@marcellogo

F-35 was not designed with interception missions … Interception and air superiority roles are a completely different scenario and would require a whole different plane layout

Of course, I’m well aware that it wasn’t designed for interceptor / air sovereignty missions. The point was that it nonetheless would carry out the role superbly, better than any other fighter on the market. It’s for two reasons;

(1) The ability to reach a genuine (not theoretical) mach 1.6 on clean load-out, and a sustained 1.2 mach on dry thrust for 250km. Very much unlike fourth-gen aircraft that are weighed down badly by hardpoints and external weapons / tanks

(2) Its exceptional AESA radar that can quickly de-conflict crowded air corridors, working in conjunction with DAS and EOTS to classify aircraft and perhaps even provide details intel (for example, if a plane has gone off course due to damaged aileron; the F-35 will be able to see that from 30 or 40 miles out using optical / IR). DAS and EOTS will also be able to provide high-quality IMINT to analysts back on the ground, for example if it’s an air sov mission over Estonia and the F-35 are intercepting Su-27 or Su-35; the DAS and EOTS will be running continuously hoovering up that IMINT for later consumption by hungry analysts at National Air and Space Intelligence Centre, painstakingly inspecting every rivet, every scratch, squeezing out every last droplet out of the rind. And of course the superb ESM system will allow it to efficiently “sniff” any radar the Su-27/35 emits if they are silly enough to turn it on.

(3) Communications technology. MADL really is the future, and it will allow those hungry NASIC analysts on the ground back at Wright-Patterson to receive the high quality IMINT / ELINT data extremely quickly after the event, perhaps even during the event (although I understand that’s not in the current block).

I wrote a little scenario that I believe shows off the versatility of the F-35 in the interceptor / air sov mission, but really it’s a demonstration of the extraordinary adaptability of the F-35. Those in the aviation field really need to be thinking about the future uses of aircraft, how the technology can be used in novel and unexpected ways. This is where the Russian air acquisition programme fails; they lack the technology to put this sort-of true next generation sensor fusion, content agnostic (Is it an AESA radar? Is it a comms transceiver array? Is it it a jammer? Could it be all three?), flexible network-centric model. Hence their obsession with thrust to weight ratios and maneuverability. Maneuverability means nothing if you get three Meteor missiles slam into left side, one after the other, because you didn’t realise that the faint emitter and erratic target you thought you were detecting in front of you (the LPI radar and F-35) was actually just baiting you and getting targeting data while he vectored his mates in on your flank using the MADL datalink. F-35s potential is only barely now being understood, so too the nature of modern warfare

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When I mentioned “interceptor”, I was using it in the sense most air forces use the designation (essentially officially tasked as air interceptor units, but in practice carrying out air sovereignty missions). For a country like Canada, the F-35 seems like the perfect all-rounder to contribute to any coalition, in any role (some better than others, in fairness), along with air sov missions at home where a clean config F-35, armed with maybe 2 x AIM-9X internal. One squadron in the east, one in the west.

Scenario: An unknown aircraft has flown into Canadian airspace, it is neither responding to ATC radio calls nor is it transmitting Mode C. The ATC radars are only getting intermittent locks. The commanding general orders an intercept and the F-35, on a 5 minute alert, roars off the runway. Within 90 seconds, it has climbed to 55,000 feet. It is receiving datalink information from ground radars and Canadian ATC providing a very clear air picture on the F-35 pilot’s screens, including identified civilian aircraft. The F-35 pilot is vectored into the last known location, about 100 miles north of the airport. He switches on his AN/APG-81 momentarily, on an LPI settting, as the F-35 fuses the radar data with the ground data, Mode C. The non-transmitting unknown aircraft now sticks out like a saw thumb and the pilot can use the flexibility of the F-35 cockpit interface to de-emphasise all confirmed civilian aircraft so he can concentrate on the unknown.

The brief burst of radar from the AN/APG-81 provided airspeed, altitude and heading information, permitting the DAS to note and mark the large infrared signature coming from the unknown aircraft, even if it’s only a blob of pixels right now. As the pilot doesn’t know what he’s dealing with, he proceeds cautiously as if it could have been a hostile fighter. The pilot uses the DAS data to fly a direct, rather than lead, intercept course. He would like to identify it but is still too far away. He descends to 32,000 feet, slows slightly and now at around 65 nautical miles out, he slaves the EOTS to the DAS-marked aircraft. With the high-fidelity IR camera in the EOTS, he gets a superb view of the unknown aircraft. It’s a Learjet, and he can see a stream of warm jet fuel trailing from one of its nacelles. This obviously being a civilian aircraft, he reports back to base and is ordered to proceed at full mach 1.6 to the aircraft.

When he arrives, he can see passengers in the window but they don’t seem to be responding. He moves up to the cockpit and waves but no response. As it’s getting darker / evening the pilot can’t rely on visual sight, and uses the EOTS to zoom in on the passengers faces. This is also being beamed back to the analysts working under the commanding general. The people look quite clearly dead. The conclusion from the analysts is that there was some kind of depressurisation, that the plane will crash soon when it runs out of fuel but that it can be brought down safely now in this very remote region the aircraft is flying over.

The order is given, but not before additional intelligence is gathered. Using remote control capabilities, one of the Defence Intelligence CNE experts at air headquarters takes control of the MADL antenna array on the F-35 and uses it to scan for Wi-Fi signals from the plane. He can see that the aircraft’s wireless network is still active and onboard local network is still intact. They manage to get access to the WiFi system, router and IP logs. The officer, using the MADL as effectively a router in the air talking to the plane’s router, wirelessly downloads all data available on the network as it will include internet searches made by the passengers in their last moments, it may be useful and give clues during the investigation. Once completed, the F-35 is given the order and he moves back four or five miles. He then squeezes the trigger and an AIM-9X is loosed. It hits the back end of the plane, tearing off the tail and one of the nacelles entirely. The aircraft goes into a death spiral.

The DAS is maintaining visual contact on each of the major pieces (the fuselage, ripped off tail and nacelle). He follows the fuselage down until it hits the ground. He then uses his EOTS to record information about the crash site, and transmits the GPS co-ordinates back to base for the S&R helicopters to come. He then flies out to the other two pieces of wreckage, similarly using the EOTS to take imagery in the immediate aftermath of the crash, for later analysis, then providing the GPS co-ordinates.

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