Thanks for the comments.
UNC,
Nikon D2X fitted with Nikon Nikkor 300mm f/2.8. Some of those were taken with a 1.4x teleconverter. Yes the cost is worth it. A prime lens will have the edge over a zoom. Some zooms are soft at the top end.Cheers
TJ
I will go along with that. A Prime lens is much better than a zoom. Images tend to be sharper, focusing better and images smoother. This is most visible at high resolution. I would not ditch the zoom though so keep it as an extra for flexibility.
Martin
I have finished editing little images and so will post few more here.
The rest can be seen at:
http://semaesmallairshowimages.fotopic.net
Martin











Crikey, these are brilliant shots.
Thank you for showing them.
Martin
Lovely pictures TEEJ, especially the sunset.
And great low fly images in your previous posts. The best I have seen.
Martin
Worth a try I suppose.
This was photographed at Fairford Royal International Air Tattoo departure day 2007

I am not sure about this but as the Fierfly was operated by the Navy Historic Flight it would be the militry authorities that would have conducted the investigation.
Martin
Hi
The crash/emergency landing appears to have been remarkably short.
On such a short landing I would normally expect a serious rate of descent resulting in casualties and much more damage to the aircraft than what actually happened.
Okay, I am speculating but perhaps the aircraft was about to stall. Fortunately it was probably just a few feet from the ground so it did not follow through with the stall (i/e pilots managed to flare the aircraft out a bit just a few feet from the ground) This may account for the less damage to the aircraft than what I would expect.
Reports do suggest that the aircraft was loosing height very quickly just before landing. I am assuming that the aircraft had no or very little power at the time.
Thankfully no casualties.
Thanks
You realize, of course, that before and candidate’s name is added to a ballot in Iran, he has to be vetted by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei? When the ballot is stacked in such a manner, how can you call it democracy? :rolleyes: Just because a country holds elections, don’t be fooled into thinking democracy is at work.
Indeed I do. Democracy around the Persian Gulf in non Arab and Arab countries is very much relative to each other. I believe the previous Iranian president was relatively moderate so I hold out some hope in this respect.
Some believe Saudi Arabia has very little democracy, perhaps less than Iran.
Thanks
Martin
Does make one laugh, Iran is probably the most democratic countrys in the persian gulf region, more democratic than the US’s close allies yet they have the worst relations.
I totally agree.
Martin
My view
The United States Navy and its aircraft can easily overcome Iran’s air defences. I presume they will also target buildings of military value including those alleged secret places of research, nuclear or whatever. Iran’s air and naval bases will also be attacked. They won’t get all those secret places and some are probably too well protected.
Iran will be too mad to try a first strike against US carrier groups. The US navy is too well defended. If Iran did attack then it will give the United States a justified pretext to carry out what I stated in the first paragraph. All Iran can do at most and get away with it is to harass US navy ships and meddle in Iran.
However. Iran is not Iraq.
The leadership in Iran whilst extreme is no comparison to Sadam Hussein. Sadam was universally hated by his own people but I do not think that the Iranian people hate their government. Some Iranians may dislike their government but if the United States followed up with a ground invasion, the US will not be welcomed as liberators. Most of the Iranian people will hate the US if they invaded and turn toward their own government and extremists. I do not think there will be much in the way of communal conflict between Iranian communities in Iran to solve. Iranian people would support a guerilla war/insurgency in their own country against an occupation force and will continue to do so. You will have to think of something else rather than COIN.
You will be biting off more than you can chew.
Iran is supported by high oil prices. As far as I am aware, the rest of its economy is not doing too well. If you want a change in the Iran leadership, hope that the Iranian people will vote out the Iranian president for someone more moderate. Off course the Iranian spiritual leaders have ultimate control but I think this is the best you can hope for.
Still no viable threat scenarios that demand an immediate increase in defence spending.
Iraq and Afghanistan are funded as far as personnel allows, all the funding in the world will not make up for poor recruitment figures. This is primarily a social/political problem. improved living conditions and pay will make a difference but to suggest that it is a panacea is blatantly dishonest. In times of high employment, generous welfare and unpopular wars with perceived high casualty rates in a safety and comfort obsessed society recruitment will always be very difficult.
The 1998 SDR was not a blue print for national defence- it is another common misconception that it was. That review would have been better called the Strategic Offense Review. Its purpose was to design armed forces that fitted in with the Blair governments ideological affiliation to liberal interventionism. It was not conceived to defend the UK against a threat to its national survival it was conceived to allow the Labour government to undertake its political and ideological fantasies. As such the government can abandon it, manipulate it, modify it, even ridicule it at its hearts content. The SDR was the product and exemplification of choice not of necessity.
You are quite right. Generous welfare/comfort obsessed society in times of high employment does make it difficult to recruit. Improved living conditions/pay etc, etc will help but I am totally aware that it is not a panacea and I never suggested it was.
I take it that your use of the word ‘dishonest’ is generalization of your view and not a personal judgment.
If the SDR in 1998 came from a Conservative government, it would have been quite remarkable. As it came from a Labour government it was breathtaking. It represented for the first time (ever) that a political party actually proposed a policy that reflected my view on defence but is failing to deliver
You state that it should have been called the Strategic Offence Review. Perhaps that explains why the SDR was too good to be true.
I will respect other peoples views on defence. There have been some valid points made even though I may disagree. On balance, I will stick with my own view on defence.
I do think this thead as a whole is becoming increasingly circular and repetitive so this is my last post on it for at least a while and at most, ever.
I have made my contribution.
