense? Or don’t you know any better?

My search says it’s a FLIR mounted beneath the front fuselage as expected.

KS-U/01 and KS-U/02 sensors part of PAK-FA’s OEIS.
http://missiles2go.files.wordpress.com/2013/08/wp_20130825_009-1.jpg

Is the right sensor the on that will be fitted beneath the front fuselage?

It didn’t perform technically as flight trials were not even permitted at that time! And the claim of “preference” sounds more like the authors opinion than anything else, regardless of whether it’s true or not. Factually both LMA and EADS have pointed out that they haven’t received any formal notification of their alledged disqualification and according EADS the bid was within the boundaries of the RfQ. Of course that’s impossible to verify without having seen the RfQ.

I don’t see much Eurofighter A2G capability increases in the future.

The airframe is already on it’s way out with major users – both UK and Spain are planning on retiring/offering for sale Tranche 1 jets in near future. Spain would probably buy F-35s to replace F/A-18s in A2G role. That leaves Italy which is in F-35 boat and Germany which apparently is only paying lip service to A2G with JaBoG 31.

That the UK and Spain may retire their T1 Typhoons over the next few years neither means that the Typhoon weapons system as a whole is on its way out of service, nor does it mean an end to the continued evolution of it, on contrary! The UK MoD’s rational behint the early retirement of the T1 Typhoons is that their avionics suite is based on now obsolete electronic components which are out of production and which offer a limited grow capacity only. The software running on the T1 processors is incompatible with that running on the T2/T3 processors and the other way round. That means that the T1 Typhoons in their current form can’t be supported anymore in a few years from now on as several electronic components won’t be available anymore. The limited grow potential means that the aircraft can’t be upgraded to meet future requirements which in turn renders them operationally irrelevant. A common upgrade strategy for T1, T2 & T3 aircraft can’t be pursuit either for the above mentioned reasons. Thus far upgrades for T1 and T2 Typhoons are developed indepent from each other which is economically inefficient and disatisfactory given the ever declining defence budget cuts. Of course industry and customers try to port as much from the software development for the T1 Typhoons to the T2 a/c and the otherway round, but while it’s possible it requires effort that requires precious resources which are scarce these days and which will become even more scarce in the forseeable future. The problem could be mitigated by upgrading the T1 aircraft to a T2 equivalent or higher standard. While this is possible, it would be an extensive and thus expensive upgrade. The UK MoD considers upgrading its 48 T1 Typhoons to such a standard as unaffordable in the current economical climate. The consequence is the early retirement of these aircraft. Whether it will materialise or not remains to be seen. As a matter of fact RAF T1 Typhoons are being upgraded right now and additional upgrades for T1 Typhoons are already under development and planned for the future. This raises the question whether the UK MoD is wasting money for upgrading aircraft that it will directly retire afterwards or whether the UK MoD is already reviewing its plan and possibly re-considering its options for keeping or dropping the T1 aircraft.

Spain intends to reduce its Typhoon force, among other type’s forces, on cost grounds. But reduction is to 58 aircraft which means that at least 4 T1s have to be kept. It is false that Spain has ever offered 18 T1 Typhoons to anyone, they don’t have 18 operational T1s! 12 was mentioned in later reports and that’s much more realistic, given the disparity between T1 single and twin seats in particular. That’s also an interesting issue in the UK’s case which has 26 TS on order, 2 of them being unavailable for operational service and 16 of the remaining two dozen come from T1. That means the UK would operate a force of 107 Typhoons with only 8 twinseats!

Italy doesn’t plan to employ the Typhoon in the AG role any. Germany does and its future force construct envisages multirole units instead of dedicated fighter, fighter-bomber and reconaisance wings. Settling down to a T2/T3 fleet is a sensible option for those who can’t afford upgrading the T1s as the T2/T3A share a much greater commonality and any developments can be leveraged from one to another without much duplication of efforts. This allows a common fleet to be kept and support which is cheaper in the end and it allows the scarce ressources to be spent more effectively. A common upgrade strategy for T2 & T3A aircraft is already in place. Users that will keep the T1s will sooner or later make the step of upgrading them to a more or less equivalent standard and a couple of T2 components as well as components from the common obsolecences programme are already qualified on T1s or will be with upcoming upgrades. The T1 Typhoons are in fact slowly but surely morphing into T2 equivalents which may influence the current plans of the UK MoD in particular.

In any case stupid EADS seems to have shot itself in the foot in South Korea by not adhering to the bid requirements.

And stupid Lockheed Martin dared to bid when knowing that there was a cost ceiling that they could never undercut in the first place. Honestly the reports are not confirmed by any official sources and if it turns out to be true that the Eurofighter bid is disqualified on grounds of “offering only 6 instead of 15 twinseats” it just proves what anyone has thought anyway, the competion is being rigged in favour of the US bidders!

