UnicornI believe that the ROC defence establishment may want the Aegis / SPY / SM-3 combo to provide a level of additional balistic missile defence.
Unicorn
UnicornYou can find a lot of excellent images by surfing over to http://www.airliners.net and using their photo search function. They also upload military images.
More than a million images available.
Unicorn
UnicornShiplover, I love your work, the comparison drawings really help in comparing sizes of classes really well.
many thanks
Unicorn
UnicornUnfortunately I am now out of the service and have no access to the reports. I did read the reports on the two LSTs we acquired from the USN (and was there during their conversion) and the extent of the corrosion and emergent work was simply horrific.
One of my former CO’s was involved in the Tico inpections and it was he who passed on the info over a coffee a few years back.
He had been a part of the crew who commissioned Manoora and had been posted to her throughout the yard work so he spoke with some authority.
He is now posted to HMAS Stirling in WA so it will be a while before I see him to ask which one had been longtitudinally damaged.
Unicorn
UnicornWith regard to the option for the RN to lease Tico’s to cover until the Type 45’s came into service (this was quite a few years ago when the first five Tyco’s were still in operational service) a friend of mine was on exchange duty with the RN and working in the MOD.
He said that the proposal was very attractive to the RN, but British industry was adament that the RN would NEVER operate aegis-equipped ships.
It was being commonly speculated in the MOD that if the RN got their hands on the Aegis / SPY / SM-2 combination, they would never go back to what was then seen as being significantly inferior offerings from British industry.
Probably not totally true, but it has enough elements of truth in it to make me believe there may be something in it.
Unicorn
UnicornThey were offered to the Royal Australian Navy as an interim measure to cover the gap until the Air Warfare Destroyer enters service.
However the RAN has its own institutional memory of trying to operate ex-USN ships that were in bad shape when they were mothballed, and then left to deteriorate (the current HMA Ships Manoora and Kanimbla cost a not-so-small fortune to return to seaworthy state when they were acquired from the USN, leading to significant cost overruns on the project).
Reports from the RAN surveying teams who examined all five vessels apparently pointed out many significant areas that would require major repairs and refitting to bring them back into service, including structural rust and corrosion, metal fatigue in structural members, one ship suffering from hogging, another had developed a twist in the hull along the long axis, internal compartments on one ship had been flooded from a burst water hose and had been left sealed, not repaired, resulting in significant electrical system damage.
In addition much of the SPY system and the CIC electronics had been scavanged to maintain other ships in the class in operation.
The result was the RAN decided that the costs involved, and more importantly the time required to return them to service (a minimum of at least 12 months+ per vessel, not including emergent work of which much was expected to be found) made them a very poor option.
UnicornIndeed, the additional costs of nuclear propulsion over gas turbines is one that the USN was careful to keep quiet about when building the California’s and Virginia’s.
Much can be inferred from the fact that when the Ticonderoga class were being contemplated it came down to nukes = no ships built vs gas turbines = class built.
Unicorn
UnicornGerald Ford is not such a bad name from some angles. Ford was a US Navy officer during WW2.
From the Wikipedia entry covering the relevent period
Ford received a commission as ensign in the U.S. Naval Reserve on 13 April 1942. On 20 April, he reported for active duty to the V-5 instructor school at Annapolis, Maryland. After one month of training, he went to Navy Preflight School in Chapel Hill, North Carolina, where he was one of 83 instructors and taught elementary seamanship, ordnance, gunnery, first aid, and military drill. In addition, he coached in all nine sports that were offered, but mostly in swimming, boxing and football. During the one year, he was at the Preflight School, he was promoted to Lieutenant Junior Grade on 2 June 1942, and to Lieutenant on March 1943.
Applying for sea duty, Ford was sent in May 1943 to the pre-commissioning detachment for a new small aircraft carrier, the USS Monterey, at New York Shipbuilding Corporation, Camden, New Jersey. From the ship’s commissioning on 17 June 1943 until the end of December 1944, Ford served as the assistant navigator, Athletic Officer, and antiaircraft battery officer on board the Monterey. While he was on board, the Monterey participated in many actions in the Pacific with the Third and Fifth Fleets during the fall of 1943 and in 1944. In 1943, the carrier helped secure Makin Island in the Gilberts, and participated in carrier strikes against Kavieng, New Ireland in 1943. During the spring of 1944, the Monterey supported landings at Kwajalein and Eniwetok and participated in carrier strikes in the Marianas, Western Carolines, and northern New Guinea, as well as in the Battle of Philippine Sea. After overhaul, from September to November 1944, aircraft from the Monterey launched strikes against Wake Island, participated in strikes in the Philippines and Ryukus, and supported the landings at Leyte and Mindoro.