Cheers
Martin
Fundamentally flawed post. Still no viable threat scenarios. All of the examples given were successfully dealt with within the existing budget or with minor increases in spending.
The only one with any validity is the Falklands (indeed you seem to recognise this yourself) as it shows the importance of working towards viable threat scenarios. The Falklands should always have been seen as one and still should be, thus defence should be orientated towards that. With Europes most capable amphib fleet, 2 aircraft carriers on order not to mention the rest of the fleet this is well within the capability of the UK armed forces.
You seem to have made the mistake of thinking that some people here are suggesting that the UK spend no money on defence at all, the simple fact is that nobody is suggesting that and it dishonest to suggest that they are.
Again: defence spending being relatively low is not a valid reason to increase it without viable threat scenarios.
I do not gree to some of your comments
In paragraph one:
Whilst the examples were successfully dealt with within the existing bugdet in terms of winning (if that is what you mean) lives have been lost due to inadequate equipment. Lack of body amour is an example. I would only regard an operation as successfully dealt if it was properly equipped at a reasonably minimal level for the job. That does not necessarily mean the latest equipment but equipment that can do the jobs well as enough of it.
In my opinion, with the current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the MOD and government as a whole are not providing the minimal level of support for the job and it remains to be seen if the outcome in Iraq and Afghanistan will be a success. When the armed forces is overstretched, I do not regard that that a success. Ultimately, it will drain our capability and the fatigue life of some of our equipment (Pumas need replacing)
Paragraph 3:
I have not made any mistake at all. Can you quote my mistake? Where did I write it? Did I write that some people prefer to spend nothing on defence? I do not think I even implied it. I prefer to think that I have given an honest opinion in my post.
Paragraph 4:
I agree that there are no current viable threats but that is far as I will go. My point is in having a viable force to deal with or necessarily involve us in an unexpected event. The Strategic Defence review would have provided this. As you are determined to stick with your position, perhaps we can agree to differ.
Lastly with paragraph 2:
Yes two aircraft carriers on order. However I do not share your confidence. If a Falklands case scenario happened tomorrow we could still make a successful recovery though those Sea Harriers may have to be brought back in to service unless some GR9s re brought up to some of level fighter capability very quickly.
Unfortunately the way our destroyer/frigate fleet is going with ever decreasing numbers of platforms I do not think it could be viable force in a few yeas time even with the carriers. April 2008 will probably see more cuts being announced
With speculation that two T45 destroyers have even been considered for sale, it would not surprise me that when one of the carries is built it shortly ends up being sold to India.
Please excuse my cynicism.
Martin
Well I’ve made a start on your answer, but when you refer to yourself as ‘us’ and dismiss my argument before you’ve hard it, I’ve decided that you don’t deserve the effort I was prepared to put in to educate you. This is some unedit quotes and notes that were going to be more extensive and logically argued. I post them in case someone can put up with your abuse enough to state the case of a vital argument. That would be for the benefit of those of ‘us’ that aren’t you.
During 1989 the Berlin Wall was pulled down. An event that typifies the end of the cold war. UK defence spending
was just above 4% of GDP. By 1995 this had dropped by a quarter to a hair over 3% of GDP. This is what you might
expect from a peace dividend, but the cuts went further: 2.8% by the time New Labour got into power in 1997. Since
then they have brought defence spending down to almost half the level at the tail end of the cold war (2.2%).
For the UK armed forces generally:
Recruitment and retention are a constant problem. The low level of wages compared to similar professions where one
isn’t expected to risk your life so much. The poor standard of accomodation and support for families while you are
away on active service for months at a time. These cuts and delayed spending make shortages in manpower more
likely, which in turn mean that those in the services have to cover for the shortfall. Another cause for discontent
and lower retention.
===========================
Air ForceAircraft
The airforce is short of transport helicopters and aeroplanes. While some 8 Chinooks have been adapted from a
failed special forces role and 6 Merlins bought from Denmark this doesn’t fill the shortfall. It is the best that
can be done at short notice. Other countries have placed orders that must be fullfilled prior to any more being
built for us. We are slowly adding to the C-17 heavy transport squadron, but again it is spending that should have
been made before a shortage arose.
===========================
NavyShips
Speculation has been rife all year that Royal Navy’s escort force is to be cut from a paper strength of 25
destroyers and frigates to just 20 – the four Cornwall-class Type 22 Batch 3 frigates plus one Type 23 frigate
being seen as the likely victims. The RN had 35 frigates and destroyers when Labour took power in 1997, and it’s
hard to see how the government’s interventionist foreign policy has reduced demands on the escort force. By
comparison the another island nation – Japan – feels the need to maintain a force of about 54 modern frigates and
destroyers despite its pacifist constitution.
A quick ‘surf’ through some other elements of bad news in 2007:
The Fleet Arm failed in its effort to re-establish 801 Naval Air Squadron due to a lack of qualified pilots, and
instead in March 800 NAS was officially renamed the Naval Strike Wing, this supposedly comprises of elements of
both 800 and 801 Squadrons – although equivalent in strength to just one 9 aircraft squadron
The struggle to find Harrier’s to occasionally embark on the the UK’s Strike Carrier (HMS Illustrious) has became
positively embarrassing, with the US Marine Corps, Spanish Navy and Italian all being persuaded to loan aircraft
and help the RN to maintain basic fixed wing carrier operating skills.
The reduction in the size of the Royal Fleet Auxiliary service continued, with RFA Brambleleaf and Oakleaf being
unexpectedly being laid up in 200, and RFA Fort Victoria going to extended readiness. This reduction is probably a
reflect of the generally low level of exercises and deployments that RN can currently afford to maintain.
