Pontius NavI always wonder if the Lancaster sound track made it into the BoB film.
During the scene in “Belgium”, with aircraft trying to scramble but being bombed and blowing up as they taxied, we were orbiting in the Duxford overhead at about 1500 feet waiting IIRC the RAF Spit and Hurri to join with us for a display.
Pontius NavPontius NavLyffe, thanks for that. I have not ‘dated’ that part of the tale accurately but they had just converted from Halifax to Lancaster at Elsham Wold.
While the Research Branch (if they existed then) would have done much work a lot was also done on the sqns. I once found several pages of pencil notes working out bomb sight theory and sighting angle calculations. I passed them all to the RAF Museum as it was building up.
Pontius NavThey also did not seem to use minimum safety altitudes either,so many were lost descending through cloud into cumulus granitus.
Ah, that reminds me, Air Ministry Safety Height Procedures – the bicycle chain construction. It was really only useful in a slow moving aircraft as construction was not quick.
Anyone want me to try and repeat the procedure here?
Pontius NavBroadening the altitimeter/altitude debate, I read an account in a book today by a navigator on one of the first Oboe raids. What he said was quite simple but that belied the complexity of the attack. He wrote the book in 1956.
We know that Oboe Mosquitos flew along an Oboe beam until a pre-calculated release point determined by a UK based ground station and that the bombers dropped on the ground or sky marker as appropriate.
But . . .
That Oboe release point had to be pre-caluclated based on forecast winds and the Mosquito had to fly at a given height and airspeed. The first question therefore was whether the wind was updated in flight.
In his book Charnwood said they were briefed to fly at 23000 feet twice their normal altitude and at a precise speed and direction. Now this is what he did not say.
A bomb trajectory is horizontal at release and given sufficient altitude nearer verticle at impact. It can be said to follow an increasingly steep curve. Naturally the direction of the bomb fall line is such that the bomb hits the target.
For sky marking however the situation becomes dynamic.
First the marker must be dropped at an offset distance, allowing for wind drift, such that a bomb dropped from a greater altitude will pass through the marker and continue to hit the target. It is bit like walking past a dartboard as someone passes a circular disk in front of you. Your dart must pass through that disk en route to the bull.
The boffins, of Bomber Command Research Branch were still at it when they calculated our nuclear weapons release procedures too. Their work was effective in WW2 and we had faith in them for WW3 as well.
As a wg cdr said when I was at the Bombing School – welcome to the best sport in the world – visual darts from a mile or more high.
At the time he was right, later I found a better game. Throwing darts at a target you can’t see, and I don’t mean by radar. Dropping a torpedo on an evading submarine, and getting a ‘kill’ is far better fun.
Pontius NavIt would likely be a T7 or one of the early NF versions,I believe that other than the MB Meteors, the NF 14 was the only two seat type to have bang seats……but I could be wrong,maybe the technical minded among you could correct or confirm that one.:) 🙂
No bang seats in our NF14s.
Pontius Navto answer your question ‘Why are we still in the Falklands?’
Two reasons :
1) we have only been out of the islands for a short period in 1982 other than that we have maintained a military presence there since 1833. 2( the more important answer is that the Islanders want us to stay. As they put it the islands are commonwelth territory and that’s the way they want to stay.
In view of the second answer I’d say who are we to argue?
The answer, as usual, is probably a little deeper than that.
Initially, having won the islands back we saw an opportunity to sell licences to fish. To enforce licences you need a fisheries inspector.
Now, with the new UN rules on the extension of territorial waters based on the continental shelf, there is the potential oil revenue.
Argentina claims that the continental shelf is an extension of the South American mainland and this includes the undersea portions out beyond the Falklands. OTOH, as you might expect, HMG has a contrary view.
Pontius NavOn 23 Mar, post 98, I talked about how a Pop-Down attack had actually been practised in the 60s. I have just found, on the back of a Vulcan print the following (abridged) description of the Black Buck sortie which was actually a classic Hi-lo-Hi.
“We levelled at 300 feet over the moonlit sea and listened to the RWR buzzing . . . the RN battle fleet had found us and ‘locked-on’. We prayed they had received the signal announcing the intention of our attack.
Forty miles from the assumed position of the target, the aircraft was pulled into a full power clim to bombing altitude of 10,000 ft (the optimum altitude for a free-fall bomb to penetrate a runway and explode, creating a large crater).
Now selecte ‘on’, our radar took a while to stabilise, but soon confirmed the accuracy of our navigation and the target area identified.