Although the ship was not damaged by the Japanese forces, the Monterey was one of several ships damaged by the typhoon which hit Admiral William Halsey’s Third Fleet on 18-19 December 1944. The Third Fleet lost three destroyers and over 800 men during the typhoon. The Monterey was damaged by a fire, which was started by several of the ship’s aircraft tearing loose from their cables and colliding during the storm. During the storm, Ford narrowly missed being a casualty himself. After Ford left his battle station on the bridge of the ship in the early morning of 18 December, the ship rolled twenty-five degrees which caused Ford to lose his footing and slide toward the edge of the deck. The two inch steel ridge around the edge of the carrier slowed him enough so he could roll and twisted into the catwalk below the deck. As he later stated, “I was lucky; I could have easily gone overboard.”
After the fire, the Monterey was declared unfit for service and the crippled carrier reached Ulithi on 21 December before proceding across the Pacific to Bremerton, Washington where it underwent repairs. On Christmas Eve 1944 at Ulithi, Ford was detached from the ship and sent to the Athletic Department of the Navy Pre-Flight School, at Saint Mary’s College of California where he was assigned to the Athletic Department until April 1945. One of his duties was to coach football. From end of April 1945 to January 1946, he was on the staff of the Naval Reserve Training Command, Naval Air Station, Glenview, Illinois as the Staff Physical and Military Training Officer. On 3 October 1945, he was promoted to Lieutenant Commander. In January 1946, he was sent to the Separation Center, Great Lakes, Illinois to be processed out. He was released from active duty under honorable conditions on 23 February 1946. On 28 June 1963, the Secretary of the Navy accepted Ford’s resignation from the Naval Reserve.
For his naval service, Gerald Ford earned the Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Medal with nine engagement stars for operations in the Gilbert Islands, Bismark Archipelego, Marshal Islands, Asiatic and Pacific carrier raids, Hollandia, Marianas, Western Carolines, Western New Guinea, and the Leyte Operation. He also received the Philippine Liberation with two bronze stars for Leyte and Mindoro, as well as the American Campaign and World War II Victory Medals.
Unicorn
UnicornHad the Argintine carrier not been on the fritz at the time, it would undoubtably have been send out as well.
I don’t know exactly where you got your info, but 25 de Mayo was at sea during the operations that saw the General Belgrano sunk.
She was located to the North-west of the RN task force and was preparing to launch a strike, however local conditions were highly atypical of the South Atlantic in winter, being almost completely windless that day.
De Mayo could not generate enough wind over the deck to allow her aged steam catapult to launch her fully laden A4s on the strike, and the attack was postponed till the following day when winds were expected to be high enough to allow a launch to take place.
The loss of the General Belgrano had a salutary lesson on the Argentinian Navy, the De Mayo was pulled right back to port and she remained there for the rest of the campaign.
Unicorn
UnicornI think the concensus we have here is that the SSK surfacing was a political, not a military manouver.
The militarily expedient thing to do is to sneak in, work out how to do so, then practice it again and again so you can do it time after time, for real if necessary.
The politically expedient thing seems to have occured here, with the SSK ordered to surface to try and convey a message to the US that they can approach that close and get away with it.
What exactly happened? We don’t know. As suggested there are some who would like to see a more hard ine approach taken between the two countries, by influential people in both countries.
Some in China wish to eventually make it do hard for the USN to challenge the PLAN and not intervene if China seeks to occupy Taiwan or expand into the Spratleys.
On the other hand the USN is the top dog and there are those who wish it to remain so, reminding the PLAN of that fact and reinforcing the perception that challenging the USN in a shooting war is mass suicide.
This incident needs to be examined in that light.
Unicorn
UnicornWell, Sweden is also a large country, with less then half the population of Australia (nearly 9 mill.) Despite that we have/or are still designing and producing every military gadget you can think of (except military jet engines (only producing) and AAM´s (co-producing ).
A small point that you seem to have overlooked is that Sweden is located close to a vast market for its goods and services, hundreds of millions of consumers and producers located a short drive or short ferry ride across the Baltic. That means the actual and opportunity costs for Swedish enterprises are vastly lower than for Australia and market access is both much cheaper and easier for the Swedes. It also means that a vast amount of economic activity is generated simply by geography.