The first Type 45 – HMS Daring – will not now be in service until November 2010 – three year later than originally
contracted, while the odds that two more units (i.e. the seventh and eighth of class) will ever be ordered for the
Royal Navy have sink close to zero. Also rumours that two of the six Type 45 destroyers (Defender and Duncan)
could be sold to Saudi Arabia that first surfaced in the summer of 2005 remain worryingly persistent – even the
implication that the MOD has authorised BAE Systems to offer these ships for sale is disturbing given the urgent
need to replace the ancient and nearly obsolete Type 42’s. It also remains unclear whether the MOD would order
replacements if they were sold, or whether the RN would end up with just four of the twelve Type 45 destroyers that
it had expected to get as recently as 2004.
Despite reductions in capability, the estimated cost of the six Type 45’s on order has increased to nearly £6.5
billion – i.e. about £1.1 billion or $2.2 billion each. It’s perhaps worth remembering that the American Arleigh
Burke design was quickly ruled out in 1999 as an option to replace the Type 42’s on the grounds that it was too
large and expensive, with a then sticker price of about $1 billion (£600 million).
The resignation of Minister of State for Defence Equipment and Support Lord Drayson in November on the implausible
grounds that he wanted to go motor racing in America. The reality seems that an argument with civil servants over
the procurements of the Army’s FRES was the final straw as he struggled to secure the funding needed to make the
next version of his well respected Defence Industrial Strategy (issued December 2005) reality rather than just
words. It remains to be seen whether the RN will still get the “drum beat” he promised of a new major warship
every year, and a submarine every 22 months.
Despite the interesting proposals of the S2C2 pathfinder study, progress on the Future Surface Combatant remained
snail like, currently amounting to just a few low value study contracts supervised by a team of just four dedicated
staff in DE&S. The last Type 23 frigate. HMS St Albans, entered service in 2002 and the current average age of
the RN’s seventeen frigates is just over 13 – acceptable but increasing rapidly. It now seems almost impossible
that the four Type 22 Batch 3 will replaced, even if they remain in surface until 2015-18 as is current the
official published plan.
The £200 million a year in funding robbed from the Royal Navy’s support budget in July 2004 was not restored in
2006/7 as planned, and the cumulative effect is that levels of equipment maintenance and serviceability are now
deplorable. Ships often either remain alongside or deploy with major systems non-operational – the later being
accepted on the basis that the system(s) in question were not vital for the envisaged tasking. Of course no
allowance is then being made for the unexpected.
– Navy Matters: Review of 2007 (c) Richard BeedallThe Royal Navy has seen massive cuts in capability. Even the one warship a year promised amounts to only 25
(eventually) from a level of 35 when Labour came to power.
===========================
ArmyCold War peace dividend cuts:
The collapse of the Soviet Union, ending the Cold War, saw a new defence white paper, ‘Options for Change’ produced. This saw inevitable reductions in the British armed forces. The Army experienced a substantial cut in its manpower (The ending of the Cold War saw a 40% cut in manpower, reduced to about 120,000), which included yet more regimental amalgamations, including two of the large regiments of the 1960s — the Queen’s Regiment and Royal Irish Rangers — and the third battalions of the remaining large regiments being cut. The British Army in Germany was also affected, with the British Army of the Rhine replaced by British Forces Germany and personnel numbers being reduced from about 55,000 to 25,000; the replacement of German-based I Corps by the British-led Headquarters Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps also took place. Nine of the Army’s administrative corps were amalgamated to form the Royal Logistic Corps and the Adjutant General’s Corps). One major development was the disbandment of the Women’s Royal Army Corps (though the largest elements were absorbed by the AGC) and their integration into services that had previously been restricted to men; however, women were still forbidden from joining armoured and infantry units. The four Gurkha regiments were amalgamated to form the three-battalion Royal Gurkha Rifles, reduced to two in 1996 just before the handover of Hong Kong to the People’s Republic of China in 1997.
– wiki rumourCuts will leave Army struggling in the sand
By Michael Smith, Defence Correspondent
Last Updated: 10:38pm GMT 24/11/2002The deep post-Cold War cuts to Britain’s defences, which began in the early 1990s and have effectively continued under Labour through persistent under-funding, will leave Britain’s troops struggling to fight in Iraq.
An exercise in Oman last year turned into a near fiasco as piece after piece of equipment failed in the heat and dust of the desert, largely as a result of ill-considered attempts to save money.
A Daily Telegraph investigation has found that despite the possibility that British troops may soon be forced to fight in the desert, virtually nothing has changed and, again, the reason is money.
Commanders and civil servants have been told that they cannot make any preparations that will cost even moderate sums. The problems have been exacerbated by a more commercially orientated system of defence procurement whereby everything from tank spares to desert boots can be ordered only when needed.
Virtually nothing is stockpiled in a system that works for commercial companies with a steady flow of predictable business but is totally impractical for an army whose needs surge if it goes to war.
The best-known victim of the Saif Sareea II exercise in Oman was the Challenger 2 main battle tank. The Ministry of Defence ignored the advice of commanders that it had to be “desertised” to protect it against sand.
Half of the tanks deployed in the exercise were stranded within four hours of the start and the cost of replacing engines far exceeded that of modifications.
Yet the MoD is “still considering” whether to desertise tanks, even though Vickers, the manufacturer, has given warning that it would take up to three months.
The sand in Oman affected not only tanks. There were insufficient sand filters for armoured vehicles and helicopters. No new ones have been ordered.