Approaching the target, a lock-on from an enemy radar controlled ant-aircraft system was broken using active ECM, the bomb doors were opened and the bombs released.
After about 11 seconds holding the aircraft steady . . . all bombs had gone.
. . . now full power, hard left and climb for our next RV with another tanker.”
The attack was very similar to very similar to a 2G attack which had been on the books but never practised as the 8000 ft release was in the MEZ for the primary enemy SAM – the SA2 Guideline.
The 2G was just above the lower limit of the Calc 3 Ballistics computer – 7,200 feet and said to be above the light AA ceiling. It was of course suitable against NATO SHORADEZ but of course we were not going to attack a NATO armed country were we?
Pontius NavBomber Command and the Groups
Digressing somewhat, but until its disbandment in 1968 Bomber Command was a complete entity within itself. As well as an Air Staff it also had a complete P-staff (personnel) function.
Aircrew were posted from Flying Training Command to Bomber Command by the Air Secretary’s Department. This posting to Bomber Command was for a period of 5 years or 2 tours. It could of course be extended for 5 year periods and most aircrew were on commissions for up to 16-20 years only.
Bomber Command handled its officers’ careers with only a few high fliers ‘retained’ by the Air Sec although even so inter-command postings were relatively rare.
Equally operation liasion between Commands was also a rarity. On one exercise Bomber Command had to hire in Dan Air and BUA as Transport Command would not accord them the necessary priority.
Also there was no liasion between Bomber Command and Fighter Command over V-Force routing and air defence of the UK, at least as far as either fighter or bomber crews were concerned and I suspect even at higher levels there was no coordination.
In WW2 the same ‘boxed’ secrecy would probably have prevailed with night fighter intruder sqns being told only minimal information about the bomber force attacks.
Pontius Navthe Group HQs were themselves part of a chain, and their instructions/orders originated from HQ Bomber Command.
Your mention of pressure pattern flying and Coomand reminds me of a story, I don’t know whether it was a true story or an account but I have little doubt that there would have been an element of truth whatever.
The tale involved a Lancaster that returned to base early but without its bombs. IIRC it may also have suffered damage. There was an accusation of LMF and that the crew had simply left the bomber stream, jettisoned their bombs and returned home. I think this may have been before the target photographs were introduced.
The crew was grounded and the navigator sent to Command where he protested their innocence and said that they had lost so much fuel that they could not have flown the planned recovery route. He had got out the met sheets and realised that if they flew a longer track well to the north of the planned track they could fly around a low pressure area with a tail wind rather than the forecast headwind.
This they had done which both accounted for their early return and the fact that they had not enough fuel. Naturally, so the story went, this was seen as poppycock. However the CNO – the Command Navigation Officer was sufficiently intrigued that he called for the met forecasts for that night and reconstructed the mission. In his reworking he proved that indeed the navigator’s application of Buy Ballot’s Law would have enabled the crew to do what they claimed. The nav was exonerated and the crew reinstated.
Pontius NavFurther to the previous posts, I have found a book No Moon Tonight (1956) but reprinted more recently. The first raid covered was a Wellington raid on Bremen at 9000 feet.
This was based on a Group forecast that it would be below cloud (12500) above the light flak and below the heavy flak/fighters.
The point about pressure settings of course is that crews needed to know the height above ground rather than a standard setting as all the bombing calculations were based on true altitude.
The pressure setting at base would probably be as accurate a datum as any forecast over enemy territory.
Pontius NavThe question was asked earlier why some Javelins had flight refuelling probes. AFAIKR the probes were detachable and fitted for ferry flights. One Valiant could trail one Javelin from UK to Singapore in 4 hops. It would have been possible to tank a Javelin out in 2-days although 4 would have been the norm.
Unlike a Victor 1 trail which involved tanker-tanker top up etc before setting off the Valiant could do the whole on one tank of fuel. They may have had a reserve standing by but I am not sure about that.
Then which was better as a fighter?
In the Vulcan we could always win a turning fight against the Javelin by turning tight and climbing. I cannot remember a pairs attacks against us. OTOH the Sea Vixen was a different kettle of fish and against a pair very difficult.
I recall one exercise where we easily evade a pair of SV because of sloppy RT and laziness. As we turned towards one we heard “He’s turning towards my Cyril, you take him.” “OK Claude” or similar names. We reversed and they swapped too. We continued to weave and went right between the pair neither of whom made the turn.
