I thought it was a fairly well made and thought provoking program. My own personal conclusions boiled down to-
1) I believe the key problem here lay with the AA training department. I find it ludicrous that in this day and age they are teaching their pilots to apply light aircraft recovery techniques for unusual attitude recoveries. How on earth AA can justify to the insurance companies that they recommend a technique that contradicts the manufacturers recommended technique baffles me.
2) I had always believed in the thought that pilots should gain as much experience as possible in light aircraft before transferring to large transports. I wonder how much of the copilots actions were ingrained because of too much time at the controls of Cessnas. Perhaps there is a point where it makes sense to leave light aviation early and focus on commercial flying techniques. This is a major reversal in my previous views on aviation training and one that I don’t make lightly.
3) It took me a little while to fathom why Airbus would have created a reduction in rudder pedal movement for a given rudder deflection after lift off but I can only assume it is to assist the pilot in the post V1 engine failure scenario. It does seem very poor that this information was not better relayed to operating crews during type conversion.
4) While not believed to be a contributory factor there is definitely a need to start utilising ultrasound in composite airframe component inspection. The documentary did start to annoy me a bit for the short period they seemed to be attacking the idea of using composites but lets not forget that Boeing have now adopted composites for fin designs themselves.
Mongu – You mention about Airbus using computers that could prevent pilots getting unruly with the controls, etc. This only came into effect with the A320 family onwards. The A300 and A310 are effectively Airbus’s attempt at creating their own 767 and are largely identical in technological status.
Regards
wys
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