Efficient anti-tank guided weapons will be absolutely crucial against the Republican Guard’s T-72 tanks. The current Milan system was originally due to be taken out of service in 1995.
A failed attempt to produce a joint European system and cost-cutting have delayed any replacement until 2005-6. Ageing rocket motors are now cracking, with the risk that the missiles could explode on launch.
The probability that Saddam Hussein will use chemical and/or biological weapons rather than face defeat is a concern. The Army does not have enough nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) warfare filters for either armoured vehicles or soldiers’ gas masks.
During the Gulf war there were only enough supplies of NBC suits for one week of intensive combat but there are now even fewer than there were then. Both filters and suits are dependent on only two sources of high-grade charcoal, one in Ukraine, which is supplying arms to Iraq, and the other in America, which has blocked exports to equip its own troops.
Another of the problems thrown up by Saif Sareea II was the MoD’s decision that, to save money, it would not order desert uniforms and boots. Many troops bought their own. The MoD has ordered more desert clothing but not enough.
Other problems go back to the Gulf war.
The Army’s ancient DROPS ammunition supply vehicles and fuel tankers were incapable of keeping up with the troops and the tankers are prone to leaks. The FV432 armoured personnel carrier, which still forms the basis for many of the Army’s armoured command post vehicles, was also heavily criticised in post-Gulf War reports for failing to keep up with the advance.
The Scimitar armoured recce vehicle is also too slow as well as being under-armoured, under-gunned and lacking full night capability.
Delays and cancelled orders have also left the armed forces without any efficient communications systems. During the Kosovo conflict British troops had to use mobile telephones, operating on the Yugoslav network, removing even the very limited security their communications systems provide.
Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) will be vital for intelligence gathering. An upgrade of the Army’s Phoenix UAV to allow it to operate in hot weather was put off to save money.
Deep cuts to the forces’ medical services have left them desperately short of doctors and other trained staff. They will need to call up large numbers of reservists for any big operation in Iraq, putting immense strain on the NHS. Plans for 200-bed hospital ships costing £70 million were delayed last year.
-the Telegraph november 2002
The reduction from 40 to 36 battalions (10% of frontline infantry)
Defence Secretary Geoff Hoon has rejected claims from a top general that looming cuts will leave the British Army “dangerously small”.
Speaking on BBC One’s Politics Show, Mr Hoon said he did not share the views of former head of the Armed Forces Lord Guthrie, printed in a Sunday newspaper.Lord Guthrie told the Sunday Telegraph that cuts due to be announced this week would leave it “dangerously small”.
But Mr Hoon said he thought the changes would leave the Army in better shape.
The proposed changes include cutting Scotland’s six single-battalion regiments to five and merging these into a super regiment, which may affect the Black Watch which has now returned from duties in Iraq.
Battalions cut
He said: “What we are trying to do is ensure our armed forces, and our Army in particular, are organised to face the challenges of the 21st century.
“The nature of the enemy has changed even in those five short years that I have been in this job.
“We have got to make sure, indeed it’s my obligation and responsibility, to make sure that our armed forces are equipped and organised to face the kind of challenges we face today, not those of a previous generation.”
Critics say cuts will affect the army’s ability to serve
The government is expected to announce this week cuts that will reduce the Army’s size from 104,000 to 102,000, with the majority of cuts amongst infantry troops.
Cuts are also expected for both the Royal Navy and The Royal Air Force.
The number of Army infantry battalions are expected to be cut from 40 to 36 – one from Scotland and three from England.
-BBC news december 2004
THE government is set to announce another round of drastic cuts to Britain’s over-stretched infantry as part of a radical shake-up of the Territorial Army, The Scotsman has learned.
At least one territorial infantry regiment is to be axed and three centres will be closed as part of the changes to be announced by John Reid, the Defence Secretary (as was), within the next two weeks.
Historic regimental names will disappear as the TA units are amalgamated into the new super-regiments that the government has deemed essential to the overall restructuring of the British Army.
In Scotland, that will mean that the Lowland and Highland regiments become the 6th and 7th battalions respectively of the Royal Regiment of Scotland. The plans, which will effectively see the part-time force merge into the regular army, is set to be every bit as controversial as the recent loss of four regular infantry battalions and the amalgamation of the Scottish regiments.
Many soldiers who signed up to serve as part-time infantry will find that their role has been abolished. Instead, the MoD intends to try to persuade them to take on new tasks to fill the gaping holes in its ranks of specialists left by previous defence cuts.
The timing could hardly be worse, with the infantry already pared down to the minimum required for operations and British troops committed indefinitely to Iraq and Afghanistan.
Mr Reid recently revealed that gaps between deployments for regular infantry units had shrunk to 21 months from the recommended 24 months.
Mr Reid is expected to announce the closure of a number of TA centres, leaving volunteers facing long journeys to training sessions if they want to remain in uniform. Many are expected to quit…
…The infantry is already stretched to the limits and has relied heavily on the TA to make up the numbers in Iraq, with about 11,500 soldiers deployed since the start of the war in 2003.
Officers and senior NCOs say that they have integrated well and have done much to rid themselves of the “weekend warriors” tag.
But the additional demands on its members have taken their toll on retention figures and about 13,500 have resigned in the same period.
Some have expressed concern about the length of deployments – up to nine months in some cases once training is included – and there have been problems with unsympathetic employers who have refused to keep jobs open for those who volunteer for duty.
-The Scotsman february 2006
Army manpower stands at about 98,000 (from 120,000 ten years ago)
Well done. Excellent post.