Another incident was a trial of the ant-IR manoeuvre by the Vulcan. 300k 300ft, radar lock, chaff and IR fired, max angle climb, power off, 1000ft, roll hard through 90 deg, dive, 300ft reverse and resume original course and power back up.
Meanwhile lock broken, Sea Vixen 300ft, inverted, descending.
Immediately there followed a knock it off, endex, and a permanent ban on practicing that manoeuvre with a fighter in the 6 o’clock.:diablo:
Pontius NavAnd moments later a second story from one of my nav instructors:
“No strong memories but I am pretty certain the Bomber Force used a standard altimeter setting of 1013.2 mb’s except for take off and landing when, in the local area, the QFF would have been set. I don’t recall a regional pressure setting system. QNH, I think, was introduced post war and sparked off the QFF v QNH debate (QFF = barometric pressure at a stated place reduced to mean sea level; QNH = the pressure setting that causes the altimeter to read the height above mean sea level of the touchdown on landing plus the height of the altimeter above the ground – AP3340). To use other than a standard pressure setting would have led to chaos!
On operations height and time separation were used to reduce the risk of collision. Heights to fly were planned at Group level and given to crews at briefing. They varied during a mission for tactical reasons. In my time, Oct 44 to May 45, maximum height was rarely used. A quick glance through some squadron operational records shows that bombing whilst on 106 Squadron (to Feb 45) was from as low as 4,500ft up to 21,000ft with around 12,000ft as most often.”
Pontius NavI got this question from a friend. I am seeking a definitive answer but first my own experience.
In the Varsity nav trainer the navigator’s altimeter did not have a sub scale setting. Instead it was set to zero on the ground and once we passed transition altitude we used a small knob to reset the altimeter to 1013. This was identified by a lubber line.
When we returned to base at the end of the sortie we left it on 1013. Naturally it would have been possible to reset to QFE by using pressure difference from 1013 times 30 but we were never taught that technique.
As for the earlier remark about resetting altimeters when crossing FIR boundaries, that is what you still do but for Regional Pressure Settings areas.
Now for some recollection from a WW2 navigator:
“Quick response from the top of my head. I did not keep a diary or make notes during the period or after, so it is a question of my general recollection which may be a little faulty after sixty-two years. I certainly always had a specific altitude specified at which the bombing run was to be made and always tried to accomplish a steady run-up and release at the given level regardless of the temptation at times to deviate. We took a string of photgraphs, of course, which recorded the altitude and heading throughout the run-up and release and after, and these could be seen on debriefing to assess the result of each aircraft’s attack.
I do not have any special memory of the altimeter settings used in the stream. Of course our attacks were organised by bomber groups, my group being 3 Group. Therefore our squadrons in a particular part of the stream would be based in a relatively small, flat part of the country and our altimeter settings would not affect our relative altitudes to any great amount whether set to show zero or height above MSL on landing at home base. Nor would the barometric pressure vary much in the groups base area at any given time. I think we probably were given a QFE to use when cleared for approach and landing on return to base.There are people who either remember events very well or did make notes at the time who have written fairly detailed account of squadron life who might be able to answer this question better than I can.”
So from this recollection groups of bombers may have been on the same pressure setting but different from other groups. As someone said, the return route was side stepped from the outbound. Furthermore it would have been plain stupid to fly on a fixed pressure setting like 1013 and at fixed levels as in the quadrantal system. Flying predetermined heights on the base or group setting on the other hand would have avoided confliction in the immediate target area.
As for flying as high as possible, this was covered in Bomber by Len Deighton with Alf Price as a researcher. Here, IIRC, some pilots would claw a few more feet altitude by dropping the flaps and jumping a couple of hundred feet at a time.
Pontius NavAt 10000 feet the release, allowing for stick length would have started at abou 2.85 miles until 2.15. Sandy’s 2 miles, more dramatic, would accord with the end of the bomb run.
The jamming suite consisted of 3 red Shrimp, one down in the L-band and the other 2 in E-F. Also an I-band jammer (AKA X-Band jammer). The latter had been fitted with an aft pointing aerial to jam fighter AI.
A later mod was to add a forward facing antenna.
A major threat at low level was the ZSU-23-4 with a J-Band Gundish radar. I do not know if the X-Band jammer had been modified to cover the J-band too. Another threat radar was the Superfeldermaus which was a Swiss I-Band gun radar. This would certainly have been jamable by the X-Band jammer. The jammer was state of the art when it was fitted in 1968.
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