I do realize that the current F-15K’s are not equiped with an AESA. But the AESA is an easy upgrade for them, and that which is already developed by the USAF and raytheon. Regarding commonality, Raytheon markets their AESA’s as a FAMILY with quite a bit of commonality within the family. In fact Northrop does it the same way. One of the advantages of the SABR to the USAF was that radar modes developed for the Apg-81 (F-35) can be integrated onto the SABR, without the added costs of developing them. Raytheon has based its -82 on the Apg-79 and Apg-63(V)3 which are both proven AESA radars. The ROKAF went out of the way to choose the RACR, and did not wait like others to see what the US chooses and go for economies of scale. This to me suggests that that they are committed to raytheon and advancing their own radar needs for the future. It should take less then a couple of hours to upgrade the F-15’s (V)1 with an AESA antenna…

The common software development is undeniably viable for the AN/APG-82(V1) and RACR as both are based on the AN/APG-79. The -63(V3) however is based on the previous generation 63(V1) MSA radar and has thus to cope with the physical constraints of its older technology processor and receiver. Even if we assume that the same programming language is being used and that the chip sets of boths processors support it, a common software development would be viable only up to the physical limits of the -63(V3) hardware. I doubt they’ll limit the development of the -82(V1) to the physical constraints of the -63(V3). The only thing that the two radar sets have in common is the antenna.

Its a neat technology to have. If it by itself was so revolutionary, i am sure SK can pay for something similar from raytheon. That they went in for the current -82, suggests that it was more than adequate for their mission. Raytheon and Boeing have positioned themselves briliantly for the export market given that raytheon offers a wide lineup of IN SERVICE AESA’s that have performance that is proven. Airbus and selex have to realize this, they are way behind as far as maturity is cocnerned. While the AESA radar is being industry funded and integrated onto the typhoon, raytheon has produced and delivered more than 500 tactical fighter AESA radars. The -82 an in production radar, that is backed by ORDERS from its cheif customer, and is based on proven, in operational AESA radars. Not to mention that it can be upgraded onto the existing F-15K fleet at a later date. All of these things cannot be done by the Captor_E, which is essentially promising capability at a future date, and that too with an uncertain production run. Its really tough to find an objective reason to go and invest in the Captor_E (For the ROKAF) at this stage of its development, when no one has formally committed to acquisition and a formal development path. Looking at the -82, you have a clear line of devleopment –> Production–> Operational usage, and you have commonality with your existing radars, and the future prospect of standerdizing your entire F-15 fleet with one radar, that has software commonality with your F-16 AESA radar (RACR). Raytheon could also be tasked by South korea to work on a new radar for their future fighter, where raytheon can leverage its industry leading AESA R&D and production to produce a cost-effective NG GaN solution.

You must confuse me with someone else as I neither said that the repositioner technology is revolutionary as such, nor did I claim that it will make Captor-E a better radar in comparison to other designs. I know that there are people out there who may think and argue that way, but these people aren’t me and I would appreciate it not to be confronted with strawmen replies tailor made to assumed “generic Typhoon fan claims”.

You asked what advantages the repositioner technology offers, especially wrt to AG operations and I gave you an answer, not more, not less. Of course there is much more about a radar which shapes its performance and capabilities. Software in particular is mandatory to exploit the huge potential offered by the AESA technology. The hardware is important and forms the base, but without proper software and algorithms it’s useless. In this area the Europeans are lagging behint the US and I believe that Captor-E at entry into service will be inferior to the proven US AESA designs from an overall capability POV. In the mid-terms Captor-E may exceed the existing designs on many fronts as the radar matures and evolves, but other companies won’t stand still. Some of the US AESA radars will likely evolve more than others, as the US military will prioritise its allocation of funds to the assets it considers most vital, i.e. the F-22 and F-35. The -82(V1) is unlikely to be upgraded anytime soon hardware wise as it is just about entering service. The -63(V3) might be even more short lifed as the F-15C will be retired around 2025. Of course there will be upgrades to cater for electronic obsolecences as well as software upgrades which are of high importance.

It’s a little bit ignorant, however, to claim that the EURORADAR consortium member’s experience wrt AESA radar technology is limited to the 3 years, self funded FSD activities of Captor-E. Selex and AB D&S are working on airborne AESA FCR technologies since 2 decades already and while they can’t rival the extensive experience of NG or Raeython, their experience isn’t limited to the FSD activities on Captor-E which was launched on 1st July 2010. The AMSAR, CECAR and CAESAR programmes all fed into its development, as did ARTS, bright adder, the Vixen family of AESA radars, involvement in the ES-05A Raven under development for the Gripen NG and several other programmes, including those for maritime and land base applications. They aren’t exactly starting from scratch. The Captor-E demonstrator that has been fitted to IPA5 has a mature hardware architecture and will primarily focus on software development among obvious refinements of the hardware. These activities aim at the Radar 1 standard targeted at export customers who require an earlier delivery of the AESA capability. For the core customers a more sophisticated Radar 2 will be developed introducing new hardware that provides backwards compatibility to earlier versions. That’s the reason why the UK’s stated in-service date is around 2020 as at this time the more advanced Radar 2 or possibly a Radar 3 will be available. How good or bad it will be in comparison to other AESA designs at that time is speculation at best and I’ll not going into this.