I would add that cost of defence inflation has certainly and inevitably lead to reductions in equipment for the navy, army and air force. However, delay after delay in procuring equipment due to insufficient funding in the first will only lead to a tipping point where so much will have to be replaced that the costs will be so huge as to be unaffordable.
In my opinion this point is now being reached and in the end may require an even bigger increase in defence spending than even a 3 per cent share of GDP which of course would not be for forthcoming.
There is suppose to be trade off between quality and quantity of equipment but the quality is simply not advanced enough technologically to reduce equipment levels by so much. I my opinion there is no balance any more in this trade off. The equipment levels are now too low.
There has been a lot of posts on the current benign environment in terms of defence that the UK is now finds itself in. That is a concentration on the here an now. It is probably right to state that the Soviet Union is not a threat to us at the moment. In 1945 the United States government certainly did not think the Soviet Union was a threat. Stalin hoodwinked the US government and it took the United States three years to wake up to the fact.
Again in my opinion. it is completely useless to try and forecast what the environment is likely to be in a few years time. The reason is that every forecast made in the past has been so wrong due to the so called unexpected.
Falklands War – Unexpected (though I would disagree with that)
First Gulf War – Unexpected
Kosovo – Unexpected
September 11 2001 and Afghanistan – Unexpected
One would have thought that within two years of the Invasion of Afghanistan the MOD would have seen the need for additional Helicopters then and not six years later. Perhaps they hoped the Taliban would just go away.
Second Gulf War – where are those additional helicopters?
Also the so called Northern Ireland Peace dividend. A smokescreen. There is no peace dividend as our soldiers are now in Iraq and Afghanistan.
There is an earlier post in this forum suggesting that as military spending is consumption then if you spend more than 1 per cent on defence a share of GDP, your county will go in to decline. There is plenty of consumption spending by the UK Government and the biggest share is on the NHS. I hardly think that the NHS has contributed to the relative decline of the UK. You could argue for US style Medicare to enable spending on health to be reduced, release precious resources on technology and innovation, give us tax cuts on personal income and corporate taxes so that the private sector is no longer squeezed out of funding on investment. As defence spending is consumption, then the suggestion that a greater than one per cent spend on defence leads to a decline in the country will also have logically to be applied to the NHS.
Why did the Roman Empire go in decline (or rather the Western Roman Empire) Depends on what book you read. Historians do not agree on why it went in to decline. There were other things happening at around the late western Roman period One example is the river (can’t remember which river, perhaps it was the Rhine) that divided the Roman Europe from Barbarian Europe completely froze a few times so it was no longer a natural border. This enabled the barbarian hordes to cross more easily. It did not help that one or two of the barbarian previously served in the Roman Army. One of those leaders and his force sacked Rome in AD410 after being refused settlement within the Empire. Perhaps Rome’s attitude towards the barbarians was to blame for the decline in the later period of the Western Empire?
I remember a couple of years ago of a Minister responsible for the NHS (can’t remember her name) commenting that the then £1b deficit on the NHS budget was so small compared to total spending on the NHS that savings could easily be found. Well if that is the case then finding additional funds on military spending compared to total government spend should be even easier. Also and whilst I agree that if too much is spending on defence can divert resources away from private sector investment, I hardy think that 3 per cent on military spending is going to make any difference.
I have no doubts that in the past people said that if you increase spending on defence it will put up your income tax by so much in the £. In reality income tax is just one of many taxes. There is VAT, Corporation Tax etc, etc. Take these other taxes in to account then extra taxes to fund defence spending would be minimal. Perhaps someone can calculate how much he extra spending to 3 per cent of GDP is likely to put up ALL taxes.
At the end of the day it is about choices. If you scrap some of the ill thought and costly schemes (ID cards as an example) you may not even have to put up taxes at all.
The Government came out with the Strategic Defence Review. Nothing has changed since then. It should stick to it. It promised us a force (although at relatively lower levels of equipment) with reasonable breadth and depth and a good trade off between quality and quantity.
Thsands
Martin
Well I’ve made a start on your answer, but when you refer to yourself as ‘us’ and dismiss my argument before you’ve hard it, I’ve decided that you don’t deserve the effort I was prepared to put in to educate you. This is some unedit quotes and notes that were going to be more extensive and logically argued. I post them in case someone can put up with your abuse enough to state the case of a vital argument. That would be for the benefit of those of ‘us’ that aren’t you.
During 1989 the Berlin Wall was pulled down. An event that typifies the end of the cold war. UK defence spending
was just above 4% of GDP. By 1995 this had dropped by a quarter to a hair over 3% of GDP. This is what you might
expect from a peace dividend, but the cuts went further: 2.8% by the time New Labour got into power in 1997. Since
then they have brought defence spending down to almost half the level at the tail end of the cold war (2.2%).
For the UK armed forces generally:
Recruitment and retention are a constant problem. The low level of wages compared to similar professions where one
isn’t expected to risk your life so much. The poor standard of accomodation and support for families while you are
away on active service for months at a time. These cuts and delayed spending make shortages in manpower more
likely, which in turn mean that those in the services have to cover for the shortfall. Another cause for discontent
and lower retention.
===========================
Air ForceAircraft
The airforce is short of transport helicopters and aeroplanes. While some 8 Chinooks have been adapted from a
failed special forces role and 6 Merlins bought from Denmark this doesn’t fill the shortfall. It is the best that
can be done at short notice. Other countries have placed orders that must be fullfilled prior to any more being
built for us. We are slowly adding to the C-17 heavy transport squadron, but again it is spending that should have
been made before a shortage arose.