Australia is so vast that driving from Sydney to Perth is like driving from Madrid to Moscow, or New York to Los Angeles, but there is almost nothing to support human life for much of that vast area. It is then thousands of miles from the northern part of Australia to the main Asian markets, and another 8-10 thousand miles beyond that to Europe.
What this means is that Australia has has had to overcome a vast tyranny of distance, which has proven to be a significant economic burdon, hampering the ability of Australian companies to compete on a world scale until the last 25 or so years, as the telecommunications revolution has shrunk the world.
Since then, Australian companies have been able to compete on a much more level playing field, allowing the most competitive Australian companies to compete on the world economic stage, hence News Limited, BHP, Westfield and so forth, all global heavyweight players in their fields. This was simply not possible before.
The reason for this economics lesson is to explain why Sweden and Australia have vastly different arms industries.
Sweden makes equipment which is designed for its environment and which is built by companies which can take advantage of Sweden’s closeness to natural markets (SAAB for example builds cars for the local market which include Europe and this helps subsidise the operations of SAAB’s aircraft business).
Australia lacks that advantage, and furthermore is restricted by the extremes of distance and climate. That means that equipment designed for the European environment is often unsuitable for Australian conditions and requires significant modification.
An example is the RAN’s Anzac class frigates, a MEKO 200 variant, it has the lonngest range of any of the family, prcisely because it may be thousands of nautical miles voyage to reach an operational area, whereas the European navies operating the Meko do not need the same range.
The Collins was derived from a Swedish design, however that design needed significant modifications to enable it to meet Australia’s critical operational requirements, which demanded a range and size unparralleled by the Swedish Navy, which does not face the same requirements.
Thus Sweden or Gemany can sell submarines that meet their national requirements to Norway or Finland or Italy or Greece or Portugal, who have very similar operational requirements, whereas there are only a very few navies in the world who require a submarine with the capabilities that the RAN require.
All of this is a roundabout way of saying your comparison is completely erronious, as you are comparing apples and oranges, and then saying that Sweden is a better orange.
Australia is completely different from Sweden, and meaningless comparisons do you no benefit.
unicorn
UnicornI agree that the RAN buying three or four of the last batch of Arleigh Burke class destroyers would have resulted in their receiving the ships faster and cheaper, however as Stingray points out, the through life costs are the killer.
If Australia can develp and maintain the capability to build and upgrade surface ships in country, it will mean significant cost benefits over the life of type for each system.
It also keeps open the possibility of developing indigenous capability in specific areas and being able to integrate them in upgrades and refits, something much harder when you buy off the shelf with no understanding of the build process.
For example it may be possible to envision the RAN seeking to fit CEA’s CEA-FAR phased array radar system to the AWD and other combatants in the future, which would probably not be possible if the expertise in system integration was not developed in country.
Buying off the shelf is often the quick and cheapest option in the short run, but you often end up paying a lot more over the long haul.
Unicorn
UnicornI agree that unless the RAN starts long lead design work for the Collins replacement the skills and capabilities will be lost.
ASC has won the contract to build the three Hobart class Air Warfare Destroyers, but the skills required are quite different.
Taiwan apparently approached Australian Submarine Corporation to build Collins class for them, but nothing came of it (nor was it likely to).
Unicorn
UnicornMaskirovka, you may also want to look up the following before you make a fool of yourself;
Nulka
Jindalee
Metal Storm
Kalkara
Jindavik
Wundarra
Mulloka
HMAS Jervis Bay
Armidale Class patrol boats
Australia is a large country geographically, but only has 20 million people, spread across an area larger than (all of) Europe.
Australia will never be a major arms exporter, particularly of major stand-alone items such as destroyers or main battle tanks or fighters.
It’s capabilities lie in niche programs and systems optimised for use in Australia’s demanding environment.
It also has the capability to build systems designed elsewhere, such as the Oliver Hazard Perry frigates, the Collins class submarines and the Hobart class Air Warfare Destroyer. In most cases the end product is as good as anywhere (in the case of the OHP the two Australian built ships are substantially better than their US counterparts). Similarly the capabilities now inherent in HMA Ships Kanimbla & Manoora are light years ahead of what those vessels were capable of when they were in service in the USN.
Google and Wikopedia are excellent resources, try them.
Unicorn
UnicornNo, but you jumped to conclusions, which is ALWAYS a bad mistake on these forums.
People from all over the world and from all walks of life post here, so accusing someone you don’t know of being anti-something without any real proof to back it up simply makes you look like you have a chip on your shoulder.
Unicorn
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