Then you say the F-15 will rule over MiG-21s and MiG-23s implying the same condition existed in 1989, yeah Schorsch the F-15 with a STR of 16 deg/s and ITR of 21 deg/s and no HMS was going to rule over the MiG-29 that has a STR of 22deg/s and ITR of 28 deg/s and has HMS in WVR yeah schorsch the Soviets did not have the better fighter in 1989.

Kiwi, you get over-fixated with numbers.
Here’s a video, not a great one but still, in which you can see F15 performing a circle, very similar to what F22 flies on shows.
How’s that bad?
Ok, it may not be the best, but close and F15 most certainly doesn’t have ITR 21°/s (closer to 30°) and STR is higher than 16°/s most certainly, at least at SL and clean.

The MiG-29 has STR of 22 deg/s at 3000 mtrs.
The MiG-29 pretty much out turns the F-15 Eagle for great Margin

Yeah right…
Where do you come up with those numbers from, anyway?
Forget numbers.
All you need is a 1g envelope and possibly a lift/drag curve (for estimating STR) and that’s all.
Everything is written there…

The Russians and Chinese also noted NATO’s ability to detect and zero in on RF emissions. As a result, they have developed passive RF location systems, IR sensors to augment the tracking capabilities of SAM batteries, LPI SAM radar, LPI RF communications and fiber optic networks to limit emissions. They have also developed decoy emitters to spoof systems such as Harpy and legacy SEAD location technologies. Such advancements will drastically reduce the effectiveness of NATO’s legacy weapons. As I said, smart guys and good engineers.

All true…

In the Balkans, the US was shamed by its inability to discriminate between simple decoys and real targets. That inability has been fixed by F-35. F-35’s sensors are able to survey huge swaths of territory with its sensor suite and automatically detect, identify, and prioritize threats whether they are emitting/silent, moving/stationary. F-35 then shares that information with other airplanes in the strike package in real time via MADL and can provide a situational picture to other allied assets in theater using SATCOM/JREAP-C like reachback.

But, this is where you lost me.
How can F35 hope to achieve even a full IRband range of some 20 km (let alone “huge swaths of territory”, as you put it), in continental climate and in a terrain like Balkans f.e.??
Besides, how can it successfully measure a distance to the target, when on average (non-winter) morning the heaviest tank’s (CO2) lasers loose their range, considerably?
Apache got Longbow radar and radar Hellfires, due that reason.
Brimstone is another example, of such (continental) modern AT combat concept.
It’s very likely that some silent drone (like ones for artillery fire correction) equipped with camera (TV/IR/IIR) or mm radar, will spot targets and relay them, much sooner than any F35, with its 40-43k lbs of thrust and 1XX dB of noise.

Even in Cola1973’s example, the AWACS radar is not actually being used as a targeting radar but is rather giving the ‘best estimate’ its non-X-band radar can give to get the missile’s (x-band) targetting radar close to the target.

Russians use FlapLid (Lband ~1GHz) radar for missile guidance, for quite some time now, so it’s possible and quite probable that Erieye does the same, enabling Gripens (f.e.) to perform passive launches.
Xband is mainly used due fighter’s antenna aperture and missile range constrains.

For example by hopping between a number of frequencies in quick succession (so called Fast Frequency Hoping, FFH) the Power Spectral Density (PSD) is lowered. By lowering the PSD it becomes possible to (nearly) hide the emissions in background noise making it extremely difficult (but not impossible) to detect. This is termed Low Probability of Detection, or LPD. These techniques also reduce the likelihood of the signal being monitored or spoofed, this is termed Low Probability of Exploitation (LPE). These two capabilities combine to give Low Probability of Interception, or LPI.

Other LPI techniques that may be exploited with a solid-state active array include the ability to trade the peak power output against resolution, automatically reduce the peak power to a minimum for a given target and range and preventing the transmission of microwave energy towards a known threat. Of course though all these techniques will trade something to achieve LPI.

That’s all well and fine, but the degree of

…hide the emissions in background noise making it extremely difficult (but not impossible) to detect.

depends on equipment and processing power of EWS.
For example, low PSD here is being presented as a “solution” and that’s only true in relative terms and is directly related to EWS’ processing power and while legacy RWS’, that heavily rely on stability of incoming signal’s freq. and PRF due slow proc/low sampling bandwidth (if digital at all), would most probably have problems with low PSD, I very much doubt it’d be the case with contemporary ones in which the signal sampling and processing is done by powerful computers, via broadband buses.

spectra does have directional rwr

I’d be most interested, if you could post a link, which talks a bit more about that.

What word would you prefer I use other than alter, to describe what the deception jammer does to the signal?

Here’s the abstract.
Read it, yourself.

You’re still misrepresenting my point. I never said that the altered signal would return first, which was the entire point.

Of course it won’t because it can’t, but you thought it can and it does and that was somehow the modus operandi of your imaginary DECM and that’s the point.
So, the sole purpose of this quotation was to show that you don’t know how DECM works, in spite of your permanent arguing on a very high level of “expertize”.
Anyway, that’s fulfilled now, so if you plan to throw more semantics this way, no need.

By the time the altered signal arrived, the radar would’ve already changed freqs many times, and the unaltered signals would’ve been interpreted prior to any altered ones being filtered(due to not having the correct coding).

No and original signal won’t be processed prior to arrival of jammer’s signal and that’s the wole point of DECM, of which you obviously don’t have a clue.
I’ve posted you a several links where you can learn more about this…

Which goes back to the whole- is the jammer operating at all times, or only if a threat is detected question? If the RWR/jammer don’t realize that a signal is a radar, it’s not going to be doing anything. The LPI signal has to be detected and identified as a threat, or it will be treated as background noise, and filtered out.

Ok, let’s not get into this. It’s sufficient to say “NO” and EWS doesn’t need to ID the radar in order to jam it. Period.

So when you misrepresent what I’m saying, and then try to challenge my understanding, you’re making a strawman argument.
This would be another example of misrepresenting what I said.

There’s no misinterpretation and I’m full aware that you don’t know this from your prior posting.
Wrightwing, these are your words.
How else could “The radar return would give the Raptor accurate info, as its ping would return prior to an altered return from a jammer.” be interpreted??
Apparently, you think jammer’s pulses return before original radar’s and that jammer is somehow jamming in advance, before seeing the inbound signal at all.
Ok, that’s possible too but simple PRF shift, or frequency jump, renders jamming ineffective and I’m not sure, if such jammers are used anymore and they most certainly don’t work against freq/PRF agile radars, like AESA is.
This is why I told you to learn how does the radar work.

It has to do with the jammer being in use or not. Until the LPI signal is detected, and indentified, the jammer is doing bupkis.

Radar signal doesn’t have to be identified to be jammed.
Where did you get that idea?
One detected (not identified), LPI signal can be jammed normally, in fact even easier due radar’s low power output, while in LPI op.mode.

LOL!!
You don’t even understand RGPO jamming. I takes some time to break a lock using RGPO but agile radar changing frequency more than 1000 times per second is to fast for RGPO. That means that before RGPO jammer measures PRF the radar will be listening to different frequency. Besides RGPO is used to break a RADAR LOCK…

We have another radar “expert on call” here. 😀