===========================
NavyShips
Speculation has been rife all year that Royal Navy’s escort force is to be cut from a paper strength of 25
destroyers and frigates to just 20 – the four Cornwall-class Type 22 Batch 3 frigates plus one Type 23 frigate
being seen as the likely victims. The RN had 35 frigates and destroyers when Labour took power in 1997, and it’s
hard to see how the government’s interventionist foreign policy has reduced demands on the escort force. By
comparison the another island nation – Japan – feels the need to maintain a force of about 54 modern frigates and
destroyers despite its pacifist constitution.
A quick ‘surf’ through some other elements of bad news in 2007:
The Fleet Arm failed in its effort to re-establish 801 Naval Air Squadron due to a lack of qualified pilots, and
instead in March 800 NAS was officially renamed the Naval Strike Wing, this supposedly comprises of elements of
both 800 and 801 Squadrons – although equivalent in strength to just one 9 aircraft squadron
The struggle to find Harrier’s to occasionally embark on the the UK’s Strike Carrier (HMS Illustrious) has became
positively embarrassing, with the US Marine Corps, Spanish Navy and Italian all being persuaded to loan aircraft
and help the RN to maintain basic fixed wing carrier operating skills.
The reduction in the size of the Royal Fleet Auxiliary service continued, with RFA Brambleleaf and Oakleaf being
unexpectedly being laid up in 200, and RFA Fort Victoria going to extended readiness. This reduction is probably a
reflect of the generally low level of exercises and deployments that RN can currently afford to maintain.
The first Type 45 – HMS Daring – will not now be in service until November 2010 – three year later than originally
contracted, while the odds that two more units (i.e. the seventh and eighth of class) will ever be ordered for the
Royal Navy have sink close to zero. Also rumours that two of the six Type 45 destroyers (Defender and Duncan)
could be sold to Saudi Arabia that first surfaced in the summer of 2005 remain worryingly persistent – even the
implication that the MOD has authorised BAE Systems to offer these ships for sale is disturbing given the urgent
need to replace the ancient and nearly obsolete Type 42’s. It also remains unclear whether the MOD would order
replacements if they were sold, or whether the RN would end up with just four of the twelve Type 45 destroyers that
it had expected to get as recently as 2004.
Despite reductions in capability, the estimated cost of the six Type 45’s on order has increased to nearly £6.5
billion – i.e. about £1.1 billion or $2.2 billion each. It’s perhaps worth remembering that the American Arleigh
Burke design was quickly ruled out in 1999 as an option to replace the Type 42’s on the grounds that it was too
large and expensive, with a then sticker price of about $1 billion (£600 million).
The resignation of Minister of State for Defence Equipment and Support Lord Drayson in November on the implausible
grounds that he wanted to go motor racing in America. The reality seems that an argument with civil servants over
the procurements of the Army’s FRES was the final straw as he struggled to secure the funding needed to make the
next version of his well respected Defence Industrial Strategy (issued December 2005) reality rather than just
words. It remains to be seen whether the RN will still get the “drum beat” he promised of a new major warship
every year, and a submarine every 22 months.
Despite the interesting proposals of the S2C2 pathfinder study, progress on the Future Surface Combatant remained
snail like, currently amounting to just a few low value study contracts supervised by a team of just four dedicated
staff in DE&S. The last Type 23 frigate. HMS St Albans, entered service in 2002 and the current average age of
the RN’s seventeen frigates is just over 13 – acceptable but increasing rapidly. It now seems almost impossible
that the four Type 22 Batch 3 will replaced, even if they remain in surface until 2015-18 as is current the
official published plan.
The £200 million a year in funding robbed from the Royal Navy’s support budget in July 2004 was not restored in
2006/7 as planned, and the cumulative effect is that levels of equipment maintenance and serviceability are now
deplorable. Ships often either remain alongside or deploy with major systems non-operational – the later being
accepted on the basis that the system(s) in question were not vital for the envisaged tasking. Of course no
allowance is then being made for the unexpected.
– Navy Matters: Review of 2007 (c) Richard BeedallThe Royal Navy has seen massive cuts in capability. Even the one warship a year promised amounts to only 25
(eventually) from a level of 35 when Labour came to power.
===========================
ArmyCold War peace dividend cuts:
The collapse of the Soviet Union, ending the Cold War, saw a new defence white paper, ‘Options for Change’ produced. This saw inevitable reductions in the British armed forces. The Army experienced a substantial cut in its manpower (The ending of the Cold War saw a 40% cut in manpower, reduced to about 120,000), which included yet more regimental amalgamations, including two of the large regiments of the 1960s — the Queen’s Regiment and Royal Irish Rangers — and the third battalions of the remaining large regiments being cut. The British Army in Germany was also affected, with the British Army of the Rhine replaced by British Forces Germany and personnel numbers being reduced from about 55,000 to 25,000; the replacement of German-based I Corps by the British-led Headquarters Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps also took place. Nine of the Army’s administrative corps were amalgamated to form the Royal Logistic Corps and the Adjutant General’s Corps). One major development was the disbandment of the Women’s Royal Army Corps (though the largest elements were absorbed by the AGC) and their integration into services that had previously been restricted to men; however, women were still forbidden from joining armoured and infantry units. The four Gurkha regiments were amalgamated to form the three-battalion Royal Gurkha Rifles, reduced to two in 1996 just before the handover of Hong Kong to the People’s Republic of China in 1997.
– wiki rumourCuts will leave Army struggling in the sand
By Michael Smith, Defence Correspondent
Last Updated: 10:38pm GMT 24/11/2002The deep post-Cold War cuts to Britain’s defences, which began in the early 1990s and have effectively continued under Labour through persistent under-funding, will leave Britain’s troops struggling to fight in Iraq.
An exercise in Oman last year turned into a near fiasco as piece after piece of equipment failed in the heat and dust of the desert, largely as a result of ill-considered attempts to save money.
A Daily Telegraph investigation has found that despite the possibility that British troops may soon be forced to fight in the desert, virtually nothing has changed and, again, the reason is money.
Commanders and civil servants have been told that they cannot make any preparations that will cost even moderate sums. The problems have been exacerbated by a more commercially orientated system of defence procurement whereby everything from tank spares to desert boots can be ordered only when needed.
Virtually nothing is stockpiled in a system that works for commercial companies with a steady flow of predictable business but is totally impractical for an army whose needs surge if it goes to war.
The best-known victim of the Saif Sareea II exercise in Oman was the Challenger 2 main battle tank. The Ministry of Defence ignored the advice of commanders that it had to be “desertised” to protect it against sand.
Half of the tanks deployed in the exercise were stranded within four hours of the start and the cost of replacing engines far exceeded that of modifications.
Yet the MoD is “still considering” whether to desertise tanks, even though Vickers, the manufacturer, has given warning that it would take up to three months.
The sand in Oman affected not only tanks. There were insufficient sand filters for armoured vehicles and helicopters. No new ones have been ordered.
Efficient anti-tank guided weapons will be absolutely crucial against the Republican Guard’s T-72 tanks. The current Milan system was originally due to be taken out of service in 1995.
A failed attempt to produce a joint European system and cost-cutting have delayed any replacement until 2005-6. Ageing rocket motors are now cracking, with the risk that the missiles could explode on launch.
The probability that Saddam Hussein will use chemical and/or biological weapons rather than face defeat is a concern. The Army does not have enough nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) warfare filters for either armoured vehicles or soldiers’ gas masks.
During the Gulf war there were only enough supplies of NBC suits for one week of intensive combat but there are now even fewer than there were then. Both filters and suits are dependent on only two sources of high-grade charcoal, one in Ukraine, which is supplying arms to Iraq, and the other in America, which has blocked exports to equip its own troops.
Another of the problems thrown up by Saif Sareea II was the MoD’s decision that, to save money, it would not order desert uniforms and boots. Many troops bought their own. The MoD has ordered more desert clothing but not enough.
Other problems go back to the Gulf war.
The Army’s ancient DROPS ammunition supply vehicles and fuel tankers were incapable of keeping up with the troops and the tankers are prone to leaks. The FV432 armoured personnel carrier, which still forms the basis for many of the Army’s armoured command post vehicles, was also heavily criticised in post-Gulf War reports for failing to keep up with the advance.
The Scimitar armoured recce vehicle is also too slow as well as being under-armoured, under-gunned and lacking full night capability.
Delays and cancelled orders have also left the armed forces without any efficient communications systems. During the Kosovo conflict British troops had to use mobile telephones, operating on the Yugoslav network, removing even the very limited security their communications systems provide.
Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) will be vital for intelligence gathering. An upgrade of the Army’s Phoenix UAV to allow it to operate in hot weather was put off to save money.
Deep cuts to the forces’ medical services have left them desperately short of doctors and other trained staff. They will need to call up large numbers of reservists for any big operation in Iraq, putting immense strain on the NHS. Plans for 200-bed hospital ships costing £70 million were delayed last year.
-the Telegraph november 2002
The reduction from 40 to 36 battalions (10% of frontline infantry)
Defence Secretary Geoff Hoon has rejected claims from a top general that looming cuts will leave the British Army “dangerously small”.
Speaking on BBC One’s Politics Show, Mr Hoon said he did not share the views of former head of the Armed Forces Lord Guthrie, printed in a Sunday newspaper.Lord Guthrie told the Sunday Telegraph that cuts due to be announced this week would leave it “dangerously small”.
But Mr Hoon said he thought the changes would leave the Army in better shape.
The proposed changes include cutting Scotland’s six single-battalion regiments to five and merging these into a super regiment, which may affect the Black Watch which has now returned from duties in Iraq.
Battalions cut
He said: “What we are trying to do is ensure our armed forces, and our Army in particular, are organised to face the challenges of the 21st century.
“The nature of the enemy has changed even in those five short years that I have been in this job.
“We have got to make sure, indeed it’s my obligation and responsibility, to make sure that our armed forces are equipped and organised to face the kind of challenges we face today, not those of a previous generation.”
Critics say cuts will affect the army’s ability to serve
The government is expected to announce this week cuts that will reduce the Army’s size from 104,000 to 102,000, with the majority of cuts amongst infantry troops.
Cuts are also expected for both the Royal Navy and The Royal Air Force.
The number of Army infantry battalions are expected to be cut from 40 to 36 – one from Scotland and three from England.
-BBC news december 2004
THE government is set to announce another round of drastic cuts to Britain’s over-stretched infantry as part of a radical shake-up of the Territorial Army, The Scotsman has learned.
At least one territorial infantry regiment is to be axed and three centres will be closed as part of the changes to be announced by John Reid, the Defence Secretary (as was), within the next two weeks.
Historic regimental names will disappear as the TA units are amalgamated into the new super-regiments that the government has deemed essential to the overall restructuring of the British Army.
In Scotland, that will mean that the Lowland and Highland regiments become the 6th and 7th battalions respectively of the Royal Regiment of Scotland. The plans, which will effectively see the part-time force merge into the regular army, is set to be every bit as controversial as the recent loss of four regular infantry battalions and the amalgamation of the Scottish regiments.
Many soldiers who signed up to serve as part-time infantry will find that their role has been abolished. Instead, the MoD intends to try to persuade them to take on new tasks to fill the gaping holes in its ranks of specialists left by previous defence cuts.
The timing could hardly be worse, with the infantry already pared down to the minimum required for operations and British troops committed indefinitely to Iraq and Afghanistan.
Mr Reid recently revealed that gaps between deployments for regular infantry units had shrunk to 21 months from the recommended 24 months.
Mr Reid is expected to announce the closure of a number of TA centres, leaving volunteers facing long journeys to training sessions if they want to remain in uniform. Many are expected to quit…
…The infantry is already stretched to the limits and has relied heavily on the TA to make up the numbers in Iraq, with about 11,500 soldiers deployed since the start of the war in 2003.
Officers and senior NCOs say that they have integrated well and have done much to rid themselves of the “weekend warriors” tag.
But the additional demands on its members have taken their toll on retention figures and about 13,500 have resigned in the same period.
Some have expressed concern about the length of deployments – up to nine months in some cases once training is included – and there have been problems with unsympathetic employers who have refused to keep jobs open for those who volunteer for duty.
-The Scotsman february 2006
Army manpower stands at about 98,000 (from 120,000 ten years ago)
Well done. Excellent post.
I would add that cost of defence inflation has certainly and inevitably lead to reductions in equipment for the navy, army and air force. However, delay after delay in procuring equipment due to insufficient funding in the first will only lead to a tipping point where so much will have to be replaced that the costs will be so huge as to be unaffordable.
In my opinion this point is now being reached and in the end may require an even bigger increase in defence spending than even a 3 per cent share of GDP which of course would not be for forthcoming.
There is suppose to be trade off between quality and quantity of equipment but the quality is simply not advanced enough technologically to reduce equipment levels by so much. I my opinion there is no balance any more in this trade off. The equipment levels are now too low.
There has been a lot of posts on the current benign environment in terms of defence that the UK is now finds itself in. That is a concentration on the here an now. It is probably right to state that the Soviet Union is not a threat to us at the moment. In 1945 the United States government certainly did not think the Soviet Union was a threat. Stalin hoodwinked the US government and it took the United States three years to wake up to the fact.
Again in my opinion. it is completely useless to try and forecast what the environment is likely to be in a few years time. The reason is that every forecast made in the past has been so wrong due to the so called unexpected.
Falklands War – Unexpected (though I would disagree with that)
First Gulf War – Unexpected
Kosovo – Unexpected
September 11 2001 and Afghanistan – Unexpected
One would have thought that within two years of the Invasion of Afghanistan the MOD would have seen the need for additional Helicopters then and not six years later. Perhaps they hoped the Taliban would just go away.
Second Gulf War – where are those additional helicopters?
Also the so called Northern Ireland Peace dividend. A smokescreen. There is no peace dividend as our soldiers are now in Iraq and Afghanistan.
There is an earlier post in this forum suggesting that as military spending is consumption then if you spend more than 1 per cent on defence a share of GDP, your county will go in to decline. There is plenty of consumption spending by the UK Government and the biggest share is on the NHS. I hardly think that the NHS has contributed to the relative decline of the UK. You could argue for US style Medicare to enable spending on health to be reduced, release precious resources on technology and innovation, give us tax cuts on personal income and corporate taxes so that the private sector is no longer squeezed out of funding on investment. As defence spending is consumption, then the suggestion that a greater than one per cent spend on defence leads to a decline in the country will also have logically to be applied to the NHS.
Why did the Roman Empire go in decline (or rather the Western Roman Empire) Depends on what book you read. Historians do not agree on why it went in to decline. There were other things happening at around the late western Roman period One example is the river (can’t remember which river, perhaps it was the Rhine) that divided the Roman Europe from Barbarian Europe completely froze a few times so it was no longer a natural border. This enabled the barbarian hordes to cross more easily. It did not help that one or two of the barbarian previously served in the Roman Army. One of those leaders and his force sacked Rome in AD410 after being refused settlement within the Empire. Perhaps Rome’s attitude towards the barbarians was to blame for the decline in the later period of the Western Empire?
I remember a couple of years ago of a Minister responsible for the NHS (can’t remember her name) commenting that the then £1b deficit on the NHS budget was so small compared to total spending on the NHS that savings could easily be found. Well if that is the case then finding additional funds on military spending compared to total government spend should be even easier. Also and whilst I agree that if too much is spending on defence can divert resources away from private sector investment, I hardy think that 3 per cent on military spending is going to make any difference.
I have no doubts that in the past people said that if you increase spending on defence it will put up your income tax by so much in the £. In reality income tax is just one of many taxes. There is VAT, Corporation Tax etc, etc. Take these other taxes in to account then extra taxes to fund defence spending would be minimal. Perhaps someone can calculate how much he extra spending to 3 per cent of GDP is likely to put up ALL taxes.
At the end of the day it is about choices. If you scrap some of the ill thought and costly schemes (ID cards as an example) you may not even have to put up taxes at all.
The Government came out with the Strategic Defence Review. Nothing has changed since then. It should stick to it. It promised us a force (although at relatively lower levels of equipment) with reasonable breadth and depth and a good trade off between quality and quantity.
Thsands
Martin
Superb photos TEEJ
Do you get any advance information on what is likely to appear? I fancy doing some of this stuff myself one day but it would long way to go for me only to find nothing happening.
Cheers
Martin